

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-24

06 DECEMBER 1979

SUBJECT: EXECUTION OF RESCUE OPTION/TRAINING

1. FOR EXECUTION IN 8 DAYS (13/14 DEC) THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS ARE NEEDED TODAY:

A. 1730 LOCAL REQUEST 2ND ADG PREPARE FLIGHT PLANS FOR

~~E MC-130'S FROM [REDACTED]~~

B. 2300 LOCAL REQUEST 2ND ADG PREPARE FLIGHT PLANS FOR

~~E MC-130'S FROM [REDACTED]~~

2. TRAINING - NO TRAINING SCHEDULED FOR 6 DECEMBER 1979.

- ALL ELEMENTS CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE.
- AIR CREW TRAINING WILL RESUME ON 7 DECEMBER.
- FUTURE TRAINING FOR [SFOD-II] IN HOLD STATUS.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

EXEMPTED ON 17 Aug 92

REVIEWED BY DDD NMCC

CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] TO CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEW BY OADR

REMOVED FROM JS

pg 500

#523

Classified By ICS  
Declassified ON OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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04 DECEMBER 1979

SUBJECT: EXECUTION OF RESCUE OPTION/TRAINING

(c) 1. FOR EXECUTION IN 8 DAYS (11/12 DEC) THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS ARE NEEDED TODAY:

A. 1730 LOCAL REQUEST [2ND ADG] PREPARE FLIGHT PLANS FOR

E MC-130'S AT [REDACTED]

B. 2300 LOCAL REQUEST [2ND ADG] PREPARE FLIGHT PLANS FOR

E MC-130'S FROM HUMBURT [REDACTED]

(S) 2. TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS - YUMA PROVING GROUNDS 4 DEC 79.

A. DELTA - AM: TRAINING AT EMBASSY MOCK-UP;  
PM: PREPARATION FOR NIGHT REHEARSAL;  
REHEARSAL COMMENCES 1800MST.

B. MC-130: EXECUTE FUEL DROP IN CONJUNCTION WITH REHEARSAL WITH DELTA SUPPORT EXFILTRATION.

C. AC-130: DRY FIRE FOLLOWED BY REHEARSAL WITH DELTA.

D. HELICOPTERS: TRANSPORT DELTA; REHEARSE REFUELING, AND EXTRACTION.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EB 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
INITIATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. (29-DOWNGR TO CONFIDENTIAL)  
REVW ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM JS

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Classified By JS  
Declassified On OADR

STATUS REPORT

1. (U) (TS) Preparation for the actual operation continues. The six RH-53 helicopters have been flown from [redacted] to the KITTY HAWK. This movement was completed 281940Z NOV 79. [Four AC-130s are prepared for further deployment from [redacted] through [redacted] to [redacted] on order.] MC-130s at Hurlburt Field and [redacted] are prepared to deploy to [redacted] via intermediate base on order. [Delta] is continuing planning and rehearsing in accordance with available information. [Ranger's] staff is planning for mission to secure [redacted] (Manzariyeh Airfield).

2. (U) (TS) Additional training required includes a full rehearsal with [Delta] helicopters, MC-130s, AC-130s and [Rangers]. The training, originally scheduled for Sunday, is tentatively scheduled for Sunday and Monday, 2 - 3 Dec 79.

3. (U) (TS) Logistics preparation is continuing on schedule.

4. (U) (TS) Impacts of variance from basic plan:

- failure to conduct full rehearsal will impair task force efficiency
- lack of designated recovery sites impairs medical support planning
- the lack of in-country support assets continues to impose constraints on the operation

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMCC  
 DESL TEB DOWN TO CONFIDENTIAL  
 REVW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM JS

Classified By: JCS  
 Declassified ON: OADR

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281645EST Nov 79

(U) AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL FOR SPECIAL HELO OPERATIONS

1. In order to continue operations at present or future sites, two additional skills/personnel are required to present force.

- a. Hydraulic Man (AMH - 1 or 2) CDI Qualified
- b. Electrician (AE - 1 or 2) CDI Qualified

Two individuals known to be qualified are in the parent organization of the Marine personnel. If available, the operators desire to have:

- a. [REDACTED] HMH - 461, MAG-26
- b. [REDACTED] HMH - 461, MAG-26

2. In the event the helo unit relocates to another site with borrowed aircraft to continue training over a five day period, the following additional personnel will be required for the training period only.

- a. ONE AE Avionics Man
- b. ONE AMH Hydraulic Man
- c. ONE AMS Structure Mechanic CDI Qualified
- d. ONE PR Parachute Rigger CDI Qualified
- e. FOUR AD H-53 Mechanic

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I-29

7  
RICE BOWL / SNOWBIRD  
REVIEW

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ID 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC

DECLASSIFIED TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

① FINAL ESTIMATES

① 24 APRIL LOCATIONS

① DISPERSION ACTIVITIES

① MOVEMENT REVIEW

① OBSERVATIONS.....

FINAL ESTIMATES

18 MAR

(J-2)

[REDACTED]  
(2ND FLOOR - BASEMENT)

IN CHANCERY

6 - 7 APR (J-2)

[REDACTED]  
(2ND FLOOR - BASEMENT)

- MOST IN CHANCERY

11-14 APR

[REDACTED]

18 APR

(J-2)

[REDACTED]

- ALL/MOST IN

CHANCERY, SOME AMB RES.

20 APR

(J-2)

- IMPLICATIONS: "ALL" IN CHANCERY  
CAUTION: ON OTHER LOCATIONS

23 APR

[REDACTED]

23 APR

[REDACTED]

24 APR

[REDACTED]

24 APR  
(FINAL)

(J-2)

- FRAGMENTARY, SEPARATE, UNKNOWN RELIABILITY  
- CHANCERY, AMB RES, STAFF COTT, COMMISSARY  
- "WARNING" - INFO WILL BE DATED BY OPS TIME.

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STATUS REPORT

1. (S) (TS) Preparation for the actual operation continues. Six RH-53 helicopters are aboard the KITTY HAWK which is en route to a MODLOC position in the Indian Ocean. Four [redacted] are prepared for further deployment from [redacted] through [redacted] to [redacted] on order. MC-130s at Hurlburt Field and [redacted] are prepared to deploy to [redacted] via intermediate base on order. [Delta] is continuing training and rehearsing in accordance with available information. Ranger staff is planning for mission to [redacted].

2. (U) (TS) Additional training required includes a full rehearsal with [redacted] helicopters, MC-130s, [redacted] and Rangers. The decision has been made to conduct this additional training and rehearsal at the Yuma Proving Grounds. Movement to the exercise area was completed on 3 December 1979.

- a. JTF Forward [redacted] Delta and the helicopter crews are based at the Yuma Proving Grounds.
- b. Two MC-130's and one [redacted] are located at Davis Monthan AFB.
- c. [redacted] are conducting an air land assault exercise at Fort Benning.

3. (U) (TS) The training/rehearsal schedule is as follows:
- a. Monday - Unit functional training (3 Dec 79).
  - b. Tuesday - Full rehearsal (4 Dec 79).
  - c. Wednesday - Full rehearsal (5 Dec 79).
  - d. Thursday - Full rehearsal (if required) (6 Dec 79).

4. (U) (TS) Logistics preparation is continuing on schedule.

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 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
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 Declassified On: OADR

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I-#30

QUESTIONS

The series of unpredicted material failures raises several questions:

First was there a valid basis for the judgement that eight A/C were sufficient?

Second, what were the probabilities that the required number of mission capable helo's would remain operating at Desert One, the refueling site, and the helicopter hide-out?

Third, assuming that eight would provide a high probability for mission success, why were not more placed on board the ship and flown on the mission as additional insurance?

Fourth, what additional actions could have been taken to increase helicopter reliability?

Fifth, should an operations analyst or maintenance analyst have been able to predict the failures?

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indicate that the seven aircraft that were operational during this period experienced a pre-flight abort rate of 6.3 per 100 flights and an in-flight abort rate of 3.8 per 100 hours. These numbers are not statistically different from the fleet data, therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, the fleet data, based on a significantly larger size, will be used.

Third, each abort experienced aboard the NIMITZ during the above forty-five day period was investigated to determine if the failure would cause abort during execution of this particular high priority mission. Of these 13 pre-flight and in-flight aborts, 6 were determined to be associated with equipment which would not compromise flight safety or mission success. Therefore, a derived "combat" preflight abort rate of 3.8% and an in-flight abort rate of 1.9% was computed. In the subsequent analyses these abort rates will be referred to as "combat" rates while the 18 month fleet rates will be referred to as "peactime" rates.

To address the first three questions above, four statistical methods were used. The first approach involved computing the expected numbers of aircraft available at various points in the mission using the two abort rates cited above (Chart 1). Given 8 aircraft on board the NIMITZ and utilizing the combat abort rates, the planner could expect to have seven mission capable aircraft arrive at Desert One and six complete the mission at [Manzariyeh]. Using the higher peactime abort rates, the planner could expect to have six mission capable aircraft at Desert One

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and five at Manzariyeh. The addition of one more aircraft onboard the NIMITZ would not significantly change the expected numbers of aircraft available at either point because the numbers of aircrews available constrains the expected numbers of aircraft at take-off to eight. If, on the other hand, 9 crews and 9 aircraft were available each of the expected numbers of available would be increased by a factor of 1.

The second method (Chart 2) involved determining probabilities that 5 helicopters would be available at the completion of the mission at Manzariyeh given various numbers available for launch at the NIMITZ (assumes crews available). With eight aircraft available, the probability of 5 completing the mission is 90% using combat criteria and 75% using peacetime abort rates. If the number available is increased to 9, the probabilities increase to 96% and 87% respectively. Similarly, if only 6 had been available, the probabilities of 5 completing the mission would have been reduced to 58% and 36%.

The third approach (Charts 3 and 4) involves computation of the probabilities that 5 mission capable RH-53D's would arrive at the hide-site given that either 8 or 7 (mission abort criteria) actually take-off from the NIMITZ. Given 8 take-off, the planner would have a confidence range of 87% (peacetime) and 98% (combat) that 5 mission capable

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RH-53D's would arrive at the hide-site if the mission went according to schedule. The 90 minute delay experienced on the mission would reduce this range to 78% (peacetime) to 96% (combat). If only 7 had launched on the mission, there would have been a confidence level of 85% to 92% that at least 5 mission capable helicopters would arrive at the hide-site.

Chart 4 can also be used to derive expectations subsequent to the abort of one aircraft. For example: If 8 aircraft are airborne and one aborts with six hours remaining on the mission, the planner still has an 86% to 96% expectation that at least 5 will complete that mission.

The fourth methodology (Chart 5) involved determining the probabilities of having at least 5 mission capable helicopters arrive at Manazariyeh given 6 or 5 depart Desert One. If 6 depart Desert One, There would be a 79% to 86% probability that at least 5 would complete the rescue mission. If only 5 were launched the probability range decreased to 37% to 56% that all 5 would complete the operation.

Based on analysis of the available RH-53D abort data, it can be concluded that there was a valid basis for the judgement that eight aircraft were sufficient to complete the mission. One additional aircraft onboard the NIMITZ would not have significantly affected the probabilities



unless manned by a qualified crew.

The analyses of the available data would indicate that with 8 aircraft launching from the NIMITZ, there was an 86% to 96% (combat) probability that at least 6 mission capable helicopters would depart Desert One and an 86-98% probability that at least 5 would arrive at the hide-out site.

In assessing the failures that occurred during the mission, there are no identifiable additional maintenance actions which could have been taken which would have precluded the failures. Those unique actions which were taken (i.e., removal of dust screens, inspection of hydraulic pumps, premature replacement of time-change items, etc) had no identifiable adverse impact on the mission. Using the most optimistic pre-flight abort data (combat) there would be a 73% probability of all 8 RH-53D's taking off. The fact that all 8 RH-53D's did take off and fly for two hours attests to the maintenance effort expended toward the success of the mission.

From a purely analytical perspective, it would be highly improbable that an operations or maintenance analyst could, with any degree of confidence, predict either the types or numbers of failures encountered on this mission. In addition, the analyst cannot predict the synergistic effects of unrelated events and the ultimate outcome on the mission. For example, with respect to Helo #5, TACAN failure did not

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cause the abort. Flight instrument failure did not cause the abort. The reduced visibility did not cause the abort. Loss of visual contact with the flight did not cause the abort. Taken independently, each of these events had a low probability of occurrence. In fact, had any of these events not occurred, there is evidence that Helo #5 would have continued on the mission, arrived at Desert One with a mission capable aircraft thereby validating analytical predictions. Taken collectively, they caused a prudent decision to abort this flight and a subsequent mission abort.

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To insure a high degree of mission success it was determined that five operational helicopters would be required to extract the former hostages and rescue forces from the two helicopters landing zones (HLZ) in Tehran. This number was based on the numbers of people to be lifted and the lift capabilities of the RH-53's given the probable temperatures and density altitudes in Tehran during this timeframe. There was an alternative plan to be employed should there have been less than five available RH-53D's available for the extraction. However, this entailed refueling one or more RH-53D's at Manzariyeh and returning to the HLZ to extract the remaining personnel. Because this action would take in excess of one hour, it would have placed those remaining at the HLZ at extreme risk.

Given the requirement to have five operational helicopters for the extraction, it became necessary to examine RH-53D abort data to determine aircraft reliability and mission requirements at various stages of the operations. Three sets of failure data are available.

First, pre-flight and in-flight abort data for the entire fleet of 30 RH-53's for the period of 1 July 1978 through 31 December 1979 was examined. It was determined that there had been an average of 6.3 pre take-off aborts per 100 flights and 3.3 in-flight aborts per 100 flight hours.


Second, maintenance records from the NIMITZ for the forty-five days immediately prior to mission execution

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CHART 1. EXPECTED NUMBER OF RH-53D'S MISSION CAPABLE AS A FUNCTION OF TIME, GIVEN 8 PROGRAMMED FOR LAUNCH ( $E[x/\theta]$ )



PLANNED RH-53 CHRONOLOGY

- A - CROSS COAST
- B - ARRIVE DESERT ONE
- C - DEPART DESERT ONE
- D - ARRIVE DROP OFF
- E - DEPART DROP OFF
- F - ARRIVE HIDE OUT
- G - ARRIVE HLZ
- H - DEPART HLZ
- I - ARRIVE MANZARIYEH

11. (C)

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PURPOSE: The purpose of this figure is to show the expected number of RH-53D's to arrive Manzariyeh and intermediate points, given eight are available and programmed to depart the NIMITZ. For this figure, expected number is a mathematical expectation based on the probability that an event will occur. Given the probability data is valid, the decisionmaker can have a high degree of confidence that at least the expected number will occur.

BASIS FOR COMPUTATION: Three inflight abort rates are available to determine attrition during flight. First, the actual in-flight abort rate for the entire USN RH-53D fleet of 30 helicopters for an 18 month period (3.3 per 100 flight hours); Second, the actual abort rate experienced by the seven flyable RH-53D's on the NIMITZ (3.8 per 100 hours); and Third, a derived "combat" abort rate (1.9 per 100 hours) which eliminated those aborts from the NIMITZ which would probably not have caused an abort during this mission (similar data was not available for the entire fleet). The actual fleet experience was considered to be a more valid rate for computational purposes from a statistical standpoint. Thus, two curves are presented. The combat curve represents a "best" case (1.9 aborts per 100 hrs) and the peacetime curve (3.3 aborts per 100 hrs) depicts the "worst" case, statistically. The vertical distance between the curves provides the decision maker with a range of expectations of the number of aircraft available.

BASIC POINTS: The shaded area depicts the difference between the peacetime and combat abort criteria. For example, arriving Desert One (point B on the graph), the decisionmaker can expect to have more than seven RH-53D's operational when applying combat abort criteria, but less than seven with peacetime criteria. If the mission is flown on time to Manzariyeh, you could expect better than six aircraft combat operational when the mission was complete.

The three rectangles on the graph depict the times at which numbers 6, 5 and 2 RH-53D's aborted the mission. The actual combat inflight abort rate for the mission RH-53D's was better than six aborts per 100 flight hours. The actual results far exceeded the historical and predicted abort rates and, thus, the expected number of combat operational RH-53D's.

Had it been known that the actual in-flight abort rate would be greater than six per 100 flights, 11 RH-53D's would have been required at the NIMITZ to insure you could expect better than five aircraft operational at Manzariyeh. 11 aircraft at the NIMITZ would provide a more than 70% expectation that five helos are combat operational at Manzariyeh.



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PURPOSE: The purpose of this figure is to provide the COMJTF and staff with a measure of RH-53D mission completion. It was identified prior to mission launch that five RH-53D's were required at the American Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs to extract the former hostages and rescue team. Depicted in the bar graph is the probability that five RH-53D's remain operational at Manzariyeh. Alternative numbers of RH-53D's available to launch from the NIMITZ are shown to depict the differing probabilities when considering more or less than eight.

BASIS FOR COMPUTATION: Three inflight abort rates are available to determine attrition during flight. First, the actual in-flight abort rate for the entire USN RH-53D fleet of 30 helicopters for an 18 month period (3.3 per 100 flight hours); Second, the actual abort rate experienced by the seven flyable RH-53D's on the NIMITZ (3.8 per 100 hours); and Third, a derived "combat" abort rate (1.9 per 100 hours) which eliminated those aborts from the NIMITZ which would probably not have caused an abort during this mission (similar data was not available for the entire fleet). The actual fleet experience was considered to be a more valid rate for computational purposes from a statistical standpoint. Thus, two curves are presented. The combat curve represents a "best" case (1.9 aborts per 100 hrs) and the peacetime curve (3.3 aborts per 100 hrs) depicts the "worst" case, statistically. The vertical distance between the curves provides the decision maker with a range of expectations of having five, or more, RH-53's mission capable at any point during the mission based on elapsed time.

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BASIC POINT: The bargraph shows that if only six aircraft were available for launch from the NIMITZ, the probability of five combat operational RH-53D's reaching Manzariyeh is 58%. However, if the actual abort rate actually falls to the peacetime level, the probability of five is only 35%. For eight aircraft available on the NIMITZ, the probability of five combat operational at Manzariyeh is 90% and 75% peacetime operational.

The actual inflight abort rate for the RH-53D's was greater than six per 100 flight. Using that actual abort rate for the eight aircraft available on the NIMITZ, the probability of five combat operational at Manzariyeh is 19%.

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32A15



PURPOSE: The purpose of this figure is to identify for COMJTF and staff the probability of at least 5 RH-53D's arriving a destination (Iranian coast, Desert One, hide out), given eight RH-53D's actually took off from the NIMITZ (i.e. the actual event on 24 April 1980).

BASIS FOR COMPUTATION: Three inflight abort rates are available to determine attrition during flight. First, the actual in-flight abort rate for the entire USN RH-53D fleet of 30 helicopters for an 18 month period (3.3 per 100 flight hours); Second, the actual abort rate experienced by the seven flyable RH-53s on the NIMITZ (3.8 per 100 hours); and Third, a derived "combat" abort rate (1.9 per 100 hours) which eliminated those aborts from the NIMITZ which would probably not have caused an abort during this mission (similar data was not available for the entire fleet). The actual fleet experience was considered to be a more valid rate for computational purposes from a statistical standpoint. Thus, two curves are presented. The combat curve represents a "best" case (1.9 aborts per 100 hrs) and the peacetime curve (3.3 aborts per 100 hrs) depicts the "worst" case, statistically. The vertical distance between the curves provides the decision maker with a range of expectations of having five, or more, RH-53's mission capable at any point during the mission based on elapsed time.

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BASIC POINT: The table in the lower right hand corner of the figure gives the probability of take-off given eight RH-53D's are available. There was a 73% probability that eight combat operation aircraft would take-off - all eight in fact did. The probability curves then show that, once eight took off, there was a 99% probability at least five combat operational aircraft would arrive Desert One and a 98% probability that at least five would arrive the hide out. Even if the mission operational time to the hide out slipped from approximately eight to ten hours, the probability of at least five combat operational aircraft remained above 90%.


However, given the actual abort rate was greater than six, the probability that at least five operational aircraft would arrive Desert One and the hide out are 37% and 36% respectively.

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32A17

CHART 4. PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST 5 RH-53D'S ARRIVE AT A DESTINATION  
FUNCTION OF TIME, GIVEN 7 TAKE-OFF



PLANNED RH-53 CHRONOLOGY

- A - CROSS COAST
- B - ARRIVE DESERT ONE
- C - DEPART DESERT ONE
- D - ARRIVE DROP-OFF
- E - DEPART DROP-OFF
- F - ARRIVE HIDE OUT

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PURPOSE: The purpose of this figure is to show the COMJTF and staff the effect of "what if" only seven helos took off from the NIMITZ or "what if" one helo aborted enroute to the hide out. The figure displays the probability that at least five RH-53D arrive at a destination, given seven RH-53D take-off from the NIMITZ or one aborts after eight take-off.

BASIS FOR COMPUTATION: Three inflight abort rates are available to determine attrition during flight. First, the actual in-flight abort rate for the entire USN RH-53D fleet of 30 helicopters for an 18 month period (3.3 per 100 flight hours); Second, the actual abort rate experienced by the seven flyable RH-53s on the NIMITZ (3.8 per 100 hours); and Third, a derived "combat" abort rate (1.9 per 100 hours) which eliminated those aborts from the NIMITZ which would probably not have caused an abort during this mission (similar data was not available for the entire fleet). The actual fleet experience was considered to be a more valid rate for computational purposes from a statistical standpoint. Thus, two curves are presented. The combat curve represents a "best" case (1.9 aborts per 100 hrs) and the peacetime curve (3.3 aborts per 100 hrs) depicts the "worst" case, statistically. The vertical distance between the curves provides the decision maker with a range of expectations of having five, or more, RH-53's mission capable at any point during the mission based on elapsed time.

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BASIC POINTS: The probability curves show that if seven instead of eight aircraft took off from the NIMITZ, the probability that at least five combat operational aircraft would arrive the hide out changes from 98% to 92%.

Suppose an RH-53D aborts after two hours (as did #6 helo) enroute to the hideout. This leaves seven helos with a planned time remaining of approximately six hours to the hide out. The figure shows that, given seven helos operational and six hours to go, the probability that at least five are operational at the hideout is 96%. The answer is obtained by starting at the origin and moving along the horizontal axis to 6 hours and then straight up to intersect the combat line which reads, with reference to the vertical axis, a probability of 96%.

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
32A19

CHART 5. PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST 5 RH-53'S ARRIVE ~~MANEUVER~~ ~~NEH~~  
 GIVEN 6 OR 5 DEPART DESERT ONE  
 $(P_{0-m}[5/x])$

$P_{0-m}[5/x]$   
 (%)

PLANNED RH-53 CHRONOLOGY

- D - ARRIVE DROP OFF
- E - DEPART DROP OFF
- F - ARRIVE / DEPART HIDE OUT
- G - ARRIVE HLE
- H - DEPART HLE
- I - ARRIVE MANEUVER



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PURPOSE: The purpose of this figure is to provide COMJTF and staff with an assessment of risk involved when departing Desert One with only six or five RH-53D's, given five are needed combat operational at Manzariyeh; The figure displays probabilities of having at least five RH-53D'S arrive ~~Manzariyeh~~ given six or five depart Desert One. Probabilities of arriving intermediate points are also displayed on the time line with alphabetic identifiers for significant events.

BASIS FOR COMPUTATION: Three inflight abort rates are available to determine attrition during flight. First, the actual in-flight abort rate for the entire USN RH-53D fleet of 30 helicopters for an 18 month period (3.3 per 100 flight hours); Second, the actual abort rate experienced by the seven flyable RH-53D's on the NIMITZ (3.8 per 100 hours); and Third, a derived "combat" abort rate (1.9 per 100 hours) which eliminated those aborts from the NIMITZ which would probably not have caused an abort during this mission (similar data was not available for the entire fleet). The actual fleet experience was considered to be a more valid rate for computational purposes from a statistical standpoint. Thus, two curves are presented. The combat curve represents a "best" case (1.9 aborts per 100 hrs) and the peacetime curve (3.3 aborts per 100 hrs) depicts the "worst" case, statistically. The vertical distance between the curves provides the decision maker with a range of expectations of having five, or more, RH-53's mission capable at any point during the mission based on elapsed time.

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BASIC POINTS: Given six RH-53D's takeoff from Desert One, there is an 86% probability that at least five will be combat operational at Manzariyeh. Given only five RH-53D's takeoff from Desert One, there is only a 56% probability that all five will be combat operational at Manzariyeh.

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(#31)

TOT 10402  
PB

RCR OSL AT 1337Z IMI OSL AT 1837Z AND READY FOR NEXT KK

SSH 0119  
O 230050Z APR 80  
FM COMJTF  
TO CJCS

BY  
T-SECRET  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] OVERFLIGHTS

TO PRECLUDE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES WITH [REDACTED] WHEN WE CONDUCT OUR FIRST CROSSING ON D-DAY ENROUTE TO (MANZARIYLN) SUGGEST [REDACTED] BE GRANTED AUTHORITY TO SAY SOMETHING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

FOR THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF [REDACTED], THE US HAS BEEN CONDUCTING SEA SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH C-130 A/C BASED IN THE REGION. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MOVING THEIR SHIPS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE UPPER PERSIAN GULF, AN OPTION WHICH I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED IS IN PROGRESS WOULD USE TANKER SUPPORTED C-130 A/C CROSSING [REDACTED] TO CONDUCT PRESENT SURVEILLANCE OF THESE SOVIET SHIPS. THE MOST EFFICIENT ROUTE TO THE WESTERN PERSIAN GULF AREA INVOLVES FLIGHTS ALONG A [REDACTED] PATH NEAR YOUR COUNTRY. THIS UNANTICIPATED MILITARY PLAN WITHIN US COMMAND AUTHORITY HAS PRECLUDED USE OF NORMAL CLEARANCE PROCEDURES. I EXPECT TO LEARN ADDITIONAL DETAILS IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS AND WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. "SECRET LATE NOTIFICATION."

THIS SHOULD BUY ENOUGH TIME TO GET BASIC MISSION UNDER WAY AND PRE-POSITIONED LETTER DELIVERED. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. VAUGHT SENDS.  
BT  
#0119

*Soviet  
Belong and the  
necessity to clear  
our military  
plan*  
~~13  
Air  
MAC~~

*This unanticipated Soviet military action and the necessity to clear our military plan.*

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12250  
EXEMPTED ON 12 Aug 92  
EXEMPTED BY DPO NMCC  
EXEMPTED BY-DESIGNER TO CONFIDENTIAL  
EXEMPTED BY OADR  
EXEMPTED BY JS

Classified By ~~JS~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT  
1-3  
E-3  
ON MASTER BOARD

I-32

750  
2200000 APR 60  
[REDACTED]

E-G  
E-G  
E-G

- 1. [REDACTED] NEED FOR A PROBABLE REQUIREMENT FOR [REDACTED] TO DELIVER [REDACTED] LETTER TO U.S. AMBASSADOR [REDACTED]
- 2. [REDACTED] LETTER, IF AUTHORIZED, WOULD BE DELIVERED BY [REDACTED]
- 3. [REDACTED] SHOULD PLAN TO DEPART [REDACTED] 25 APRIL AND BE IN PLACE [REDACTED] EVENING. YOU MAY WISH TO REQUEST [REDACTED] AIR FORCE [REDACTED] DESCRIPTION OR TIMING OF REQUEST.
- 4. YOU WILL RECEIVE MORE INFO LATER. LET ME KNOW IF YOU FORSEE PROBLEMS.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EB 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DEEL CDS DOWNGR TO CONFIDENTIAL  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 REVIEW FROM JS

Classified By: JCS  
 Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

33

TOT 10772  
RHA

SSN 0117  
O 230925Z APR 80  
FM COMJTF  
TO CJCS  
BT

(U)


~~SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF SENSITIVE LETTERS  
REFERENCE 211642Z MSG. SUBJECT SAME AS ABOVE  
BE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] ARRIVED AT JTF HQ  
AT 230600Z AND DELIVERED REFERENCED LETTERS  
BT  
#0117

UG

Classified By: ~~JCS~~  
Declassified On: ~~OADR~~

HNN

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR/19022

34

HSG #32  
DTG 211042Z APR 82  
FM: JTF [RC]  
TO: GEN VAUGHT  
GEN CAST

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: DELIVERY OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE LETTERS

MCN #49

A, E, G

(S) AIR CRAFT COS OF C-141 ARRIVING YOUR LOCATION  
030600Z APR FROM [REDACTED] WILL HAVE A PACKET TO BE HANDLED TO  
GEN VAUGHT, GEN CAST OR [REDACTED] LTRS TO BE DELIVERED TO THE  
CAPITALS OF [REDACTED] DETAILS FOLLOW. [REDACTED]  
BT

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DESL (ES) DOWN TO CONFIDENTIAL  
REVW ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM JS

Classified By: ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 #36

OSL DTC 230755Z AT 1320Z AND I HAVE ONE FOR U

TOR / 1325Z  
8C (MCN #0125)

MSG 00  
DTC 231245Z APR 82  
FM CJCS  
TO JTF CDR/SITE ALPHA

~~TOP SECRET~~

REF: YOUR 230558Z APR 82

ZE

1. WE HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT CONTACTING [REDACTED] REGARDING OVER-FLIGHT. FIRST, THEY MAY WELL DELAY APPROVING PENDING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THEIR GOVERNMENT. SECOND, IT IS VERY LIKELY TO ALERT THE ENTIRE NETWORK.

2. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD ADJUST SO THAT WE [AVOID RADAR COVERAGE] OR HAVE EXPOSURE AT A VERY MINIMUM.

3. SUGGEST YOU EXAMINE LOWERING OF ALTITUDE FOR MC 130 REFUELING. I AM SURE YOU ARE CONSIDERING ADJUSTING TIMING SLIGHTLY TO DECONFLICT MC130 AND AC130 REFUELING.

G

4. ALSO, GEN DONNALLY AND [REDACTED] SHOULD BE AWARE OF [RADAR] SITUATION AND BE READY, WITHOUT TIPPING HAND IN ANYWAY, TO COOL SITUATION IF NECESSARY.  
BT

NNNN

Classified By  
Declassified On

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~ADR~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 17 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL. ES-DOWNGR TO CONFIDENTIAL

REVISED ON OADR

DECL. FROM JS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~







SCNDAT TALON LOW LEVEL FLIGHT PLAN AND LOG										PILOT		NAVIGATOR		ACFT MDS		ACFT NO		T.O. WT		STATIONS		START ENDS		TAXI		T.O. P	
DATE	T.O.	A	L AND.	FROM	TO	30/30 MIN	10 MIN	5 MIN	3 MIN/5 D.	1 MIN	TOA	COORDINATES															
PT	DESCRIPTION	V NO	COORDINATES	ELEV	MSA	MC	ZONE DIST	ZONE TIME TOTAL	ETA	TC	W	V	VAR	NAV AID	RAD	R	DESCRIPTION	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	ELEV							
T	[REDACTED]				7100			5.0					2.5F														
	ESCAPE							3+59.2																			
T	12 #1																										
J	desert track				4000			6.4																			
V	Road INTX				9800			6.4					2.5E														
V	Road Bend				6000			4.2					2.5E														
W	3979'				7800			10.6					2.5E														
W	PEEK				2600			12.4					2.5E														
X	Bend in Stream				7200			17.9					2.0E														
X	PT of Land				3700			35.9					2.0E														
N	PT of Land				6000			10.5					2.0E														
N	Land				1800			40.4					2.0E														
M	PT of Land				1900			6.3					2.0E														
M	Land				1800			52.7					2.0E														
L	PT of Land				1900			2.3					2.0E														
L	Land				4500			55					2.0E														
R	PT of Land				1900			9.6					2.0E														
R	Land				4800			1109.6					2.0E														
J	PT of Land				3000			7.0					1.5E														
J	Land				10000			111.6					1.5E														
I	Road INTX				3900			9.					1.5E														
I	Road				0000			1420.6					1.5E														
H	INTX				1500			10.2					1.5E														
H	Stream				2500			1730.8					1.5E														
G	INTX				2200			19.0					1.0E														
G	Stream				0800			1749.8					1.0E														
F	Road				1900			4.5					1.0E														
F	INTX				2200			1754.3					1.0E														
E	Road/Stream				6900			16.2					1.0E														
E	INTX							2+10.5					1.0E														
D	PT of Land				3600			+5.2					1.0E														
D	Land				6110			2+15.7					1.0E														

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: J25/33 (A) (U) (S) (X) (Y) (Z) (AA) (AB) (AC) (AD) (AE) (AF) (AG) (AH) (AI) (AJ) (AK) (AL) (AM) (AN) (AO) (AP) (AQ) (AR) (AS) (AT) (AU) (AV) (AW) (AX) (AY) (AZ) (BA) (BB) (BC) (BD) (BE) (BF) (BG) (BH) (BI) (BJ) (BK) (BL) (BM) (BN) (BO) (BP) (BQ) (BR) (BS) (BT) (BU) (BV) (BW) (BX) (BY) (BZ) (CA) (CB) (CC) (CD) (CE) (CF) (CG) (CH) (CI) (CJ) (CK) (CL) (CM) (CN) (CO) (CP) (CQ) (CR) (CS) (CT) (CU) (CV) (CW) (CX) (CY) (CZ) (DA) (DB) (DC) (DD) (DE) (DF) (DG) (DH) (DI) (DJ) (DK) (DL) (DM) (DN) (DO) (DP) (DQ) (DR) (DS) (DT) (DU) (DV) (DW) (DX) (DY) (DZ) (EA) (EB) (EC) (ED) (EE) (EF) (EG) (EH) (EI) (EJ) (EK) (EL) (EM) (EN) (EO) (EP) (EQ) (ER) (ES) (ET) (EU) (EV) (EW) (EX) (EY) (EZ) (FA) (FB) (FC) (FD) (FE) (FF) (FG) (FH) (FI) (FJ) (FK) (FL) (FM) (FN) (FO) (FP) (FQ) (FR) (FS) (FT) (FU) (FV) (FW) (FX) (FY) (FZ) (GA) (GB) (GC) (GD) (GE) (GF) (GG) (GH) (GI) (GJ) (GK) (GL) (GM) (GN) (GO) (GP) (GQ) (GR) (GS) (GT) (GU) (GV) (GW) (GX) (GY) (GZ) (HA) (HB) (HC) (HD) (HE) (HF) (HG) (HH) (HI) (HJ) (HK) (HL) (HM) (HN) (HO) (HP) (HQ) (HR) (HS) (HT) (HU) (HV) (HW) (HX) (HY) (HZ) (IA) (IB) (IC) (ID) (IE) (IF) (IG) (IH) (II) (IJ) (IK) (IL) (IM) (IN) (IO) (IP) (IQ) (IR) (IS) (IT) (IU) (IV) (IW) (IX) (IY) (IZ) (JA) (JB) (JC) (JD) (JE) (JF) (JG) (JH) (JI) (JJ) (JK) (JL) (JM) (JN) (JO) (JP) (JQ) (JR) (JS) (JT) (JU) (JV) (JW) (JX) (JY) (JZ) (KA) (KB) (KC) (KD) (KE) (KF) (KG) (KH) (KI) (KJ) (KK) (KL) (KM) (KN) (KO) (KP) (KQ) (KR) (KS) (KT) (KU) (KV) (KW) (KX) (KY) (KZ) (LA) (LB) (LC) (LD) (LE) (LF) (LG) (LH) (LI) (LJ) (LK) (LL) (LM) (LN) (LO) (LP) (LQ) (LR) (LS) (LT) (LU) (LV) (LW) (LX) (LY) (LZ) (MA) (MB) (MC) (MD) (ME) (MF) (MG) (MH) (MI) (MJ) (MK) (ML) (MM) (MN) (MO) (MP) (MQ) (MR) (MS) (MT) (MU) (MV) (MW) (MX) (MY) (MZ) (NA) (NB) (NC) (ND) (NE) (NF) (NG) (NH) (NI) (NJ) (NK) (NL) (NM) (NN) (NO) (NP) (NQ) (NR) (NS) (NT) (NU) (NV) (NW) (NX) (NY) (NZ) (OA) (OB) (OC) (OD) (OE) (OF) (OG) (OH) (OI) (OJ) (OK) (OL) (OM) (ON) (OO) (OP) (OQ) (OR) (OS) (OT) (OU) (OV) (OW) (OX) (OY) (OZ) (PA) (PB) (PC) (PD) (PE) (PF) (PG) (PH) (PI) (PJ) (PK) (PL) (PM) (PN) (PO) (PP) (PQ) (PR) (PS) (PT) (PU) (PV) (PW) (PX) (PY) (PZ) (QA) (QB) (QC) (QD) (QE) (QF) (QG) (QH) (QI) (QJ) (QK) (QL) (QM) (QN) (QO) (QP) (QQ) (QR) (QS) (QT) (QU) (QV) (QW) (QX) (QY) (QZ) (RA) (RB) (RC) (RD) (RE) (RF) (RG) (RH) (RI) (RJ) (RK) (RL) (RM) (RN) (RO) (RP) (RQ) (RR) (RS) (RT) (RU) (RV) (RW) (RX) (RY) (RZ) (SA) (SB) (SC) (SD) (SE) (SF) (SG) (SH) (SI) (SJ) (SK) (SL) (SM) (SN) (SO) (SP) (SQ) (SR) (SS) (ST) (SU) (SV) (SW) (SX) (SY) (SZ) (TA) (TB) (TC) (TD) (TE) (TF) (TG) (TH) (TI) (TJ) (TK) (TL) (TM) (TN) (TO) (TP) (TQ) (TR) (TS) (TT) (TU) (TV) (TW) (TX) (TY) (TZ) (UA) (UB) (UC) (UD) (UE) (UF) (UG) (UH) (UI) (UJ) (UK) (UL) (UM) (UN) (UO) (UP) (UQ) (UR) (US) (UT) (UU) (UV) (UW) (UX) (UY) (UZ) (VA) (VB) (VC) (VD) (VE) (VF) (VG) (VH) (VI) (VJ) (VK) (VL) (VM) (VN) (VO) (VP) (VQ) (VR) (VS) (VT) (VU) (VV) (VW) (VX) (VY) (VZ) (WA) (WB) (WC) (WD) (WE) (WF) (WG) (WH) (WI) (WJ) (WK) (WL) (WM) (WN) (WO) (WP) (WQ) (WR) (WS) (WT) (WU) (WV) (WW) (WX) (WY) (WZ) (XA) (XB) (XC) (XD) (XE) (XF) (XG) (XH) (XI) (XJ) (XK) (XL) (XM) (XN) (XO) (XP) (XQ) (XR) (XS) (XT) (XU) (XV) (XW) (XX) (XY) (XZ) (YA) (YB) (YC) (YD) (YE) (YF) (YG) (YH) (YI) (YJ) (YK) (YL) (YM) (YN) (YO) (YP) (YQ) (YR) (YS) (YT) (YU) (YV) (YW) (YX) (YZ) (ZA) (ZB) (ZC) (ZD) (ZE) (ZF) (ZG) (ZH) (ZI) (ZJ) (ZK) (ZL) (ZM) (ZN) (ZO) (ZP) (ZQ) (ZR) (ZS) (ZT) (ZU) (ZV) (ZW) (ZX) (ZY) (ZZ)

EXTENDED BY: REASON:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAS CHECK		ZONE TIME BY	SIGNATURE OF NAVIGATOR
TIME	CORR		

C

A





ALASKA / VICTOR ROUTE

NIGHT 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# 010 P.2 of 8

SHEAT TALON LOW LEVEL FLIGHT PLAN AND LOG				PILOT	NAVIGATOR(S)				ACFT	MDS	ACFT NO.	T.O. WT	STATIONS	ST AT ENGE	TAXI	T.O. P
DATE	T.O.	A	LAND	FROM	TO				TO MIN	MIN	MIN	MIN	MIN	MIN	TOA	

PT	DESCRIPTION	V NO	COORDINATES	ELEV	MSA	MC	ZONE	ZONE TIMES TOTAL	ETA	ATA	TC	W	V	VAR	NAV AID	RAD DIST	R NO	DESCRIPTION	COORDINATES			
																			LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	ELEV	
	00							2+29.6														
	01							7.0														
	02							4.9														
	03							5.4														
	04							10.7														
	05							4.2														
	06							16.6														
	07							5.7														
	08							5+26.1														
	09							8.0														
	10							5+29.9														
	11							2.2														
	12							10.2														
	13							5+24.9														
	14							5.0														
								5+29.4														
								6.0														
								5+25.4														
								7.7														
								5+23.1														

REMARKS: NUMEROUS OIL WELLS (SOME UNLIGHTED) IN PERIOD FROM COAST-IN TO [REDACTED] TOTAL TIME FROM 110 TO [REDACTED] 5+53 HRS.

CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED] REVISED BY: [REDACTED] 29 NOV 1999

TAB CHECK: [REDACTED] ZONE TIME: 240/210 SIGNATURE OF NAVIGATOR: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A.







~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 of 10 P. 648

NIGHT 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

FLIGHT PLAN AND LOG

ACFT: AC-130E  
 MOD: F-105  
 ACFT NO: [REDACTED]  
 T.O. WT: [REDACTED]  
 STATIONS: [REDACTED]  
 START ENG: [REDACTED]  
 T.O. "V": [REDACTED]

DESCRIPTION	V NO	COORDINATES	ELEV	MBA		MC	ZONE DIST	ZONE TIMES TOTAL	ETA	TC	W	V	DC	VAR	NAV. AID	RAD. DIST	R NO	DESCRIPTION	COORDINATES			
				ESA	MSA														LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	ELEV	
[REDACTED]																			CENTER OF RWY	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
RR BRIDGE								3.6											RR BRIDGE	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
RD "Y"								9.9											MT. PEAK	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								13.5											RD BRIDGE	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								6.6											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								20.1											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								8.3											RD BRIDGE	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
STREAM INTO PT. ON POWER LINE								28.4											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
BEND IN RIVER								7.8											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								35.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
BRIDGE BEND IN CREEK								4.3											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								39.5											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								10.4											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
PT. OF LAND								49.9											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								5.1											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								55.0											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								4.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								59.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								4.7											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								103.9											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								6.7											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								1+10.6											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								2.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								1+12.8											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								9.0											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								1+21.8											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								2.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								1+25.0											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								4.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								1+29.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								8.5											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								1+38.0											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								6.2											[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								1+44.2											COASTAL PT. OF LAND	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

MARKS NUMERICAL OIL WEYS (SOME UNLIGHTED) IN PERSIAN GULF.  
 TO TIME @ [REDACTED] G.S. FROM [REDACTED] COAST-OUT = [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY: JES/J-3  
 DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION

TAS CHECK -- ZONE TIME: 240  
 TIME CORR SIGNATURE OF NAVIGATOR

OR REVIEW  
 IS: 29 NOV 1999

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(K)

A, E



G

A

EC 79 CASUALTIES

50

G

LOG

ASSUMES WILL GO

2030 - CTC

[REDACTED]

GAVE T/O TIME + DESTINATION  
Kelly & BROOK

2124 CPT.

[REDACTED]

SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE, DUTY OFFICER  
ASKED HIM CK IF BROOK AN KNOWS THEY  
ARE GOING TO RELIEVE THEM. TOLD HIM  
NC TO ARRIVE SAT. 1400 LOCAL.

G

2149 -

[REDACTED] ONLY ONE AT BROOK Med  
WHO KNOWS COL. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Coordinating Delivery.

2204

at Brook  
1 CAS GOING TO 375<sup>th</sup> MED AIRLIFT WING SCOTLAND

G

[MUST BE [REDACTED]] (sprained knee)  
COL. [REDACTED] KEEPING ALL QUIET, WILL MAKE  
NO ARRANGEMENTS PRIOR TO 2 HR BEFORE  
ARRIVAL, PLANS TO HAVE MP PROTECTED  
LAW EN. I TOLD HIM NO ONE AUTHORIZED TO  
DISCUSS OPN'L BE MATTERS w/PATIENTS UNLESS  
THEY CK THRU ME.

G

2256 Determined thru MAC that [REDACTED] WILL BE  
UNDER USAF CARE AT IN SAN ANTONIO

G

2312 - CONTACTED DR. [REDACTED]  
BRIEFED HIM ON SCTY REQ'TS. TOLD HIM NO OPN'L

Declassified by: DPO NMCC 12 Aug 92

DETAIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: [REDACTED] Declassified On: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


260850R MSG PASSED FM MAC (COL  
G [REDACTED]) CONCERNING PRES  
AT McGUIRE AND ARRIVAL  
OF CAS. A/C. J33 IS  
WORKING PROGRAM

260906R TELECOM W/ COL [REDACTED]  
G HE RECEIVED TELECOM  
G FM COL [REDACTED]  
DOD PA WHO STATED PRES  
COULD TAKE PICTURES OF  
CAS. AFTER DISCUSSION  
W/ J33 & J3 I ADVISED  
G COL [REDACTED] THAT THE  
G GUIDANCE FM COL [REDACTED]  
G WAS APPROVED. COL [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THEN ADVISED THE  
HOSPITAL POLICY, BASED O  
PRIV. ACT. PRECLUDED  
PHOTOS OF A WARB.

260930R BG TODD ASKED IF WE  
WERE PROVIDING THE STATE  
IRAN WORKING GROUP  
LOC (PROBABLE) OF BODIES NE  
G CONFIDENTIAL A/C - TOLD HIM YES [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

260930k



Mr Jerry DeKor, Brooks  
Med Ct (AV 471-2437/  
3038/3014) PAO was  
told - no interviews  
pictures OK if in good  
taste & do not violate  
hospital rules; i.e., not  
on wards.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

#51

MEMORANDUM

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR JTF

FACTS:

AG

~~WINGS~~ ~~WINGS~~ WILL CARRY ORGANIZATIONAL MEDICS.  
HELICOPTER + AIR CREWS CARRY ON [REDACTED]

C-141 [AT: [REDACTED]] WILL BE CONFIGURED FOR MED SPT

MATTRESSES FORWARD FOR EMERGENCY CARE  
MORQUE (CONCEALED) IN REAR

[REDACTED] WILL CARRY MEDICAL [REDACTED]

C-141 WILL CARRY CASUALTIES TO [REDACTED]

CASUALTIES WILL THROUGHPUT TO FRG [REDACTED]

C-141 CONFIGURED FOR MEDEVAC WILL BE PREPARED [REDACTED]

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Our records show there were 80  
USAF of all ranks (Col to Senior Airman)  
on the ground at Desert ONE. Of this  
number, ten or 12.5% (all enlisted)  
joined the AF after 1 January 1977.  
There are ~~875~~ were in service prior  
to 1 Jan 77.

~~SECRET~~









DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

I-55

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31018

CATION PROCESSING WILL TAKE PLACE.

3. (U) FOR MPCC, BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY A MORTUARY AFFAIRS TEAM, TO DOVER AFB UPON ALERT BY THIS OFFICE. TEAM SHOULD BE READY FOR SHORT-NOTICE DEPARTURE.

4. (U) ~~FOR~~ FOR MAC: REQUEST YOU A. PROVIDE MORTUARY FACILITIES AND SERVICES TO COMPLETE THE NECESSARY POST MORTEM EXAMS AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATIONS, B. ARRANGE BILLETING FOR THE MORTUARY AFFAIRS TEAM FROM AFMPC. CONTACT POINT AT AFMPC/MPCC IS MR. COURTNEY, AV 487-6459.

5. (U) THIS OFFICE IS AIR FORCE FOCAL POINT FOR THIS OPERATION. POINTS OF CONTACT ARE COL TAYLOR, LT COL MAYBURY, CMS MYERS, AV 225-0735. DECLASS 2 MAY 1984

BT

#7807

ANNOTES

GCH 861

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DAY	TEN DAY OPTION		PREPOSITIONING		COMPRESSED	
	DAILY	CUMULATIVE	DAILY	CUMULATIVE	DAILY	CUMULATIVE
D - 9						
D - 8			1/0	1/0		
D - 7			4/2	5/2		
D - 6	3/0	3/0	5/4	10/6		
D - 5	10/5	13/5			2/0	2/0
D - 4	9/5	22/10	8/5	18/11	12/6	14/6
D - 3	11/8	32/18	15/7	33/18	14/7	28/13
D - 2	4/2	36/20	4/2	37/20	10/8	38/21
D - 1	5/5	42/25	5/5	42/25	4/4	42/25

"D" DAY

NOTE: This is the planned approximate flow. Actual flow will be dependent upon lead time provided by decision to deploy.

LEGEND: Aircraft Landing At [REDACTED] Aircraft Remaining At [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL (23-DOWN) TO CONFID  
 REVW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM JS


Classified By JCS  
 Declassified ON OADR

	PRE POSITIONING		COMPRESSED			
	DAILY ①	CUMULATIVE ②	DAILY ③	CUMULATIVE ④	DAILY ⑤	CUMULATIVE ⑥
D-8			1/0	1/0		
D-7			4/2	5/2		
D-6	3/0	3/0	5/4	10/6		
D-5	10/5	13/5			2/0	2/0
D-4	9/5	22/10	8/5	18/11	12/6	14/6
D-3	11/8	32/18	15/7	33/18	4/7	28/13
D-2	4/2	36/20	4/2	37/20	10/8	32/21
D-1	5/5	42/25	5/5	42/25	4/4	42/25
D						

NOTE: THIS IS THE PLANNED APPROXIMATE FLOW. ACTUAL FLOW WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON LEAD TIME PROVIDED BY DECISION TO DEPLOY.

LEGEND:  
 AIRCRAFT LANDINGS AT [REDACTED] / AIRCRAFT REMAINING AT [REDACTED] E M

308  
1/22



I-66

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY / BUILD UP  
(7 DAY OPTION)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DAILY

CUMULATIVE

PREPOSITIONING

9/0

D-7

D-6

D-5

D-4

D-3

D-2

D-1

3/0

12/8

9/5

11/8

4/4

12/0

24/8

33/13

44/21

48/25

A

"D" DAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~


Classified by ~~JCS~~  
Declassified on ~~OADR~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EA 12258  
COMPLETED ON 12 Aug 92  
DECLASSIFIED BY DPO NMCC  
 DECL. RELATIVE TO CONFID  
REF BY OADR  
DERIVED FROM JS



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#68



A, E

S. 7  
2. 5

Classified By ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. RED. DOWN TO CONFID  
 REVW BY OADR  
 DERIVED FROM JS

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



AE, B

08

~~TOP SECRET~~




D - DAY "H" - HOUR \_\_\_ FEB 2200Z 1700 EST 0130 L IRAN

09

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69



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E

COLE  
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 72  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL (S) DOWNGR TO CONFID  
 REYN ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM JS

Classified By JCS  
 Declassified ON OADR

A E

(C)

DEPLOYMENT  
DECISION  
TRANSMITTED

3 PAC MC-130  
LAUNCH  
COMPLETION

		D(-) 9	D(-) 8	D(-) 7	D(-) 6
	26	27	28	29	MAR 1

LAUNCH  
3 PAC MC-130  
FROM

NOTE -- DEPLOYMENT REDUCED 31 HRS  
IF WESTWARD ROUTING  
USED OPSEC CONSIDERATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCDP0961  
JAN: 096-024125  
INPUT CDSH = DKA531  
TOR: 260712Z APR 80 TOT: 260740Z APR 80

AUTO\*\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

ACTION\*\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

INFO = DNCD(1)

ADDED DIST PER MR. GOOD CJCS

TOTAL COPIES = 00001  
RTR=23

INFO: J-3  
INFO: DJS

DAAMZYUW YHLHDR 4902 1170521-MNSH--YEKDH,  
ZNY MNSH  
ZKZK OO SOA DE  
O 260522Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF-6  
FM ADM LONG CINCPAC  
TO YDHANOC/GEN ALLEN, DCINCEUR  
INFO GEN JONES CJCS  
YDHODSC/GEN PAULY CINCUSAFE  
YEDADAC/GEN WARNER USCINCRED  
YDORONC/GEN ELLIS CINCSAC  
YDHAVSC/GEN ROGERS USCINCEUR  
YEDAHNC/GEN HUYSER CINCMAC  
YEKHRAC/GEN CREECH CINCAFRED  
YHLIAHC/LTGEN HUGHES CINCPACAF  
YDHODSC/BGEN SMITH USAF//322 ALD/MACE//  
YEKRASC [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

SUBJ: REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES (U)  
A. USEUCOM 260204Z APR 80 (PABEP)  
1. (U) CINCAC ASSUMES OPCOM OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT AT [REDACTED] EFFECTIVE 260600Z APR 80 AS REQUESTED REF A.  
2. (U) CINCACAF HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE TO ASSUME OPCOM OF ABOVE AIRCRAFT AND CONDUCT THEIR REDEPLOYMENT.  
REVW 26 APR 80

SSO NOTE: ACTION ADDEE: DELIVER UPON RECEIPT  
INFO ADDEE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.  
#4902

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CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. ES. DOWNGR TO CONFID  
REVW ON OADR  
SERVED FROM JS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~UNIDENTIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ 76

ORAN: 1350-13517  
INPT CDSN = UKA252  
OF: 20K3167 APR 80 TOT: 2693227 APR 80

AUTUMS UNASSIGNED \*\*  
ACTION UNASSIGNED \*\*  
INFO UNCO(1)

FLASH

ADDED DIST PER MR. GOOD CJCS

ACTION: J-3  
INFO: DJS

TOTAL COPIES = 4001  
RTB=25

ZTTMZYU YOMAND 0001 1170205-MNSH--YEKDDH  
ZNY MNSH  
ZK7K ZZ SCA DE  
Z 1260204Z APR 80 ZYM ZFF 386  
FM SSO USEUCOM  
TO AFSSO USAFE 77322 ALD/MACE//  
AFSSO USAFE//CAT//  
SSO REDCOM  
JCS  
CINCPAC  
INFO SYSEC SHAPE  
SSO MAC  
AFSSO TAC  
SSO SAC

E

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DELEGATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DESL TEL DOWN TO CONFID  
REVW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM JS

ZEX  
~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ VHM 2289 ECJ3  
AFSSO USAFE PASS TO 322 ALD//MACE//CC//  
PERSONAL FOR GEN PAULY, CINCSAFE; GEN WARNER, USCINCRD; GEN ELLIS,  
CINCSAC; GEN JONES, CJCS; ADM LONG, CINCPAC; BGEN SMITH, 322 ALD;  
[REDACTED] INFO GEN ROGERS, USCINCEUR; GEN HUYSER, CINCMAC; E, G  
GEN CREECH, CINCAFRED; FROM GEN ALLEN, DCINCEUR  
SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES (U)  
A. USEUCOM 172031Z APR 80  
B. JCS 171750Z APR 80  
C. JCS 252323Z APR 80  
1 (75/NT) REF A DIR CINCSAFE ASSUME OPCON OF DEPLOYING USCINCRD  
USAF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORT CONDUCT OF FLINTLOCK 80  
MARITIME SURVEILLANCE EXERCISES REF B DIR CINCPAC DEPLOY MC-130  
AIRCRAFT TO [REDACTED] IN SUPPORT OF MARITIME SURVEILLANCE EXERCISE.  
REF C DIRECTED USCINCEUR REDEPLOY AND CHOP CINCPAC AND USCINCRD

FLASH

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PAGE 2

FLASH

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT DURING THE PERIOD 26-28 APR 80.

- A. (U) ENEMY FORCES. NONE.
- B. (U) FRIENDLY FORCES.

- (1) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ CINCOSAC PROVIDES AERIAL REFUELING SUPPORT FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF USREDCOM AIRCRAFT.
- (2) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ CINCMAC PROVIDES AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT AS REQUESTED.

- (U) ~~(TS//NF)~~ MISSION. USEUCOM REDEPLOYS AND CHOPS SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATING IN THE MARITIME SURVEILLANCE SUB-EXERCISE OF JCRX FLINTLOCK 80.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

- A. ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ CONCEPT. DURING PERIOD 26-28 APRIL USEUCOM REDEPLOYS SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT TO HOME BASES IN COORDINATION WITH USREDCOM AND PACOM.

- B. (U) TASKS.

- (1) (U) CINCUSAFE.

- (A) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ IN COORDINATION WITH CINCAFRED, REDEPLOY USCINCRD SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT TO HOME BASES DURING PERIOD 26-28 APR 1980.

- (B) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ PASS OPCOM TO CINCAFRED AT 10 DEGREES WEST LONGITUDE AND TO CINCPAC AT 260600Z APR 80.

- (C) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ DIRLAUTH WITH CINCOSAC AND CINCMAC FOR AERIAL REFUELING AND AIRLIFT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

- (2) (U) USCINCRD.

- (A) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ REQUEST DIRECT CINCAFRED TO ASSUME MOVEMENT CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REDEPLOYING SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT FROM ~~██████████~~ TO CONUS HOME STATIONS.

- (U) (B) ~~(TS//NF)~~ INTEND PASS OPCOM AT 10 DEGREES WEST LATITUDE.

- (3) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ CINCPAC. REQUEST REDEPLOY SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT FROM ~~██████████~~ TO HOME STATIONS COMMENCING 26 APR 1980. TO FACILITATE REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING, REQUEST ASSUME OPCOM EFFECTIVE 260600Z APR 1980.

- (U) (4) ~~(U) (TS//NF)~~ CDR 322 ALD. PROVIDE AIRLIFT SUPPORT TO CINCUSAFE AS REQUESTED.

- C. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP USCINCEUR AND JCS INFORMED.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- A. (U) MOVEMENT PRIORITY: 1B2.

- B. (U) CINCUSAFE PROVIDES LOGISTICS/MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT BEYOND ORGANIC DEPLOYED CAPABILITY.

- C. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DEPLOYMENT IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AND BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF USEUCOM PAO.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- A. (U) COMMAND.

- (1) (U) USCINCEUR IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER.

- (2) (U) USCINCRD, CINCOSAC, AND CINCMAC ARE SUPPORTING

COMMANDERS.

- (3) (U) OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF RESPECTIVE DEPLOYING SPECIAL

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PAGE 3

OPERATIONS FORCES PASSES TO USCINCPAC AT 18 DEGREES WEST LONGITUDE  
AND TO CINCPAC AT 260000Z APR 80.

~~(U)~~ COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS; EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS  
ARE ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THIS DEPLOYMENT.

REVW 26 APR 2014

SSO NOTE: DELIVER UPON RECEIPT.

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EYES ONLY

#77

PAGE 1

J-3

ZCZCDP0957  
DANI 096-024245  
INPUT CDSN = KDA864  
TOR: 260739Z APR 88 TOT: 260739Z APR 88

AUTO\*\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

ACTION\*\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 08001  
RTR#23

ADDED DIST: PER MR GOOD CJCS

INFO: J-3  
INFO: DJS

ZTTMZYUW YEDADA 0515 1170735-MNSH--YEKDOA.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK ZZ SDA DE

Z O 260739Z APR 88 ZYM ZFF-386

FM AFSSO REDCOM

TO AFSSO TAC

INFO SSO USEUCOM

AFSSO USAFE//CAT//

AFSSO USAFE//322 ALD/MACE//

JCS

SSO CINCPAC

SYSEC SHAPE

SSO MAC

SSO SAC

JOC  
JE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL E2S DOWNGR TO CONFID

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS

ZEM

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

AFSSO USAFE PASS TO 322ALD//MACE//CC

PERSONAL FOR GEN CREECH, CINCAFREDI

INFO: GEN JONES, CJCS; GEN RODGERS, USCINCEUR; GEN ALLEN, DCINCEUR;

GEN ALLEN, CSAF; GEN ELLIS, CINCSAC; ADM LONG, CINCPAC; GEN PAULY,

CINCUSAFE; GEN HUYSER, CINCMAC; BGEN SMITH, 322 ALD

[REDACTED]

E

SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES CUS

A. JCS 252323Z APR 88 (NOTAL)

B. USEUCOM 260204Z APR 88

1. REF A REQUESTED USCINCEUR TO REDEPLOY AND CHOP USCINCREC  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT SO AS TO BEGIN RETURN TO HOME BASE  
26 - 28 APR 88; REQUESTED CINCSAC TO PROVIDE AERIAL REFUELING AS

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EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

MAY BE NEEDED AND CINCMAC TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT AS MAY BE NEEDED TO SUPPORT REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS. REFERENCE B IS USEUCOM TASKING MESSAGE FOR REDEPLOYMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR CHOP OF REDEPLOYING USCINCPAC FORCES AT 10 DEGREES WEST LONGITUDE AND REQUEST USCINCPAC ASSUME MOVEMENT CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REDEPLOYING SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT FROM [REDACTED] TO CONUS.

2. (U) TAKE REFERENCE B FOR ACTION. PROVIDE SCHEDULED AND ACTUAL MOVEMENT DATA TO USREDCOM. FOLLOWING EMERGENCY ACTION CENTER OFFICERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE MOVEMENT DATA AT SECURE DROP 141061 MAJ YOST, MAJ FLYNT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE UPON RECEIPT, TO INFO ADDRESSES DURING WAKING HOURS.

REVW 26 APR 2010

#0515

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EYES ONLY

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

ZCZCDP0887  
DANS: 001-024266  
T CDSN = DKA327  
271156Z APR 80 TOT: 271159Z APR 80

AUTO==\* UNASSIGNED \*  
ACTION==\* UNASSIGNED \*  
INFO= DNCO(1)  
TOTAL COPIES = 00001  
RTR=74

FLASH

~~EYES ONLY~~

R SOD  
J-3  
#78

1 Copy furnished Maj Joersz OPG

ZTYMZYUW YDHANO 0005 1180940-MORN--YEKDH,  
ZNY MMORN  
ZKZK ZZ SDA DE  
Z O 270937Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6  
FM SSO USEUCOM  
TO JCS//J3//  
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//  
AFSSO TAC//DO//  
SSO SAC//DO//

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DPO NMCC  
 DECL. (REL. DOWNGR. TO) CONFID  
REVISED ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM JS

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET NOFORN EYES ONLY~~ VHN 2296 ECJ3-CAT, SEC1 OF 2  
PERSONAL FOR(LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS,  
[REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER)

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM [E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP] 137 AS OF 270700Z APR 80  
(U)

A. SSO USEUCOM 261338Z APR 80, VHN 2293 (SITREP 136) (TS/NF) (U)  
B. SSO USEUCOM 172031Z APR 80, VHN 2078 (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.  
A. (U) E-3A (353) LAUNCHED 260515Z APR 80 FOR SUPPORT OF 26-29  
APR 80 HANNOVER AIR SHOW. ACFT AIRBORNE 0.8 HOURS AND LANDED  
HANNOVER 260607Z APR 80. REDEPLOYMENT [REDACTED] AB SCHEDULED  
29 APR 80. E-3A (560) ARRIVED [REDACTED] AB FROM TINKER AFB 260715Z  
APR 80 FOR SWAP OUT WITH E-3A 604. E-3A 604 LAUNCHED 260931Z APR 80  
FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO TINKER AFB.

B. (TS/NF) C-130 SERIES ACFT DEPLOYED IAW REF B AND REDEPLOYED  
26 APR 80 AS FOLLOWS: (ALL TIMES ARE ZULU)

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
6569	0600 [REDACTED]	1935 [REDACTED]
6570	0600 [REDACTED]	1935 [REDACTED]

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.  
A. (U) E-3A. NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 27 APR 80. ALL  
(U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5 of 5 Copies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE

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TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

(TS/NF) C-130 SERIES ACFT SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOYMENT 27APR80  
AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULL ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
6567	0700 [REDACTED]	2000 [REDACTED]
6575	0705 [REDACTED]	2005 [REDACTED]
0562	0600 [REDACTED]	2020 [REDACTED]
0567	0605 [REDACTED]	2025 [REDACTED]

E

(TS/NF) KC-135 REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULED FROM [REDACTED] 27APR80  
AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

ACFT	DPT	ARR
047	0800 [REDACTED]	1355 [REDACTED]
049	0815 [REDACTED]	1410 [REDACTED]
018	0830 [REDACTED]	1427 [REDACTED]

3. (U) LOGISTICS- ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 26APR80, ALL TIMES  
ARE ZULU

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
1780-19(C-130)	0306 [REDACTED]	0929 [REDACTED]
1105-02(C-141)	0851/1638 [REDACTED]	1505/270210/ANDREWS [REDACTED]
1105-03(C-141)	1554 [REDACTED]	2210 [REDACTED]
	2258 [REDACTED]	TBD /CONUS [REDACTED]
1780-26(C-141)	1053 [REDACTED]	1530 [REDACTED]
	1716 [REDACTED]	2355 [REDACTED]
1780-12(C-130)	0843 [REDACTED]	1810 [REDACTED]

E

EYES ONLY

(U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

(U)

(1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 20.1 (31 PERCENT)  
 AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)  
 AREA 3: 64.2 (54 PERCENT)  
 R-14: 143.9 (72 PERCENT)  
 R-9: 15.0 (75 PERCENT)  
 TOTAL: 309.4 (66 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 26APR80 13.7. 160.9 REQUIRED TO  
COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 27APR80. ALL  
TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-19(C-130)	0630 [REDACTED]	1500 [REDACTED]	
1780-36(C-141)	0206 [REDACTED]	0600 [REDACTED]	1
	0830 [REDACTED]	1430 [REDACTED]	
1780-37(C-141)	0613 [REDACTED]	1100 [REDACTED]	1, 2
1780-37(C-141)	0915 [REDACTED]	1400 [REDACTED]	3

E

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.  
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0005

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~~SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDPO889  
001-024322  
T CDSN = DKA328  
271159Z APR 80 TOT: 271200Z APR 80

~~NOFORN~~

AUTO>\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*  
ACTION>\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*  
INFO>\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

TOTAL COPIES = 0000  
RTR=74

FLASH

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZTTHZYUW YDHAND 0006 1180940-MORN--YEKDH,  
ZNY MMORN  
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE  
Z O 270937Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6  
FM SSO USEUCOM  
TO JCS//J3//  
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//  
AFSSO TAC//DO//  
SSO SAC//DO//

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ EYES ONLY VHN 2296 ECJS-CAT, SEC 2 OF 2  
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS,  
FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 137 AS OF 270700Z APR 80

- NOTES: 1. [REDACTED] DEPARTURE TIME ACTUAL.
- 2. RON. ETD 281730Z APR 80
- 3. RON. ETD 282130Z APR 80.

- 5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS. NO CHANGE.
- 6. (U) PERSONNEL.
- 7. A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD	USAFE	13
SP	TAC	37
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	29
MED.	TAC	1
	USAFE	2
ENG	TAC	35
	SAC	1
ENG/SVC	USAFE	21
RED HORSE	USAFE	3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE ~~NOFORN~~

A-1E	MAC	27
S	USAFEUR	20
	JCSE	69
	AFCC	76
PDL	TAC	18
	SAC	2
E-3A	AWACW	3
TANKER		
TASK FORCE SAC		147
OTHER		18

FLASH

TOTAL 530

B. (TS/NF) STATUS - [REDACTED]

E

~~EYES ONLY~~

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	2
E-3A	AWACW	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL:	7

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.  
 8. (U) ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. MAINTAIN STRICT OPSEC AND COMSEC. KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE KNOWN BY THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PEOPLE.  
 REVW: 27 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.  
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

36

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

NNNNMVV EIA664NCA390  
OO RUE IZJC  
DE RUE IZTT #0107 1172105  
ZNY TTTT

*D-3 file*  
*27/00017*  
*579*

O [262055Z] APR 80  
(FM DELTA/ADVANCE//BECKWITH)  
TO COMJTF//MG VAUGHT  
INFO [REDACTED]  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ [262055Z] APR 80 CITE [DELTA/ADVANCE 0107]

SUBJECT: SAFE RECOVERY OF [REDACTED]

1. MY MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN AT THIS POINT IS TO ASSURE THE SAFE RECOVERY OF [REDACTED]

2. I WAS APPALLED TO LEARN THAT THE EXISTENCE OF [REDACTED] WAS DISCOVERED BY THE NEWS MEDIA AND REFLECTED IN [REDACTED] THIS DISCLOSURE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZES THE [REDACTED] AND EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PREVENT FURTHER DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION, AND TO SAFELY RECOVER [REDACTED]

3. RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT THE FOLLOWING BE DONE:

A. [REDACTED]

B. [REDACTED]

C. THE MAINTENANCE OF APPROPRIATE [REDACTED] IN THE EVENT THAT THIS METHOD OF RECOVERY IS REQUIRED.

4. I AM PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT TO SAFELY RECOVER [REDACTED] WITH EVERY ASSET AVAILABLE [TO DELTA.]

RVW [26 APR 2010.]  
BT  
#0107

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 3/2 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 GEAR  DOWN TO secret  
REVW ON 0407  
REVIEW FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET  
251532  
89

SSN 8259  
ZNY TTTT  
DTG 251135Z APR 80  
FM JTF  
TO JTF/RC  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJ: DEBRIEFING REPORT  
REF: UR 250615Z APR 80, SAB  
HELO CREWS (1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8) DEBRIEFED  
1000Z APR 80 AT [REDACTED]  
STOD-D, DEBRIEFED SEPARATELY AT  
SAME TIME.

REPORT OF HELO DEBRIEF:  
A. NR 1: HELOS: NO PROBS.  
B. NR 2: 2ND STAGE PUMP FAILURE 2 HOURS  
AFTER TMO, MARGINALLY FLYABLE FM LZ.  
C. NR 3: (BEFORE CRASH): 2D STAGE HYDRAULIC  
FAILURE IN ROUTE. HYDRAULIC PROBS AT LZ.  
D. NR 4: RETURNED TO NIMITZ. REASON: WINK.  
E. NR 6: LANDED IN DESERT WITH BAD HIM.  
HIM WOULD NOT TRANSFER.  
F. NR 7: AFCS PROBS ENROUTE.  
G. NR 8: BAD AFCS SERVO. INTERMEDIATE  
REAR BOX CHIP LIGHT LIT AT CIP (NORMALLY  
REQUIRES PILOT TO LAND IMMEDIATELY, BUT  
HELO CONTINUED TO LZ.  
H. PILOTS EXPECTED HIGH OVERCAST ENROUTE.  
AFTER CROSSING APPROX 29 DEG GRID LINE,  
EXPERIENCED SEVERE DUST STORM. EXTENDED  
TO AT LEAST 4,000 FEET -- MAYBE HIGHER.  
IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP IN FORMATION OR KEEP  
SIGHT OF HELOS NEARBY. (THIS POSSIBLY  
REASON NR 5 RETURNED TO NIMITZ). IFR  
MAJORITY OF THE ROUTE.  
I. WHEN NR 6 WAS FORCED TO LAND IN  
DESERT, NR 8 LANDED WITH HIM AND TOOK OFF  
CREW AND ALL CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. NR 8  
CONTINUED TO LZ.  
J. NR 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 ARRIVED AT LZ.  
K. EC-130'S WERE FACING EAST, 2 NORTH OF  
ROAD, 1 SOUTH. NR 3 HELO WAS NORTHERNMOST  
HEL0 BEHIND NORTHERNMOST EC-130. NR 3  
LIFTED OFF TO MOVE OUT FM BEHIND EC-130.  
MAIN ROTOR STRUCK EC-130 NEAR COCKPIT, AND  
BOTH A/C WERE IMMEDIATELY EVACUATED.

CLASSIFICATION 1255  
CONTROL BY 92 AF 92  
EXEMPT FROM 100-114ec  
EXEMPT FROM 100-114ec  
EXEMPT FROM 100-114ec  
EXEMPT FROM 100-114ec



THE HANGAR BAY OF NIMITS WAS ACCIDENTLY  
STARTED ON 24TH. RESULTED IN SALT  
SPRAY AND "PROTEIN" FOAM BEING SPRAYED  
ON HELOS.  
(1) EQUIPMENT/MATERIALS LEFT ON  
A/C VARIES WITH A/C AND CREW  
MEMORIES. HIGH CERTITUDE FOLLOWING ITEMS  
VARIOUS QUANTITIES LEFT ON HELOS AT  
LZ.

(1) FULL (GEOI) PROBABLY 1, WITH NUMEROUS EXTRACTS

ROUTE BOOKS FOR TEHRAN AREA

(4) ROUTE BOOKS AND/OR MAP PRODUCTS (SOME CLASSIFIED)  
OF ROUTES AND TEHRAN.

(5) CVW-8 CARD OF THE DAY (240400Z-250400Z APR 80.)

(6) TACKLE INFO SHEET INDICATING, FOR EXAMPLE: WAREHOUSE AND  
MANZARIYEH COORDINATES, "DELTA", "FRANCIS"

(7) LIST CONTAINING NAMES OF ALL HELO CREW MEMBERS.

(8) COURSE CARDS SHOWING ENTIRE ROUTE TO TEHRAN AND  
MANZARIYEH.

(9) PROBABLY E & E KITS

(10) RADIO EQUIPMENT AND COMSEC MATERIALS.

REPORT OF DEBRIEF:  
A. AS SOON AS THE INFILTRATION  
AIRCRAFT HAD LANDED, THE  
FIRST MAN OFF THE AIRCRAFT  
STOPPED A VEHICLE WHICH WAS  
HEADING EAST. THIS WAS A BUS  
WITH 46 PASSENGERS, INCLUDING  
THE DRIVER.

B. THE WESTERN BLOCKING ELEMENT  
STOPPED THE NEXT ONCOMING VEHICLE,  
AFTER IT INITIALLY REFUSED TO HALT. THE  
DRIVER JUMPED FROM THE VEHICLE,  
RAN TO A VEHICLE WHICH WAS  
FOLLOWING HIM, AND LEFT TOWARDS  
THE WEST. THE STOPPED VEHICLE  
WAS A TANKER TRUCK WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY BURNED.

C. THE PERSONNEL ON THE BUS  
WERE INITIALLY TAKEN  
TO AN AIRCRAFT. LATER, THEY WERE MOVED  
OUT TO THE EAST OF THE LZ AND  
RELEASED.

D. NO REPEAT NO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WERE KILLED  
OR INJURED.

BT  
0259

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

NNNN



GSSN0156  
ZNY TTTT  
O 232250Z  
FM JTF ALPHA  
TO USSNIMITZ

TOR 232330Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E, G

JCS/RC  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: CTF 70 CAP SUPPORT  
1. CTF 70 WILL SUPPLY CAP SUPPORT TO GROUND/AIR UNITS  
REQUIRING ASSISTANCE. UNITS MUST  
HAVE UHF COMM ON 341.4 MHZ (PRI) AND 240.5MHZ  
(SEC) BEFORE CAP UNITS CAN COMMIT. USE UNIT  
CALL SIGNS LISTED IN CEOI AND GIVE POSITION  
USING ECAP POINT CODE WORD. GROUND UNITS USE SMOKE TO  
ASSIST IF POSSIBLE.

ECAP POINT	DISCRIPTION
ALPHA	REFUEL AREA
BRAVO	HELO HIDE
CHARLIE	WAREHOUSE
DELTA	EMBASSY
ECHO	MANZARIYCH
FOXTROT	KHARIZAN
GOLF	FARAJ A/F
HOTEL	SEMNAH-NEW-A/F
INDIA	ROAD RAILROAD JUNCTION

COORDINATES  
 33-0425N/55-52-55E  
 [REDACTED]  
 35-42-40N/51-25-30E  
 34-58-00N/50-48-10E  
 35-27-15N/50-15-20E  
 35-40-25N/50-15-00E  
 35-25-50N/53-40-15E  
 35-15-00N/52-45-00E

1-3  
file

#96

A

2. CAP A/C WILL MONITOR [TACAN CHAN 99] GIVE POSIT  
IN RANGE AND BEARING FROM NEAREST ECAP POINT.] IF  
NOT POSSIBLE PROVIDE LAT LONG COORDINATES.  
3. PASS THIS INFO TO ALL UNITS PRIOR TO  
START OF MSN.  
4. REQUEST CTF 70 PUBLISH CAP CALL SIGN TO  
ALCON ASAP.  
BT

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
 CONTROLLED BY: [REDACTED]  
 DERIVATIVE: G. P. [REDACTED] NMCC  
 REL. TO: [REDACTED] CONFID  
 KEY: [REDACTED]  
 DERIVED FROM: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



192

J-3  
file

241951Z

FLASH.....

SSN 0211  
ZNY ~~TTTT~~  
DTG 241945Z APR 80  
FM JTF  
TO JCS/RC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: SPOT RPT

1. TWO MC-130S HAVE LANDED AT DESERT TRACK. TWO VEHICLES WERE STOPPED ON ROAD; HOWEVER, A THIRD VEHICLE ESCAPED. VEHICLES INCLUDED BUS WITH 44 PAX. NO INJURIES. GAS TRUCK ON FIRE

BT  
0211

NNNN

~~Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Clear Hands read.

J2

J3

BU

J4

Comm

1491

502352

J-3 file

MESSAGE L1 RECEIVED.

FM JTF/VAUGHT  
TO JCS-AC

KC-135 ELEMENT  
MAC ELEMENT  
SITE ALPHA

SUBJECT: OPSEC  
1. ALL COMMANDERS AND PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO, IN SUPPORT OF, JTF-79 ARE REMINDED THAT OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC) REMAINS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE. UNTIL DIRECTED BY JCS, INFORMATION REGARDING THIS FORCE, ITS MISSION, ITS COMPOSITION, ITS OPERATIONAL PLANS AND ITS STAGING BASES ARE CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET SENSITIVE AND WILL NOT BE DIVULGED.  
2. ALL INQUIRIES RECEIVED WILL BE ANSWERED WITH QUOTE NO COMMENT UNQUOTE. REPORT ALL INQUIRIES THRU JTF-79 CHAIN OF COMMAND TO JCS-J3/SOD.  
3. COMMANDERS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, AND BRIEF THEIR FORCES ON ITS CONTENTS.  
VEUGHT  
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE L2 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO WMCC  
 DECL. (28) DOWN TO CONFID  
REVW ON OADR  
REVISED FROM JS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*u*  
*TOR 251105Z*  
*el*  
*EA-90*  
*J-3*  
*file*

SSN 0222  
O DTG 250315Z APR 80  
FM: JTF [REDACTED]  
TO: JTF/RC

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF JTF KC-135 (TS) (U)  
1. (TS) RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR  
REDUCING KC-135 ACTIVITY AT SITE ALPHA AND

[REDACTED]  
27 APRIL: 3 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY SITE ALPHA  
TO [REDACTED]

2 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY [REDACTED]  
TO [REDACTED]

28 APRIL: 1 KC-135 ART AND 2 KC-135A'S REDEPLOY  
SITE ALPHA TO [REDACTED]

1 KC-135 ART AND 1 KC-135A REDEPLOY  
TO [REDACTED]

ONCE REACHING [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT  
COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE EUROPEAN/  
PACIFIC TANKER TASK FORCE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE.

2. (TS) FOUR AIRCRAFT WOULD REMAIN AT  
SITE ALPHA AND [REDACTED] TO CONTINUE  
KC-135 PRESENCE, IF IT IS DESIRABLE TO  
RETAIN THESE LEVELS, AIRCRAFT COULD BE  
REPLACED BY EUROPEAN/ PACIFIC TANKER  
TASK FORCE ASSETS.

3. (TS) [REDACTED] WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE COULD  
BE ADJUSTED TO SUPPORT REDEPLOYMENT OF  
MC-130'S TO [REDACTED] IF DESIRED.  
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. DOWN TO CONFID  
REVISED ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM JS

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

J-3  
#100

MSG 076  
DTG 221715Z  
FM: SITE ALPHA/JTF  
TO: JCS/RC  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: JTF SITREP AS NR 3 (AS OF 221800Z)

1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS/REDEPLOYMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. C-141 [REDACTED] FORCE ARR [REDACTED] 212100Z.
- B. ONE MC-130 ARR [REDACTED] 211735Z.
- C. [TWO] AC-130 ARR [REDACTED] 221320Z.
- D. [THREE] EC-130'S AND [ONE] MC-130 DEPARTED [REDACTED] 220400Z. A/C ARR [REDACTED] 221145Z.

A, E

2. JTF FORCENOW ON STATION:

- A. [REDACTED]
- (1) JTF STAFF
- (2) TWO MC-130
- (3) TWO AC-130
- (4) [SIX] KC-135
- (5) [REDACTED] FORCES. TO MOVE TO [REDACTED] ON 24 APR.
- (6) [REDACTED] FORCE. TO MOVE TO [REDACTED] ON 24 APR.

A, E

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO CONFID  
 REVM ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM JS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E B. [REDACTED]

- (1) [THREE] EC-130
- (2) [FOUR] MC-130

C. NIMITZ. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS. SEVEN RH-53'S FMC WITH NUMBER EIGHT UNDERGOING ROTOR REPAIRS. HELO PAINTING SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 231400Z.

3. OPERATIONAL REHEARSALS CONDUCTED BY [DELTA] AND CCT'S LAST NIGHT. PREPARATION FOR MISSION AND RECOVERY UNDERWAY.

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. TSC-101 ARRIVED ON SITE O/A 212200Z. CHECKING WSC-3'S AT THIS TIME.

B. JTF CEOI HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ALCON EXCEPT RANGERS.

BCSC. TSC-85/MUX TERMINAL ARRIVED ON SITE THIS AM AKEY

<sup>N</sup>  
IMMEDIATELY. TERMINAL TSC85S CUT OVER AT 221503Z. INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THERE IS NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THE ORIGINAL TSC-85. C/KT READINGS ARE IDENTICAL.

E D. EC-130 AND MC-130 ABN WSC-3 CHECKED GOOD BEFORE DEPARTURE THIS LOC AND MC-130 CHECKED GOOD UPON ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED] WILL CHECK THE EC-130 LATER.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
BT

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~  
~~Declassified On: [REDACTED]~~  
JCS  
CASH

NNNNX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



NO. 2 ON NITE 1 NO. 4 ON NITE 2

[REDACTED]

Mc  
NIGHT 1 - A/c 64-0504  
NIGHT 2 -

SECRET

[REDACTED]

NO. 3 ON NITE 1 ONLY

[REDACTED]

Mc  
NIGHT 1 - A/c 63-7785

[REDACTED]

NO. 2 ON NITE 1 ONLY

[REDACTED]

EC  
NIGHT 1 - A/c 62-1809  
- 52 2ND BRANCH PFCB BUND

G

[REDACTED]

BT KAGE SPAN

NO. 3 ON NITE 1

[REDACTED]

Fc  
NIGHT 1 - A/c 62-1857

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2 ON NITE  
EC  
NIGHT 1 - A/c 62-1818  
NIGHT 2 -

[REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~

2-102

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

~~(S)~~ The operation will be accomplished during a nine day period (7 days for warning and positioning the force and 2 days for execution and recovery). Heavy lift helicopters (RH-53s), AC and MC-130 aircraft, refuelable C-130Es, C-141 airlifters and KC-135 tankers will be used. The helicopters will launch from the Nimitz. Other air operations will be conducted from [redacted] and [redacted].

E

(U) The operation in Iran takes two nights and one day. It is divided into three phases - Insertion, Hostage Release and Extraction.

A, E

~~(S)~~ Upon last light of the insertion day, SFOD-Delta (92 Delta personnel plus [redacted]) will be airlifted by 2 MC-130s from [redacted] to an isolated desert LZ in Iran.

(U) The first MC-130 will land on the desert LZ and Delta forces will immediately set up blocking positions on the road in order to control any vehicular traffic transiting the area.

(U) The second MC-130 lands desert LZ where number one has secured the area.

E

~~(S)~~ The first two aircraft will be followed by three C-130Es from [redacted]. Each of these aircraft will have two fuel bladders for a total of 18,000 gallons of fuel available for refueling purposes. Once the C-130Es have landed and are in position, the 2 MC-130s will depart for [redacted].

(U) Concurrently, 7 RH-53s will depart the USS Nimitz to marry up with the forces at the LZ. While at the LZ, the helos will refuel from the C-130Es and load the Delta personnel (the refuel and load evolution should take approximately 40 minutes).

(U) Once refueled and loaded, the helos will fly to a hideout area which is located approximately 100 KM from Tehran.

E

~~(S)~~ The C-130Es at the desert LZ will depart for [redacted].

-- Once the helos reach the hideout area, they will be camouflaged and defensive positions set up. This evolution will be completed prior to sunrise.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. AND DOWNGR. TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources  
DIA TC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) The Delta force will move by [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]  
-- (U) While at the warehouse, final preparations will be made for the hostage release phase.

A [REDACTED] That night, Delta will move into Tehran [REDACTED] and enter the compound early the next morning.

-- (U) The hostage release can be completed in less than one hour - most will be out in 30 minutes or less.

E [REDACTED] -- (S) Two AC-130s will fly from [REDACTED] to the compound and provide on-call fire support if required.

E [REDACTED] -- (S) Concurrently, 2 MC-130s w/Rangers (61 personnel) from [REDACTED] will secure Manzariyeh. Two C-141s w/Rangers (14 personnel) from [REDACTED] will land immediately thereafter and prepare for the arrival of the helos from Tehran.

E [REDACTED] -- (S) A third AC-130 from [REDACTED] will be available to provide on call fire support at Manzariyeh.

-- (U) Once Delta has entered the Embassy Compound and initiated the hostage release, the helos will be called in for extraction and transportation of the hostages and Delta to Manzariyeh.

-- (U) A separate fully coordinated, concurrently executed plan will be used to free Mr. Laingen + 2 from the Foreign Ministry.

E [REDACTED] -- (S) At Manzariyeh the former hostages and any wounded JTF personnel will be loaded on the C-141 which will be staffed with an emergency medical team. This aircraft will fly to the nearest US military hospital, [REDACTED] and then on to Germany.

E [REDACTED] -- (S) Other personnel (Delta, helo crews and 14 Rangers) will board the second C-141 and fly to [REDACTED] for further transportation to CONUS.

E [REDACTED] -- (S) The AC and MC-130s (with 61 Rangers) will return to [REDACTED] or to other airfields, as the situation requires. All MC/AC-130 flights from [REDACTED] to Iran and return will require air refueling over [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~DELTA~~

OPSEC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

(U) This document addresses general and specific procedures that must be considered to avoid compromise of the operation and to maintain a high degree of OPSEC. Some of the measures have already been incorporated while others remain unfulfilled.

(U) I. MOVING FORCE TO OVERSEAS STAGING BASE

A. DELTA

(U) 1. HUMINT Threat to include inadvertent disclosure by the press, through family and friends.

a. Fort Bragg Responsibilities

A

(U) (1) Continue [REDACTED]

(U) (2) Continue personnel welfare activities such as residence checks, financial support, caring for families, etc.

A

(U) (3) Monitor Fort Bragg community (especially [REDACTED] JFK G2, [REDACTED] and other sources.

(U) (4) Monitor attachments and civilian hire (cooks, KPs, guards, etc.).

(U) (5) Divert press inquiries to HQDA PAO while otherwise refusing to talk to the media.

b. Delta Main REsponsibilities

(U) (1) Conduct stringent OPSEC briefing to personnel.

A, B

(U) (2) Train and live in isolation; restrict contact of personnel with others; [REDACTED]

A, B

(U) (3) Move in isolation - no exposure when possible, [REDACTED]; apply need-to-know principle stringently.

(U) (4) Minimal exposure times on ground.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

A, B

(U) (6) Cover cargo with opaque material and transport only essential cargo.

(U) (7) Eliminate access to areas by foreign nationals when possible.

(U) 2. PHOTINT/SIGINT Threats

(U) a. Program SATRAN information with movement times and utilize camouflage and concealment techniques when applicable.

(U) b. Emplace [REDACTED]

A, B

(U) c. Use maximum COMSEC procedures to include secure systems, rigid scheduled contacts except for emergencies, dummy traffic, etc.

(U) B. USAF

(U) 1. Maintain similar measures as Delta.

(U) 2. Special attention to concealment of aircraft and/or accounting for their presence overseas.

(U) C. RANGERS

(U) 1. Maintain similar measures as Delta

A

(U) 2. Move force under [REDACTED] and have [REDACTED]

(U) D. POTENTIAL DAMAGE FACTORS IN EVENT OF COMPROMISE

1. Hostages killed.
2. Increased security/vigilance by Iranians..
3. Hostages moved.
4. Combination of above.

II. MC-130 INSERT FROM STAGING BASE TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. DELTA MAIN (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Secure storage and facilities for personnel and equipment not taken forward.

A

2. Continue COMSEC procedures with emphasis on [redacted]

B. RANGERS - same as for Delta.

C. USAF

1. Same as for Delta.

2. Minimal use of [redacted] by USSR, Iranian, and other applicable ground/air stations.

A

3. [redacted]

4. [redacted]

5. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft encountering in-flight emergency.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE

1. Same as I. D. above.

2. Possible decisive engagement of force by air defense guns/missiles and/or aircraft intercept.

III. RH-53 INSERT TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. [redacted] Threat is from USSR shadowing craft with visual, SIGINT, and PHOTINT capabilities; Iranian air platforms with visual, SIGINT, and PHOTINT capabilities; and Iranian ground SIGINT stations.

A, B

B. Develop plan to [redacted]. Threat is same as III. A. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft having in-flight emergency.

E. Minimal use [redacted] with COMSEC emphasis.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - same as II. D. above.

IV. TAKEOVER AND LAGER AT NA'IN

A. RANGERS (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Recover/dispose of air items if applicable.

(2) 2. Total elimination or capture of guarding force [REDACTED]

(3) 3. [REDACTED]

(4) 4. [REDACTED]

5. Stress COMSEC procedures.

B. USAF

1. Develop landing techniques to avoid ground observation. Attention to light and noise conditions.

2. Ensure minimal ground time for aircraft with appropriate light/noise discipline - will engines be shut down; what is parking pattern, turn around, and takeoff procedures; what are refueling procedures?

3. Develop OPSEC procedures if 1 or more aircraft is unable to takeoff.

C. RH-53s

1. Same as for USAF.

2. Develop plan to protect/conceal aircraft from ground and air observation during the day.

D. DELTA - same as for rangers.

E. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - Same as I. D. as well as possible decisive engagement of the force on the ground.

V. MC-130 RETURN FROM NA'IN TO STAGING BASE

Same as I and II above for USAF.

A

VI ~~(S)~~ RECRUITMENT/ PROCUREMENT OF [REDACTED] (HUMINT THREAT)

~~SECRET~~

A. Standard agent recruitment procedures must be followed but time may not be sufficient to vett personnel and to ascertain full reliability [REDACTED]

C ~~(S)~~ B. [REDACTED] a manner as to avoid suspicion/investigation.

C. Compromise may result in same potential damage as in I. D. above as well as possible intercept and decisive engagement of force.

VII ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] MOVE FROM TEHRAN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT THREAT)

C ~~(S)~~ A. [REDACTED] for concealment by trusted and reliable personnel to preclude leaks.

C ~~(S)~~ B. Cut-outs should be used to assemble and mate [REDACTED] to avoid compromise.

C ~~(S)~~ C. Plan must be developed to prepare [REDACTED] to link-up point to include appropriate cover, documentation, and procedures [REDACTED]

D. [REDACTED] near link-up point with an ostensible reason for being there or with concealment to avoid ground/air observation.

E. Consequences of compromise are the same as VI. C. above.

VIII. AIR MOVE FROM NA'IN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

A. RH-53s

1. Establish OPSEC procedures in event 1 or more aircraft cannot take off or have in-flight emergencies.

2. Route planning to avoid ground and radar observation.

3. COMSEC measures.

4. Landing must be in isolated area to avoid ground observation with special attention to noise and light discipline.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B. DELTA/RANGERS

A

1. Movement plan from aircraft [redacted] without being detected.

2. Last minute concealment check after loading [redacted] and prior to move out.

3. Capture or [redacted] any personnel observing aircraft.

IX. RH-53 GROUND TIME (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

A. Conceal aircraft and personnel from air/ground observation.

B. Maintain security around aircraft, capture [redacted] ground observers or passers by.

A

C. Maintain radio silence.

X. [redacted] FROM LINK-UP TO TEHRAN (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Develop plan to [redacted] or to pass through them to include control of [redacted]

B. Noise/light discipline in vehicles.

C. Maintain COMSEC measures.

XI. MC/AC-130 MOVE FROM STAGING BASE TO MANZARIYEH

Same considerations as for II above.



2/0800Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130 Airborne b. 4/MC-130 "	None Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go Go, will provide the 19 operational bladders to complete mission
	c. <4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	<u>No Go</u> Delay 24 hrs
	d. >1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helos in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	<u>No Go</u> Delay 24 hrs
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch: 3 KC-135 Airborne <3 KC-135 Airborne	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go <u>No Go</u>
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, <2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go <u>No go</u>
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 Helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hideout	Go Go, Foldup 6th Helo and leave it + TACA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	<u>No GO</u>
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo airborne (5 w/ Delta/1 w/ extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets) b. >5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay c. <5/Helo airborne	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target  Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft  Would unacceptably degrade equip and personnel for "Delta"	Go  If there is a delay instruct MC-130s to orbit  <u>No/Go</u> delay 24 hrs Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than  
> = greater than  
≤ = less than or equal to  
≥ = greater than or equal to

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
2/1430Z 1515Z	d.>1:00 delay Helo goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, delay 24 hrs
(1330 EST)	- Cargo Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall Helos advise MC-130s to take 2nd refueling and RTB. Scramble SAR from Carrier, advise KC-130s/ARTS
2/1640Z (1140 EST)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hide out Insufficient fuel for helos	Go Go, Foldup 6th Helo and leave it + TACA No Go, recall Helos
2/1515Z 1810Z (1015 EST)	Helo goes down prior to turn around point: - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helos land and spread the load Advise MC-130 to delay by no. of minutes required for recovery. - If injuries: Option 1: 6th helo lands, dumps cargo if necessary, p/u injured and return to carrier.
Cargo Helo down		Crew requires recovery	Option 1: Launch SAR Delta Helos continue

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
			Option 2: Land each of the other 5 helos and load 1 crew member and 1 camouflage net on each. The FACAN should be able to go on one of the helos. Advise the MC-130's to delay
	More than one helo goes down	Force unacceptably degraded	Abort, recall helo, advise MC-130's to RTB, call for early KC-135 support
2/1810Z 1918Z 310-1418 EST)	6 helos operational for entire route	Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment	Go
	Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries	Part of attack force down, must be recovered	Option 1: Land all helos and spread load. Continue to refuel point  Option 2: Land cargo helo and p/u De. plus crew.
	Delta helo goes down with injuries	Force could be unacceptably degraded	NOTE: Any one helo can recover Delta plus the crew. The cargo helo is 2000 lbs lighter Option 1: Abort, proceed to refuel point, take max fuel, return to carrier.  Option 2: Proceed to refuel point, one helo will return to carrier with injuries. Remaining 4 helos on mission. (NOTE: No camouflage nets can be taken to hideout)

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
2/1948Z (1445 EST)	<p>Airdrop of fuel bladder:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 5 MC-130s make drop</li> <li>- 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4.</li> </ul>	<p>Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK</p> <p>Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.</p>	<p>Go, can proceed with number of helos desired</p> <p>Can go with 4 helos if we get 19 bladders.</p>
	<p>&lt;4 MC-130's make successful drop or &lt;19 bladders are usable.</p>	<p>Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target</p>	<p>Option 1: Try to extract fuel from a extra helos so as to get 4 operational</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to ship</p> <p>Option 3: Delay 24 hours to get more fuel the next night</p>
		<p><i>30 hrs Crew Rest</i></p>	
2/2248Z (1745 EST)	<p>Helos launch from refueling: 6 helos airborne</p>	<p>Will have extra helo support for extraction</p>	<p>Go, use 6th helo to carry max fuel</p>
	<p>5 helos airborne</p>	<p>Adequate support for extraction</p>	<p>Go, fold up 6th helo and leave it. Extract extra fuel for operational helos</p>
	<p>4 helos airborne</p>	<p>Marginal support for extraction</p>	<p>Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helos.</p>
	<p>3 helos airborne</p>	<p>Minimum helos for extraction</p>	<p>Option 1: Proceed mission in degraded status</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier.</p> <p>Option 3: Delay in place 24 hrs. Try to fix helos or get more fuel, as req'd</p>

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay 24 hours, try to fix helos or get more fuel, as required.  Option 2: Load all personnel on 2 helos strip down and fly to RV near beach. Call for SAR.  Option 3: Delay 24 hours, fly personnel to Manzariveh in time to meet MC-130s and Rangers.
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Option 4: Delta and crews fly to vicinity of Darband. Takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land and extract. Same as option 4 above except cycle the one helo with Delta from refueling point to vicinity of Darband
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband, call for MC-130's when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00 48 (1 hr EST)	Helos must be off by <u>2348Z</u>	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hours
2/2318 (1515 EST)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to <u>Manzariveh</u> for extraction	JTF Commander can recall the force to the carrier, no contact means Go
2-3/2248Z 0124Z 8-2024 EST	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point:  - 6 helos available cargo helo goes  - 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets  Delta force unacceptable degraded	2 helos land and p/u crew and nets  3 helos land, 13 Delta or crew board

*Load on Delta*  
*Bill*

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
			the cargo helo, 5 Delta board each of the other two helos
	5 helos available, Delta helo goes	Same as above	4 helos land spread load the personnel, attempt lift off with nets, if unable dump nets.
	4 helos available, Delta helo goes down	Same as above	Abort, strip down, spread personnel among 3 helos, proceed to hideout, extract on MC-130's the next night.
	3 helos available Delta helo goes down.	Same as above	From here on we must find a recovery airfield to secure and call for the MC-130's
3/0124Z (024 EST)	Any major problem at the dropoff point	Mission could be blown and/or force degraded	Option 1: Abort, move to hideout, meet MC-130s next night.  Option 2: Continue, ground commander's decision.
3/2200Z 2210Z (1710 EST)	Helo goes down enroute to hideout	Will affect ability to perform extraction	If 3 or more helos available, continue; if < 3, inform Delta and abort to <u>Sitaraf</u> <u>Manzariyeh</u> <u>AF</u>
3/0124Z 2135Z (4 - 3/1635)	Delta is discovered enroute while helos are at hideout	With the force split Delta must be able to call the helos to a predetermined RV	Move helos at night to RV to p/u Delta then to <u>Manzariyeh</u> for extraction.

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TIME      EVENT/SITUATION      CONSEQUENCES      DECISION/OPTION

3/1500Z (1000 EST)	AC-130 launch		
3/1630Z (1130 EST)	MC-130 Launch 5 MC-130 OK 4 MC-130 OK 3 " " 2 " " 2 " "	Personnel jammed on A/C - Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people)	GO  - P/U only hostages + wounded - Direct [redacted] launch and P/U some leftovers
3/1545 (1245 EST)	KC-135 launch for MC-130 3 KC-135 OK 2 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at least 2 MC-130, more if possible.
3/1605 (3/1105 EST)	KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Go Same as above
3/1900 (3/1400 EST)	AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Same as above	Same as above
3/2135Z (1635 EST)	Helo lift off from hideout >3 RH-53 OK <3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	Use extras (>3) for CAS - Cycle helos from Manzariyeh to Embassy
3/2230Z (1730 EST)	MC-130's arrive at Manzariyeh find R/W blocked	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Paradrop Rangers onto airfield - Wait for Delta helos to arrive to secure field and clear R/W
3/2230Z (1730 EST)	Helos land at Embassy 5 RH-53 OK  3 RH-53 OK  2 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos  Min req'd helos for for extraction  Not sufficient helos for extraction	- Use extra helos [redacted] - Land helos single use other 2 for [redacted] - Cycle helos for extraction
3/2230Z 2300Z	[redacted]		

30-1800 EST

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
32245Z (1745 EST)	Extraction: >3 Helo's OK =1 Helo OK  Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	Go Cycle Helo's Use ██████████ ██████████ to Manzariych
32300Z (1800 EST)	Helo's arrive at Manzariych >3 RH-53 OK  <3 RH-53 OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130  Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded  - MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded
	<3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130	Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground	MC-130 plus 1 or 2 extra MC-130
	Zero helo's OK	MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	- Keep all MC-130's ground till per- sonnel arrive - Launch two MC-130 for ██████████ or for departure
4/0015 (3/1945 EST)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/1945 EST) Movement of Delta	AC-130 refuel  Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	<p><i>AS</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Have Delta set up prearranged rally points. If discovered, disengage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lift off, direct them to appropriate P/U zone.</li> <li>- Establish Manzariych as rally point, Helo go to Manzariych if no contact with Delta</li> </ul>



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PENETRATION OF IRANIAN AIRSPACE

Q: What was the first take off time for the helicopters departing the carrier?

A: 1507Z (1007 EST) (1937 Tehran local)

---

Q: What was the first take off time for the C-130 aircraft?

A: The first aircraft departed at 1400Z (0900 EST) (1830 Tehran). NOTE: This information with simple arithmetic and knowledge of C-130 flight speed could indicate the launch location of the C-130s.

---

Q: At what time did the helicopters enter Iranian airspace?

A: Based on an estimated position of 50 NM from the land mass of the carrier and recognizing a 12 mile boundry limit from territorial land, the aircraft should have entered Iranian space at 1518Z (1018 EST) (1948 Tehran).

---

Q: When did the C-130s first enter Iranian airspace?

A: Again using the 12 mile limit as criteria, the first C-130 would have been in Iranian airspace at 1531Z (1031 EST) (2001 Tehran).

---

Q: When did the aircraft depart the landing site?

A: The exact time of departure and route flown by the aircraft are unknown. Estimated departure time was 2245Z.

---

Q: When did the aircraft depart Iranian airspace on its return?

A: The exact time is unknown. Based on the expected coast out time, the aircraft would have passed the 12 mile limit at 0113Z (2113 EST) 0543 Tehran).

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Q: What was the exact number of US personnel on or over Iranian soil?

A: The exact number is unknown due to changes in the force made up after the JTF had moved to its forward location. However, based upon best information available here, the force was between [REDACTED]

NOTE: This can be broken down into:  
Aircrew: [REDACTED]  
Others: [REDACTED]  
Both figures are approximate

Q: What was the nature of the operation?

A: The mission was humanitarian in nature and designed solely to rescue Americans held hostage in the Embassy in Iran with minimum injury to Iranians. Evidence of this was the detaining and subsequent release of Iranian citizens at the desert site.

Q: What was the maximum penetration of Iran?

A: Distance from the coast to the actual landing site is approximately 500 Nautical Miles.

Q: How long was the force actually on the ground?

A: As the actual departure time is unknown, an exact answer cannot be given. However, from the landing of the first aircraft at 1813Z until the estimated departure time of 2245Z is four hours and 32 minutes.

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(ONF)

SAR SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN OPERATION

- ASSUMPTIONS

- Permissive environment at forward operating location (FOL).
- Less than permissive environment in-country Iran.
- FOL will be bare base (worst case).
- Night operations for optimum cover.
- No in-country aerial refueling (AR).
- Possibly no helo AR at all.
- SAR objective(s) may have to E&E up to 48 hours.

- RECOMMENDED FORCES

- E ~~(\*)~~ Aircraft.
- 2 HC-130 tankers from [REDACTED]
  - 3 HH-53H PAVE LOW III helos from Kirtland AFB NM.
  - Personnel (116 Total).
    - Aircrew (42 total).
      - 3 HC-130 Crews (24 people - 9 off, 15 enl).
      - 3 HH-53 crews (18 people - 6 off, 12 enl).
    - Maintenance (61 total).
      - 1 off, 60 enl.
    - Rescue coordination center (RCC) (4 total).
      - 2 off, 2 enl.
    - Support folks (9 total).

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12 Aug 92

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- One helo will fly on a mission with a second helo as backup (ramp space).
- HC-130 will orbit in safe area during actual SAR to act as airborne mission commander and comm relay.
- RCC will control mission.
- Depending on objective location, HC-130 will refuel helo feet wet just before coast in country and be available to refuel helo on coast out.
- Unrefueled range of helo is approx 1000 NM with 20,000 lbs fuel.
- Requires 650 gal external tanks and 4-2000 lb internal tanks/acft.
- ( ---- Helo could fly to Nain and RTB with no AR.
- Helo could fly to Manzariyeh and RTB with 1 AR.

- ALTERNATIVES

- Airlift could be cut to 2 C-5s.
- Only 2 helos could go (not recommended).
- Need 3rd helo as spare aircraft/cannonball (currently no WRSK for PAVE LOW III, and there is a shortage of black boxes).
- If limited to 2 C-5s, we will cannonball critical parts at Kirtland.
- Deployment timing.
- Two options.
- Option 1 - Deploy ASAP (D-X).
- Pro's.

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- We will get 14 external tanks (4 more)

A

--- Being worked [redacted] of increasing long range deployability of HH-53. Tanks are identified - will come from McClellan to Kirtland O/A 10 Feb.

-- Get Marine internal tanks (8 required with associated hardware).

A

--- Being worked [redacted] as above.

---- These USMC tanks are in short supply. As of now the only eight operational tanks we know of are in use at the desert site.

-- Test flight PAVE LOW III with 650s/Internals so Air Force crews can become familiar with internal tank and increased gross weight operations.

--- Waivers are required.

---- Operation of helo at 50,000 lbs G.W. vs 42,000 lbs.

- BOTTOM LINE

-- Need approval of this concept ASAP so we can get the SAR forces (aircrew, intel, etc.) up to speed.

G

[redacted]

AF/YOOTA  
78479/72971

(S)

19<sup>th</sup>

(S)

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# 105

- 1 MC-130 Departs [redacted] Lands [redacted]
- JTF Departs for [redacted]
- 2 MC/3EC-130s Depart Eglin for [redacted]
- 1 C-130 Delivers W-3 Radio to [redacted] from [redacted]  
Returns to [redacted]
- Helo Crews Arrive [redacted]
- 4 C-14)s Complete Airlift of [redacted] Personnel to [redacted]
- 2 KC-135s Launch from [redacted] Plattsburgh for [redacted]

~~E~~, E

- 2 MC-130 [redacted]
- 1 MC-130 Departs Eglin [redacted]
- 1 MC/3 EC-130s Arrive [redacted]
- 3 C-14)s with [redacted]
- 2 KC-135s Arrive [redacted]
- 2 KC-135s Depart [redacted]
- 3 KC-135s Depart Grissom for [redacted]

~~E~~, E

- 1 MC-130 Arrives [redacted]
- 1 MC-130 Departs Eglin [redacted]
- 2 AC-130s Depart Eglin [redacted]
- 2 KC-135s Depart [redacted]
- 3 KC-135s Arrive [redacted]
- 2 KC-135s Depart Grissom [redacted]
- 3 C-14)s w/Delta Arrive [redacted]

~~E~~, E

22<sup>nd</sup>

- 3 EC/1 MC-130s Depart [redacted] Arrive [redacted]
- 1 MC-130 Arrives [redacted]
- 2 AC-130s Depart Eglin for [redacted]
- 2 AC-130s Arrive [redacted]
- 3 KC-135s Depart Plattsburgh for [redacted]
- 2 KC-135s Arrive [redacted]
- 2 C-14)s Depart [redacted] for [redacted] w/ [redacted]
- 1 C-14) Departs [redacted] with Medical Team

23<sup>rd</sup>

- 1 MC-130 Arrives [redacted]
- 2 AC-130s Arrive [redacted]
- 3 KC-135s Arrive [redacted]
- 2 C-14)s Arrive [redacted] w/ [redacted]
- 1 C-14) Arrives [redacted] w/ Medical Team

- 2 C-14)s or 3 C-130s Deliver Delta from [redacted] to [redacted]

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
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~~NOTE~~

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--- 6 off.

----- Mission commander.

----- Mission vice commander.

----- Maintenance officer.

----- 3 Intel.

----- 3 Enl.

- CONCEPT OF OPS

~~(S)~~ - Possible FOL.

--- [redacted] Int'l (recommended).

--- [redacted] Int'l.

--- Bare base.

-- Deployment.

~~(S)~~ --- 2 HC-130s fly [redacted] direct FOL (approx 10 hrs).

--- 3 C-5s deliver 3 HH-53Hs, aircrew, maintenance and support people, comm gear, and WRSK to FOL (approx 18 hrs-non-stop).

--- Upon landing, two select teams of 9 maintenance people each reassemble first two helos.

----- Approx 18 hours required for build-up.

----- Short FCF required (30 min).

----- 3rd helo will be built up when 1st 2 are complete.

-- Employment.

--- Helos/tankers stand 24 hour alert.

--- No missions fly (e.g., precautionary SAR orbit) until there is confirmed SAR objective.

E

NITE-16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

-00

T.O. 1745Z

2 EC/MC 4 EC/MC

1 KC-ART

1 KC

1 KC

1 KC

AR

ON-STA HIGH

ON-STA LOW

ON-STA LOW

RTB

RTB

2145

LAND

T.O. 1845Z

AR

ON-STA LOW

F14/AG/KAG ALERT CAP

2030

ON-STATION HIGH SOUTH OF TF70

2330

RTB

LAND 0400 DG

AR

AR

AR

RTB

1945

LAND

AR

LAND

2300

1 KC-ART

1 KC

1 KC

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12 Aug 92

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THE JOINT STAFF

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Conditions for Hostage Rescue Attempt

1. <sup>u</sup>~~(TS)~~ The attached paper by the JTF explores the factors affecting a decision to rescue the hostages. The summary on page 8 gives a good thumbnail sketch of the analysis.

2. <sup>(u)</sup>~~(TS)~~ It appears to me that three external conditions can apply:

- a. Hostages secure. Negotiations continuing as at present.
- b. Hostages gravely threatened by current captors, other competing politically oriented terrorist organizations, or mob action during chaos.
- c. One or more hostages injured or killed.

3. <sup>(u)</sup>~~(TS)~~ The odds on success (60-70% in execution tempered by 15-30% possibility of disruption) do not appear to be high enough to warrant an attempt under current conditions. If we wait until hostages have been injured or killed, the pressure to act will be so high, and the situation in Iran so uncertain, that the odds for success would certainly be drastically reduced. The hard part will be to recognize a time of increased danger and to act accordingly. The team is continuing to refine plans to deploy, in particular to get to the shortest response time consistent with operational security. Because the movement of the helo crews to the carrier takes the longest time and also because their stateside activity is the most likely OPSEC give away, we may want to move the crews forward in increments as the next step to reduce response time.

Very respectfully  
Philip D. Shutler  
PHILIP D. SHUTLER  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Director for Operations

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

1. It is possible to assess factors which may be used to determine if and under what conditions the US should attempt rescue of the American hostages in Tehran.
2. Following is a list of factors which may be assessed and weighed. (The list does not include geo-political or strategic factors)
  - a. The US team of men and machines and its ability to complete the mission.
  - b. The ability of Iran to frustrate or prevent success.
  - c. The threat to safety of the hostages.
  - d. Operations Security (OPSEC). (How long can the training and planning continue without discovery and become known by the Iranians.)
  - e. Ability of the Soviets to detect deployment and employment.
3. Assumptions:
  - a. That a rescue will not be attempted until diplomatic and economic efforts fail to bring release.
  - b. That the US would attempt a rescue should the lives of the hostages be threatened greatly or if there were other compelling reasons.
4. Criteria for rescue success. There could be several criteria for predicted success ranging from all hostages rescued with no loss of American lives to almost the reverse. This paper sets the criteria as follows: More hostages rescued than killed or continued to be held in addition to those of the rescue force killed or captured. (NOTE: This criteria does not include those personnel lost due to an operational

accident of a fixed wing or helicopter aircraft.)

5. Factor assessment:

a. The US Team. A team of personnel has been formed and trained to perform well. The machines have been modified and enhanced and the men have developed techniques to perform at a far greater capability than has existed previously. An adequate Command Control Communications system has been developed to support the mission. With the exception of Search and Rescue, events to be performed during the mission have been accomplished satisfactorily during functional training and two rehearsals. There are unknowns at this time to include the conditions at the currently selected helicopter drop off point for Delta and arrangements for a holding area for ~~Delta~~ in Tehran and the precise hostage location. We have good confidence that the team has the ability to perform each segment of the mission. However, due the fact that each segment is interdependent on others, our assessment for total mission profile will be limited to the range of 60-70% even after we receive satisfactory information on the drop off point and Tehran holding area.

b. Ability of Iran to frustrate or prevent success. There are indications that instability within Iran is increasing. [The

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ The Gendarmarie is beset with internal problems and the National Police have been largely delegated to the role of traffic control and security of official buildings. There are

also signs that the Pasdaran are experiencing coordination problems. The government is becoming more fragmented and ineffective. Two national issues have drawn attention away from the compound; the national elections and the Soviet threat. The absence of US newsmen has reduced the demonstrations and the fervor within Tehran. Our assessment of these indicators is that the ability of Iran to frustrate a rescue mission up to the Embassy Compound wall is less than it was prior to 1 Jan. Time, lack of success and poor weather have a debilitating effect on the captors to the extent that morale and the effectiveness of security will wane. We assess the capability of Iran to frustrate the mission at 20-30%.

c. Threat to Safety of the Hostages:

During the first 45 days of captivity, the threat for safety of the hostages was tenuous and high. The situation was unstructured and chaotic; circumstances were such that there were compelling reasons to seriously consider an immediate rescue. In the last few weeks, other events to include the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan, the Iranian Presidential Election and departure of the American Press seemingly has reduced the focus, value, and immediate importance of the hostages to Khomeini and the captors. Because of these events, one might conclude that conditions in Iran may be more structured, and that the hostages will continue to be protected by Khomeini with the captor's cooperation. At the least, it would seem, the hostages will likely remain safe unless a

new event planned or unplanned by various elements in or out of Iran bring re-focused attention and new demands for trials.

While we may take some comfort in apparent conditions today, they may not be valid or changes could occur rapidly. Neither Khomeini nor the captors have changed their hard position; no release until the Shah and his wealth are returned to Iran. Despite all unilateral and bilateral initiatives by the US and UN the requisites for the release have not changed. Another factor is the orientation of the captors, their leadership and source of funding and what precisely is their potential political strength and real goals? Are they, as some believe, "a state within a state"? What is their source of authority and political strength and how steadfastly will they hold their position and will they accede to Khomeini direction should he order their release? Another factor to consider is the probability that the current conditions of anarchy, chaos and lack of government authority will be reversed and improved in the near future. It is questionable that election of a President alone will lead to improvement of conditions since a newly elected President will have a thin political base, and will not have effective ministers for some time. He will, therefore, draw upon Khomeini's legitimacy and authority for

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an indefinite period.

The conditions described above, if reasonably accurate, give little comfort and confidence that the safety of the hostages, judged to be acceptable today, will remain acceptable in the future. We are unable to predict future conditions. However, we believe it is feasible to identify indicators and events which would enable the US to ascertain when the safety of the hostages becomes seriously jeopardized. Following is a list of indicators and events offered as a range of possibilities for tracking and assessment.

6. Generally, two broad situations could develop. The first is an abrupt increase in the threat and the second a gradual but detectable change.

(1) Abrupt changes:

(a) A diplomatic incident which could cause an immediate trial.

(b) A sudden but undetected decision by the captors to gain or regain cognizance from Khomeini, which could be manifested by trials or outright direct threats.

(c) A decision by unknown elements in or outside Iran which may have influence over the captors to escalate matters quickly.

(d) A physical accident on the compound such as accidental shooting of one or more hostages.



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(e) Sudden eruption of violence in Tehran such as experienced in Tabriz resulting in complete disappearance of law and order.

(f) An attack on Iran by Russia or Iraq.

(g) US required to suddenly take military action such as protection of shipping lanes in Persian Gulf.

(2) Gradual and detectible increase in threat:


(a) A diplomatic incident which would cause Khomeini or captors to schedule a trial.

(b) A hardening of the captors position and attempt to gain or regain cognizance from Khomeini which could lead to trials

(c) A decision by unknown elements in or outside Iran which may have or could gain influence over the captors to cause a trial.

(d) Gradual beginning of riots in Tehran and loss of law and order.

(e) A deepening of anarchy, greater chaos, and a loss of control by Khomeini and the new President, resulting in competition among groups each struggling for control of the hostages.

C ~~(f)~~ (f) US loss of communications as result of news media departure, 

and other sources. The US would be unable to monitor the situation in Iran which in turn would cause grave

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national concern for hostage security.


(g) Indication of impending Soviet or Iraq invasion of Iran.

(h) A possible growing need for US military action: for example, protect the oil supply line.

d. Operations Security: The useful life of the US team for hostage rescue could be ended abruptly with either public disclosure of its existence or as a result of strong suspicion by the Soviets and Iranians. It is indeed remarkable that the effort has not yet been exposed. We cannot predict the circumstance that would expose the effort; however, the chances of exposure grow each day as we train. Although OPSEC is stressed daily, an unfortunate incident or remark by team members could occur. Further, some of the forces such as Delta are cancelling scheduled events, some of which are with foreign governments. Our assessment is that OPSEC can be maintained for a range of 2-6 weeks.

e. Ability of the Soviets to detect deployment and employment. We believe that should the Soviets become knowledgeable of movements, they would either make it known publicly or privately to Iran. Through strategic and tactical deception (subject of a previous paper) properly accomplished, we can avoid detection. Our assessment is high for probability of non-detection.

6. Summary: The US team of men and machines is capable of performing the mission. Two important facilities remain undetermined: the drop-off point for Delta and a holding area for Delta in Tehran. Assuming satisfactory determination of these facilities, we assess the probability of the team's mechanical capability to complete the mission at 60-70%. We assess the capability of Iran to frustrate the mission at 15-30%. Although the future threat to the hostages is unpredictable we believe that certain indicators and events would enable the US to ascertain when the safety of the hostages becomes seriously jeopardized. The useful life of the US team cannot be protracted indefinitely. The existence of the force could be compromised and operational security lost at anytime. We are unable to predict how long OPSEC can be maintained, but judge it to be in the range of an additional two to six weeks. Effective strategic and tactical deception should enable the mission to be conducted without prior knowledge of Iran or Russia.



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1-109  
05 February 1980

Working Paper for J-3

SUBJECT: Current Political Situation in Iran (U)

1. (U) ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The sudden hospitalization of Ayatollah Khomeini has altered the political situation in Iran because of concern for his health and the fact that he may suddenly die, leaving a vast power vacuum. Even before his illness there were signs that the political struggle among the religious hierarchy was intensifying, and we suspect there is much behind the scenes maneuvering at this time, even though Khomeini is alive and may completely recover from the current ailment. There is no clear-cut successor to Khomeini, and religious rivals will be working to attain the prominent position. This will detract from efforts to organize the first post revolution government, and will defer even further attempts to restore order and get the economy moving again.
2. (U) ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The election of Bani Sadr as Iran's first president raised what we believe to be false hopes that the hostage situation could be quickly resolved. Despite his supposedly "conciliatory" position on this issue, he does not have the political clout to resolve it by himself. The lukewarm endorsement of his victory by Khomeini has not significantly strengthened his position, and he has already squabbled with the revolutionary council on the issue of who would swear him into office, Khomeini or the yet unelected national assembly. Even though he has been sworn in by Khomeini, he must now wait until the national assembly is elected and he has chosen his cabinet and prime minister before he has a functioning government. We expect no action on the hostage issue before these events are completed, which is another two months or so away. Until then we can expect to see continuing confusion and turbulence in Iranian politics, diverting attention away from the hostage issue, except for occasional moments which cannot be predicted.
3. (U) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ There seems little doubt to us that the militants at the US Embassy are an element to be considered in internal politics in Iran. However, they seem frustrated at the moment, and a little concerned that events may be passing them by. The "lamentation" issued by them over the past weekend reflects their concern that the hostage issue is being pushed into the background, and that the government and others may be working to resolve it. Even at the height of the crisis, in November and December, despite the turmoil around the embassy, life in Tehran seemed to go on as before, with little concern by the average Tehrani over events downtown. Without daily news coverage, demonstrations have tapered off, and a certain degree of apathy towards the hostage crisis seems to be setting in among the populace. Even the militants are likely bored at this point. Their public statements have tapered off in number and do not appear to be as substantive as they once were. It would be dangerous to assume, however, that the militants have relaxed their guard, and as far as we can observe, defenses at the embassy are still good. The

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recent escape of 6 Americans with Canadian assistance has likely heightened the vigilance of the militants, although this may be a temporary phenomenon. The danger in the current situation is that the militants might believe that Iranians are willing to resolve the crisis without achieving the goal of the Shah's return, and more radical elements among them might push for action against the hostages, such as a show trial of one or several, and/or some form of punishment. Even if the government and/or Khomeini determine that the hostages should go free, the militants, or at least some of them, will not wish to comply. To give up the hostages is to reduce their influence to nothing, and may lead to the punishment of some of the captors. The hostages are the militants' trump card.

(U)  
4. (~~C/NOFORN~~) There will likely be continued turmoil in the provinces in the coming months, which will further detract from the hostage situation and occasionally, from efforts to set up the new government.

(U)  
5. (~~C/NOFORN~~) A factor which must be considered when discussing the above is that if Khomeini does die soon, all bets are off. There will be a strong possibility of even further chaos, the political struggle for control may get violent, and anarchy is possible. The militants will not likely obey any successor to Khomeini and will appeal to the "people" for guidance, which means in effect that the militants will have no master.

(U) MC  
6. (~~C/NOFORN~~) To sum up, it appears to us that the current political turbulence in Iran will continue for the next several months at least. We see no quick solutions to the hostage crisis, which will wax and wane in the public eye as the militants are able to focus attention on it. The situation at the embassy appears to have been routinized, but we would not assume from this that the militants are any less vigilant.

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CURRENT PERCEPTION/  
PREDICTED PERCEPTION

(U) 1. No indications reported that Iranians or Soviets have identified US plans or intentions to rescue US diplomats held in Tehran.

2. NIMITZ was subject to Soviet surveillance off Africa. Currently, the task group is scheduled to arrive vicinity KITTY HAWK on or about 22-23 Jan 1980. Predict that Iranians and Soviets will be alert for several days either side of 22-23 Jan for US military action.

E 3. Because of probable high interest and suspicions of the Soviets and the Iranians that the arrival of the NIMITZ is likely to generate, movement of forces through [REDACTED] and Red Sea should be unrelated to that date to degree possible. Units most visible are the 3 MC-130s from [REDACTED] the 4 AC-130s [REDACTED] and the 2 C-141s carrying ammo, parts, and maintenance personnel for the AC-130s. The area where their flights will be most noted will be during transit of the [REDACTED]

(U) 4. The buildup of aircraft at [REDACTED] may be an indicator of impending operations. This could be assumed to be for a rescue operation, or might simply be reported by Soviet clandestine radio as preparations for operations against Iran to stir up anti-American feelings.

A, B, E 5. The establishment of [REDACTED] will be an indicator that a command to direct some sort of operations has been established. To reduce correlation with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] as soon as possible.

6. Planned pattern of flights [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This will be an indicator of impending operations.

7. [REDACTED] will be an indicator of impending operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Approve [REDACTED]

o AWACS operations [REDACTED] will continue.

o AF support capability for possible other USAF/USN a/c operations being established and tested.

o Surveys underway of possible US aid to upgrade [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (e.g., [REDACTED])

(TAB A is [REDACTED] plan outline)

b. Sortie MC-130s from [REDACTED] on or about 14 Jan to arrive [REDACTED] as soon as possible.

(TAB B outlines movement concept)

c. Sortie AC-130s and supporting C-141s to [REDACTED] Hold at [REDACTED] and conduct maintenance and training flights.

Sortie from [REDACTED] to arrive at [REDACTED] to be on ground minimum period (36 hours prior to AC-130 departure on mission).

(TAB C outlines movement concept).

d. Approve activation of [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] traffic.

e. Approve maintenance of a continuous [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] until the rescue is completed

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TAB A

~~OVERALL~~ [REDACTED]

- A, E**
1. Establish [REDACTED]
  2. Task suitable units F15, F111, F14 to plan for possible deployment to [REDACTED] late Jan - early Feb. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to indicate planning. Indicate close hold needed on intentions so unnecessary to coordinate with [REDACTED]. Prepare outline of our actual plan in Washington and reveal selected details through COMMS/HUMINT channels.
  3. COMM/telephone breaches of security re: upgrading/clearing w/EOD personnel of [REDACTED]
  4. Smooth out air traffic flow to [REDACTED]
    - o Deploy at an early date R-14, R-9 and fuel bladder systems to [REDACTED]. Have [REDACTED] increase fuel capacity to fill systems.
    - o Deploy supporting ground vehicles at an early date.
    - o Plan non-operational traffic, including if possible, C-141 flights to [REDACTED].
    - o Plan non-operational traffic to [REDACTED].
  5. Schedule (if diplomatically and operationally feasible):
    - o [REDACTED] AWACS, US fighters, [REDACTED]
    - o Demo to [REDACTED] of US air intercept procedures and capabilities;

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TAB B

MC-130 MOVEMENT CONCEPT

~~(C)~~ 1. THREATS

- a. At home base  
E b. ██████████ (Diplomatic clearances)  
c. ██████████ transit.

~~(C)~~ 2. ██████████ at home base:

- A, E a. Deployment to ██████████ for possible ██████████ delivery  
of ██████████ supplies. Operation currently close  
hold since no firm NSC decision yet made.  
b. File due regard flight plan.

~~(C)~~ 3. ██████████

- E a. Alt #1 - cross peninsula black  
b. Alt #2 - Fly MAC corridor

~~(C)~~ 4. ██████████

- a. File ICAO as C-130s, ██████████

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1. The purpose of this paper is to examine political and strategic factors which could be used to determine, if and under what conditions the U.S. should attempt rescue of American hostages in Tehran. The paper did not address geo-political or strategic factors.

2. The purpose of this paper is to examine political and strategic factors in an attempt to find possible solutions to the Iranian - American crisis and early release of the hostages within terms acceptable to both Iran and the U.S. Since our interests in Iran and the region extend far beyond hostage release or rescue, it is imperative that mutually acceptable solutions be found; these solutions should be found quickly or the U.S. will possibly lose the option for emergency rescue. As stated in the 25 Jan paper, we estimate that operational security can be maintained for two to six additional weeks. The disclosure by the news media that six Americans departed Iran with Canadian assistance will likely turn the media attention to rescue options for Americans held hostage. While we are working hard to maintain OPSEC the useful life of the rescue capability has probably been shortened, perhaps significantly.

3. Approach: Solutions must be mutually acceptable to Iran and the U.S. However, due to our longer term interests in Iran and the region, proposals by the U.S. must consider the geo-political and strategic implications for other regional states, in particular Russia. Whatever is good for Iran and the U.S. is in

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most important factor in our decision making. We have examined the options available to the U.S. in the context of near and long term interests of these nations. Following is our identification of Iranian, American, and Russian goals and objectives.

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In our assessment, Iranian and American goals and objectives are not dissimilar with the possible exception of the hostage issue. In only a very few instances Russian objectives are complimentary. If our assessment is reasonably accurate, the U.S. has at least an even chance of selecting a course which appears to accommodate most of the U.S. and Iranian political and strategic objectives. The accommodations could also blunt Russian objectives.

4. It would appear that the Iranian perception of the American position towards the Iranians of our sincerity is beleaguered by a set of circumstances and "truisms" as perceived by the Iranians. Although we do not share the Iranian perception, it is necessary to understand them and work to correct them. following is our understanding of the situation:

a. Previous U.S. support of the Pahlavi Dynasty, judged by the Iranians to have been despotic, corrupt, etc. They demand at the least an "apology" from the U.S. - a U.S. recognition of its past mistakes. Many Iranians believe that for 2500 years foreigners have influenced Iran to its disadvantage. Many believe that the U.S. support of the Shah up to and during the revolution was so extensive and determined that the U.S. was strongly opposed to the formation of an Islamic Republic. Considering America's strength and commitment to the Shah, plus a perception of America's unsatiabale imperialistic motives, the Iranians remain convinced that the problems of today's Iran are surely our doing.

b. Many Iranians, particularly religious leaders, believe that foreign influence and presence in Iran has seriously damaged the cultural and religious fibre of the nation. (The Shiite see the nation and Islam as synonymous.)

c. Based on the foregoing, Iran perceives that any relationship must guarantee independence from foreign influence. For example, they will not agree to security assistance which infers a commitment on their part nor will they request in the near term American DOD advisors, civilian or military. They will avoid economic commitment

... of Iran is a manifestation of our desire to see the current regime fail.

e. The Iranian bottom line to the U.S. is that since the U.S. has, as they see it, kept Iran in political, economic, religious, and cultural bondage, it is up to the Americans to demonstrate we have put the past behind us, recognize and demonstrate that we have accepted that we must have a relationship which is sincere, fair and based on a policy of non-interference.

f. Iranians distrust the Russians and hate Communism. Yet, the memory of Russian intervention is old compared to their perception of the U.S. They, the Iranians, underestimate the strength and intentions of the Russians and over estimate both for the U.S. They remain fearful that the U.S. has the power and intention to preclude establishment of the Islamic Republic.

5. Other factors to consider are:

a. The captors have added to the U.S. dilemma and the Iranian Government as well. We do not know their strength nor the source of it. Should we or should we not single them out as the culprits detrimental to U.S. - Iranian relations.

b. The current stage of elections adds to our problems. Should we or should we not work to approach the new President. If we do, will it brand him as pro-American or otherwise reduce his potential as a leader willing to work out solutions?

6. Obviously, the U.S. cannot satisfy all Iranian - U.S. objectives in the near term. Our approach and immediate objective should be to secure the early release of hostages which in turn should enable a more stable and favorable environment for longer term objectives.

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... the perspective Iran and her objectives and find them, in general acceptable to us. To the contrary, we probably should not publicly express the view that it is in Iran's best interest to recognize that Russia is her real threat vs the U.S. The Iranians may well believe we are trying to influence them on what is good or bad for them. They will not publicly admit that the Russian is a common enemy of Iran and the West for fear of appearing aligned with one superpower against another. Our general denunciations of Russia, plus those of the U.N. and Islamic Conference are sufficient for them to be on guard.

8. Following is a list of proposals for near term U.S. initiatives for consideration in addition to those underway in the U.N. or other channels. Most of them are overt, others not as apparent.

a. A high U.S. official should send a message to the Revolutionary Council congratulating them on the recent presidential elections. It should be in the context of another important step toward forming a government within the Islamic Republic and we look forward to good relations with the government. We wish them a speedy election of the Majelists and a free and independent Islamic Republic. We need not and perhaps should not mention the President's name as it could serve to make him appear to our particular liking. Another attractive feature of this proposal is that it could come at a time that the Russians are becoming more critical of Iranian leadership.

b. We should send a message to Khomeini wishing him a speedy recovery. He is the head of state and most Iranians may well

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appropriate...  
the message. We also suggest that U.S. religious leaders also follow suit.

c. We should immediately begin a campaign to convince Iran that the departure of six American diplomats from Iran and the manner of their departure was not intended to offend the Regime. Rather, we should express regret that it was necessary but we were concerned that they might fall into custody of groups who would further exacerbate the situation and work to make our mutual objectives even more difficult. To do otherwise will strengthen the Iranians perception of our capabilities and power once again took advantage of them and lead to cause resentment and bitterness.

d. The hostage issue: Iran and the U.S. appear to be at an impasse. There are some signs that release could be arranged short of the Shah's return. But the Iranians are not likely to compromise, no matter how much they may want to, until the U.S. "owns up to its past evil deeds." We obviously cannot own up to evil deeds not committed nor can we suggest return of the Shah. It is imperative, then that we generate and facilitate concepts which will convince the Iranians that the past era is dead, that we wish to demonstrate that we want a new relationship based on Iran's independence from the U.S. and non-intervention and are prepared to prove it. Our delima is how to implement a program without withdrawing adequate



Iran for release of the hostages. An equally  
challenge is to implement a program short of confusing or  
alienating the American public, and political and governmental  
establishments.

There are several commodities which the U.S. controls  
directly or indirectly, that Iran needs urgently, others not  
as urgently. Some are: military spare parts, spare parts  
for the petroleum industry, agricultural products, drugs  
and medicines, Iranian monetary assists, and greater  
recognition of Iran, specifically the Islamic Republic.

We should develop the thought that the U.S. can withhold  
these commodities indefinitely without injury to the U.S.  
In recognition of Iran's new republic, we agree to the release,  
sale and recognition of commodities with small but important  
commitment to continue to make the commodities available. This  
could serve as an unstated recognition that we value our  
relationships with Iran under the Islamic Republic to be as  
or more important than the former regime. Further, we should  
state that with the release and sale of the commodities, that  
we prefer a new relationship which does not carry commitments  
by the U.S. or Iran and only one provisio is required:  
return of the hostages.

The manner and style of negotiations is vastly important  
to the U.S. and Iran. On the one hand, it may be desirable to  
initiate quiet and secret negotiations. On the other hand, Iran  
might strive for open negotiations to publicly demonstrate  
that Iran is equal to the U.S. and wishes to publicly "punish"

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... that the U.S. begin with quiet negotiations through diplomatic channels. We should propose urgent but closely held meetings in Tehran. This could cause the Iranians to believe we are sincere and very much concerned by offering to come to Tehran under current security conditions. We should also be prepared to meet on neutral ground or in the U.S. This message to the Iranians can also be transmitted to Iranians through commercial, military, medical, agricultural and petroleum contacts - surely there are influential Iranians in these sectors who want desperately to see an end to the impasse.

e. The Captors: It is becoming increasingly clear that the captors will play a major role in not only the release of the hostages but also the safety of hostages from the time they are released until safely out of Iran. At this point, we do not know enough about them. We should expend immediately all efforts within our entire intelligence community to determine who they are, where and by whom trained and what connections they have to other groups in and out of Iran. We believe that they are supervised and governed by a higher structure outside of the compound which is sophisticated, has clear objectives and is highly disciplined. It is very unlikely that this group could have trained and organized itself and become so highly competent without strong and effective supervision. Their demonstrated performance within the compound including running the compound, orientation

dealing with Khomeini and the Revolutionary Councils. The hierarchy which develops and implements policy, strategy and tactics and in turn governs the captors.

There is evidence that some of the captor's objectives are not in concert with Khomeini's and the Revolutionary Councils. They apparently have short and long term goals. Within a relatively short period of known existence they have become a major political force in Iran and internationally. In a nation where strength is recognized, admired, and feared, they now approach, at least temporarily, a force equal to all political forces with possible exception of Khomeini. What direction and how much momentum they can develop, remains to be seen.

One may find some comfort from the captor's statements that they will release the hostages on Khomeini's order. We are concerned, however, that they may have privately communicated to Khomeini that he should not order them to do so. Depending on their power base and Khomeini's assessment of the situation, he may or may not order release.

Whatever the case, we should not suggest publicly that Khomeini does not have influence over the captors. Statements to this effect could encourage the captors to pursue their objectives, whatever their objectives may be, give the Iranians the impression we are meddling in their internal affairs and further aggravate Khomeini. We, therefore,

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should attempt to win over the Iranian leadership. One of the factors involved in this process is the OPSEC (OPSEC) for the Joint Task Force (JTF). News Media disclosure of the departure of six Americans from Tehran has increased our concern for OPSEC.

We propose that the U.S. begin an urgent and concerted diplomatic effort with the objective of bringing early release of the hostages, hopefully before OPSEC is compromised.

This paper: examines Iranian perceptions of the U.S.; examines Iran's conditions for renewed relations with the U.S.; lists Iranian, American, and Russian goals and objectives; and, suggests that the U.S. can determine a course which could lead to early release of the hostages, enhance our strategic interests in Iran, while at the same time blunting Russia's objectives.

We propose that through quiet diplomatic initiatives the U.S. recognizes the recent Presidential election, show concern for Khomeini's health, provide commodities needed urgently by Iran, demonstrate new regard for the Islamic Republic and Islam, send an envoy to Iran and learn far more about the captors. Each of these proposals is accompanied with rationale to support the initiative.

to find out the nature of the situation -- at least until we find out  
more about them.

f. Islam: The U.S. should take into full account Khomeini's  
version of Shiite Islam. Khomeini's revolution was based  
largely on Islam and the need for his style of Islam to be  
instituted not only in Iran but also in other Moslem countries.  
Since Shiite Islam considers religion and politics to be  
complementary, it is important for us to understand it and  
to recognize it in our overtures, negotiations and new  
relationships. This will require a delicate balance in the  
attitudes we project. While we should respect many features  
of Islam, we must not give, for obvious reasons, credence  
to the export of Iranian Islam to other nations in the  
region. This approach will require care in our expressions  
of the Russians reprehensible persecution of the Moslems  
in Afghanistan. The connection between Shiite Islam and  
the Moslem world need not necessarily be made.

IRAN

U.S.

RUSSIA

Establishment of Islamic Republic.

Form of Government chosen by Iran as long as not Communist.

Islamic Republic OK for now.

- West elect majlis and appoint ministers.

- Support completion of Iranian process.

- Desire those to be elected to be anti West/American.

Perpetuation of Khomeini's version of Islam through revolutions if necessary.

Mute spread and attempt to direct Muslim attention toward Russia.

Blunt spread of new Islamic movement to prevent spread to Russia.

Political stability in Iran.

Political stability in Iran for near and long term.

Political stability in Iran for near term - turmoil should Iranian Government turn to West.

Continued oil and gas production with sale to West and East.

Continued production and sale of oil to West - neutral on gas to Russia.

Reduction in production and oil sale to West - can accept loss of attendant gas flow to Russia.

Iran does not succumb to Russian Hegemony.

Keep pressures and political awareness of Russian might be for Iranians.

Iran and Pakistan hold line against Soviet drive to warm water port.

Through Hegemony and more direct actions cause eventual collapse of Iranian and Pakistanian Governments - seek parties who invite Russian presence.

IRANIAN, U.S., AND RUSSIAN GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

<u>IRAN</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>RUSSIA</u>
Return of Shah and wealth. - Hold hostages until real movement.	Hostage release. - Obtain release prior to loss of rescue option.	Continued U.S. - Iranian confrontation.
Non-interference by U.S. in Iranian affairs.	Good relations with Iran and non-interference in Iranian affairs.	Total and lasting break of U.S./ Iranian relations.
Non-alignment	Non-aligned Iran	Anti west or at least a non-aligned Iran.
Free of dependence or influence of West and East.  - Political: Not reliant on world opinion. - Foreign Affairs: No alliances or impediments. - Security Assistance: Receive purchased and purchase materials - no strings attached. - Economic: No political conditions for trade; free Iranian assets.	An independent and self sufficient Iran.  - Political motives satisfy internal Iranian requirements. - Iran becomes good neighbor - aware of Soviets long-term interest. - Release and sell non-sensative material with assurance it will not be transferred. - Even trade policy - no threat of impoundment of U.S. assets.	An Iran isolated from the West and increasingly under Russian influence.  - Iranian politics recognize Russian Interests. - Iranians lay-off Russians. - Stop U.S. security assistance and sell Russian material. - Shift trade to Russia - little Iranian economic development.

General

1. Q. I understand the RH-53 is primarily used for minesweeping -- why was it used for a rescue mission?
- A. Shipboard compatibility, range, and lift capability made it the only helo in the US military suitable for this mission.
2. Q. Is the RH-53 the first generation of a helicopter type?
- A. No. The CH-53A was the lead aircraft.
3. Q. Have RH-53Ds been used to fly long distances before?
- A. Yes. RH-53 helos routinely make long distance transits. One of the helicopter's missions is to provide vertical onboard delivery (VOD) to ships at sea.
4. Q. How old were the RH-53's which were used? Were later models available that might have been used?
- A. They were 7 years old. Newer models were not available.
5. Q. What is the impact of the loss of these helicopters on US minesweeping capability?
- A. A total inventory of 30 RH-53D airborne mine countermeasures helos is now reduced to 23.
6. Q. How long had the helos and their maintenance crews been deployed on the NIMITZ prior to the mission?
- A. Maintenance crews and helos had been deployed on NIMITZ and KITTY HAWK for five months; flying crews for only four days. Helos did not routinely fly mission profiles.
7. Q. Were the RH-53 helicopters given the same attention as the other aircraft aboard the NIMITZ?
- A. Yes. As a matter of fact, the RH-53 helos received high level attention and high priority was placed on getting required repair parts to the NIMITZ.
8. Q. Why weren't additional RH-53's positioned aboard NIMITZ?
- A. The number of helos positioned aboard NIMITZ was considered to be adequate to support the mission.

~~Classified By~~ JCS

~~Declassified On~~ OADR

Declassified by:

DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

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## Execution of Mission

1. Q. If you launched eight capable RH-53s, how do you account for the fact that less than seven hours later you aborted because you only had five helos which were flyable?
  - A. The helo carrying contingency repair parts was unable to penetrate a severe sandstorm, because navigation and attitude, heading, and reference systems were inoperative. It returned to the aircraft carrier. A second aircraft made a forced landing with indications of a main rotor blade failure. A third aircraft developed hydraulic problems which could not be repaired without the repair parts.
2. Q. Why couldn't the helo that returned to the NIMITZ proceed to the fuel rendezvous despite the time lapse?
  - A. Approaching daylight rendered this option infeasible.
3. Q. Who was coordinating the departure of the aircraft when the decision was made to cancel the mission?
  - A. The ground controller ~~(with Delta forces)~~ directed parking, fueling and aircraft movements which was difficult because of deep loose sand.
4. Q. Why did a helo and a transport plane collide?
  - A. Extremely dusty conditions in total darkness degraded visibility during refueling operations.
5. Q. Why were two aircraft moving at the same time?
  - A. Only one of the aircraft was moving. The C-130 was stationary; the RH-53D was repositioning to take on additional fuel.

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- Q. Has this type of helo operated from aircraft carriers previously?
- A. Yes. This type of helo is used primarily for minesweeping and is usually operated from amphibious helicopter carriers when performing this type of mission.
2. Q. What type of ship does it usually operate from?
- A. It usually operates from amphibious ships (LPH, LPD) conducting minesweeping preparatory to amphibious landings.
3. Q. What is the usual mission radius of these helos?
- A. 250 miles without internal range extension tanks.
4. Q. How was the range extended?
- A. By adding internal range extension tanks which almost doubled the range.
5. Q. Was this a routine mission for this helicopter?
- A. No. The routine mission for the RH-53 is minesweeping.
6. Q. Were the RH-53s especially configured for the mission, i.e., was special equipment added?
- A. Yes. Two types of special equipment were added:
1. Long range navigation equipment (OMEGA and inertial navigation system (PINS)).
  2. Internal extended range fuel tanks.
7. Q. Did the helos operate within their design limits on the mission?
- A. Yes.
8. Q. Is the RH-53 capable of operating over terrain such as that found in Iran?
- A. Yes. As a matter of fact, the Iranian Navy purchased six RH-53Ds for their own use.
9. Q. Did the helos operate within acceptable environmental conditions on parts or all of this mission?
- A. No. An unexpected, severe sandstorm was encountered. The aircraft were in this sandstorm for approximately 3 hours.
10. Q. What effect does sand and dust and high altitude have on the RH-53?
- A. Sand and dust reduced crew visibility and affected their visual orientation. Altitude reduces performance, as it does to all helos.

11. Q. Were the helos configured to operate in a sandy environment -- was any special equipment added or were they designed for such terrain as the desert of Iran?

A. The aircraft has an engine air particle separator (EAPS) to prevent sand from entering the engines.

12. Q. How did the pilots and crewmen see at night?

A. Night vision goggles were provided for all the aircrew.

13. Q. Were these devices adequate?

A. Yes, under visual flight conditions, but the goggles induced severe vertigo in the sandstorm environment.

14. Q. Had they been designed for use in flying a helo?

A. They had been designed for use by infantrymen but were adapted for use by pilots flying a helo.

## Maintenance.

1. Q. Did failures occur during training rehearsals?  
A. Yes, but sufficient helos were available to complete the training missions.
2. Q. What is the RH-53 operational ready rate for normal operations?  
A. During the past nine months the mission capable rate has been: 45% in Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) configuration; 83% in Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) configuration. The VOD configuration involves long range delivery of personnel and equipment to or from ships at sea. This mission required VOD configuration.
3. Q. What were the types of failures experienced during training?  
A. There were no unusual events or failures.
4. Q. Does the RH-53 have a history of maintenance problems?  
A. Yes. The RH-53 has historically had a low availability rate. This is attributed to shortages of qualified maintenance personnel, unique deployment requirements, and the small size of the AMCM community (only about 30 helos).
5. Q. What were the specific material failures which occurred?  
A. - A/C #2 experienced a failure of the 2d stage hydraulic system pump enroute.  
- A/C #6 experienced a two (2) channel BIM indication and the loss of the 2d stage hydraulic pressure. These symptoms indicated imminent rotor failure.
6. Q. What parts with high failure rates were pre-positioned in the C-130? What maintenance personnel? What repair equipment?  
A. None in the C-130. Parts were positioned in A/C #5. No extra maintenance personnel were positioned other than aircrew, who were qualified to perform routine maintenance tasks, including minor repairs.
7. Q. Was adequate supervision provided to the maintenance effort?  
A. Yes.

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8. Q. Who was assigned responsibility for maintenance support of the mission aircraft?
- A. CINCPACFLT was responsible for the overall support. HM-16 maintained the helos on board the aircraft carriers.
9. Q. What is the background and experience of HM-16 in helo support?
- A. Both the commanding officer and maintenance officer of HM-16 have extensive experience in support of RH-53D's.
10. Q. How was the maintenance effort coordinated?
- A. Special attention and highest priority were given by all levels of Navy command for repair and replacement parts.
11. Q. Was there adequate support equipment available -- intermediate level?
- A. Yes.
12. Q. Was there any indication of lack of support for these helos?
- A. No.
13. Q. Were there any shortages of qualified maintenance personnel?
- A. No.
14. Q. Who was responsible for parts support?
- A. CINCPACFLT
15. Q. What was the quality of parts received?
- A. All were ready for issue.
16. Q. What were the means and routing of parts delivery? Time?
- A. High priority air and sea delivery were provided.
17. Q. Was there a problem providing adequate replacement repair parts to the deployed helos?
- A. All known requirements were satisfied prior to the mission.

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18. Q. Did the helicopters carry spare parts?  
A. Yes, the spares were in A/C #5, which returned to the carrier.
19. Q. What percentage of the aircraft were normally operational?  
A. 85% were mission capable during the 30 day period prior to the mission.
20. Q. Why couldn't the crews land and perform the repairs?  
A. Because all spare parts were aboard A/C #5, which returned to the carrier.
21. Q. Did you have any maintenance problems on the carrier?  
A. Nothing significant that would indicate a maintenance trend.
22. Q. How frequently were RH-53's exercised, i.e., turned up or flown?  
A. Daily for approximately 0.4 hours.
23. Q. How did the stringent security requirements affect the maintenance and supply support effort on the RH-53's?  
A. Ground turn-ups and short duration flight impact on dynamic components which require longer flights than were performed on this mission. OPSEC further precluded movement of the aircrews to NIMITZ in sufficient time to provide them the amount of time they would have preferred to exercise the airplane they were scheduled to fly.
24. Q. Were the RH-53's completely ready for flight when they were launched?  
A. Yes. All systems were thoroughly checked before the mission was launched.
25. Q. Did you receive any warnings concerning the ability of the RH-53 to support the mission?  
A. No. The RH-53 with special equipment installed was considered to be sufficiently reliable for the type of mission flown.



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
JOHN F. KENNEDY CENTER FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

124

AFJK-CG

14 February 1980

SUBJECT: Psychological Operations Plan - Iranian Hostage Issue (S)

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Pentagon  
ATTN: J-3 SOD  
Washington, DC 20301

(S) In response to your request, the 4th Psychological Operations Group expanded the National Strategic Psychological Operations Plan to include a sub-campaign to address the "captors." This sub-campaign is designed so that it may be implemented by itself immediately or as an integral part of the broader National Plan.

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as

*Jack Mackmull*  
JACK V. MACKMULL  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

~~Classified by: Director, J-3, JCS  
Review on: 14 February 2000  
Extended by: Director, J-3, JCS  
Reason: Para 2-301c, DoD 5200.1-R  
3, 5, 7~~



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Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

AFJK-POG-CO

13 February 1980

SUBJECT: Psychological Operations Plan - Iranian Hostage Issue (S)

Commanding General  
USAJFKCENMA  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

1. (U) (S) On 8 February 1980, OJCS requested that the proposed National Strategic Psychological Operations Plan be expanded to include a sub-campaign to address the "captors." Specific objectives are:
  - a. (U) (S) Convince the captors to cooperate with Bani Sadr on the hostage issue.
  - b. (U) (S) Isolate the captors to eliminate their influence on the hostage issue.
2. (U) (S) Attached is a sub-campaign designed to convince the captors to release the American hostages. This particular sub-campaign is designed to be used as an integral part of the National Plan using the same methodology and format as the other sub-campaigns. Thematic material is compatible with and reinforces thematic material in the National Plan; however, this sub-campaign could be implemented by itself. This approach offers planners the flexibility of implementing this sub-campaign immediately without detracting from a more deliberate consideration of the National Plan and the concomitant recommendations for its implementation.
3. (U) (S) This sub-campaign is the only sub-campaign in the National Plan which includes recommendations for the use of "black and gray propaganda." These recommendations are justified by the critical nature of the hostage issue and its potential impact on US foreign and domestic policies.

1 Incl  
as

*Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.*  
ALFRED H. PADDOCK, Jr.  
COL, IN  
Commanding



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1. (U) (S) Statement of PSYOP Objective (U)

(U) (S) Convince militants occupying the US embassy in Tehran to release all hostages without harm.

2. (U) (S) Definition of Target Audience (U)

(U) (S) The militants occupying the US embassy in Tehran have demonstrated a high degree of revolutionary zeal, a continuing firm commitment to the position that the US hostages will not be released before the former Shah is returned to Iran for trial, and a relatively disciplined organization. The militants also have demonstrated a fairly sophisticated understanding of hostage-captor psychological dynamics, a keen appreciation of media manipulation for political advantage, and a willingness to confront Iranian political authorities. They have exploited the political leverage provided by their occupation of the US embassy to have ministers of state replaced, an ambassador recalled, and to exert considerable influence on the 25 January presidential election. It can be presumed that the political influence their status as captors has given them has convinced some of the militants to prolong the embassy crisis as long as possible in order to preserve their political influence. The group holding this conviction apparently dominates the "leadership committee" which governs the collective actions of the militants.

(U) (S/NF) Despite the organizational discipline they have demonstrated and the apparent unanimity of their public statements and actions, the militants are not a homogenous group. Five general sub-groups with overlapping membership have been tentatively identified among the composite force occupying the embassy. These are theological students, university students, Revolutionary Guardsmen, Palestinian-trained Iranian activists and political leftists. The attitudes, perceptions, goals and ultimate loyalties of the sub-groups probably vary considerably. It is highly likely that the theological students, many of the university students and Revolutionary Guardsmen, and perhaps some of the Palestinian trained activists are committed primarily to the goals of the Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran. Most of the militants in this category are devoted to Ayatollah Khomeini as the possessor of both ultimate spiritual and temporal authority. They could be expected to obey Khomeini if he unambiguously ordered release of the hostages. Furthermore, because of their devotion to Khomeini and their commitment to Islamic revolutionary goals, these activists are potentially susceptible to appeals or demands issued by less revered political authorities holding positions approved by Khomeini and acting with his tacit, if not explicit, endorsement. The constitutionally-elected President of the Islamic Republic is one such political authority. The remaining militants probably hold little if any allegiance to Khomeini and the goals of the Islamic Revolution. These leftist militants could be

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expected to resist and perhaps to defy orders issued by either political officials or Ayatollah Khomeini to release the hostages. The leadership committee which directs militant activities at the embassy is dominated by the more radical or intransigent elements among the militants and may be dominated, although this is not certain, by leftist elements holding no real allegiance to Khomeini.

(U)  
(C) While it is extremely unlikely that a summary execution of any hostage will occur, this radical element may contain a few individuals willing to resort to such extremes if the militants become totally isolated from the Iranian people and government. Such actions would clearly separate the radical fringe from the other captors and the Iranian government. The government would no longer be an appropriate target, but an excellent opportunity would arise for the US to call for retribution against the executioners in particular and condemnation of terrorism in general.

3. (U)  
(C) Statement of Themes (U)

a. (U)  
(C) The embassy occupation is isolating the militants from the Iranian Revolution. As a collective unit, the militants are extremely vulnerable to loss of the public support and the consequent political influence their seizure of the embassy has generated. Public sympathy and support of their activities are the most important conditions which have allowed the militants to develop and exercise political influence. All of the militants are vulnerable to the loss of this support. Those sincerely devoted to the Islamic Republic and Khomeini are further vulnerable to the adverse ramifications the embassy occupation may have for ultimate international acceptance of the Republic. The criticality of the militants' vulnerability to isolation from public support makes them highly susceptible to this theme, if there is convincing evidence that the theme accurately reflects political reality.

b. (U)  
(C) Continuation of the hostage crisis contributes to conditions threatening the survival of the Islamic Revolution. Those militants loyal to Khomeini and the goals of the Islamic Republic are vulnerable to loss of the successes the revolution has achieved. Growing domestic instability and the increasing threat of Soviet intervention both carry the potential to overthrow the Islamic revolutionary leadership and to replace the Islamic Revolution with one seeking different political goals. To the extent the Khomeini devotees perceive these vulnerabilities, they will be susceptible to this theme. Leftist elements among the militants having little or no commitment to Islamic goals are not subject to the same vulnerabilities and, in fact, probably would welcome further turmoil in Iran as improving conditions for a second, leftist, revolution. Consequently, the leftists are not susceptible to this theme.

c. (U) (S) There are a variety of legal and internationally accepted methods for airing the legitimate grievances of the Iranian people. The militants are vulnerable to the loss of public support and their own ability to guide the Revolution toward those idealist goals which initially motivated their occupation of the US embassy. In addition to the idealistic motivations, the captors generally are driven by three very primal needs. First, they have an intense fear of the Shah's return to power or the reimposition of a foreign (read US) "satanic" puppet. Secondly, the captors are driven by greed in terms of the exported Shah's wealth. Finally, they have a sense of vindictive responsibility to punish and humiliate the Shah, his supporters and the US. Accordingly, the captors are susceptible to themes which emphasize these vulnerabilities while also offering means through which the militants can retain a vanguard, or at least influential, role in the revolutionary process. Themes addressing the aforementioned vulnerabilities/susceptibilities would have little credibility if they appear to be originating from a US or US influenced source. Therefore a "gray propaganda" effort would be most effective.

d. (U) (S) The US respects the goals of the Islamic Revolution and the desires of the Iranian people. The vulnerabilities of the militants are those previously described. Under conditions prevailing on 9 February 1980, the theme of US respect for Islamic/Iranian goals does not directly exploit any of the militants' vulnerabilities and, consequently, is not a theme to which they are susceptible. However, other groups within the Iranian population that possess the potential to influence the perceptions of the militants are susceptible to the theme. Furthermore, the militants can be expected to become increasingly susceptible to the theme, as justification for accepting a compromise resolution of the hostage situation, if they become convinced that the hostage crisis must be resolved either to preserve their own political influence or to protect the achievements of the Islamic Revolution.

4. (U) (S) Effectiveness (U)

(U) (S) As a collective entity, the militants are capable of effecting the release of all hostages without harm by deciding to do so. However, such decisions appear to be made for the total group by a leadership committee dominated by the more intransigent element among the militants. This group probably will attempt to prolong the hostage crisis in order to preserve its own political influence. Militant efforts to avoid compromise solutions and to prolong the crisis can be anticipated to continue until the intransigents perceive that further prolongation of the crisis threatens to convert public support for their activities into alienation or hostility that will eliminate their political influence.

5. (U) Accessibility (U)

~~(S)~~<sup>(U)</sup> Aggressively seeking to influence, if not control, political events in Iran, the militants are highly attuned to all media that indicate the current status of their role in the political arena. Avid consumers as well as manipulators of the domestic broadcast media, the militants are highly accessible through these media. The militants also can be expected to closely follow external broadcasts that provide information, not available in the increasingly controlled domestic media, concerning the impact of their own activities on other political participants, government intentions, and public reactions to both their own and government activities. These also can be carried effectively to component elements among the militant group by influential individuals and groups in Iran. Such people and groups include Ayatollah Khomeini and his representatives, government officials, members of Iran's Revolutionary Council, seminary students in Qum, university students in Tehran, Revolutionary Guard leaders and cadre, respected religious figures, members of Iranian leftist groups, representatives of various Palestinian nationalist groups (notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Fatah), and activists of the communist Tudeh Party of Iran. More general population groups, such as the intelligentsia, the bazaaris and the unemployed lower economic class, also are capable of conveying generalized themes to the militants through personal contact or public displays, such as wall graffiti, speeches and public demonstrations.

6. ~~(S)~~<sup>(U)</sup> Conclusions (U)

a. ~~(S)~~<sup>(U)</sup> Most Lucrative Target Audience: The militants are a particularly resistant target audience for themes related to hostage release. However, the Khomeini loyalists and other religious devotees will be more susceptible to themes related to release of the hostages than will be the leftists. The leftists, while more resistant to hostage-release themes, will be more effective in ultimately orchestrating release of the hostages than will be the religious devotees.

b. ~~(S)~~<sup>(U)</sup> Most Productive Themes: Growing isolation will be the most productive theme directed at the militants as a total group. Of equal productivity for the Khomeini loyalists only will be themes emphasizing the dangers posed to the Islamic revolution by prolongation of the embassy crisis. The theme emphasizing the pragmatic utility of a compromise solution will be productive only when a sense of growing isolation from public support has been engendered in the dominant intransigent element among the militants. Themes emphasizing US respect for Islamic values and the Iranian people will be effective with influential intermediate target audience among the Iranian population but will not by themselves alter the perceptions of the militants.

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c. (U) (S) Most Productive Media: An unambiguous public statement by Ayatollah Khomeini provides the single most effective medium. Short of such a statement by the Ayatollah, no single medium can be considered particularly more productive than others. A combination of all media does have the potential to convincingly carry desired themes to the militants.

d. (U) (S) Anticipated Impact: By themselves, psychological operations offer little probability of successfully altering the perceptions and behavior of the militants holding the hostages. However, appropriate communications can both encourage Iranian government authorities to attempt to resolve the hostage situation and provide significant support to Iranian officials in their efforts to resolve the situation. A combination of Iranian government efforts, US diplomatic support for those efforts, and the projection of themes related to hostage release to both the activists and intermediate target audiences, does have the potential to reduce the current political influence of the activists, isolate the activists from public support, and eventually convince the activists that a compromise solution provides greater advantages for them than would a prolongation of the crisis.

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1. (U) Statement of PSYOP Objective (U)

(U) Convince militants occupying the US embassy in Tehran to release all hostages without harm.

2. (U) Definition of Target Audiences (U)

a. (U) Ayatollah Khomeini: Khomeini remains the ultimate legitimizing force for political activities in Iran. He views political affairs primarily in moralistic terms and relies for practical advice, as well as for daily implementation of policy, on a circle of advisors within the Revolutionary Council and, since 25 January 1980, on the elected President of the Islamic Republic. Although Khomeini has endorsed the militants' position that the US hostages will not be released until the Shah is returned to Iran for trial, he is capable of reversing his position and ordering a release of the hostages, if given a face-saving method of doing so.

b. (U) President Abul Hasan Bani-Sadr: Bani-Sadr, the elected President of the Islamic Republic, is the only Iranian official besides Khomeini whose position is legitimized by the new constitution. A de facto political exile from the Shah's regime, Bani-Sadr spent fifteen years in France, where he eventually joined Khomeini's circle of advisors. An ardent anti-imperialist and critic of US involvement in Iran, Bani-Sadr portrays himself as a true revolutionary and leftist. As acting Foreign Minister during most of November 1979, he refused to open direct negotiations with the US to resolve the hostage situation but nevertheless took the position that the hostage seizure had been a spontaneous but mistaken incident that should be terminated as rapidly as possible without the use of force. His previous statements indicate that he probably views his presidential responsibilities as a balancing act in which he must on one hand retain Khomeini's confidence, public support and his own ascendancy over political rivals in both the Revolutionary Council and the larger political arena, while on the other hand taking positive measures to establish an effective "revolutionary" government and solve Iran's pressing foreign and domestic problems.

c. (U) The Revolutionary Council of Iran: While some members of the Revolutionary Council appear to view political affairs primarily from the same moralistic basis as Khomeini, other members take a more pragmatic position on specific issues. The Council has in the past persuaded Khomeini to reverse his publicly-announced position on specific issues. A perception that either domestic instability or foreign hostilities seriously threaten the survival of the Islamic Republic could provide pragmatically oriented members of the Council with sufficient rationale to convince Ayatollah Khomeini to order release of the hostages.

(U) d. (S) Religious leaders (mullahs): Combining spiritual with political leadership, the mullahs give pre-eminence to spiritual values and to the necessity of following Shiite Islamic precepts in political life. However, they are highly politicized and are intimately involved in political affairs.

(U) e. (S) University and theological students: Many of these students are both deeply religious and fervently committed to the revolutionary goal of establishing a Shiite state. They continue to be revolutionary activists and have constituted an important source of public sympathy and vocal support for the embassy militants.

(U) f. (S) Revolutionary Guards: Primarily youthful, zealous, and at least initially motivated in significant degree by religious commitment, these guardians of the Revolution have cooperated closely with the militants and have provided at least a portion of the militants' numerical strength. Guards representatives may also be prominent members of the militants' leadership committee.

(U) g. (S) Bazaaris and middle class: The bazaaris can be categorized as both deeply religious and strongly motivated by economic and profit considerations. The middle class generally believes that religious devotion can be compatible with Western life-styles and methods. The middle class is concerned primarily with political freedoms and living standards.

(U) h. (S) Militant Iranian leftist organizations: Although some of the militant leftist organizations in Iran have contributed members and perhaps leaders to the occupation group at the US embassy, other leftist groups apparently have been barred from the embassy compound by the occupying militants. At least one organization loosely associated with the "Islamic-Marxist" Iranian Peoples Strugglers (Mujahidin) appears to be represented among the militants, although the tightly organized and ideologically cohesive Mujahidin itself may not be. While the leftists among the militants appear to draw support from their families and from associates with similar beliefs, they also appear to be the objects of resentment and passive opposition from other leftist groups. Lack of convincing information about the leftists at the embassy, coupled with historic rivalry among leftist groups in Iran, make the leftist organizations outside the embassy compound difficult to assess as target audiences. Generally, these groups advocate the revolutionary establishment of a classless, socialist state and portray themselves as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle in Iran. Some of the significant groups couple fundamentalist Shiite principles to their socialist ideology.

i. (U) (S) Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO): Some of the embassy militants almost certainly have personal links with PLO groups. George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is the Palestinian organization most likely to have had past and perhaps continuing ties with at least some of the militants. It is also possible, although not substantiated, that a number of the militants could have past associations with a Shiite militia organization in Lebanon, the Amal, which occasionally has cooperated closely with various Palestinian factions. The organization and conduct of the militants at the embassy indicates that at least some of their leaders have been associated with or trained by experienced guerrillas, possibly a Palestinian organization. Palestinian groups are interested primarily in advancing the Palestinian nationalist cause. Although other considerations are secondary, some Palestinian groups, notably the relatively moderate Fatah of Yasir Arafat, have involved themselves in diplomatic initiatives of virtually every nature in order to attract support for their nationalist cause.

j. (U) (S) International Islamic groups: These organizations attempt to promote the mutual interests of their members by gaining greater recognition for Islam in the world community and by promoting Islamic values within member states. They exercise some political influence and can be manipulated if they perceive the hostage situation as detrimental to Islam.

3. (U) (S) Statement of Themes (U)

a. (U) (S) The hostage crisis contributes to conditions threatening the survival of the Islamic Revolution. Both the president and the Revolutionary Council are in the process of consolidating a tenuous hold on political authority and are acutely conscious of their vulnerability to both internal and external developments that might precipitate either domestic disturbance or foreign interference. They are susceptible to all themes depicting potential dangers to the regime. The mullahs have returned to political influence as a result of the Islamic revolution and are vulnerable to the erosion of this hard won position. They are susceptible to themes articulating the possibility that revolutionary failure will submerge their own position and the influence of spiritual values on the life of the country. To the extent they are committed to both the spiritual and political goals of the Revolution, the students, seminarians and Revolutionary Guardsmen are vulnerable to the loss of these idealized goals as a result of revolutionary failure. They are potentially susceptible to themes announcing realistic threats to the goals of the Revolution. The bazaaris and middle class are vulnerable to the deterioration of economic prospects and living conditions that would accompany further political instability or foreign hostility. They are susceptible to the theme that continued confrontation with the US may be exacerbating domestic and international difficulties. Iranian leftist groups and Palestinian fellow



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travelers are not susceptible to this theme, as in most cases they are pursuing differing goals through the convenient vehicle of an Islamic revolution.

b. (U) (S) The hostage crisis strengthens the political effectiveness of groups with no allegiance to the Islamic Revolution. Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council are vulnerable to a reduction of their political influence caused by the competing influence exercised by the militants. The militants and other political pressure groups challenge legitimacy of the emerging constitutional regime, prevent it from attracting support through resolution of the social and economic difficulties besetting the nation, and threaten to undermine its ability to consolidate itself as a government-in-being. The president and the Revolutionary Council also are vulnerable to a further deterioration of Iran's status in the international community. They are aware already that Iran's status as a responsible nation state and the Islamic Republic's image as a rational and civilized government has been damaged by the intransigence of a small group of student activists. They are acutely aware that their failure to deal effectively with this group will precipitate further damage. They are vulnerable to themes emphasizing the inevitability of unhappy consequences, because both a measure of their continuing domestic legitimacy and their access to the forums in which they can reconstitute Iranian responsibility and status depend upon international support.

c. (U) (S) The embassy militants do not respect or represent the desires of the Iranian people. All of the target audiences that support, actively or passively, the goals of the Islamic Revolution in Iran are vulnerable to counter-revolutions or other political developments that could place desired goals beyond even potential attainment. Other Islamic states, and consequently international Islamic organizations, are vulnerable to secular, and particularly communist, exploitation of Iranian domestic turmoil. The fear of communism, regarded as the antithesis of religious value, coupled with a renaissance of Iranian xenophobia make this theme appropriate for use as "black propaganda." The related suggestion of self-serving factionalism on the part of the militants echoes and reinforces themes in use by the emerging constitutional leadership. The prevalence of factionalism and self-interest among Iranian political groups of all orientations makes all target audiences vulnerable to this suggestion. The sub-theme which stresses the incalculable damage that militant activities are working upon Islam is directed primarily at religious leaders and exploits a critical susceptibility already sensitized by the Iranian experience at the recent Muslim conference.

d. (U) (S) The US respects the goals of the Islamic Revolution and the desires of the Iranian people. The vulnerabilities of all target audiences

except the leftists, Palestinians and Islamic organizations are those discussed previously, with one addition. Each target audience also is vulnerable to the psychic and social disorientation produced by rapid Westernization and the uncontrolled encroachment of Western culture. The target audiences will be susceptible to this theme only to the extent that the US demonstrates a willingness to concede, at least partially, to Iranian political demands and to accept restrictions on its economic and cultural penetration of Iran. To be effective, the theme must be supported by actions that convince target audiences of a US willingness to cooperate with Iran on terms that are fully acceptable to Iran. Even given the necessary and appropriate supporting actions, however, this theme will have low credibility among virtually all target audiences. It is necessary as an anodyne which will form a neutral background to the sharper persuasive/coercive themes.

4. (U) Effectiveness (U)

a. (U) An unambiguous statement by Khomeini ordering release of the hostages would be the single most effective influence on the militants. Most if not all of the militants probably would obey such an order. Militants refusing to obey would be able to generate little public support for their defiance.

b. (U) Bani-Sadr probably remains capable of influencing, although not of dominating, Khomeini's political views and thus potentially is capable of persuading the Ayatollah to order release of the hostages. As a president with Khomeini's tacit endorsement, he is potentially capable of depriving the embassy militants of much of their current political influence and possibly of forcing them to accept a compromise solution to the hostage situation. His ability to fully realize this potential will be determined primarily by political developments in Iran.

c. (U) Individual and factional struggles for pre-eminence apparently characterize much of the Revolutionary Council's activity and limit its overall effectiveness. However, the Council remains the highest decisionmaking body on the Iranian political scene. If convinced of the pragmatic necessity of doing so, the Council is capable of rendering significant support to Bani-Sadr in his efforts to undermine the influence of the embassy militants and to impose a compromise solution to the hostage situation. The Council also controls or supervises all of the Iranian mass media and is capable of employing this vehicle and other means to generate public support for its policies.

d. (U) The mullahs provided an important medium of communication as well as an effective focus for mobilizing public sentiment and organizing public action during the anti-Shah revolution. Their political effectiveness and their ability to channel public perceptions remain intact. A decision by

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Khomeini or by the lesser ayatollahs on the Revolutionary Council to isolate or limit the influence of the embassy militants could be effectively translated into public action by the mullahs.

e. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ A lessening of the support currently provided the militants by the university and theological students would contribute meaningfully to generating perceptions of isolation among the militants. A conversion of the students' current support to even passive opposition would be a more significant contribution to perceptions of isolation by the militants.

f. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ Any lessening of the Revolutionary Guards' cooperation and support would contribute significantly to isolating the militants from external support.

g. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ The potential effectiveness of Iranian leftist groups in promoting desired objectives is minimal. Increasing opposition from rival leftists probably would have little effect. Withdrawal of support by sympathetic groups would be more significant, but probably could not be dissociated meaningfully from withdrawal of general public support.

h. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ The bazaaris and middle class, while possessing little if any ability to directly influence the militants, are capable persuading Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council of the continuing urgency of solving the hostage crisis.

i. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ Although one or more radical Palestinian factions may exercise influence with some of the militants at the embassy, the extent of that influence is not known. It is quite likely, however, that whatever influence these factions possess would be exerted toward retention of the hostages and prolongation of the crisis. There is no evidence that Fatah, the comparatively moderate Palestinian organization of Yasir Arafat, exercises any direct influence with the embassy militants. Fatah does have the potential to act as an intermediary between the US government and Iranian authorities, but its effectiveness in such a role probably would be no greater than that of a "neutral" Muslim state such as Pakistan, Turkey or Algeria, or than that of an international organization such as the United Nations.

j. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ The international Islamic organizations, and their member states, can effectively convey to Iranian leaders the positive or negative reactions of the international community to events in Iran. These groups contribute to the international community's generalized ability to encourage or discourage specific policies of the Iranian government.

5. (U) Accessibility (U)

(U) All Iranian target audiences remain highly active participants in the revolution which Iran continues to experience. As a consequence, each target audience is highly sensitized to all media of political communication. Each target audience actively seeks information from all available media. No single medium by itself, however, is capable of altering or significantly influencing the perceptions of any of the target audiences. The opinions and advice of trusted leaders, and particularly of Ayatollah Khomeini, are the most credible sources of information. However, even the persuasiveness of trusted leaders is not absolute. Repetition (and implicit corroboration) through multiple sources is the only effective method for altering the perceptions and behavior of the target audiences.

6. (U) Conclusions (U)

- a. (U) Most Lucrative Target Audience: No single target audience is conspicuously lucrative in isolation. The cumulative influence of all target audiences does provide the possibility of success.
- b. (U) Most Productive Theme: The most productive general theme for all potentially effective target audiences is that the hostage crisis is contributing to conditions, both domestic and external, that threaten the survival of the Islamic Revolution. Individual target audiences are best galvanized through use of tailored versions of this general theme.
- c. (U) Most Productive Media: No single media can produce the results desired, but a combination of all available media does have the potential to generate desired perceptions.
- d. (U) Anticipated Impact: The messages have the potential to convince the Iranian regime that its continued existence is threatened by domestic and foreign conditions and that the challenge presented by these conditions can be met only by peacefully resolving the hostage crisis. If this perception achieves ascendancy, the regime will undertake necessary domestic action to isolate the militants, turn public opinion against them and eventually force them to release the hostages as part of a compromise solution.

1. NATIONAL OBJECTIVE: Gain release of all hostages without harm.
2. NATIONAL PSYOP OBJECTIVE: Convince militants occupying the US embassy in Tehran to release all hostages without harm.
3. TARGET: Militants occupying the US embassy.

Target-Specific PSYOP Obj	Target Audience	Themes	Implementation	Impact Indicators
Militants cooperate with government to achieve a compromise solution.	All militants	<p>The embassy occupation is isolating the militants from the Iranian revolution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The people wanted and voted for a constitutional Islamic government.</li> <li>b. The people have overwhelmingly elected a president to represent their views and to lead their Republic.</li> <li>c. Public opposition to the militants will continue to grow as long as the policies of the president are defied.</li> <li>d. Continuation of the crisis will discredit the captors and, with them, an element of the revolution.</li> </ul>	<p>BBC broadcasts of diminishing public support for militants.</p> <p>Encourage anti-militant activities by receptive Iranian intermediate groups (religious leaders, bazaaris, middle class, urban unemployed).</p> <p>VOA/BBC/Arab radio reports linking crisis with growing political and economic turmoil in Iran.</p> <p>Cassettes and printed material linking crisis to turmoil and economic hardships, transported by networks of expatriate political leaders.</p>	<p>Increasing statements by the militants that they support the desires of the Iranian people.</p> <p>Diminishing criticism of government officials and policies.</p> <p>Statements indicating weakening of intransigence on hostage release.</p> <p>Moderate elements depart embassy compound.</p>
Khomeini loyalists break unanimity of militants on hostage release or withdraw from embassy compound.	Khomeini loyalists and religiously motivated groups among the militants	<p>Continuation of the hostage crisis contributes to conditions threatening the survival of the Islamic Revolution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Crisis increases the potential for Soviet intervention.</li> <li>b. Crisis contributes to domestic political fragmentation and turmoil.</li> <li>c. Crisis contributes to economic instability.</li> <li>d. Crisis strengthens the political effectiveness of groups with no allegiance to Islamic values or the political freedom of Iran's people.</li> </ul>	<p>VOA/BBC/Arab broadcasts linking crisis with growing political and economic turmoil.</p> <p>VOA/BBC Arab broadcasts linking crisis with Soviet threat.</p> <p>Personal contacts with expatriate friends and relatives linking crisis with domestic and external threats.</p>	<p>Statements of criticism and disagreement among militants.</p> <p>Statements by militant spokesmen that compromise solution is acceptable for consideration.</p>

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1. NATIONAL OBJECTIVE: Gain release of all hostages without harm.
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3. TARGET: Militants occupying the US embassy.

Target-Specific PSYOP Obj	Target Audience	Themes	Implementation	Impact Indicators
	All militants	<p>*e. Some of the militants actually are trying to destroy the Islamic Revolution by perpetuating the crisis. This group is working for a communist revolution.</p> <p>*Most effective as a "black propaganda" theme.</p> <p>There are a variety of legal and internationally accepted methods for airing the legitimate grievances of the Iranian people:</p> <p>**a. International proscription based on recognized legal norms is the best way to keep the US from setting up another puppet government in Iran.</p> <p>**b. Sanctioned international litigation will force the Shah and his supporters to return the wealth taken from Iran.</p> <p>**c. Extradition is the legal and internationally accepted means for returning the Shah to Iran.</p> <p>**d. Continuation of the hostage crisis is denying the captors the ability to participate in the growth of the Revolution.</p> <p>**e. Release of the hostages is an act of rededication to the ideals of the Revolution.</p> <p>**Most effective as "gray propaganda" themes.</p> <p>The US respects the goals of the Islamic Revolution and the desires of the Iranian people:</p> <p>a. US has exercised extreme moderation toward Iranian people despite the severe provocation of the hostage seizure.</p>		

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3. TARGET: Militants occupying the US embassy.

Target-Specific PSYOP Obj	Target Audience	Themes	Implementation	Impact Indicators
		<p>b. US respects the right of the Iranian people to develop their own government, free from all outside interference.</p> <p>c. US desires mutually cooperative relations with the people and government of Iran.</p>		

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4. NATIONAL PSYOP OBJECTIVE: Convince militants occupying the US embassy in Tehran to release all hostages without harm.

3. TARGET: Groups influencing the militants occupying the US embassy.

Target-Specific PSYOP Obj	Target Audience	Themes	Implementation	Impact Indicators
	<p>Iranian students            Revolutionary Guards            Middle Class            Bazaaris            Religious Leaders            International Islamic groups</p>	<p>Embassy militants no longer respect or represent the desires of the Iranian People:            a. Captors are acting in self-interest to retain influence to which they have become addicted.            b. Actions of the militants are indelibly tarnishing the image of Islam as the merciful faith.            *c. Certain elements within the militant group/among the captors intend to take advantage of the turmoil to launch a communist counter-revolution.</p> <p>*Most effective as a "black propaganda" theme.</p>	<p>VOA/BBC/Arab radio commentary of Soviet strategic goals in Persian Gulf region.            VOA/BBC/Arab radio reports on signs of Iranian disenchantment with embassy militants.</p> <p>Personal contacts between expatriate Iranian friends and relatives of all target audiences.</p> <p>Rumor campaign among Iranian student groups in US.</p> <p>Discussion with prominent Muslim leaders in their capitals and with their representatives in Islamic studies centers worldwide.</p> <p>**Media/delivery vehicles above supplemented by the quiet disclosure of linkage between certain militants and Tudeh activists. Disclosure</p>	<p>Occurrence of anti-Soviet sermons and government statements.</p> <p>Demonstrations protesting economic conditions.</p> <p>Appearance of posters calling for improvement in economic conditions.</p>



1. NATIONAL OBJECTIVE: Gain release of all hostages without harm.
2. NATIONAL PSYOP OBJECTIVE: Convince militants occupying the US embassy in Tehran to release all hostages without harm.
3. TARGET: Groups influencing the militants occupying the US embassy.

Target-Specific PSYOP Obj	Target Audience	Themes	Implementation	Impact Indicators
	All targets	<p>The US respects the goals of the Islamic Revolution and the desires of the Iranian people:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. US has exercised extreme restraint toward Iranian people despite severe provocation of hostage seizure.</li> <li>b. US respects the right of the Iranian people to develop their own government, free from all outside interference.</li> <li>c. US desires mutually cooperative relations with the people and government of Iran.</li> </ul>	<p>preferably made public by University at Qum.</p> <p>**Black propaganda" implementation.</p> <p>Low-key steady repetition in all available media.</p>	

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1. NATIONAL OBJECTIVE: Gain release of all hostages without harm.
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3. TARGET: Groups influencing the militants occupying the US embassy.

Target-Specific PSYOP Obj	Target Audience	Themes	Implementation	Impact Indicators
Encourage Iranian political authorities to continue the process of isolating the captors politically.	Ayatollah Khomeini Right wing of Iranian Revolutionary Council Mullahs Middle Class Revolutionary Guards	The hostage crisis daily exacerbates conditions which threaten the survival of the Islamic Revolution: a. Crisis increases potential for Soviet and Iraqi intervention. b. Crisis contributes to domestic political fragmentation and turmoil. c. Crisis contributes to economic instability and social deterioration.	This theme should not be transmitted through US diplomatic channels, as it will be perceived as a theme and identified as interference.  Arab and Pakistani diplomatic channels at the highest accessible level, couched in terms of the growing Soviet threat and the need for increased regional stability.	Government moderates its representations of the US. Government increases restrictions of militant statements. Government increases restrictions on statements supporting militants. Government and others promote public demonstrations supporting Bani-Sadr. Government increases criticism of militant activities. Government announces that crisis is diverting the revolution from its goals. Government places representatives among the militants. Government seeks intermediate diplomatic contacts for resolving crisis.
Suggest to Iranian political authorities and pressure groups with political influence the need for examining alternative methods for dealing with the captors.	President Bani-Sadr Iranian Revolutionary Council	Crisis strengthens the effectiveness and influence of competing political groups with no allegiance to the Islamic Revolution.  Internationally recognized legal methods are available for airing and rectifying legitimate Iranian grievances.  The emerging Iranian government will not acquire genuine legitimacy in the eyes of the world until the hostages are released.  US domestic expectations have been raised by recent official public Iranian statements; if these hopes are dashed, the US will be reluctantly forced to react, perhaps in international forums again.	Private US diplomatic contacts at the highest available levels.  Reiterated in public statements by official US spokesmen and by authoritative political commentators in the US press.  VOA/BBC/Arab radio reports on events in Afghanistan and possible Iraqi moves. VOA/BBC/Arab radio reports on incidents of turmoil in Iran.	Government increases criticism of militant activities. Government announces that crisis is diverting the revolution from its goals. Government places representatives among the militants. Government seeks intermediate diplomatic contacts for resolving crisis.  Occurrence of sermons supporting government and criticizing militants.

MFF

Subject: JCS Printing Requirement,  
15-22 Apr 50

1. On 15 Apr 50, I was alerted by JCS personnel to a potential printing requirement involving an unclassified but highly sensitive item. Printing would involve an unusually large quantity of a non-MCQG item.

2. On 16 Apr 50, I discussed the requirement with the Dir, HPL and a limited number of HPL personnel. I also advised the Dir DMA and sought his

guidance relative to accepting the job since it was outside of DMA's normal mission. The Dir DMA agreed that in view of the circumstance, we should accept the requirement.

3. On 17 Apr 50, the copy was received at HPL and preparations were made to do the necessary camera, negative engraving and platemaking in order to start printing during the night.

Printing was started as scheduled and completed mid-afternoon Saturday while finishing operations were in progress, [redacted] the JCS representative was alerted to a possible change to the product

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
which would require a new printing. He then departed for the Pentagon to get involved in the decision. At about 1730 hours, he phoned HTC and advised that a second printing would be necessary. The problem was the lack of a qualified linguist to do the necessary translation of the new version. We offered to try and find the one HTC person who had the capability and [redacted] gratefully accepted. He arrived back at HTC around 1730 hours, the linguist arrived shortly thereafter and work was started on the new version.

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4. By mid-afternoon 20 Apr 80, printing of the second version was complete. Finishing operations and packaging were complete by late afternoon. Transportation arrangements were made and plans for destruction of the first version were initiated. Project was considered virtually complete at this time.

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5. AT about 1500 hours 21 Apr 50,  
 Dir DMA was informed that  
 yet another change had been  
 made at high level and  
 that we would have to  
 print again, but a reduced  
 quantity. People were called in  
 and preparations were made  
 for a third printing. Repr  
 materials had been destroyed,  
 so it was necessary to  
 start from scratch. Work  
 continued through the night  
 on a crash basis, and the  
 project was finished at  
 about 0800 hours, 22 Apr 50.  
 Due to the time urgency  
 arrangements were made  
 for a helicopter to pick up  
 the finished job at HTC and  
 deliver it to the next  
 trans-shipment point. Helicopter  
 departed HTC at 0935 hours  
 22 Apr 50.



OF THE DESIGN FIELD  
 FROM THE UNITED STATES

WE HAVE COME FROM AFRICA TO FIGHT THE COMMUNISM,  
 WE HAVE COME FROM AFRICA, AT A TIME, WE TRIED TO  
 SETTLE THIS MATTER WITHOUT FORCE UNTIL NOW,  
 WE HAVE TRIED EVERYTHING LEFT, BUT YOUR COUNTRYMEN WHO  
 ARE HOLDING OUR BROTHERS HAVE MADE THIS ACTION  
 NECESSARY, THESE FEW HOURS, BY THEIR ILLEGAL ACTS,  
 HAVE Brought THIS SITUATION ABOUT, WE HAVE COME TO  
 END THIS SITUATION, SO THAT OUR PEOPLE CAN RETURN TO  
 THEIR FAMILIES,  
 WE HAVE ONLY DONE WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE OUR PEOPLE  
 HOME, LET US ALL PRAY IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO COME AGAIN  
 IN AFRICA, AND THAT ALL COUNTRIES CAN BECOME FRIENDS  
 AGAIN, IF ANY MORE OF OUR COUNTRYMEN ARE TAKEN HOSTAGE  
 OR HARMED, OUR COUNTRY WOULD HAVE TO USE STRONG FORCE AND  
 DO IT SWIFTLY.

OUR COUNTRYMEN,  
 TIME, BUT TRIED TO  
 UNTIL NOW,  
 THE TERRORISTS WHO  
 THIS ACTION  
 THEIR ILLEGAL ACTS,  
 WE HAVE COME TO  
 HONOR SO THAT OUR  
 ES,  
 HARY TO TAKE OUR PEOPLE  
 NECESSARY TO COME AGAIN  
 CAN LIVE TOGETHER ON  
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CONCEPT FOR PSYOP INITIATIVE WITH NSC

I. ISSUES:

- A. Bring PSYOP CONPLAN to the attention of NSC.
- B. Advise NSC to form intelligence coordinating body on PSYOP/international information.

II. OBJECTIVES:

1. Provide the Executive Department with a comprehensive concept plan for employing PSYOP capability to accomplish US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East.
2. Initiate action to establish a standing national-level inter-agency PSYOP/international information coordinating group to deal with current and future contingencies.

III. DISCUSSION:

- Both issues are inter-related and can be mutually reinforcing.
  - Issue A: Time-sensitive
  - Issue B: Longer-range project
- The two issues can be treated together or separately.
- There are several alternative approaches to accomplish the above objectives.

IV. ALTERNATIVES:

1. Forward PSYOP CONPLAN to NSC through appropriate channels for the consideration by the NSC Staff and through NSC, for the consideration and staffing by USG agencies concerned (USICA, CIA, STATE, and BIB).
  - a. With recommendation that a national inter-agency coordinating body be formed:
    - For one-time action: implementation of the PSYOP CONPLAN; or
    - Standing group to deal with current and future contingencies.

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

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b. Without recommendation to form an inter-agency coordinating group, but only to consider the CONPLAN as a one-time action (single - contingency action).

- Under this excursion to Alternative No. 1, the request for considering the establishment of a national coordinating body would be a separate Joint Staff action, if deemed required.

2. Establish linkage between the requirement for inter-agency PSYOP coordinating body and the ongoing action on "Perception Management."

3. Pattern the proposal for inter-agency PSYOP coordinating group after the proposed coordinating group on "Perception Management" with or without the provision for eventual consolidation under "one umbrella" of "Perception Management."

V. BEST COURSE OF ACTION:

- Alternative No. 1: Forward CONPLAN to NSC for consideration.
  - Not recommend formation of an inter-agency coordinating work group.
  - REASON: Time-sensitive nature of the CONPLAN.

VI FORWARDING CONPLAN TO NSC:

The following methods of forwarding CONPLAN to NSC can be considered:

- Formal: Memorandum from CJCS through D/ISA to SECDEF to NSC.
- Informal: Asst to CJCS -
  - Provide selected NSC staff members CONPLAN for information.
  - Table CONPLAN at NSC meeting.
  - Offer as a discussion item at NSC.

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7 DEC 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS

SUBJECT: Psychological Assessment of the Iranian Situation (U)

1. ~~S~~(U) In response to your request for a psychological assessment of the Iranian situation, three papers prepared by the 8th PSYOP Battalion are hereby forwarded.
  - a. ~~S~~(U) Special Psychological Assessment--Iran (Tab A).
  - b. ~~S~~(U) Middle East Attitudes Toward Embassy Crisis in Iran (Tab B).
  - c. (U)(~~S~~) Psychological Impact of Military Action in Iran (Tab C).
2. (~~S~~)(U) US military action against Iran would have, under certain conditions, potential for favorable psychological impact in the region and further US interests (Summary on page 4, Tab C).
3. (~~S~~)(U) The 8th PSYOP Battalion is preparing a more detailed assessment of the psychological impact of potential US military actions. A regional paper with country-by-country assessments will be completed by the end of next week. Suggested themes and/or actions to reduce the negative psychological impact will be included.

3 Incl  
as

*Renick*  
R. D. RENICK, JR.  
Brigadier General, GS  
Acting Director of Operations  
and Readiness Directorate

~~Multiple Sources~~  
~~6 Dec 1985~~

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 97

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SPECIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT--IRAN

PURPOSE. This assessment is intended to provide an interim update to the existing Basic Psychological Operations Study (BPS) on Iran, which is scheduled for reissue during CY 80. The emphasis in this assessment is on major psychologically exploitable issues and associated target groups; no attempt has been made to provide a detailed update on each section of the BPS. The cut-off date for research on this assessment was 5 Dec 79.

General. Events in Iran during 1979 can in a sense be said to have culminated in the constitutional referendum held on 2 and 3 December. This election resulted in the official adoption of a 175-article statement of principles for an Islamic Government, as well as giving formal recognition to the Ayatollah Khomeini as leader of the Iranian revolution. The leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Council (IRC) had looked to this dual achievement as their primary objective since the early days of the Provisional Government. All that now remains to complete the institutional edifice is to hold elections for the new National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) and President, and to install a new government. It is planned that these steps will have been achieved by the beginning of the new year (21 Mar 80).

In reality however, events in Iran have been dominated by the inability of any single individual or group both to consolidate power and to use it effectively to rule Iran. While the Ayatollah Khomeini remains the major popular figure of the revolution and is thus able to command widespread support for his policies, independent centers of power have proliferated and are now engaged in free-wheeling battles over ideology, policy, and control of key positions within the government. A major test of the durability of the new regime is whether a clergy-based government will be able to perform adequately without having to rely on the "liberal bourgeois" National Front technocrats (thus raising the kind of conflicts that ultimately led to the fall of the Bazargan government). Thus far, governmental paralysis due to internecine power struggles and the effects of the revolution itself on Iran's governmental bureaucracy--both exacerbated by a confrontation with the US over the hostage issue during November and December 1979--has meant that the aims of the revolution have been realized by no significant group in Iranian society (with the possible exception of the Mullahs).

ISSUES. The overriding issues currently discernible in Iran tend to fall into two major groups: (1) those involving the nature and institutional framework of the Iranian polity, which have in large measure been articulated within the context of the draft (now approved) constitution; and (2) those involving the actual performance of the revolutionary regime.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. The most important issue is that of the position of minority peoples within the Iranian state. Certain groups not only are

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ethnically (i.e., language and customs) different from Persians, but are also Sunni rather than Shiite Muslims and have long histories of separatist tendencies: the Kurds, Baluchis, Gulf Arabs, and Turkomen. The official recognition of Shia Islam as the state of religion, a requirement that all school texts be in Persian (Farsi), and a complete lack of any provisions for regional autonomy in the proposed constitution led leaders of all of these groups to call for a boycott (apparently effective) of the constitutional referendum. The Kurds have been in armed conflict with the Revolutionary Government during most of the past year, while the other groups have only been involved in relatively localized, sporadic incidents of violence. Because of their location in the major oil-producing area of Iran and their heavy involvement in the oil industry itself, as well as their affinity with Iran's traditional rival, Iraq, the so called "Gulf Arabs" constitute the most potentially explosive problem for any central government in Iran.

A related problem is posed by the Azeris, the predominant ethnic group in Azerbaijan. Although Shiite Muslims, the Azeris are culturally and linguistically distinct from Persians. Additionally, they have a recent history of autonomous rule (during and immediately after the WWII Russian occupation of northern Iran) and furthermore tend to look to the religious leadership not of Ayatollah Khomeini, but of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari (who has expressed serious reservations concerning the new constitution).

Another major constitutional issue involves the role accorded to the Shiite clergy under its provisions. Briefly, the constitution grants what could theoretically become dictatorial powers (including supreme command of the armed forces) to a leading religious figure--under the circumstances obviously Ayatollah Khomeini. Carried to its extreme, this objection becomes an attack on the entire concept of the religious basis of the state. Rather than take such an approach, however, most secularly oriented groups have emphasized inconsistencies and deficiencies in the constitution which need to be remedied. Ayatollah Shariat-Madari's Azeri-based "Muslim People's Republican Party" focused its objections on the one-man rule aspect, while the "National Front" (which represents the bulk of the Iranian "liberal bourgeois") on this issue limited itself to pointing out the need to correct the contradiction between elective and appointive elements within the governmental structure.

Secularist groups also attack the constitution because of its lack of basic individual and social rights (freedom of expression and association, equal rights for women, etc.) and because its rudimentary representative organ is accorded virtually no real power. By far, the most extensive critique of the constitution from a secularist perspective was that issued by the "Jurist Association of Iran." Although this secularist attack on the clerical regime does not have a broad appeal throughout Iranian society as a whole, it does enjoy real significance within several potentially important groups, including professionals and intellectuals, civil servants

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(among whose ranks are to be found the vast majority of educated working women), military officers, and expatriate Iranians living in Europe and the United States.

Disguised as a constitutional issue, but in reality a Marxist attack on the class basis of the clerical regime, are a number of criticisms which fault the constitution for such items as: (1) not outlawing capitalism, (2) not providing for a thoroughgoing land reform in which each peasant would acquire some kind of right to land, (3) not taking sufficiently stringent measures against foreign economic domination, and (4) failure to accord decisionmaking roles to worker's councils. The Jurists' critique cited above, as well as that of the "Socialist Worker's Party" and the "Iran Today" group followed this general approach in their opposition to the economic features of the new constitution. When focused on the constitution per se, these issues will evoke little response from significant Iranian groups. However, when articulated as critiques of government policies and programs, they become highly exploitable.

Surprisingly, the Tudeh (Masses) party, which had been calling for implementation of measures like these, called for a "yes" vote in the referendum. Although it would be tempting to explain this position in terms of Tudeh's Soviet ties and the anti-American rationale for its support of Khomeini, it appears that a more fundamental explanation involves tactical considerations of domestic Iranian politics. Specifically, Tudeh probably calculated that under the new constitution, leftwing parties will be repressed. By jumping on the clerical bandwagon (Tudeh head Kianuri has even touted Khomeini's son Ahmad for President), Tudeh hopes to survive the purge and thus to consolidate its hold over the left wing.

REGIME PERFORMANCE. The clerical regime is under heavy criticism for a series of economic difficulties, including most prominently (1) very high unemployment--particularly among young men, (2) rampant inflation, (3) shortages of foodstuffs and other necessities (such as pharmaceuticals), (4) failure to get social welfare and construction projects moving, and (5) lack of programs in land reform and aid to agriculture. These problems, as well as the negative impact of the revolution on bazaar interests, have resulted in a falling away of some support for the clerical regime and an increase in demands that those who seek authority should then take responsibility for accomplishing the tasks of government.

Perhaps the most significant political critique of the clerical performance involves its failure to purge the bureaucracy, the military, and the newly renovated security apparatus. Although couched in terms of revolutionary zeal, anti-Imperialism, anti-Zionism, and similar slogans, these calls to purge the government must be interpreted in the light of domestic political infighting in Iran. In effect, various groups are hoping to eliminate their rivals and improve their own position through this mechanism. The National Voice of Iran (NVOI), a Soviet-supported, clandestine station

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broadcasting into Iran, has vociferously emphasized the need to purge "remnants," counterrevolutionaries, and would-be conciliators.

SIGNIFICANT TARGET GROUPS.

1. Ethnic Groups.

a. (U)(S) Azeris. By far the largest and most psychologically important of the "minority peoples," the Azeris have a natural focus for their separatist tendencies in their religious leader, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, and the political party which follow his line, the Moslem People's Republican Party. Although in the past he has hesitated to challenge Ayatollah Khomeini directly, Shariat-madari was forced by the holding of the referendum on the draft constitution to make clear his essential disagreement with Khomeini. Clashes over the constitutional referendum between his followers and those of Khomeini in Tabriz led to a progression of demonstrations and riots which could spark off a major Azeri secession attempt. However, the importance of Azerbaijan to Iran as a whole means that major resistance there to the Khomeini regime would probably have an adverse impact on support in predominantly Persian areas of the country. Another factor to be considered in connection with Azerbaijan is the possibility that a pro-Soviet group might emerge during either a domestic rebellion or a foreign military intervention and invite the Soviet Red Army across the border to "liberate" or "protect" the province. Shariat-madari, and possibly some other Azeri political figures active in the National Front, could form a coalition government that would be able to rule Iran from Tehran.

b. (U)(S) Kurds. Embittered by their desertion by such former "allies" as the US and Israel, the Kurds appear to be increasingly susceptible to, if not to be inviting, Soviet bloc and leftwing support. A marriage of convenience appears to have existed for some while between Kurdish leaders and some Marxist elements among the revolutionary guerrillas who found it expedient to go underground when Khomeini and the IRC emerged as the de facto leaders of the revolution.

The Kurds are well armed and have large numbers of combatants with military experience (either as guerrillas or as former members of the Iranian Armed Forces). Despite their capability to disrupt, if not topple, a government in Tehran, the Kurds do not represent a mechanism for controlling the Iranian government or determining the long-run fate of Iran. The principal Kurdish religious figure in Iran is Shaykh Ezzedini Hosseini. The Kurdish Democratic Party continues to be the most significant political organization.

c. (U)(S) The Gulf Arabs. Because of their strategic location, this group can have an extremely adverse impact on any Iranian government. Iraq is actively involved in the area and could choose to exert its influence

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there. The oil industry represents a major locus of labor union activity and thus may be accessible to leftwing political groupings such as Tudeh which have been active among worker groups. Personal contacts and media with a wide listening audience in Khuzestan are available in Kuwait and Bahrain. The Gulf Arabs do not represent a target with the potential to control the Iranian government, but some actions in Khuzestan could have major long-term consequences for Iran as a whole.

## 2. Political Groupings.

a. (U) (S) The National Front. Boasting many prominent political figures and a body of potential supporters among the middle class, professional groups, and bazaaris, the Front is nevertheless disadvantaged in internecine political conflict by its own lack of organization as well as its inability to count on effective support from any large, organized faction on the Iranian scene. By far the most accessible via external media of any target, this group is also tied into a network of expatriate contacts in Europe and the United States. In conjunction with either the military or another political group with the requisite resources, the Front could play a major role in Iranian politics.

b. (U) (S) PLO-connected "Islamic Marxists." It is not clear how many different--probably competing--groups exist within this category. A group centered around the Defense Ministry and security apparatus appears to exist. Key members of this group were apparently involved in the "Amal" Shiite movement in Lebanon during the civil war there, during which time they developed their Palestinian connection. At least some of the students responsible for the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, together with Foreign Minister (and former Radio/TV Director) Ghotbzadeh and his associate Ayatollah Khomeini, also appear to have Palestinian connections. The Mujahaddin (Iranian People's Strugglers), who were active during the Revolution, appear to have been subsumed within the two groupings tentatively identified above. To the extent that many Mujahaddin moved directly into the Revolutionary Guards, they would appear to be potential backers of the Amal group. However, the propaganda line and modus operandi of the so-called "Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy" suggest Mujahaddin involvement or influence. Individually or in combination, these groups are probably the best situated at present to seize and hold power in Iran.

(U) (S) SUMMARY. The psycho-political situation in Iran is extremely fluid at present. A number of competing centers of power exist, each jockeying for position and for control of key political resources (e.g., media, the security apparatus, access to Khomeini). Additionally, pressures are building for this government to take concrete actions--either to resolve such dangerous problems as ethnic secessionism and shortages of essential goods or to prolong the confrontation with the United States and/or other external threats such as Iraq. A potential exists for a dissolution of

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the clerical regime and its replacement by either a relatively moderate National Front-type government or a Marxist-oriented regime with ties to the PLO and possibly Libya. Situations in which a coalescence of forces against the clerical regime could occur would include (1) continued failure to resolve real-world problems, (2) a clear threat to continued Iranian territorial integrity, (3) collapse of public involvement in Khomeini's confrontation politics, or (4) possibly a dramatic failure to cope with a US military response to provocation.

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INFORMATION PAPER

7 December 1979

SUBJECT: Middle East Attitudes Toward Embassy Crisis in Iran (U)

1. (U)(C) PURPOSE. The purpose of this paper is to summarize general Middle Eastern attitudes toward the US and review attitudes in Middle Eastern media toward the US Embassy crisis in Iran.

2. (U)(C) GENERAL ATTITUDES.

a. Previously held attitudes concerning both the US and Iran provide the context in which most Arabs view the current US-Iranian crisis. The US is viewed primarily as a political enemy of the Arab people. This attitude is a result not only of current US support for Israel, but also of US leadership in an international Western community that has been in conflict with the Arab world since the medieval crusades. The West, in Arab perceptions, is more than a political opponent. It historically has attempted to impose on the Middle East cultural and religious values hostile to those of Islam and Arabic tradition. The US now epitomizes the cultural aggressiveness of the West. This cultural expansionism has become increasingly threatening to Arab values over the past two centuries since during this period it has included technological and material benefits that are extremely attractive. In the view of many Arabs, the Iranian revolution against the Shah has had two significant implications for Western cultural encroachment. First, it was perceived as demonstrating that forced, rapid modernization and Westernization were not only undesirable, but also unworkable. Second, it crystallized a reemphasis of traditional Islamic values.

b. These positive implications of the Iranian revolution have been offset in Arab perceptions by several negative factors. Iran is not Arab and is viewed as historically, culturally, and ethnically alien by most Arabs. Iran has a history of territorial and political ambitions in Arab lands. Attitudes engendered by this experience are being perpetuated by the international leftist political overtones of the Iranian revolution, which pose a potentially serious threat to the stability of neighboring Arab states.

c. Within this context of general attitudes, the public statements of Arab sources concerning the US-Iranian crisis have been determined primarily by the manner in which the crisis affects the particular interests of each source. Most prominent among these interests is the Arab-Israeli conflict and the opportunity the crisis provides Israel's "imperialistic" US supporter to expand its influence in the region. Subregional security is a major secondary concern for the Persian Gulf states. Variations on these two general themes are emphasized by individual Arab states.

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SUBJECT: Middle East Attitudes Toward Embassy Crisis In Iran (U)

3. (U) The current crisis in Iran receives extensive media coverage in all Middle Eastern countries. If a high degree of government control is assumed, the press reveals that individual states do not perceive the situation as a threat to their security. To varying degrees, all media condemn or refuse to condone Iran's violation of diplomatic immunity. This attitude is generally supported on legal, humanitarian, and religious grounds. The Middle Eastern press shows a general desire to end the Embassy siege, but, with the exceptions of Egypt, Oman, and Israel, only those solutions which do not expand US influence in the region are supported. Solutions which increase the influence of anti-Zionist, anti-Imperialist actors such as the PLO will be preferred. The temporary and coincidental agreement with US on the single matter of hostage release cannot be construed as a change in the fundamental positions of the Middle Eastern countries. In this context, nations of the region can be categorized by their positions on the hostage crisis.

a. Category I--Oppose Iranian tactics; support solutions increasing US influence: (Egypt, Israel, and Oman) Dependent on US political and economic support for survival, Egypt and Israel endorse a strong US presence in the Middle East. A distinctive facet in the media coverage of Egypt is Sadat's description of Khomeini as damaging the image of Islam. Sadat offered the Shah asylum and supported US freeze on Iranian assets. Israel advocated US military intervention in Iran.

b. Category II--Oppose Iranian tactics; support solutions limiting US presence: (Persian Gulf states, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco) Oil-rich Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states are deeply concerned for the survival of Islamic culture in the face of Westernization. Because Israel epitomizes the Western attack on Islam, these "moderates" have taken the opportunity to strike back by furthering the cause of the PLO. As strong anti-Communists, the moderates would welcome US influence only if necessary to counter any Soviet "atheistic Communist" presence. The moderates have, as a matter of principle, spoken out against the US freeze of Iranian assets and refused to cooperate with US requests for a boycott of Iranian oil. They are wary of US "Imperialism" and they fear that such a tactic could some day be directed against themselves.

(1) The Saudi Arabian press gave extensive coverage to PLO initiatives in the crisis; but it subsided to embarrassed silence when the PLO failed. There was no mention of the implementation of US economic sanctions against Iran. Their varying attitudes toward attempts to resolve the same problem demonstrate continuance of long-standing Saudi policies. The PLO is seen as a principal weapon against Zionism and the Saudis tried to exploit an opportunity to increase its influence. US economic sanctions received no coverage because the Saudis could not resolve the dilemma of their

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antihostage stand and their opposition to any display of US power in the region. Saudi diplomats have supported Sadat's analysis of the religious aspects of the situation, but no public comment has been made.

(2) Among the other nations in the moderate group, the attempt to further self-interest has produced considerable internal inconsistency. The media in UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait carry objective wire service reports and editorials which shift daily from pro to anti-US positions. Qatar continues its precrisis policy of editorial attacks on the US, but it identifies closely with Saudi Arabia on religious matters.

c. Category III--Opponents of any US influence: (Libya, Syria, and Iraq) These nations differ from the moderates in that their anti-US position overwhelms any inclination to allow the US to be active in reaching even a peaceful solution to the crisis. Their fear of US "imperialism" is so intense that all three censured the PLO for trying to mediate because such action served US interests.

(1) The Libyan press had taken the most extreme position, expressing full support of every Khomeini move and reacting violently to US economic and military posturing. Nevertheless, Libyan support for Iranian intransigence faded quickly when the US actually increased its military presence. Without changing his espousal of the principles of the Iranian revolution, President Quadafi announced to the foreign press his intention to ask Khomeini to release the hostages in the interest of world peace.

(2) Syrian reaction to the US hostage situation has been two-tiered. The government-controlled media have been vocal and obnoxious in their support of Khomeini in his confrontation with the US, but have ignored the issue of the taking of hostages. In private, Syrian reaction has been mixed.

(3) The Iraqi media rarely mentions the Iranian crisis, but the few editorials show strong antipathy toward both the US and Iran. The US is portrayed as engineering the crisis to provide an excuse to extend its influence. Khomeini is portrayed as collaborating with imperialist interests.

d. Category IV--Non-Arab nations in the region: (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, USSR) With the exception of Israel, which is firmly committed in the pro-US category, the non-Arab nations generally fall into the moderate camp on this issue.

(1) Official media of Afghanistan tends to align with Soviet anti-US pronouncements while pointing out a deterioration in international status of the Khomeini government. At the same time, Afghanistan tries to

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SUBJECT: Middle East Attitudes Toward Embassy Crisis in Iran (U)

not jeopardize its tenuous relations with Iran. This is typical reportage since the Marxist regime came into power.

(2) Government controlled press of Pakistan tends to be pro-US, but is swayed by Islamic-based public support for Khomeini and the need for Iranian support due to internal difficulties that are increased by the civil war in Afghanistan. These troubles are causing Pakistan to be more favorably disposed toward Iran and the rest of the Islamic world.

(3) Media coverage in Turkey has been limited. However, the Turkish Ambassador to Iran attempted to mediate the release of the hostages. Concurrently, Turkey has expressed an unwillingness to let the US use Turkey as a staging area for military action in Iran.

(4) Soviet external media targeted on the Middle East has followed the general internal media line. Reporting has been factual with standard emphasis on American Imperialism and the Shah's criminal guilt. Although diplomatic support is given to the principle of immunity in international fora, the matter of hostages is not mentioned in the domestic media. An exception to this is the national voice of Iran (NVOI), an unofficial "clandestine" radio station broadcasting out of the Soviet Union. NVOI has exploited the current anti-Western hysteria to press for the destruction of all vestiges of US influence in Iran. At the same time, it has encouraged release of the hostages because the crisis is seen as tactically unfavorable for the revolution.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS. Aside from Egypt and Israel, important actors in the Middle East have displayed somewhat common views toward the seizure of US hostages. Unanimous condemnation of Iran's breach of diplomatic propriety does not, however, alter deep-seated attitudes toward the US. In their view, the confrontation is seen as a relatively insignificant part of Middle Eastern relations with the Western World. Widely held fears of Western cultural encroachment, epitomized today by US "Imperialism" and Zionism, together with their own national interests, continue to mold their disposition toward the US. Thus, the manner of the resolution of the crisis may well be as important as the resolution itself.

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INFORMATION PAPER

7 December 1979

SUBJECT: Psychological Impact of Military Action in Iran (S)(U)

1. (U)(S) The purpose of this paper is to assess the psychological implications of potential US military actions in Iran and to suggest themes or actions that would limit the negative impact in the Muslim world.

2. (U)(S) Nations of the region can be categorized by their positions on the hostage crisis:

a. Category I--Oppose Iranian tactics; support solutions increasing US influence: (Egypt, Israel, and Oman).

b. Category II--Oppose Iranian tactics; support solutions limiting US presence: (Persian Gulf States, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco).

c. Category III--Oppose any US influence: (Libya, Syria, and Iraq).

d. Category IV--Non-Arab nations in the region: (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey) Israel is pro-US and the USSR will not be addressed.

3. (U)(S) The spectrum of significant, potential US military actions includes:

a. Occupy territory: The presence of US forces on Iranian soil would very likely cause the death of some, if not all, hostages as well as elicit a call for  Jihad  (holy war), regardless of proximity to the hostages. However, if conducted in southern Iran, e.g., Chah Bahar, distant from population centers and residual Iranian military power, effective Iranian response would be very difficult. Under these conditions, a successful challenge to the revolution's overriding consideration of preserving newly won Iranian national self-respect would be quickly perceived by Iranians, which would provide fertile ground for questions about the legitimacy of the Gorn Regime to develop. US PSYOP themes would be limited to emphasizing its leadership as an irresistible power to which Iran (and other Muslim nations) would have to submit, thus supporting questions of legitimacy. The opportunity to promote nonbelligerence among any of the Muslim nations would be virtually nonexistent, because the entire Muslim world would be united as one. However, if harm to the hostages caused the US action, and this was made known in the Muslim world before hand, official levels of the category 1, 2, and 4 countries would be responsive to US themes isolating Iran for punishment and for shaming Islam, creating the opportunity for a nonbelligerent posture for them. States around the Eastern and Southern littoral of the Saudi Arabian peninsula would be especially appreciative

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SUBJECT: Psychological Impact of Military Action in Iran (S)(U)

of the security for the oil life line represented by a US presence in the area. However, popular response would continue to reflect the unity of Islam and would be profoundly anti-American and belligerent.

b. Conduct air strikes: A preannounced airstrike would be unlikely to cause the death of the hostages, especially if conducted outside of Tehran and took the form of limited duration strikes against a restricted number of targets. In the case where the purpose of the strikes was to force the release of unharmed hostages, official and popular reaction throughout the Muslim world would be uniformly against the United States. Material and financial assistance for Iran, along with economic sanctions against the US, would be forthcoming. The desired psychological effect of US attacks would be to create a feeling of impotence in the face of superior US power that would come from the destruction of military bases, but without the loss of dignity that the destruction of economic targets would bring, so that the choice implied by the Ayatollah's phrase, "Dignity is better than full bellies" does not have to be made because of American military actions. Where the strikes were punitive following harm to hostages, it is again likely that only the category 3 countries would officially continue to denounce the US, although popular response to armed US actions would be virilently anti-US throughout the region. One target particularly lends itself to psychological exploitation; it is the naval base at Bandar Abbas which has extensive military facilities, limited local civilian population, and is far removed from other Iranian centers of population. Its destruction following suitable warning to the local populace could provide an object lesson of American naval and air power with minimum risk which could be used in PSYOP themes and have the unspoken support of several rulers in the area.

c. Rescue hostages: This course of action would very likely result in the death of most, if not all, hostages. It offers all of the disadvantages of military action in that it would enflame the Muslim world against the US, and it offers little opportunity of success. It represents a confrontation where the Iranians would be strongest, in a major population center near available military power without the discretionary power to disengage at will and limit the effort in time and space that contributes to the favorable aspects of other options. The possibility of large civilian casualties exists which could provoke a "holy war" mentality throughout the region. This would preclude any effective US PSYOP campaign and would certainly eliminate any chance for a nonbelligerent posture by a Muslim nation.

d. Naval actions: Mining, blockade, and similar naval actions are unlikely to provoke harm to the hostages, unless the consequences of the blockades begin to have significant effects on the civil populace in Iran. Support for the Iranians would be widespread in the region and efforts to

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SUBJECT: Psychological Impact of Military Action in Iran (S)

keep supplies reaching them overland would be strenuous. Effects of the blockade would become evident only over an extended period of time, further extended by supplies from other countries. US PSYOP themes would not have timely results to shore-up claims of US power, although the category 1 and 2 nations would unofficially favor the US naval presence required to implement the policy, especially if it were present in lieu of other, more active forces. At the same time, the less spectacular results of these actions would generate less immoderate reaction against the United States at the popular level in the Muslim world. US PSYOP themes would have to focus on these as part of a repertoire of actions and on US dignity and sense of honor which were shown in the restraint of use of power.

e. Stage a show of force: this action is already being implemented by the presence of a US naval task force in the Gulf of Oman and no harm has yet come to the hostages. Response in the region has been consistent with alignment on the hostage situation. US PSYOP approach has been to maintain a relatively low profile and let the task force presence speak for itself as an example of the propaganda of the deed. An aerial example of the same type of activity would be a low-level overflight of Tehran accompanied by a leaflet drop covering the city. While the combined effect of the proximate presence of US military airpower, coupled with leaflet propaganda, would seem to be intimidating, the close association in the minds of Arabs in the Middle East of just such overflight techniques by the Israelis would undoubtedly overwhelm any propaganda effect or theme intended by the US.

4. (U) (S) Several special considerations deserve attention:

a. Any US military action originating in, or staging through, Israel against Iran or any Arab nation would elicit such antipathy toward the US by the entire Muslim world that the conduct of psychological operations by the United States would be useless.

b. US official and commercial facilities at home and abroad can expect to become the targets of Iranian nationals and Arabs living in various countries as they respond to modifications in the psychological environment brought about by potential US military actions against Iran and by supportive psychological operations by both sides. It is also likely that terrorist groups will take advantage of this opportunity to create a psychological impact of their own. Such attempts should be anticipated and planned for in order to prevent, or at least reduce, a possible reverse psychological impact from US military actions.

5. (U) (S) The feasibility of conducting a psychological operations campaign in the Middle East is limited by the fact that access to most of the media in the region is controlled either by national governments other than the

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SUBJECT: Psychological Impact of Military Action in Iran (S) (U)

United States, or by groups not readily subject to influence by the US. The voice of America could be made available, and special assets such as RIVET RIDER might have local significance. Other widely heard stations which might be inclined to support a US PSYOP campaign could include BBC, Radio Cairo, and Radio Monte Carlo. Other powerful stations heard in the region are a station from Islamabad oriented toward the Muslim world, Radio Riyadh oriented on the Arab world, and Radio Moscow; however, it is unlikely that those would actively support a US PSYOP effort. The feasibility of a US PSYOP campaign employing printed materials is also limited by low literacy levels and media access.

6. (U)(S) Summary. The military action which appears to offer the greatest potential in Iran is physical occupation, for a short period of time, of selected, isolated site in the southern portion of the country. The central objective of the occupation would be the demonstration at a strategic location on Iranian national territory of the irresistible force of the United States. The psychological aim would be to deprive the Gorn regime of its sense of self-respect based on honor and dignity and in doing so to punish it for its action in seizing hostages of the American Embassy. US PSYOP themes in support of such action would highlight the necessity for Iranians to submit in the face of superior force to the physical occupation of a portion of their territory.



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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

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REWRITTEN BY DDO NMCC

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REVISED ON OADR

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CDR C.P. O'Neill, OP-44G1

Ext. 59698, WIDE 0461A

27 February 1979

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FACILITIES SUMMARY

GEOGRAPHY

[REDACTED]

DEVELOPMENT

In Congress approved a plan to expand [REDACTED] from an austere communications facility to a small base capable of providing minimal support to task groups which would operate [REDACTED]

will be able to provide limited logistic support such as mooring, fueling, loading/offloading for ships of a small task group as well as providing communications support for units operating in [REDACTED]

for a six ship carrier task group as well as for an AE/AOE. [REDACTED] will also serve as a base for patrol aircraft providing air surveillance support to ships [REDACTED]. There will be no facilities ashore designed to support ships crews, nor are there any facilities ashore to provide any ship maintenance or repair. The original communications station construction was authorized in the [REDACTED]

The expansion program construction was authorized in the [REDACTED] MILCON programs at a cost of approximately [REDACTED]. The communications station construction is complete. The completion of the expansion program is scheduled for the end of [REDACTED]. Construction schedule is attached as TAB B.

U.S. NAVY USE OF [REDACTED]

- U.S. operation of facilities [REDACTED] is governed by agreement with [REDACTED]
- There is no current significant policy statement regarding use [REDACTED] by U.S. Naval forces.
- Historically, use has consisted of:
  - P-3 support
  - communications
  - token refueling
  - limited logistic support for CVTG when within COD range

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- Routine logistic support for [redacted] Surface Combatant Task Groups is not routinely provided because these forces normally have a mobile logistic support ship in company. [redacted] has been used as a base for onward movement of spare parts and personnel for Carrier Task Groups when within COD range. Logistic support from [redacted] task groups during contingency operations would be envisaged. This support would include mooring, fueling, loading/unloading for ships and fueling and maintenance for CV aircraft.
- A token refueling of a destroyer was successfully accomplished in March, 1978, in order to test the fuel handling capability. Capabilities summarized in TAB A.

- TAB A - [redacted] Facilities/Capabilities
- TAB B - [redacted] Construction Schedule
- TAB C - [redacted] map

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FACILITIES/CAPABILITIES

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION-ULTIMATE CAPABILITY</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
COMMUNICATIONS STATION	Receiver Bldg, Communications operations building, Transmitter bldg, Receiving and Transmitting antenna fields. Provides communications support for all units in [REDACTED]	Complete
ANCHORAGE & TURNING BASIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Channel, [REDACTED]</li> <li>• [REDACTED] turning basin</li> <li>• Anchorage capable of accommodating a 6 ship carrier task group</li> </ul>	Complete
FUEL & GENERAL PURPOSE PIER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [REDACTED] Shaped</li> <li>• Capable of 24 hour load/off-load of 180,000 bbl tanker or AO/AOE</li> <li>• Not designed structurally to accommodate carrier</li> </ul> <p>(Present capability is 585 bbl/hr on floating fill line)</p>	Under Const. (compl. in [REDACTED])
POL STORAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [REDACTED] tanks)</li> <li>• Includes Air Force &amp; Navy requirements</li> </ul> <p>(Present capability is [REDACTED] bbl)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AF working to develop [REDACTED] storage capability [REDACTED] bbl)</li> </ul>	Under Const. (compl. in [REDACTED])  Not Funded

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AVIATION OPS

a. Runway

*ft*

- 12,000 ft. long, 150 ft. wide
- Will allow recovery of divert jet aircraft from carrier
- Will accommodate any aircraft (including C-141's and fully loaded KC-135's) except B-52's

*ft*

12,000 ft.  
Useable  
Final Compl.  
in [redacted]

b. Parking Apron

• [redacted]

- Capable of accommodating
  - 3 C-141's (or 1 C-5)
  - +4 P-3's
  - +1 COD
  - +20 divert carrier aircraft

All Useably  
Complete  
Final Compl.  
in [redacted]

c. Aircraft Maintenance Fac.

- Maintenance hangar
- Aircraft rinse rack
- Aircraft ready issue refueler

*E*

Not yet  
started  
Est. compl.  
[redacted]

AMMO STORAGE

a. Navy

*A*

- One concrete bunker, [redacted]
- Purpose to house VP/VQ ordnance (torpedoes, smoke floats, sonobuoys) supporting ocean surveillance (ASW Ops. capable of storing conventional ordnance during contingency ops.

not yet  
started  
to be compl.  
in [redacted]

b. Air Force

- [redacted] of open storage comprising 20 barricaded modules

No substan-  
tive work  
done  
Est. compl.  
in [redacted]

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BEQ's & BOQ's

- Ultimate permanent capacity for approx:  
740 enlisted  
57 officers

All permanent  
housing  
compl. in  
[REDACTED]

- Personnel now accommodated on is based in  
mix of permanent/temporary facilities:  
85 officers  
1,460 enlisted  
28 civilians

(Clubs, hobby shop, gyms, etc.)

Personnel Support  
Facilities

Compl. -  
[REDACTED]

Storage Facilities

(General warehouse, medical storage, cold  
storage)

Compl. -  
[REDACTED]

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## A. Aircraft Handling Capacity

## - Ramp space

- Sufficient ramp space is available to accommodate 3 AC-130's and 10 KC-135's WITH PARKING SOME AIRCRAFT ON TAXIWAY.

$$\begin{aligned} 2 \text{ AC-130} @ 46,500 \text{ ft}^2/\text{airc} &= 93,000 \text{ ft}^2 \\ 10 \text{ KC-135} @ 81,200 \text{ ft}^2/\text{airc}^* &= 812,000 \text{ ft}^2 \\ \text{Total} &= 905,000 \text{ ft}^2 \end{aligned}$$

\* 81,200 ft<sup>2</sup> for KC-135 was extrapolated from Logistics Checkmate study for MIDEAST surge and is probably in excess of actual requirements.

## - Fuel requirements

- JP-5 approximately 232,000 bbls. No JP-4 available.

-- Fueling rate is 275 gal/min (total) from one hydrant with 2 stations

- One R5 Tank truck (5,000 gal @ 100 gal/min)
- Truck condition is questionable

-- One Fuel trailer (4,000 gal) also available

- To fuel 10 KC-135's will take a minimum of 24 hrs. (using hydrant only)

## - Maintenance

-- No hangars available

-- Service equipment (e.g. stands, jacks, etc) extremely limited

-- Two gaseous oxygen units available.

## B. Personnel Accommodations

- Permanent quarters for 740 enl/57 officers

- Temporary quarters house approx 500 officers/enlisted Naval Construction Force

134

WORKING PAPER

(Destroy when no longer needed)

8 November 1979

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II  
III  
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I. SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

II. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning [REDACTED]

III. MAJOR POINTS:

- General Data

-- Only US installation in the [REDACTED] territory. Whole [REDACTED] controlled by a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (for civilian access/egress). US Naval facility encompasses [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] remaining [REDACTED] is: [REDACTED]

-- Location: [REDACTED]

-- Physical Description: [REDACTED]

- Runway Data

-- Runway approaches: magnetic bearings [REDACTED].

-- Composition: Concrete; good condition; construction recently completed; can accomodate C-5, C-141 or DC-8 type aircraft.

--- Length: [REDACTED] overruns at each end; width: [REDACTED]; elevation: [REDACTED]; taxiway: [REDACTED].

--- One apron [REDACTED]; will accomodate 10 C-141 aircraft (if no other aircraft i.e. P-3s - are also parked there).

--- Lighting: High intensity runway lights, also at edge, along taxiway and apron edge. (Approach lights were removed during runway construction; may still be out.)

-- Support Facilities:

--- Two gaseous oxygen units available.

--- Fuel storage: [REDACTED] above-ground tanks.

DDO N M C C  
12 AUG 92

GADR

Downgraded by: DDO N M C C

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONSTRUCTION STATUS REPORT

6-1933

AS OF

P. NO	DESCRIPTION	START DATE	COMPL DATE	COMPL	REMARKS
	Expansion of Facilities (1st Incr)			71	
	POL Storage			93	Tanks 5 & 6 filled with JP-5 on [redacted] Tanks 7 & 8 filled with JP-5 on [redacted]
	Tank Erection			100	
	Tank Painting			100	
	POL Piping			69	Continuing pump installation and piping.
	Control/Pump House.			73	
	Pier			39	Pier: vertical piling to bent P-17 complete. Batter piles to bent P-6 complete. Piles encased to bent P-6. Trestle: Pouring trestle curbing.
	Airfield Expansion			97	
	N. Runway Extension			100	
	S. Runway Extension.			97	Continuing painting, landscaping. Commenced joint sealing.
	Parking Apron			91	No work this period.
				100	

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Classified By: *JES*  
Declassified ON: *OADR*  
*DDANMCL*  
Downgraded by:  
*DDO NMCC*  
12 Aug 92



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## CONSTRUCTION STATUS REPORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P. NO	DESCRIPTION	START DATE	COMPL DATE	COMPL	REMARKS
	Expansion of Facilities			76	
	POL Storage			93	See FY 1975
	Parking Apron			91	See FY 1975
	Hangar			67	CMU work 85% complete. Commenced sheathing of hangar doors.
	Operations Building Addition			67	See Hangar above.
	Airfield Transit Storage			94	Extension kits for overhead doors installed.
	Aircraft Arresting Gear			0	
	BEQ 6			100	Project completed.
	BEQ 7			100	Project completed.
	BEQ 8			83	Continuing interior electrical, mechanical. Commenced texcoating.
	BOQ 4			39	Completed 2nd floor CMU, roof beam. Continuing stairs, interior work.
	EOQ 5			13	Commenced forming and pouring patio slabs. Completed precast wall panels.

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P NO	DESCRIPTION	START DATE	COMPL DATE	COMPL	REMARKS
	TOTAL PROGRAM			4	
	Recreation Facilities			0	
	Morale Facilities				
	Education Center Addition			0	
	Officer/CPO Club			0	
	Hobby Shop			0	
	Storage Facilities				
	Armory			0	Formed grade beams and pier footings.
	General Warehouse 1			10	
	General Warehouse 2			4	Excavating footings Completed excavation. Commenced forming for footings and grade beams.
	Navy Exchange Warehouse			9	
	Medical Storage			0	
	Fire Stations			0	

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P. NO	DESCRIPTION	START DATE	COMPL DATE	COMPL	REMARKS
	Crash/Rescue Fire Station			0	
	Communications Improvements				
	Receiver Building Addition			0	
	Generator Building Addition			0	
	Airfield Facilities				E
	Aircraft Rinse Rack			0	
	Aircraft Fueling Station			0	
	Taxiway			100	Completed.
	PW Shops Alter/Conv			0	
	BEQ				
	BEQ 9			1	Site work
	BEQ 10			0	
	BEQ 11			0	
	BEQ 12			0	

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135

Lex R-2-B-1  
25 July 79

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~~(S)~~ SURGE SUPPORT

~~(S)~~ I. Required Analysis and Evaluation

Suitability of the U.S. facility at [redacted] to handle major surge force equipment supplies, and recommendations for improvements.

~~(S)~~ II. NSF Operations and Personnel Manning

Navy Support Facility (NSF) [redacted] was officially established [redacted] with Naval Communications Station [redacted] as the primary tenant. The change from a limited U.S. Navy communications facility was effected to provide limited fleet support as well. When completed the Naval Support Facility [redacted] will be able to provide limited logistic support such as mooring, fueling, and loading/offloading for ships of a small task group as well as provide communications support for units operating in [redacted]. The [redacted] provides anchorage for a six ship carrier task group as well as for an AE/AOE. [redacted] also serves as a base for patrol aircraft providing air surveillance support to ships in [redacted]. Facilities ashore are neither designed to support ship's crews, nor to provide any ship maintenance or repair.

The post-FY-80 manning for NSF [redacted] is projected to total nearly 1700 permanent and temporary personnel:

Activity	Off	Enl
NAVSUPFAC	19	452
NAVCOMMSTA	6	122
SECGRU	2	62
Weather Station	1	9
VP/VQ	26	71
FASM	3	24
Subtotal	57	740
[redacted]	2	22
Total	59	762

Construction personnel include approximately 800 officers and men of the Naval Construction Force and 50 civilians from the PWC, [redacted]. This group will be occupied with construction noted above until [redacted]. In the absence of additional major construction assignments, it is assumed that a construction detachment of 50 to 100 officers and men and 40 to 50 civilians will be permanently required. Thus, the temporary facilities of [redacted] where the Seabees are housed, would be freed for other uses on [redacted] or they could be transferred to another site.

Classified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CLASSIFIED ON CNA FOR 607~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 1987~~

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Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

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(C) III. Facilities and Support

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The facilities and capabilities at [redacted] must be viewed at three levels -- those facilities now operational, facilities under construction, and additional facilities potential considering constraints to further developments.

A. Current Facilities

Facilities currently operational provide:

Communications support for all units in the [redacted] Turning basin and anchorage capable of accomodating a 6-ship carrier task group.

Tanker load/off-load capacity of 585 bbl/hr through a floating line.

POL storage for 220,000 bbl JP-5.

Runway, [redacted] Parking apron [redacted] capable of accommodating about 28 aircraft.

Permanent/temporary accommodation for 85 officers, 146 enlisted, and 28 civilians (Permanent facilities house 25 officers and 290 enlisted).

Size and capacity details of these facilities are shown in TAB A along with details for those facilities due to be completed by [redacted]

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B. Facilities Under Construction

Major facilities to be completed are:

Fuel and general purpose pier to handle 180,000 bbl in 24 hours

POL storage, [redacted] bbl tanks.

Aircraft maintenance facility.

Ammo storage, Navy and Air Force.

Additional permanent housing for 450 enlisted and 32 officers.

Recreation, warehouse, medical and cold storage facilities.

A

C. Constraints to Further Development

There is scope for construction of additional support facilities and for upgrading the air field. However development potential is limited by agreement with [redacted] the area and configuration of the [redacted], and the limited ground water supply. U.S. jurisdiction is limited by [redacted] to [redacted] of the [redacted] total [redacted] acres, TAB B. Much of the available land is either undevelopable or otherwise restricted due to the presence of clearance requirements for explosives and for air and communications receiver/transmitter operations, see TAB C. [redacted]

E

E [REDACTED] With completion of a proposed [REDACTED] Military Construction project, the developed permanent, temporary and emergency well water supply should be adequate for an [REDACTED] population of about [REDACTED]. An unspecified additional ground water resource exists which could be developed.

D. Surge Support

E NSF [REDACTED] has, at present, limited capacity to support a surge other than to provide an air strip and anchorage for emergencies or transients and future capabilities to supply POL [REDACTED] and some ammunition [REDACTED]. Temporary support facilities to house up to 700 people would be available by [REDACTED] only if the Naval construction forces complete their major work and depart without relocating their relocatable modules.

The facility as now developed or funded could support the following in the limited mode noted. Mobile augmentation to enhance the capabilities are also suggested.

E 1. Anchorage of a six-ship task force. The ships could not go cold iron and personnel would have to berth and mess on-board. Aircraft maintenance would have to be performed aboard ship. An AD could be anchored in the [REDACTED] to service Naval surface units. Existing or planned general warehouse and cold storage space would be only marginally adequate to support the current [REDACTED] population and would not be able to provide any general supply support for sustained surge operations. Providing full supply support from [REDACTED] would require construction of additional warehouses, piers and a larger cold storage facility; in effect, establishing a Naval Supply Depot.

E 2. P-3 operations and landings by C141s, C5s, KC-135 tankers and TACAIR transients. Refueling and personnel support facilities are inadequate for more than an occasional visit. Surge force personnel would have to live in tents and utilize B/C rations unless [REDACTED] were vacated by the Naval construction forces. Military Airlift Command should be prepared to position high usage C-141/C-5 repair parts and maintenance crews at [REDACTED] at the commencement of any surge in order to increase airlift reliability. Additionally, a backup aircraft prepositioned at [REDACTED] to support Navy requested Special Assigned Air Missions to littoral airfields would be most desirable, although this would reduce number of operational aircraft assigned because of ramp capability.

The concrete runway is [REDACTED]

E [REDACTED] should be able to land and take off, but the runway and taxiways are not capable of sustaining B-52 operations due to their narrow widths and the thin sections of concrete.

AE  
 3. POL storage adequate to sustain a typical [redacted] task group for approximately 28 days. This supply also is designed to serve [redacted] contingency needs although at present JP-5 is the only fuel on the [redacted]. Following completion of the AOE-capable pier in [redacted] a POL throughput of about [redacted] barrels per month would be possible. This should be sufficient to accommodate three CVBG's, two ARG's and a ten ship URG at combat expenditure rates. It, is however, predicated on 100 percent dedication of the pier to POL.

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 4. Only outside storage is now available for ordnance. [redacted] concrete magazines and [redacted] yds of open storage comprising 7 barricaded modules are programmed for construction by [redacted]. Surge force units could be given limited ordnance support by alternating MSC ships at anchor in [redacted] and shuttling Navy munition carriers (AEs) between [redacted] and the task forces. Hence, ordnance requirements would be satisfied primarily by sealift from [redacted].

The critical value of [redacted] dictates that adequate air defense be programmed for [redacted]. As a minimum, early warning radar and an air defense missile battery would be required. In addition, and if available at the outset of hostilities, a TACAIR detachment would be deployed to [redacted] for an increased air defense capability. All these units would require additional support facilities to be constructed.

E. Costs of Additional Facilities

A surge could involve elements of one or more services and the facilities required would vary accordingly. Therefore unit costs to construct certain types of facilities which could be required are given in TAB D. These costs could be used to price facilities that would be required for a considerable mix of forces. Constraints and the carrying capacity of the [redacted] would have to be accounted for.

E  
 Preliminary analyses were made to determine costs of facilities required to support two frequently mentioned forces; a 5-ship deployment consisting of 1 CVA or LHA, 3 FF/DD and 1 SSN, and the deployment of B-52 aircraft. The associated facilities, costs, and a feasible construction schedule are shown in TABS E and F. Costs would total \$429 million if completed by contractors and approximately half that amount if accomplished by Seabees. However, as the program size would increase, Seabee resources would be unable to accomplish the work in reasonable time.

Should it be necessary to store supplies at [redacted] to support surge operations on the [redacted] littoral, a considerable expansion of road, storage and cargo handling facilities would be required.

Additional personnel required could include those for:

Cargo handling;  
[redacted] defense;  
Air operations;  
Aircraft maintenance; and  
Medical

E

(C) IV. Recommendations

A. Specific Recommendations.

It is recommended that:

1. The water supply system be upgraded as planned for the MILCON [redacted] program.
2. A fuel pit for aircraft refueling be constructed.
3. A prefabricated hanger be prepositioned for erection if C141/C5 maintenance would be required.
4. The pier and associated facilities for permitting ships to go "cold iron" be built as part of a continuing upgrading of the facility.
5. Facilities be designed to support operation of FBIIIs, and consideration be given to modification of the runway to support emergency landings of B-52s.
6. Plans be drawn and costs be estimated for constructing facilities for supply staging and defense of NSF [redacted]

B. Discussion

Construction of a pier for berthing of a 5-ship task group would contribute significantly to reduced wear and maintenance requirements for ships. This facility would be of value not only for a surge but would be a [redacted] facility for U.S. forces in the [redacted]

It is unlikely that B-52s would have to repeatedly fly into [redacted]. For contingencies around the littoral FBIIIs should be capable of supporting operations.

Any consideration of widening the runway must account for the adverse effect the action would have on the [redacted] talks.

Should the decision be made to modify the airstrip, it is recommended that it be widened by 2-25 foot shoulders, the taxiways be widened, and a 22-inch deep concrete keel be placed down the middle of the runway to support the heavy

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loadings of B-52s. These improvements to support emergency landings of B-52s would require shut down of the air strip for a prolonged period unless the keel were constructed to one side of the present runway with the widening being limited to one side.

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~~(S)~~ ██████████ FACILITIES/CAPABILITIES

BEQ's & BOQ's

o Ultimate permanent capacity for approx:  
740 enlisted  
57 officers

All perman  
housing  
compl. i  
██████████

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o Personnel now accommodated on ██████████ in  
mix of permanent/temporary facilities:  
85 officers  
1,460 enlisted  
28 civilians

Personnel Support  
Facilities

(Clubs, hobby shop, etc.)

Compl,  
██████████

Storage Facilities

(General warehouse, medical storage, cold  
storage)

Compl.  
██████████

UNIT CONSTRUCTION COSTS (\$)

**E**

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Basic Cost</u>			
<u>Ship Related</u>				
Berthing	170/SF	925	1020	1120
Cold Iron	(L.S.) 11.7 mil	63.7	70	77
Dredging	(none req'd.)			
Maintenance	94/SF	512	563	620
OPN Equipment	(L.S.) 2 mil.	2.2	2.4	2.7
Fuel Storage	42/BBL	230	253	278
Causeway	2000/L.F.	10,890	11,880	13,068
<u>Aircraft Related:</u>				
none				
<u>Support</u>				
Supply	42/SF	230	252	277
Medical	191/SF	1040	1144	1260
Admin	101/SF	550	605	665
Bach. Housing	18,000/mn	98K	108K	119K
Exchange	101/SF	550	605	665
Clubs	125/SF	680	750	825

**E** Note: Unit costs for [redacted] are a 4.5 multiple of the basic costs and are escalated 10%/year beyond [redacted]

E Cost and Schedule for Construction at NSF [REDACTED]

Five-Ship Support

Cumulative Cost (\$ Million)

By Contractor

	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Pier [REDACTED] and causeway	100	110	121
Cold iron support	64	70	77
Maintenance (SIMA)-17,000 sq ft	9	10	11
OPN equipment	2	2	3
Fuel storage - 200,000 bbl	46	51	55
Support - supply, medical, administrative, housing, exchange and recreation	<u>109</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>146</u>
Subtotal	330	375	413

Runway Modification

B-52 capable [REDACTED] 26 [REDACTED]

Note: Costs would be 50 to 55% of the above if accomplished by Naval Construction Forces.

CLASSIFIED BY CNO (OP-60)  
DECLASSIFY ON 31 DEC 1987

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NO	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE, GRADE AND DATE	NO	TO	ACTION
1	CINCMAC	INFO		6		
2				7		
3				8		
4				9		
5				10		

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SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE <del>██████████</del>	SYMBOL DDO	PHONE 3101	TYPIST'S INIT	SUSPENSE DATE
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SUBJECT SPECIAL PLANS WORKING GROUP	DATE 27 MAR 80
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SUMMARY

1. (U) THIS IS AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF A PLAN PREPARED TO DETAIL MAC SUPPORT OF A SPECIAL PLAN.

2. ~~(S-NF)~~<sup>(U)</sup> THE FOLLOWING SUMARIZES HOW MAC WILL MOVE TO POSITION TWO EMPLOYMENT C-14 AIRCRAFT, THREE MEDICAL, EVACUATION AIRCRAFT, THREE REDEPLOYMENT AIRCRAFT AND ASSOCIATED AIRCREWS AND EQUIPMENT; THE LOCATION OF ESSENTIAL MAC MISSION COORDINATORS AND MINIMUM NOTIFICATION TIMES FOR HOME STATION LAUNCH WITHOUT REVEALING MISSION PURPOSE: IRANIAN HOSTAGE EXTRACTION

3. ~~(S-NF)~~<sup>(U)</sup> SIX C-141 AIRCRAFT ARE PRIMARY TO SUPPORT THE EMPLOYMENT AND MEDICAL EVACUATION PHASE. THESE AIRCRAFT ARE

MAC-80-80-077

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WORKING PAPER-  
(WHEN FINISHED, DESTROY  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
1992

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

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~~(A)~~ A. ~~(S-NF)~~ 3 EMPLOYMENT C-141s  
AT ~~██████████~~ TWO PRIMARY AND ONE  
BACKUP. ALL CREWS SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
~~██████████~~ AND ~~██████████~~

QUALIFIED. TWO ADDITIONAL MAC  
MEDICAL TECHNICIANS <sup>ON EACH AC PLUS</sup> ~~AND~~ ONE COMBAT  
PHOTOGRAPHER FROM AAVS FOR ONE AIRCRAFT.  
CONFIGURED SIDEWALL SEATS, CENTER  
LINE STANCHIONS AND LITTERS: 72 SIDEWALL  
SEATS, 28 LITTERS.

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~~(B)~~ B. ~~(S-NF)~~ TWO PRIMARY MEDEVAC  
C-141s WITH MEDICAL CREW AUGMENTED  
WITH INTENSIVE CARE NURSES AND TWO  
PHYSICIANS POSITIONED AT ~~██████████~~  
THESE MISSIONS ARRIVE AS ~~a~~ ROUTINE  
CARGO MISSIONS AND ARE CONVERTED TO  
THE MED EVAC CONFIGURATION BY THE  
CREWS ENROUTE, TO ~~██████████~~

E ?

~~(C)~~ ~~(S-NF)~~ MED EVACS AT  
~~██████████~~ WILL BE BACKED UP BY  
PASSENGER CONFIGURED FORCE REDEPLOYMENT  
AIRCRAFT FOR COMFORT PALLET AND SEATS.



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ON ONE PALLET TO PROVIDE FULL  
BACK UP AT [REDACTED]

D. DELETED

(U)  
E. (~~S-NF~~) ONE MEDICAL EVACUATION  
MISSION ON STANDBY AT RHINE MAIN AB  
TO BACK UP THE ENROUTE STOP OF BOTH  
PRIMARY MED EVAC MISSION RETURNING THE  
HOSTAGES AND FORCE. IF NOT USED THIS MISSION  
WILL BACK UP THE REMAINING PASSENGER  
MISSIONS.

A, E

4. THREE ADDITIONAL C-141s WILL  
MOVE INTO [REDACTED] DURING EMPLOYMENT  
TO REDEPLOY THE DELTA AND RANGER  
FORCE TO CONUS AS RAPIDLY AND WITH

AS LOW A VISIBILITY AS POSSIBLE. P-4 configuration  
2 C-141s to Langley, and one to [REDACTED] (WHEN FINISHED, B STRA)  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVE

DESTINATION:

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MAC-DO-80-077

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A. PRIMARY MED EVAC AIRCRAFT

CARRIES PASSENGERS AND THE CIVIL EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT. THE  
MED EVAC ACFT WILL UNLOAD FORCE CASUALTIES.

AIRCRAFT ARE ZAPPED UP BY  
THE REDEPLOYMENT AIRCRAFT FOR THE FORCE.

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO TRANSFER FROM  
THE EMPLOYMENT C-141s

BECAUSE THE EMPLOYMENT  
AIRCRAFT ARE NOT CONFIGURED FOR AN  
INTERCONTINENTAL MED EVAC FLIGHT!  
NO COMFORT PALLET - LIMITED MEDICAL  
CAPABILITY.

B. RHINE MAIN IS THE BEST ENROUTE  
STOP BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF THE  
INTENSIVE CARE AVAILABLE AT <sup>WILSON</sup> ~~LANDBAY~~  
HOSPITAL AND THE ENROUTE MED EVAC  
AND PASSENGER SUPPORT AVAILABLE AT  
RHINE MAIN. THE BACK UP MED EVAC  
AIRCRAFT AND CREW ARE SPOTTED TO  
ENSURE NO MISSION INTERRUPTION DUE  
TO HIGH VISIBILITY.

C. TWO MAC MEDICAL TECHNICIANS

MAC-00-80-677

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C-141 MISSION TO INTERFACE WITH AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT AND THE PILOTS, MEDICS ON BOARD. ONE COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER FROM AAVS IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO FILM ONLOAD, OFFLOAD AND ON BOARD ACTIVITY, SUBJECT TO JTF APPROVAL

(S-NF)

D. INTENSE PUBLIC AFFAIRS INTEREST WILL ACCRUE ONCE THE STORY BREAKS. SECURITY POLICE WILL PRECLUDE ACCESS AT ENROUTE STOPS AND WILL CONTROL ACCESS AT ANDREWS AFB FOR THE PRIMARY MEDICAL EVACUATION OFFLOAD. REDEPLOYING DELTA AND RANGER MISSIONS WILL BE ROUTED VIA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PUBLIC AFFAIRS WILL FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PRIMARY MEDICAL EVACUATION ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY WILL INCLUDE HIGH RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED BY JCS. SECURITY POLICE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY Hq MAC COORDINATOR AT APPLICABLE LOCATIONS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

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MAC-80-80-077

WILL BE LOCATED AT:

~~(S)~~ RHINE MAIN AFB, GERMANY

RAMSTEIN AFB, GERMANY

~~E~~

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

21 AF MCGUIRE AFB

Hq MAC, SCOTT AFB

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7. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> LIC [REDACTED] WILL BE WITH JTF.

[REDACTED] WILL  
REMAIN COLOCATED WITH COMAFFOR.

8. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE SUBMISSION  
USING SHORT NOTICE PROCEDURES -  
WHICH MAC ROUTINELY USES FOR  
MANY MISSIONS - MUST BE SUBMITTED  
NOT LATER THAN D-6 FOR THE  
PACING MISSION. EXECUTION IN A  
TIGHTER TIME FRAME WILL REQUIRE  
EXTRAORDINARY DIP CLEARANCE  
ACTIVITY WHICH COULD RESULT  
IN SOME SIGNALING OF INTENTION

WORKING PAPERS  
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EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

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MAC-80-80-077

DETAILED CONCEPT FOR MAC  
OF THIS OPERATION.

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10. RECOMMENDATION: NONE PROVIDED  
FOR INFORMATION

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[REDACTED]

ATTACHMENTS: ONE, CONC  
STATEMENT

WORKING PAPER  
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES

[REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

MAC-80-80-077

OPERATION RICE BOWL

MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. OPERATION RICETBOWL IS A SPECIAL PROJECT REQUIRING MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND SUPPORT. CINCMAC HAS APPROVED MAC SUPPORT AS REQUIRED AND OUTLINED IN THIS CONCEPT STATEMENT.
2. A SPECIAL PLANS WORKING GROUP (SPWG) IS MANAGING MAC SUPPORT VICE THE MAC STAFF. THIS WORKING GROUP CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING PRIMARY PERSONNEL :

- LTC [REDACTED] / DIRECTOR, SPWG
- CAPT [REDACTED] MAC/XOZ
- MAJOR [REDACTED] MAC/BOOMT
- MAJOR [REDACTED] MAC/DOOMS
- LTC [REDACTED] - MAC/SGO
- MSGT [REDACTED] - MAC/BOCS
- CAPT [REDACTED] - MAC/DOOMS

STAFF SUPERVISION IS PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL WHO WILL ALSO SERVE AS BACK UPS TO THE PRIMARY MEMBERS:

- COL [REDACTED] MAC/XOZ
- COL [REDACTED] MAC/DOO
- COL [REDACTED] MAC/DOO
- COL [REDACTED] MAC/BOOM

G WORKING PAPERS (WHEN FINISHED, DESTROY IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES) MAC 80-80-077

3 OF 3  
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- MAJOR [REDACTED] MAC, SEC
- MAJOR [REDACTED] MAC, TRKR
- LTC [REDACTED] MACE
- MAJ [REDACTED] MAC/DOOMS

THE FOLLOWING MAC GENERAL OFFICERS ARE INVOLVED:

- CINCMAC
- VICE CINCMAC
- CHIEF / STAFF
- DCS | OPS
- ASS'T DCS / OPS
- DCS | OPS PLANS (COLONEL)
- ASS'T DCS | OPS PLANS (COLONEL)
- MAC | SG
- AWS / CC

1 (2) 3

MAC WILL PLACE PRIMARY ACTION OFFICERS IN SELECTED KEY LOCATIONS EFFECTIVE D-3:

- Hq MAC
- MACE / RAMSTEIN AB, GERMANY
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- RHINE MAIN AB GERMANY
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- MAJ [REDACTED]
- { MAJ [REDACTED]
- LTC [REDACTED]
- LTC [REDACTED]
- CAPT [REDACTED]
- MAJ [REDACTED]
- CAPT [REDACTED]
- CAPT [REDACTED]
- MAJ [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~  
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TASKING CHANNELS:

E, G A. CAPT [REDACTED] DEPLOYS TO [REDACTED] WITH JTF/RANGERS AND REMAINS AT [REDACTED] UNTIL REDEPLOYMENT. TASKING FLOWS FROM THE COMALF (COL [REDACTED]) TO CAPT [REDACTED]

G B. CAPT [REDACTED] PASSES REQUIREMENTS TO LTC [REDACTED] (MACE) AND/OR MAJOR [REDACTED] AT MAC. COORDINATES CHANGES OR NEW REQUIREMENTS TO MAC COORDINATORS LISTED ABOVE.

E, G C. CAPT [REDACTED] DEPLOYS TO [REDACTED] WITH EMPLOYMENT C-141 AIRCREWS FROM CHARLESTON. CAPT [REDACTED] RECEIVES EMPLOYMENT DIRECTION FROM THE COMALF (COL [REDACTED])

E, G  
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D. LTC [REDACTED] DEPLOYS TO [REDACTED] AND RHINE MAIN AND COORDINATES SUPPORT OF MED EVAC MISSIONS AT [REDACTED] AND MED CREW REST AT R/M.)  
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


G

E. CAPT [REDACTED] DEPLOYS TO RHINE MAIN, RECEIVING COORDINATION INFORMATION FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF C-141 MED EVAC AT RHINE MAIN. HIS PURPOSE IS TO CONTROL THE BACK UP MEDICAL EVAC MISSION AND CREW AND TO COORDINATE THE ENROUTE STOP AT RHINE MAIN FOR THE PRIMARY MED EVAC MISSIONS.

(C)5 MAC COMMAND AND CONTROL FLOWS AS FOLLOWS:

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6. MAC COORDINATION OFFICERS WILL  
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN" LETTER  
FROM MAC DO TO SERVE AS HIS  
EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR ARRANGING MAC  
SUPPORT.

7. CONCEPT FOR MAC AIRCREW/AIRCRAFT  
SUPPORT:

A. ALL AIRCREWS INVOLVED IN THE  
MED EVAC AND EMPLOYMENT  
MISSIONS TO BE WELL QUALIFIED,  
CAPABLE OF OFF LINE OPERATION  
WITH MINIMUM SUPERVISION.

B. THE CREW DUTY TIME FOR PRIMARY/  
EMPLOYMENT, MEDICAL EVACUATION  
MISSIONS ONE, TWO, THREE  
IS WAIVED TO AIRCRAFT  
COMMANDERS JUDGEMENT.

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C. MINIMUM CREW REST PERIODS FOR  
PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT, MEDICAL  
EVACUATION MISSIONS MAY BE REDUCED  
MAC DO-80-077 TO AFR 60-1 PROVISIONS (8 hrs  
UNINTERRUPTED REST).

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D. INTERFLY 21/22 AIRCRAFT,  
AS REQUIRED.

E. ENGINES RUNNING ON AND OFF LOAD  
APPROVED AS REQUIRED.

F. COMBAT LOADING OF C-141 EMPLOYMENT  
MISSION APPROVED AS REQUIRED.

~~(G)~~ G. PRIMARY MISSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

SAAM 1040-01/1045-01

AIRLIFT EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS  
THESE ARE AIRLIFT MISSIONS TO THE  
EUROPEAN AREA, PREFERABLY TO INCLUDE THE  
CAMOUFLAGED C-141, TERMINATING  
AT [REDACTED] NLT D-1. THESE  
AIRCRAFT AND EMPLOYMENT CREWS  
WILL BE PRIMARY FOR THE [REDACTED]  
EMPLOYMENT, [REDACTED] AND  
HOSTAGE EVACUATION. PRIMARY RECOVERY  
BASE IS [REDACTED] WHERE [REDACTED] INTERCONTINENTAL

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MAC 80 80-077

MED EVAC C-141s WILL BE WAITING FOR A  
PLANE SIDE TRANSFER OF HOSTAGES,  
PATIENTS, AND THE ~~EMPLOYMENT~~ <sup>AIR</sup> EMPLOYMENT CREWS TO RETURN

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TO CONUS VIA RHINE MAIN. TRANSFER  
TO ANOTHER AIRCRAFT IS NECESSARY BECAUSE  
THE PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT AIRCRAFT WILL NOT  
BE CONFIGURED PROPERLY FOR AN INTERCONTINENTAL  
FLIGHT (NO COMFORT PALLET NO AIRLINE SEATS AND  
LIMITED MEDICAL GEAR).<sup>6</sup> EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT AND  
AIRCREWS WILL BE SOURCED FROM CHARLESTON  
AFB. ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONCERNING THESE  
MISSIONS ARE LISTED IN ATTACHMENT ONE. UPON  
E ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED] THESE AIRCRAFT AND CREW  
WILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE JTF.

SAAM 1066 (2) AIRLIFT EMPLOYMENT MISSION THREE  
THIS MISSION IS SIMILAR TO MISSIONS 1040, 10  
AND SERVES AS THE BACKUP  
EMPLOYMENT MISSION. AT EXECUTE  
THE CREW STANDS COCKPIT ALERT  
THROUGHOUT EMPLOYMENT. IF NOT  
LAUNCHED IN THE EMPLOYMENT ROLE  
THIS MISSION SERVES AS A MED EVAC  
IN THE EVENT THE EGRESSING EMPLOYMENT  
FORCE REQUIRES MEDICAL ATTENTION  
AVAILABLE ON THIS AIRCRAFT. THIS  
MISSION IS CONTROLLED BY THE JTF  
UNTIL THE EMPLOYMENT OPERATION IS

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[REDACTED]




E

COMPLETED AND THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY  
OF PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE EGRESS  
FORCE. THIS MISSION MAY BE ROUTED  
[REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] TO ASSIST IN  
REDEPLOYMENT. CONTROL REVERTS TO MAC  
UPON COMPLETION OF EMPLOYMENT. ATCH 2 APPLIES.

(S)

A

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



SAAAM 1041<sup>01-02</sup> (3) MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS

THESE ARE THE PRIMARY MED EVAC MISSIONS.

E

ONLOAD IS AT [REDACTED]

WITH A PLANE SIDE TRANSFER OF Hostages, Patients AND EXTRACTION AIRCREW FROM THE PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT

C-14'S THESE MISSIONS MAKE A MINIMUM GROUND TIME ENROUTE STOP AT RHINE MAIN AB. OFFLOAD DESTINATION IS ANDREWS AFB

WITH DOVER AS ALTERNATE. THESE MISSIONS ARE CREWED WITH A MEDICAL CREW CONSISTING OF ~~THREE~~ PHYSICIANS, ~~THREE~~ NURSES <sup>(AND MEDICAL TECHNICIANS)</sup> EXPERIENCED

IN INTENSIVE CARE AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT TAILORED TO THE TYPES OF INJURIES EXPECTED. SEE ATTACHMENT 3 FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

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Same (6) MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSION THREE

THIS MISSION IS CREWED SIMILAR TO OTHER MED EVAC MISSIONS BUT WITHOUT PHYSICIANS. THIS MISSION STANDS BY AT RHINE MAIN TO BACK UP THE PRIMARY + MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS. THIS

AIRCREW AND AIRCRAFT ASSUME ALPHA STAND BY STATUS FOR THE ENROUTE TIME OF THE PRIMARY HOSTAGE MED EVAC. THE FLIGHT CREW OF THIS MISSION FLIGHT PLANS AND FILES THE FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR THE PRIMARY MED EVACS TO SHORTEN THE PRIMARY MED EVAC GROUND TIME AT RHINE MAIN. IN THE EVENT A PRIMARY MED EVAC AIRCRAFT IS NOT MISSION CAPABLE FOR THE FLIGHT FROM RHINE MAIN TO ANDREWS, A PLANE TO PLANE TRANSFER WILL BE MADE TO THIS STANDBY MISSION. IF THE STANDBY IS NOT USED ON THE PRIMARY MISSION OUT OF RHINE MAIN

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EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES

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THE MISSION MAY BE USED TO PICK UP ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES AT [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] IF REQUIREMENTS DICTATE. IF THESE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS DO NOT GENERATE THIS MISSION WILL BE A BRAVO STANDBY FOR THE OTHER RETURNING MISSIONS. THE AIRCREW FOR THIS MISSION WILL BE SOURCED FROM THE SAME WING AND PREFERABLY THE SAME SQUADRON AS THE PRIMARY MED EVAC MISSIONS, MED EVAC MISSION NUMBER ONE AND TWO. SEE ATCH 6 FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

~~(C)~~  
SAAM 1755<sup>xy-xy</sup> (7) AIRLIFT MISSIONS FOR REDEPLOYMENT.

THREE C-141 AIRCRAFT WITH AUGMENTED CREWS WILL ARRIVE [REDACTED] SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL OF THE EGRESSING EMPLOYMENT

A, E

FORCE TO REDEPLOY ALL PERSONNEL OF THE EMPLOYMENT FORCE REQUIRING REDEPLOYMENT AIRLIFT. THESE MISSIONS WILL BE CONFIGURED P-4 FOR PASSENGER AIRLIFT TO CONUS, WITH ENROUTE STOP AT RAMSTEIN AB. EFFORTS WILL BE MADE FOR MINIMUM VISIBILITY OF THESE RETURNING MISSIONS TO PRECLUDE IDENTITY OF FORCE SIZE, UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT, ETC. SEE ATCH 7 FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

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(8) ADDITIONAL MISSIONS WILL BE TAKEN ON AS REQUIREMENTS DICTATE.

(9) EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS ONE AND TWO, MED EVAC MISSIONS ONE, TWO AND THREE (IF HOSTAGES ARE ON BOARD) WILL BE ASSIGNED AIRLIFT PRIORITY 1A2. MED EVAC MISSIONS WITH EMPLOYMENT FORCE CASUALTIES WILL BE ASSIGNED AIRLIFT PRIORITY 1A3. MISSIONS REDEPLOYING THE EMPLOYMENT FORCE PERSONNEL WILL BE ASSIGNED AIRLIFT PRIORITY 1B1. OTHER REDEPLOYMENT MISSIONS WILL BE ASSIGNED AIRLIFT PRIORITIES PER NORMAL SAAM REQUEST PROCEDURES.

(10) MAC COORDINATING OFFICERS. SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE MAC COORDINATING OFFICERS ARE LISTED IN ATTACHMENT 8. GENERALLY THEY WILL ENSURE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FROM MAC RESOURCES, LIAISON WITH NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL AGENCIES TO COORDINATE OR DIRECT MISSION LAUNCHES. THESE COORDINATORS WILL BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO SECURITY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE POST  
EMPLOYMENT AND PRIOR TO PUBLIC  
ANNOUNCEMENT PHASE. THESE ELEMENTS  
ARE SEPARATELY ADDRESSED BELOW.

(11) SECURITY.

(A) OPSEC, COMSEC CONSIDERATIONS WILL  
BE PARAMOUNT. MAC PERSONNEL WILL BE  
BRIEFED ONLY AS NEEDED TO SATISFACTORILY  
COMPLETE THEIR MISSION. AIRCREWS MUST  
BE SPECIFICALLY BRIEFED REGARDING  
RADIO PROCEDURES. ALL CREWMEMBERS  
MUST BE BRIEFED NOT TO REVEAL ANY  
INFORMATION REGARDING TACTICS USED,  
PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT OR LOCATIONS  
INVOLVED. THIS SILENCE MUST PREVAIL  
POST EMPLOYMENT ALSO.

(B) PHYSICAL SECURITY MUST BE  
PROVIDED THE MEDICAL EVACUATION  
MISSIONS DURING THEIR ENROUTE STOPS  
AT RHINE MAIN AB. THIS SECURITY  
WILL BE ARRANGED WITH THE LOCAL  
WING COMMANDER. THIS ARRANGEMENT  
WILL BE MADE AFTER EMPLOYMENT

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AND PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF THE PRIMARY MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSION. THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL BE COMPLETED BY THE MAC COORDINATION OFFICER.

(C) PHYSICAL SECURITY AT ANDREWS / <sup>McGuire</sup> AFBs WILL BE COORDINATED BY HQ MAC / SP WHO WILL BE BRIEFED AS REQUIRED AFTER EMPLOYMENT. THIS REQUIREMENT IS BASICALLY IN LINE WITH THE ROUTINE ANDREWS AFB / SP MISSION.

~~(12)~~ (12) AUDIO VISUAL SERVICE GUIDANCE:

(A) ONE AVS COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER WILL ACCOMPANY ONE OF THE , EMPLOYMENT C-141s. <sup>IF APPROVED</sup> THIS PHOTOGRAPHER WILL TRANSFER TO THE MEDICAL EVACUATION AIRCRAFT AT [REDACTED] HIS MISSION WILL BE TO RECORD ON LOAD AND ENROUTE CARE OF PATIENTS. THIS RESOURCE WILL BE SOURCED FROM AVS AT NORTON AFB. TASKING TO AVS WILL BE NOTIONAL NOT REVEALING INTENDED PURPOSE OR AREA OF INVOLVEMENT. TASKING WILL SPECIFY BOTH STILL AND MOTION PICTURE OR VIDEO TAPE CAPABILITY.

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B. THE MAC COORDINATOR AT RHINE MAIN WILL, AFTER EMPLOYMENT IS COMPLETED, REQUEST RESIDENT AV SERVICE TO DOCUMENT ENROUTE SERVICE OF MED EVAC MISSIONS.

C. Hq MAC PRIMARY ACTION OFFICER, AFTER EMPLOYMENT IS COMPLETED, WILL ARRANGE FOR AV SERVICE AT ANDREWS AFB TO DOCUMENT THE MED EVAC OFF LOGS.

13. ~~SECRET~~ PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. ALL PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUESTIONS WILL BE REFERRED TO OASD/PA (OFFICE ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) UPON COMPLETION OF EMPLOYMENT Hq MAC/PA WILL BE BRIEFED TO PREPARE PA PERSONNEL AT RHINE MAIN AND ANDREWS AFB TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE PRESS ENQUIRIES. NO UNILATERAL MAC RELEASE IS AUTHORIZED NOR ACCESS TO ANY PARTICIPANTS OR HOSTAGES WITHOUT OASD/PA GUIDANCE. AFTER EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ALL MAC PARTICIPANTS WILL BE BRIEFED TO PREVENT IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, SIZE OR EMPLOYMENT TACTICS OF FORCES INVOLVED.

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14. ~~SECRET~~ DEPLOYMENT. MISSIONS WILL BE DEPLOYED USING [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
NOT LATER THAN THE [REDACTED] OF THE  
USUAL [REDACTED]

BY MAC. THIS ALSO NECESSITATES SUBMISSION  
FROM THE NAF. THE [REDACTED]  
FOR THE PACING MISSIONS (EMPLOYMENT  
MISSIONS) MUST BE SUBMITTED

A  
B  
E

[REDACTED]  
SPECIAL, EMERGENCY, HAND CARRIED, EYE BALL TO  
EYE BALL PROCEDURES CAN BE IMPLEMENTED  
LATER, BUT WILL ENTAIL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EMPLOYMENT MISSION (SAAM 1040) DEPARTS  
HOME STATION ON D-3. EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS  
(SAAM 1045 AND 1066) CANNOT DEPART HOME STATION  
LATER THAN D-2 / 0600Z TO MEET EMPLOYMENT  
SCHEDULE FROM [REDACTED]

15. LOGISTICS. NORMAL MAC LOGISTICS  
PROCEDURES APPLY. MAC COORDINATORS WILL  
OBTAIN EXPEDITED LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM THE  
LOCAL MAC WING OR SUPPORT SQUADRON  
COMMANDER AS REQUIRED. OFF LINE SUPPORT

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WILL BE REFERRED TO THE MAC  
POINT OF CONTACT, LTC [REDACTED] OR  
HQ MAC.

16. IN FLIGHT FEEDING. ALL COMFORT  
PALLET EQUIPPED MISSIONS WILL BE CONFIGURED  
WITH FROZEN MEALS SUFFICIENT FOR THE  
AIRCREW AND PASSENGERS FOR THE FLIGHT  
FROM INITIAL ONLOAD IMMEDIATELY AFTER  
EMPLOYMENT TO THE CONUS OFFLOAD. RESUPPLY  
AT THE ENROUTE BASE MAY BE REQUIRED. EMPLOYMENT  
MISSIONS WILL BE PROVIDED C-RATIONS  
FOR CREW MEMBERS FOR FOUR DAYS AND FOR THE  
POTENTIAL PASSANGER LOAD FOR TWO DAYS. A  
COMPATIBLE WATER SUPPLY WILL BE PROVIDED  
THESE EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS.

17. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT. SOURCING  
POSITIONING AND USE OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT  
IS OUTLINED IN ATTACHMENT 9

18. MEDICAL PERSONNEL. SOURCING AND  
ASSIGNMENTS FOR MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE  
POSITIONING IS DESCRIBED IN ATTACHMENT NINE.

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[REDACTED]  
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19. ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE. SHAM NUMBERS  
WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THESE MISSIONS  
USING NUMBERS PROVIDED BY JCS OR USERS.  
UNRESOLVED EXPENSES OR BILLINGS WILL BE  
ADDRESSED ON AN AFTER-THE-FACT BASIS  
BY AC PERSONNEL. MISSION SYMBOLS FOR  
EACH MISSION ARE LISTED IN THE ATTACHMENTS  
HERETO.

DECLASSIFICATION: THESE WORKING PAPERS  
ARE NOT DECLASSIFIED POST MISSION AND  
WILL BE DESTROYED OR RETURNED TO Hq MAC/DOO  
FOR DISPOSITION. NO RELEASE OF INFORMATION  
HEREIN IS APPROPRIATE WITHOUT JCS/J3 APPROVAL.

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~~SECRET~~ *John / 4W<sup>3</sup> / 721*  
EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS

*A, E*  
~~(B)~~ THESE MISSIONS ARE THE PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS REQUIRING A SPECIAL OPERATIONS LOW LEVEL CREW WITH SPECIAL NIGHT LANDING QUALIFICATIONS. THESE CREWS AND AIRCRAFTS WILL ARRIVE AT [REDACTED] UNDER A ROUTINE SAAM NUMBER AND ENTER CREW REST. THE CREWS WILL BE ALERTED BY THE MAC COORDINATOR, PROCEED TO CONFIGURE THE AIRCRAFT TO ITS SPECIAL CONFIGURATION THEN LAUNCH ON A FLIGHT PLAN FOR A [REDACTED] DEST. THE EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS WILL BE PERFORMED RECOVERING AT [REDACTED]

*A, E*  
(C) IF RECOVERY AT [REDACTED] IS ACCOMPLISHED AS PLANNED, THE OPERATING CREW WILL TRANSFER WITH PASSENGERS/PATIENTS TO MED EVAC AIRCRAFT FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO THE CONUS. THE AIRCRAFT, IF OPERABLE, WILL BE REDEPLOYED FROM [REDACTED] UPON RECEIPT OF [REDACTED] CLEARANCE. ALTERNATELY THIS AIRCRAFT, IF MISSION CAPABLE MAY BE USED AS A SPARE FOR OTHER REDEPLOYMENT MISSIONS.

2. THESE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS WILL BE SOURCED FROM CHARLESTON AIR FORCE BASE.

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3. THESE AIRCRAFT FOR DEPLOYMENT FROM CHARLESTON WILL BE CARGO CONFIGURED. FOR EMPLOYMENT THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE CONFIGURED:

- A. SIDEWALL SEATS, FULL COMPLEMENT.
- B. CENTER STANCHIONS.
- C. LITTERS FOR STANCHIONS.
- D. MED EVAC EQUIPMENT.
- E. RATIONS FOR AIRCREW FOR FOUR DAYS  
RATIONS FOR PASSANGERS FOR TWO DAYS.
- F. WATER TO COMPLEMENT RATIONS.

(EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

4. THE AIRCREWS WILL PRACTICE CONFIGURING THESE AIRCRAFT AT HOME STATION PRIOR TO ENTERING PRE DEPARTURE CREW REST. THE ASSIGNED MEDICAL TECHNICIANS MAY ASSIST. THE OPERATING AIRCREW WILL SEAL AND STORE ON THE CREW REST FACILITY THE NECESSARY MED EVAC CONFIGURATION EQUIPMENT. THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT TO BE DISTURBED UNTIL EMPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION. SWAPPING AIRCRAFT, IF REQUIRED, ENTAILS SWAPPING THIS EQUIPMENT.

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5. THE AIRCREW AND MEDICAL TECHNICIANS REMAIN WITH THESE AIRCRAFT UNTIL ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED]

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6 ONE AIRCRAFT WILL BE THE CAMOUFLAGED  
PAINTED AIRCRAFT IF MISSION CAPABLE. THE  
DOORS, RAMP AND PETAL DOOR SYSTEMS MUST BE  
AS RELIABLE AS POSSIBLE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT.

7.

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8.

THIS MISSION MUST ARRIVE [REDACTED] NLT L-HOUR  
MINUS 15:15 HOURS. ALTERNATIVELY [REDACTED]

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MAY BE SUBMITTED BY LTC [REDACTED]  
AT THE MACE. THIS MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED  
NLT D-2 AND APPLIES TO THE RAMSTEIN- [REDACTED]  
MISSION SEGMENT ONLY.

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9. LTC [REDACTED] AT THE MACE  
WILL SUBMIT [REDACTED] REQUESTS  
FOR REDEPLOYMENT MISSION SEGMENTS.

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1. THIS AIRCRAFT, CREW, MEDICAL CREW, SOURCING AND CONFIGURATIONS ARE SIMILAR TO EMPLOYMENT MISSION ONE AND TWO.

E (A) 2. THIS AIRCRAFT OPERATES SARM NUMBER 1065<sup>03</sup> (LAST RANGER MSN) MISSION TO ~~██████████~~

E (A) 3. CREW MEMBERS FROM EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS ONE AND TWO WILL ACCOMPANY THIS MISSION TO ~~██████████~~ FOR FINAL BRIEFINGS AND UPDATES.

E (A) 4. AIRCRAFT AND CREWS WILL REMAIN AT ~~██████████~~ UNTIL D-1. AIRCRAFT AND CREWS WILL DEPART WADDI TO ARRIVE ~~██████████~~ NLT D-15:15.

5. MISSION MAINTAINS COCKPIT ALERT, RADIOS ON, RADIO SILENCE D-HOUR UNTIL RELEASE BY COM ALF OR REQUIREMENT GENERATED BY DROP-IN REDEPLOYMENT MISSION.

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ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 1

MED EVAC MISSION ONE AND TWO  
(SAA 1041 01-1)

E (1) THESE ARE THE PRIMARY MED EVAC MISSIONS TO TRANSPORT THE HOSTAGES, FORCE CASUALTIES [REDACTED] TO ANDREWS/MCGUIRE.

THESE AIRCRAFT WILL POSITION TO [REDACTED]

A A COMFORT PALLET AND MED EVAC CONFIGURATION GEAR WILL BE STOWED ON THE AIRCRAFT AT CHARL AIN EVAC CONFIGURATION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BETWEEN

E RAMSTEIN AND [REDACTED]

E (2) THE CREW WILL THEN MAINTAIN ALPHA STANDBY <sup>AT</sup> [REDACTED] UNTIL ARRIVAL OF THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT A PLANESIDE TRANSFER OF PASSENGER AND PATIENTS WILL BE EFFECTED.

THE CREW OF THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT WILL ALSO BOARD THE MED EVAC AIRCRAFT. THESE MISSIONS WILL THEN PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO RHINE MAIN WHERE A STAGE CREW AND SPARE MED EVAC CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT WILL BE COCKED AND

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READY FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER  
OF PASSENGERS / PATIENTS IF REQUIRED  
AFTER MINIMUM GROUND TIME AT  
RHINE MAIN THE MISSIONS WILL PROCEED  
TO ANDREWS <sup>using</sup> DOVER AS  
THE ALTERNATE.

2. THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE SOURCED  
FROM 21ST AIR FORCE.

A, E

3. THE AIRCRAFT WILL DEPLOY TO

[REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED] THE AIRCRAFT WILL  
BE LOADED WITH CARGO TO  
INCLUDE THE PALLETIZED MED  
EQUIPMENT, TROOP SEATS AND A  
COMFORT PALLET.

4. THE MEDICAL CREWS, CONSISTING  
OF TWO PHYSICIANS AND TWO NURSES

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EXPERIENCED IN INTENSIVE CARE,  
WILL BOARD THE MISSIONS AT  
[REDACTED] AS PASSENGERS. THEY WILL

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TRAVEL ENROUTE AS PASSENGERS NOT MED CREW.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT FOUR PAGE ONE  
MED EVAC MISSION THREE (SAAW 1040)

T

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TE

cy 1 of 3 R

MAC 00 80-077

IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES

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MED-BAAC MISSION-FOUR

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cy 1 of 3

MAC DO 80-077

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
MEDICAL EVAC MISSION THREE (SMM)

1. THIS MISSION WILL BE IN PLACE AT RHINE MAIN TO PROVIDE BACKUP AND STAGE CAPABILITY FOR MED EVAC MISSION 1040<sup>01</sup>, PRIMARILY, AND THE OTHER MED EVAC MISSIONS IF REQUIRED. THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE MED EVAC CONFIGURED AND COCKED FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE HOSTAGE AIRCRAFT. <sup>(1st - Arriving)</sup> IF REQUIRED THE HOSTAGES WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THIS MISSION TO CONTINUE TO ANDREWS. ONLY A FLIGHT CREW WILL BE WITH THIS AIRCRAFT. THE MEDICAL CREW ON THE MISSION BEING STAGED WILL REMAIN WITH THE HOSTAGES/PATIENTS AS THEY CONTINUE ON TO ANDREWS. THE MAC MISSION COORDINATOR AT RHINE MAIN WILL INSURE THAT THE GROUND TIME FOR THE HOSTAGES IS HELD TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM.

WORKING PAPERS  
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11/16/80  
EO-077

2. THE CREW AND AIRCRAFT FOR THIS MISSION WILL BE SOURCED FROM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
2207 AIR FORCE

3. THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW WILL DEPLOY TO RHEIN MAIN ON A ROUTINE CARGO SAAM. THE CREW WILL BE BRIEFED BY THE MAC MISSION COORDINATOR AT RHEIN MAIN. THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE CONFIGURED FOR MED EVAC AT RHEIN MAIN.

4. THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE PARKED IN AS SECLUDED SPOT AS POSSIBLE WITH THE ARRIVING MED EVAC MISSION TO BE PARKED ALONG SIDE FOR RAPID PATIENT TRANSFER IF REQUIRED. SECURITY POLICE WILL PROVIDE CONTROLLED ACCESS TO THESE AIRCRAFT DURING GROUND TIME WITH HOSTAGES ON BOARD. THESE FACTORS WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE MAC COORDINATOR.

MAC SO 80-077

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EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

~~SECRET~~

3  
4-1-07

REDEPLOYMENT MISSION

SECRET (SAAW 1780)

(2)1. THREE C-141 AIRCRAFT WILL BE SCHEDULED INTO [REDACTED] ON D+1 TO REDEPLOY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AFTER EMPLOYMENT IS COMPLETE. THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE SCHEDULED INTO [REDACTED] AS ROUTINE 1730<sup>XX</sup> RESUPPLY MISSIONS AT ONE TO THREE HOUR INTERVALS. AFTER ONLOAD AT [REDACTED] THE MISSIONS WILL RETURN TO [REDACTED] WHERE THEY WILL BE STAGED ENROUTE TO THE CONUS. THE GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED] WILL BE MINIMAL.

E

2. IN SYSTEM AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED FOR THIS MISSION. THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE CONFIGURED P-4.

3. ALL CREWS WILL BE BRIEFED THAT, EVEN AFTER REDEPLOYMENT IS COMPLETE, THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING WHO IS BEING MOVED, IS TOP SECRET.

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EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)  
NAC 80  
80-877



ATTN: T 16 A

(A) 4. UPON COMINF REQUEST BE PREPARED  
 E TO POSITION THESE AIRCRAFT AT  
 [REDACTED] DURING EMPLOYMENT TO BE  
 CAPABLE OF PLANE TO PLANE TRANSFER  
 AND ASAP DEPARTURE.

(C) 5. ENROUTE SERVICING WILL BE  
 E ACCOMPLISHED AT [REDACTED] WITH  
 APPROPRIATE SECURITY RESTRICTIONS  
 TO PREVENT PRESS / UNAUTHORIZED  
 PERSONNEL FROM OBTAINING ACCESS  
 TO THE PASSENGERS.

6. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE  
 IDENTITY, COMPOSITION AND SIZE OF  
 THE FORCE TRANSPORTED ON THIS  
 MISSION BE PROTECTED INFORMATION.

cy 1 of 3

NAC 80-80-077

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 EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

MAC COORDINATION OFFICERS

I. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF MAC COORDINATION OFFICERS ARE:

A. RHINE MAIN. COORDINATE POST EMPLOYMENT ENROUTE STOPS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS.

- (1) COORDINATE AND ENSURE LOGISTIC ENROUTE SUPPORT.
- (2) COORDINATE, DIRECT AND CONTROL DUTIES OF STAND BY MED EVAC CREW
- (3) ENSURE FLIGHT PLAN AND CLEARANCES ARE FILED
- (4) COORDINATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT.
- (5) COORDINATE SECURITY POLICE SUPPORT.
- (6) ENSURE SIDE BY SIDE AND, OPTIMALLY, REMOTE OR SECLUDED PARKING OF THE PRIMARY MED EVAC AND THE STAND BY MED EVAC AIRCRAFT.
- (7) COORDINATE LOCAL MEDICAL CREW STAND BY SUPPORT IF AN AIRCRAFT SWAP IS NECESSARY.

WORKING PAPERS  
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EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

MAC DC 80-077





~~(B)~~

[REDACTED]

COORDINATE

ACTIVITY OF MED EVAC CREWS ONE AND TWO. SUPERVISE

THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION IF REQUIRED. COORDINATE SUPPORT BY THE LOCAL MAC SUPPORT UNIT AND BASE SUPPORT:

(1) OBTAIN SIDE BY SIDE PARKING FOR THE ARRIVING EMPLOYMENT MISSION AND THE MEDICAL EVACUATION AIRCRAFT

(2) OBTAIN SECURITY POLICE SUPPORT TO PROTECT THE PLANE TO PLANE TRANSFER.

(3) OBTAIN LOGISTIC AND REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

(4) OBTAIN LOCAL BASE MEDICAL SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN PATIENT TRANSFER OR TO CARE FOR CRITICAL CASUALTIES NOT CAPABLE OF FURTHER FLIGHT.

(5) AFTER EMPLOYMENT BEGINS BRIEF THE LOCAL MAC COMMANDER, BASE COMMANDER AND HOSPITAL COMMANDER TO ARRANGE ABOVE SUPPORT.

MAC DO-80-077

WORKING PAPERS (WHEN FINISHED, DESTROY IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

[REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(6) INSURE PA SUPPORT IS PROVIDED BY THE LOCAL BASE TO PRECLUDE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE AT THIS PHASE OF THE MISSION

(7) ASSIST IN AVS COVERAGE. AVS PHOTOGRAPHER SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE PRIMARY MED EVAC AIRCRAFT. INSURE HE HAS A SEAT ON THE AIRCRAFT.

(8) COORDINATE THE CREW CHANGE ON THE EMPLOYMENT MISSION TERMINATING AT [REDACTED] THE PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT CREW TERMINATES AT [REDACTED] AND TRANSFERS TO THE MED EVAC MISSION IN A DEAD HEAD STATUS. (IF SEATS ARE AVAILABLE)

E

MAC 00-80-077

E

~~(S)~~C. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~  
COORDINATE DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT MISSIONS AS REQUIRED

- (1) ENSURE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND CREWS ARE AVAILABLE FOR ASSIGNED MISSIONS
- (2) BRIEF ALL CREWS ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS
- (3) COORDINATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT.
- (4) COORDINATE SECURITY POLICE SUPPORT.
- (5) COORDINATE LOCAL AVUS SUPPORT IF REQUIRED
- (6) UPON COMMUNICATION FROM COMALF THAT THE EMPLOYMENT FORCE HAS EGRESSED THE OBJECTIVE COUNTRY BRIEF THE 322ALD COMMANDER ON THE SUPPORT THAT WILL BE REQUIRED.
- (7) ADVISE THE MAC COORDINATOR AT RHINE MAIN OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROGRESS.
- (8) BRIEF REDEPLOYING CREWS THAT THEY ARE NOT TO

WORKING PAPERS  
CONTROLLED BY SECURITY  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

MAC 00-80-017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

REVEAL DEPLOYMENT ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ LOCATIONS, ENROUTE STOPS, FORCES INVOLVED, ETC.

(9) THIS OFFICER IS PRIMARY IN THEATER OPR FOR [REDACTED]

A

[REDACTED]  
EUCOM C-130 SUPPORT AND STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT REROUTES. HE MUST BE KEPT INFORMED BY COMALF AND OTHER MAC COORDINATORS.

(10) INSURE AIRCRAFT DEPLOYING ARE PROPERLY OVERPACKED WITH FROZEN MEALS TO MEET REQUIREMENTS STATED HEREIN.

(11) INSURE AIRCREWS AND AIRCRAFT ARE PROPERLY STAGED.

WORKING PAPERS  
(WHEN FINISHED, DESTROY  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

MAC DO-80-077

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~(S)~~ D.

[REDACTED] COORDINATE WITH THE  
JTF, VIA [REDACTED] FOR  
ANY ADD ON AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS  
AND PASS THOSE REQUIREMENTS  
TO THE WACE. COORDINATE  
ALL WAC AIRLIFT OPERATIONS  
AT [REDACTED]

E, G

(1) ENSURE THAT CREWS ARE  
BRIEFED ON PLANS AND  
CHANGES.

(2) COORDINATE PARKING  
FOR MED EVAC AIRCRAFT

E

(3) ADVISE THE [REDACTED] COORDINATION  
OFFICER AT THE WACE OF THE  
STATUS OF THE EMPLOYMENT

(4) DETERMINE FOLLOW ON  
REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS  
AND RELAY TO THE COORDINATION  
OFFICER AT THE WACE.

[REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

WORKING PAPERS  
(WHEN FINISHED, DESTROY  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES) WAC DO  
80-077

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~E~~ ~~(E)~~. [REDACTED] COORDINATES WITH LOCAL MAC LIAISON TO OBTAIN ALL SUPPORT REQUIRED. RECEIVES LAUNCH INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMALT OR MISSION COMMANDER (JTF) INSURES A POSITIVE LAUNCH ORDER IS RECEIVED THROUGH CODE WORD VERIFICATION. ASSISTS EMPLOYMENT AIRCREWS AS REQUIRED. MAINTAINS RADIO WATCH IN BACK UP EMPLOYMENT AIRCRAFT DURING EMPLOYMENT IF POSSIBLE. ARRANGES GROUND SUPPORT TO INCLUDE GENERATOR TO POWER EMPLOYMENT BACK UP RADIOS TO PRECLUDE RUNNING APU DURING RADIO WATCH.

~~E~~ IF ANY EMPLOYMENT AIRCRAFT RECOVER AT [REDACTED], ASSISTS AS REQUIRED.

WORKING PAPERS  
(WHEN FINISHED, DESTROY  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
EXISTING SECURITY DIRECTIVES)

4CDO-80-077

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEDICAL CREW SOURCING

(1) MEDICAL TECHNICIANS FOR EMPLOYMENT MISSION  
ONE WILL BE SOURCED FROM

(2) MEDICAL TECHNICIANS FOR EMPLOYMENT MISSION  
TWO WILL BE SOURCED FROM

E (3) MEDICAL CREW FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION  
MISSION ONE (██████████ ONLOAD) WILL BE  
SOURCED FROM

E (4) MEDICAL CREW FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION  
MISSION TWO (██████████ ONLOAD/STANDBY) WILL  
BE SOURCED FROM

E (5) MEDICAL CREW FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSION  
THREE (██████████ ONLOAD) WILL BE SOURCED  
FROM

PHYSICIAN SOURCING

(1) MEDICAL CREW ONE PHYSICIAN WILL BE SOURCED  
FROM

(2) MEDICAL CREW TWO PHYSICIAN WILL BE SOURCED  
FROM

(3) MEDICAL CREW THREE PHYSICIAN WILL BE SOURCED  
FROM



#136

*A.C*  
*entire*  
*document*

BANDAR ABBASS INTERNATIONAL



T.

II-9

Classified By ~~DIA~~  
Declassified On ~~OADR~~

Declassified by  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \*AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN JOB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICAO- 78 JUL IATA- \*  
 \* ICAO AIRFIELD NAME- BANDAR ABBAS INTL AIRFIELD STATUS- 08\* \*\*\* ACTIVE \*\*\*  
 \* ICAO IDENTIFICATION NUMBER- 0548008063 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- NONE  
 \*\*\*\*\*

GENERAL

SRC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	TIME AREA CODE	ASSGN VLL NO	PAGE NO
A	I			M		
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION	ELEVATION
27 13 36N 056 22 42E		JOGA NG 40-02	OPEN 75 OCT	80053	0021	00023
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT		(C)				
40RDP 4384423-011735 UTM-INTERNATIONAL						
CENTER OF RUNWAY EQUIDISTANT FROM EITHER END.						
GRAPHIC REFERENCE		(U)				
ONC H-7, JOG 40-2, OLD EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-181, H-130.						
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS		(C)				
SIX MILES ENE OF BANDAR ABBAS, 2.5 MILES N OF THE PERSIAN GULF COAST, 90 MILES ENE OF BANDAR LINGEH.						
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE		(U)				
COASTAL TERRAIN, NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL DRAINAGE GOOD. HILLS RISING E/W RISE 8 MILES TO THE NW. PEAKS 7000 FT 17 MILES NW BY N, 1657 FT 21 MILES W BY S, 8678 FT 28 MILES NE BY N. FROM THE S, APPROACH IS FLAT. LK AND CLEAR OF NATURAL OBSTRUCTIONS.						
CONTROLLING AGENCY(S)		(U)				
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (CAO).						

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS (U)  
 DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES USING C-130, F-27, 737, 727 AIRCRAFT; A FORWARD OPERATING BASE FOR THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE (IIAF) FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (U)  
 THE CIVIL AND MILITARY APRONS CAN ACCOMMODATE 9 C-141 OR 17 C-130 (ARGO) AIRCRAFT OR 78 F-4 OR 140 F-5A/H FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS (U)

NAME	DISTANCE	DIR	RWY LENGTH	SURF	CAPACITY
NONE					

SEARCH AND RESCUE (C)  
 TEHRAN RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER 575 MILES NNW. LONG AND SHORT RANGE FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT, SAR HELICOPTERS UN BASE.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES (U)  
 CUSTOMS AVAILABLE ON PRIOR NOTICE.

PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION (S)  
 COMPLETE FACILITIES FOR MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL (U)  
 ESTIMATE SOME SKILLED AND SEMISKILLED AVAILABLE.

FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (C)  
 BANDAR ABBAS NAVAL BASE 6 MILES WSW.

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

01-11

ENTRY CODE- IR AFD) NAME- BANDAR ABHASS INTL

JOYR DATE- 06 JUL 1978

TACAF ASSOCI

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

TOWER, TACAN AND NDB. C/S BND. TACAN 725 FT AT 110 DEGREES TRUE FROM RP.

POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS

TELEPHONE, 200 LINES EXPANDABLE TO 400 LINES. TELETYPE, 2 ENGLISH AND 7 PERSI MACHINES. MICRO-WAVE LUN  
TERMINAL, 60 VLF CHANNELS.

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES

US CONSULATE IN KHORRAMSHAHR 475 MILES WNW. SSB RADIO CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES

006 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
006 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR  
006 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
015 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
020 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
015 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED.

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS

DIMENSIONS	MAG/BRG	SFC	COND	CAPACITY	KZETS	RWY	J/B	A/G	ELEV	OVERRUN	APCL	GRAD	AL
12020X00148	021/201	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A	021	N	N	00015	ASP 1000	50=1	+0.06	N
						201	A	N	00023	ASP 1000	50=1	-0.06	N

REMARKS-EXTENSIBLE FOR 6000 FT. JET BARRIER ON OVERRUN 180 FT FROM THRESHOLD RWY 02. RUNWAY MARKERS, 4X4 FT  
SIGNS, EVERY 1000 FT. CAPACITY BASED ON TWIN TANDEM AIRCRAFT.

TAXIWAYS

NO	TYPE	WID	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	KZETS
01	PARALLEL	098	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A
02	HIGH SPEED LINK	098	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A
03	LINK (APPROX)	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A
01	ALERT	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	A
01	LINK (APRON)	075	CON	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A
02	LINK (RWY ENDS)	098	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A

APRONS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FT	*PARK CAPCY*	*ARRIVALS	*DAY*HR/42*
01	OPERATIONAL (MIL)	1800X0450	CON	GOOD	ESWL-80500/185-PSI	999	0000810000*	*	* 24*	: *
01	OPERATIONAL (CIV)	1250X0360	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-80500/185-PSI	999	0000450000*	*	* 24*	: *
01	HOLDING	0415X0155	CON	GOOD	ESWL-80500/185-PSI	999	0000064325*	*	* 24*	: *
01	HOLDING	0350X0150	CON	GOOD	ESWL-80500/185-PSI	999	0000052500*	*	* 24*	: *
01	ALERT	0355X0155	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27268/225-PSI	999	0000055025*	*	* 24*	: *
						TOTAL-	1431850	*****		

11-11

\*\*\*\*\* TOTAL SQ FEET OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- BANDAR ABBASS INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUM

LIMITED-APRONS	NO. 05	SQ FT 14287	SURFACE ASP	COND G	CAP. C141
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HARDSTANDS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
01	PAD	0110X0070	CON GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	999	0000007700

RFVETMENTS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
N						

PARKING (OTHER)

NONE (U)

OBSTRUCTIONS

NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	BRG	REMARKS
01	TOWER	00395	0380	A	03.0	225	FROM RP TO TOWER
01	MAST	00270	0250	A	00.4	289	FROM RP TO MAST.
01	WATER TOWER	00125	0100	U	00.4	335	FROM RP TO TOWER.
01	WATER TOWER	00125	0100	U	00.9	221	FROM RP TO TOWER.
01	TV MAST	00189	0159	E	01.0	043	FROM RP TO MAST.

LIGHTING

LOW INTENSITY RUNWAY LIGHTS, THRESHOLD LIGHTS AND TAXIWAY AND RAMP FLOOD LIGHTS.

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

HANGARS

NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOOR	WID-HT	HEAT	
01	SINGLF BAY	STEEL AND CONCRETE	0295X0185	U	XU	E	
04	SINGLF BAY ALERT	STEEL	0110X0060	U	XU	E	
04	DOUBLE BAY	CONCRETE	U XU	U	XU	U	HANGARETTES
14	DOUBLE BAY	CONCRETE	U XU	U	XU	U	HANGARETTES

MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES

BUILDINGS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD MAINTENANCE BUT ARE NOT EQUIPPED AT PRESENT.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE

SHOPS AVAILABLE BUT NOT EQUIPPED AT PRESENT.

OXYGEN

LOX PLANT ALMOST COMPLETED. ESTIMATE 600 LITRE CAPACITY.

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS

FOUR MD-3 TYPE AVAILABLE.

GROUND POWER UNITS

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE, TYPE AND NUMBER UNKNOWN.

ORDNANCE STORAGE

STORAGE MAGAZINE, GUN STORAGE, ROCKET STORAGE AND AMMUNITION STORAGE AVAILABLE. TWELVE BUNKERS 100X40 FT.

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP EACH	TOT CAP	FILL STANDS	NO	GP4	RESUPPLY METHOD/RECIPT

11-12

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- BANDAR ABRASS INTL

JOIN DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUIM

JP-4	UNDER GROUND TANKS	004	0186261	00745044	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK
JP-4	UNDER GROUND TANKS	002	1528400	01057800	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK
TA	TANKS	U	U	00100000	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK
100/130	TANKS	U	U	U	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK
80/87	TANKS	U	U	U	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM

(U)

PRODUCT	STORAGE CAPACITY	CAP. NO. (GPM)	OUT-LETS	HOSE NO.	CARTS TYPE	NOZZLES NO. TYPE
---------	------------------	----------------	----------	----------	------------	------------------

REFUELLING UNITS

(C)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP.	DISP RATE	NOZZLES NU. TYPE
JP-4	06	TRUCK	010000	00600	U U
JP-4	02	TRUCK	005000	U	U U
JP-4	08	TRUCK	003500	U	U U
TA	U	TRUCK	U	U	U U
100/130	U	TRUCK	U	U	U U
80/87	U	TRUCK	U	U	U U

REFUELLING FACILITIES

(U)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP (GPM)
JP-4	U	TANK TRUCKS	U
TA	U	TANK TRUCKS	U
100/130	U	TANK TRUCKS	U
80/87	U	TANK TRUCKS	U

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS

(U)

THERE ARE 5640000 GALLONS OF FUEL STORED IN LARGE VERTICAL TANKS AT THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. THERE ARE SIX VERTICAL TANKS AT THE CIVIL SIDE. SIX FILL STANDS AVAILABLE.

OFF BASE STORAGE

(C)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP. EACH	TOTAL CAPACITY
JP-4	TANKS	U	U	U
TA	TANKS	U	U	U
100/130	TANKS	U	U	U
80/87	TANKS	U	U	U

REMARKS-OFF BASE STORAGE DISTANCE IS 648 MILES. RESUPPLY TIME IS 48 HOURS. NINE 100000 GAL TANKS AT THE MILITARY TERMINAL BY THE COMMERCIAL PIER IN BANDAR ABRASS. CONTENTS UNKNOWN.

STOCK LEVEL

(C)

PRODUCT	GAL-ON-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE
JP-4	01801844	A
TA	00100000	A
100/130	A	A
80/87	A	A

OIL AND LUBRICANTS

(U)

SAE 130 AVAILABLE.

THRUST AUGMENTATION

(U)

11-11

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- BANDAR ABBASS INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

IACAF ASSUIM

NONE

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT (U)  
TWO JEEPS AND 2 AMBULANCES. (MILITARY AND CIVIL).  
FIRE EQUIPMENT (C)  
FOUR LEYLAND FOAM AND POWDER ENGINES, LEYLAND AF PUMPER.  
WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT (U)  
ONE 18 FT BOOM WRECKER.  
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (U)  
ONE MAGNETIC RUNWAY CLEANER.  
CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT (U)  
ONE 2 TON FORKLIFT AND 3 HAND TRUCKS.

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS (C)

DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS AIRMEN

NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
A	U	00611	U

REMARKS-A 120 ROOM VOQ AVAILABLE, 6 MEN TO A ROOM. ONE 611 MAN DORMITORY NEARING COMPLETION ESTIMATE AUG 74.

DEPENDENT UNITS (C)

TWO LARGE SENIOR OFFICERS QUARTERS. PRESENTLY 450 HOUSING UNITS ARE COMPLETED AND 350 MORE PROGRAMMED. THERE ARE 150 OFFICER UNITS AND THE REST ARE NCO, ENLISTED AND CIVILIAN. OFFICER UNITS ARE 3 AND 4 BEDROOM, THE REST ARE 1 TO 3 BEDROOMS.

BIVOUAC AREA (U)

SURROUNDING AREA SUITABLE. NO FACILITIES.

OFF BASE FACILITIES (U)

CAMERSON HOTEL, 200 ROOMS AVAILABLE. OWNED AND OPERATED BY IRAN AIR. LIMITED ACCOMMODATIONS AT THE NEARBY NAVAL STATION.

MESSING (C)

OFFICERS AIRMEN

NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
A	U	00500	U

REMARKS-NCO AND OFFICERS CLUB AVAILABLE.

STORAGE (C)

WAREHOUSE

SHEDS

NO.	LEN.	WID.	T/SQ.FT.	NO.	LEN.	WID.	T/SQ.FT.
05	0150	0075	0011250	N			

REMARKS-WAREHOUSES CONSTRUCTED OF CONCRETE.

MEDICAL FACILITIES (U)

FIVE ROOM DISPENSARY. FOUR DOCTORS AND NO NURSES ARE ASSIGNED. SERIOUS CASES ARE EVACUATED.

SEWAGE DISPOSAL (U)

UNKNOWN

GARBAGE DISPOSAL (U)

FOREIGN DISSE

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- BANDAR ABBASS INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSOW

UNKNOWN  
RUBBISH DISPOSAL (U)  
UNKNOWN  
WATER SUPPLY (C)  
WATER IS OBTAINED FROM WELLS AND STORED IN WATER TOWERS, ONE AT THE CIVIL AREA AND TWO AT THE MILITARY AREA, CAPACITY UNKNOWN. WATER IS SALTY BUT POTABLE. THERE IS A CRITICAL SHORTAGE IN SUMMER NECESSITATING RATIONING OCCASIONALLY.  
AIRFIELD SECURITY (C)  
ENTIRE FIELD BOUNDARY ENCLOSED BY 6 FT HIGH WIRE FENCE. NAVY GUARDS AVAILABLE FOR AIRCRAFT SECURITY. AIR DEFENSE AREA IS ON NORTHERN PERIMETER OF THE CANTONMENT. SPARE 35MM DERLICKON AND 23GH AA GUNS ARE HOUSED IN COVERED SHELTERS. THREAT/SECURITY EVALUATION AS OF 13 APR 1978 IS LOW/RELIABLE.  
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES (C)  
MAIN TERMINAL ALSO 2 HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF BUILDINGS AVAILABLE. SQUADRON OPERATIONS BUILDING.  
MAIL SERVICES (U)  
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES.  
ELECTRICAL POWER (C)  
POWER IS SUPPLIED BY 5 DIESEL POWERED GENERATORS. THE TWO 150 KW GENERATORS ARE HOUSED IN ONE BUILDING AND THREE 75 KW GENERATORS ARE HOUSED IN A NEARBY BUILDING, 50 HZ AND 60 HZ AVAILABLE. BACK-UP POWER IS SUPPLIED BY COMMERCIAL STATION IN THE CITY, 220V.

TRANSPORTATION

ROADS (C)  
BANDAR ABBAS/KERMAN ROAD RUNS W OF THE AIRFIELD. ASPHALT IN GOOD CONDITION. GOOD ACCESS ROAD TO THE FIELD.  
RAILROADS (U)  
NONE  
WATER TRANSPORTATION (C)  
WATER DEPTH AT THE COMMERCIAL PIER IS 50 FT. A 60 TON FLOATING CRANE, A 15 TON MOBILE CRANE AND A 5 TON SELF-PROPELLED CRANE ARE AVAILABLE. THERE IS A CONVEYOR SYSTEM FOR ORE 350 TONS/HOUR. PIER IS STEEL AND WOOD CARGO HANDLING IS PRESENTLY LIMITED DUE TO A LACK OF SKILLED STEVADORE LABDR. THIS WILL BE THE MAJOR NAVAL BASE IN IRAN.  
MILITARY VEHICLES (U)  
ESTIMATE AVAILABLE, TYPES AND NUMBER UNKNOWN.  
COMMERCIAL VEHICLES (U)  
LIMITED NUMBER OF TAXIS IN TOWN.  
AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL) (U)  
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES.

WEATHER

STATION (U)  
HOURLY AND SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS. METAR AND SPECIAL REPORTS. OPEN 24 HOURS.  
CLIMATE (U)  
SUBTROPICAL STEPPE. HOT AND HUMID IN SUMMER, WINTER IS MILD. ARID MAY THRU SEP, LIGHT AMOUNTS OF PRECIPITATION MONTHLY THE REST OF THE YEAR. THUNDERSTORMS ARE RARE. MAXIMUM CLOUD COVER NOV THRU FEB.  
FLYING CONDITIONS (C)  
THERE IS LITTLE CLOUDINESS. GALES ARE RARE BUT OCCASIONAL SQUALLS ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERE DUSTSTORMS REDUCE

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- BANDAR ABBASS INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUW

VISIBILITY TO A FEW YARDS. THESE OCCUR MOST FREQUENTLY IN EARLY AUTUMN.

PRECIPITATION

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.9	01.5	00.7	00.6	00.0	00.0
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.1	01.2	05.0
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	071.0	073.0	078.0	085.0	092.0	095.0
MEAN	065.5	067.0	072.0	078.0	084.5	088.0
MIN	060.0	061.0	066.0	071.0	077.0	081.0

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	097.0	097.0	095.0	091.0	084.0	075.0
MEAN	091.0	091.0	089.0	084.5	076.5	059.0
MIN	085.0	085.0	083.0	078.0	070.0	053.0

DEW POINT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	059	060	070	061	068	067	073	073	071	067	062	061

(U)

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MEAN	-0175	-0155	-0055	00065	00125	00275

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	00350	00375	00175	00715	-0100	-0125

SIGNIFICANCE


THIS AIRFIELD IS THE BEST ON THE PERSIAN GULF. FIRST CLASS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND FORWARD OPERATING BASE FOR THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE (9TH FIGHTER BASE). CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES IN PROGRESS. CUSTOMS ON PRIOR NOTICE.

(S)

11-16



~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN-WNINTEL  
BUSHEHR AIRFIELD



II-17

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN-WNINTEL~~

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \*AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD JOB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICAO- 78 JUN IALAF \*  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN AIRFIELD NAME- BUSHEHR ICAO DESIGNATOR- IIAB \*  
 \* SE NUMBER- 044008003 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- NONE AIRFIELD STATUS- \*B\* \*\*\* ACTIVE \*\*\*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

GENERAL

SRC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	TOI AREA CODE	ASSOTA VCL NO PAGE NO
A	1			M	16 -
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION ELEVATION
28 56 58N 050 49 52E		JOGA NH 39-15	02ED 75 NOV	80053	002E 00057
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT		(C)			
39RVN 4835413202442		UTM-INTERNATIONAL			
MIDPOINT OF A LINE CONNECTING THE CENTERS OF TWO PARALLEL RUNWAYS.					
GRAPHIC REFERENCE		(U)			
ONC H-6, JOG NH 39-15, OGD EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-18F, H-13C.					
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS		(C)			
ON A SMALL PENINSULA ON THE PERSIAN GULF 3 MILES S OF BUSHEHR, 31 MILES SE BY E OF THE S TIP OF KHARK ISLAND, 100 MILES WSW OF SHIRAZ.					
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE		(U)			
RECTANGULAR SHAPED. NATURAL DRAINAGE GOOD DUE TO SANDY, ABSORBENT SOIL. GOOD ARTIFICIAL DRAINAGE DITCHES CARRY WATER TO THE SEA. LAND IS LEVEL, RISING GRADUALLY TO 500 FT 23 MILES E, THEN RISES STEEPLY TO PEAKS OVER 1000 FT 83 TO 105 MILES E AND NE.					
CONTROLLING AGENCY(IES)		(U)			
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (CAO).					

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS (U)  
 IRANIAN NATIONAL AIRLINES WITH DEPENDABLE DAILY FLIGHTS. FORWARD OPERATING BASE OF THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE (IIAFI).

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (U)  
 HEAVY TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. CIVIL APRON CAN ACCOMMODATE 3 C-47 TYPE AIRCRAFT. MILITARY APRON CAN HANDLE APPROXIMATELY 139 F5A OR 72 F4D FIGHTERS.

AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS (U)

NAME	DISTANCE	DIR	RWY LENGTH	SURF	CAPACITY
NONE					

SEARCH AND RESCUE (C)  
 TEHRAN RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER 405 MILES N. LONG AND SHORT RANGE FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT. SAR HELICOPTERS ON BASE.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES (U)  
 NONE

PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION (U)  
 RWY 13L TO BE LENGTHENED 3000 FT TO THE S. START AND COMPLETION DATES UNKNOWN. SIXTEEN ADDITIONAL HANGAR-ETTES UNDER CONSTRUCTION, 85 PERCENT COMPLETE. RAPCON FACILITY BEING INSTALLED. AN ADDITIONAL 1.5 TON LUX PLANT ALMOST COMPLETED. A NEW POL STORAGE AREA UNDER CONSTRUCTION, ALSO A LARGE HOSPITAL.

INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL (U)  
 ESTIMATE SEMISKILLED, UNSKILLED AND LIMITED SKILLED AVAILABLE.

FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (U)

81-11

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- BUSHEHR

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUTW

NONE

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS (U)  
TOWER, VORTAC, RBN, A/G RADIO, UHF/DF.

POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS (U)  
TELEPHONE, TWO 50 LINE AUTO DIAL. C/W RADIO, HF.

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S) (C)  
US CONSULATE IN KHORRAMSHAHR 165 MILES NW B W HAS

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES (U)  
24 HOUR SSB RADIO CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN.

012 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
012 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR  
N DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
012 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
012 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
N DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED.

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS (U)

DIMENSIONS	MAG/BRG	SFC	COND	CAPACITY	R/LTS	RWY	J/B	A/G	ELEV	OVERRUN	APCL	GRAD	AL
10892X00148	132/312	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	A	13L	N	A	00008	ASP 0803	50=1	+0.42	A
10758X00098	132/312	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	F	31R	A	A	00054	ASP 0803	50=1	-0.42	A
						31L	N	N	00007	N	50=1	+0.47	N
						31L	A	A	00057	ASP 1020	50=1	-0.47	N

REMARKS-RWY ENDS OF 13L/31R ARE 1181 FT CONCRETE WITH 213 FT DISPLACED THRESHOLDS. FIRST 2000 FT OF RUNWAYS 31R/L ARE NOT VISIBLE FROM THE TOWER. CAPACITY BASED ON LCN. MA-1A J-BAR 240 FT IN OVERRUN RWY 31R, 610S J-BAR 62 FT IN O/R RWY 31R, BLISS 500S A-GEAR ON THRESHOLD RWY 13L, A-GEAR 2700 FT INTO TWY FROM THLD RWY 31R. A-GEAR 448-2E ON THLD RWY 13R, J-BAR 62 FT IN O/R RWY 31L.

TAXIWAYS (U)

NO	TYPE	WID	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	LTS
02	HIGH SPEED LINK	082	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	A
02	LINK (RWY ENDS)	075	CON	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	A
03	LINK (CIV AREA)	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	A
01	LINK (ALERT)	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	A
02	LINK (TRANS APR)	070	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	A
01	LINK (DISPERSAL)	050	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	A
02	LINK (DISPERSAL)	070	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	A
01	LINK (REVEY AREA)	050	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	A
01	LINK (DISPERSAL)	070	C	POOR	UNUSABLE	A

APRON\* (U)

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 \*SIMUL \*EST \*HR-TIME-  
 \*PARK CAPLY\*ARRIVALS\*DAY\*HR/MN\*  
 \* \* \* \* \*

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY TOT SQ FT
01	OPERATIONAL MIL	0490X0570	CON	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	999 0000564300*

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

11-19

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- BUSHEHR

JOB DATE- 16 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUM

01 OPERATIONAL CIV	0545X0240	CON	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	999	0000130000*	*	* 12*	: *
02 WARM UP	0490X0250	CON	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	999	0000245000*	*	* 12*	: *
01 ALERT	1107X0295	CON	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	999	0000326565*	*	* 12*	: *
01 OPERATIONAL MIL	0330X0230	CON	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	999	0000075900*	*	* 12*	: *
01 HANGAR (MIL)	0270X0180	CON	GOOD	ESWL-65500/185-PSI	999	0000048600*	*	* 12*	: *
TOTAL-						1391165*****			

\*\*\*\*\* TOTAL SQ FEET OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

LIMITED-APRONS	NO.	SQ FT	SURFACE	COND	CAP.
	07	13911	CON	G	G141

**HARDSTANDS**

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
01	OPERATIONAL	0330X0130	CON	GOOD	ESWL-11880/175-PSI	999	0000042900
01	COMPASS ROSE	0130 DIAM	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	999	0000013274

**REVENEMENTS**

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
----	------	------------	------	------	----------	-------	-------------

**PARKING (OTHER)**

ON DIRT ADJACENT TO THE N SIDE OF THE RUNWAY FOR LIGHT AIRCRAFT.

**OBSTRUCTIONS**

NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	BRG	REMARKS
01	MASTS	00362	0328	A	02.0	142	
01	BUILDINGS	00270	0185	U	01.2	166	FROM RP TO OBSTRUCTION.

**LIGHTING**

RUNWAY 13L/31R IS EQUIPPED WITH M TYPE APPROACH, RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY LIGHTS. RUNWAY 13R/31L EQUIPPED WITH FLARES. BEACON FLASHING WHITE EVERY FIVE SECONDS. VASI AT RUNWAY 31R.

**MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING**

**HANGARS**

NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOCK WID-PI	HEAT	
01	SINGLE BAY	ESTIMATE BRICK	0076X0045	060X40	U	
01	SINGLE BAY	EST BRICK AND STEEL	0195X0120	110XU	U	
02	DOUBLE BAY	ESTIMATE STEEL	0110X0110	050XU	U	
06	SINGLE BAY	CONCRETE	0120X0055	050XU	E	HANGARITIES
10	DOUBLE BAY	CONCRETE	0200X0100	090XU	E	HANGARITIES
03	SINGLE BAY	CONCRETE	0100X0100	090XU	E	HANGARITIES
05	DOUBLE BAY	CONCRETE	0200X0100	U U	E	HANGARITIES

REMARKS-HANGAR 1 ACCOMMODATES CESSNA TYPE AIRCRAFT USED BY THE GENDARMERIE, ITEM 2 IS A MILITARY DRIVE-THRU, ITEM 3 ARE ALERT HANGARS, ITEM 4 ARE SINGLE BAY DRIVE-THRU TYPE, ITEM 5 ARE DOUBLE BAY DRIVE-THRU TYPE, ITEM 6 IS SINGLE BAY, ITEM 7 ARE DOUBLE BAY DRIVE-THRU TYPE.

**MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES**

11-20

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- BUSHEHR

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSCIN

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

ONE BUILDING 50X17 FT LOCATED JUST E OF THE TERMINAL BLDG. ESTIMATE USED FOR SUPPLIES. PROBABLE SHOPS IN TWO SHEDS ATTACHED TO MILITARY HANGAR.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (U)

AIRCRAFT RADAR, TISED AND ECM EQUIPMENT REPAIR CAPABILITY. LIMITED BY A SHORTAGE OF TEST EQUIPMENT.

OXYGEN (U)

LUX STORAGE CAPACITY 2000 GAL. GENERATOR CAPACITY 4-5 GAL/HOUR. ONE ADDITIONAL 1.5 TON CAPACITY PLANT IS IN OPERATION AND ONE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS (U)

MA-1A AIR START AND M-32A ELECTRICAL START UNITS AVAILABLE.

GROUND POWER UNITS (U)

AVAILABLE, NUMBER UNKNOWN.

ORDNANCE STORAGE (U)

TWO LARGE IGLDUS EACH 2370 SQ FT, 1 SMALL IGLD 1790 SQ FT, 1 FUSE STORAGE BLDG 940 SQ FT, 1 STORAGE MAGAZINE 1000 SQ FT, 1 ROCKET ASSEMBLY AND STORAGE 2570 SQ FT. ELEVEN OTHER IGLDUS APPROXIMATELY 80X40 FT EACH. EIGHT SHEDS EA ABOUT 2100 SQ FT. PERIMETER DOUBLE FENCED, GUARD SHACKS AT CORNERS. ONE ACCESS GATE AND ANOTHER ACCESS GATE BEING BUILT ON THE E SIDE.

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE (C)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP EACH	TOT CAP	FILL STANDS			RE SUPPLY METHOD/RECIPT
					NO	GPM		
JP-4	UNDER GROUND TANKS	004	0126261	00745044	A	U	A	TANK TRUCKS
TA	UNDER GROUND TANKS	U	U	U	A	U	A	TANK TRUCK
100/130	UNDERGROUND TANKS	U	U	U	A	U	A	TANK TRUCKS

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM (U)

PRODUCT	STORAGE CAPACITY	NO.	CAP. (GPM)	OUT-LETS	HOSE CARTS NO.	NOZZLES NO.	TYPE
N							

REFUELLING UNITS (C)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP.	DISP RATE	NOZZLES NO.	TYPE
JP-4	08	TANKER	010000	00600	U	U
JP-4	08	TANKER	003500	U	U	U
TA	U	TANKER	U	U	U	U
100/130	U	TANKER	U	U	U	U

DEFUELLING FACILITIES (U)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP (GPM)
N			

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS (U)

COMMERCIAL FUEL AVAILABLE AT CIVIL RAMP ONLY. NEW POL STORAGE AREA UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT THE E END OF THE STORAGE FACILITY.

OFF BASE STORAGE (C)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP. EACH	TOTAL CAPACITY
JP-4	ESTIMATE TANKS	U	U	U
TA	ESTIMATE TANKS	U	U	U
100/130	ESTIMATE TANKS	U	U	U

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

11-21

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- BUSHEHR

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUTM

REMARKS-DISTANCE TO OFF BASE REFUELING 500 MILES. RESUPPLY TIME 24 HOURS.  
(C)

STOCK LEVEL	PRODUCT	GAL-ON-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE
	JP-4	00745044	A
	TA	A	A
	100/130	A	A

OIL AND LUBRICANTS UNKNOWN (U)

THRUST AUGMENTATION NONE (U)

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT (U)

1 LARGE CRANE AVAILABLE.

FIRE EQUIPMENT (U)

TWO LARGE WHELEN FIRE TRUCKS AND 2 SMALL FIRE TRUCKS. FIRE DEPARTMENT HAS FOAM CAPABILITY.

WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT (U)

NONE

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (U)

TWO US FORK LIFTS AVAILABLE. SIX TO SEVEN RUSSIAN FORK LIFTS AVAILABLE BUT FREQUENTLY DEADLINED FOR MAINTENANCE OR LACK OF PARTS.

CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT (U)

FORK LIFT AVAILABLE AT THE MILITARY TERMINAL FOR UNLOADING MILITARY TRANSPORTS. TWO US FORK LIFTS AND SIX TO SEVEN RUSSIAN FORKLIFTS AVAILABLE BUT FREQUENTLY DEADLINED FOR MAINTENANCE OR LACK OF PARTS.

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS (U)

DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS AIRMEN

NORMAL MAX. NORMAL MAX.

00110 U 00611 U

REMARKS-BOQ STANDARD STYLE. EM DORMITORY IS H SHAPED. VIP QUARTERS AVAILABLE.

DEPENDENT UNITS (U)

TWO AND 3 BEDROOM UNITS. THERE ARE 1900 AVAILABLE.

BIVOUAC AREA (U)

AREA IMMEDIATELY N, E AND S SUITABLE. NO FACILITIES.

OFF BASE FACILITIES (U)

ESTIMATE SOME HOUSING AND FOOD AVAILABLE IN TOWN. QUANTITY AND QUALITY UNKNOWN.

MESSING (U)

OFFICERS AIRMEN

NORMAL MAX. NORMAL MAX.

N N

REMARKS-ENLISTED MENS MESS HALL AND NCO MESS FACILITIES AVAILABLE.

STORAGE (U)

WAREHOUSE - SHEDS

NO. LEN. WID. T/SQ.FT. NO. LEN. WID. T/SQ.FT.

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- BUSHEHR

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASS01W

OB U XU U A U XU U

REMARKS-ONE LARGE COVERED UNENCLOSED STORAGE AREA. THERE ARE 15 LARGE CUSTOMS WAREHOUSES AND 7 OIL COMPANY WAREHOUSES LOCATED ON THE N SIDE OF TOWN, 90X35X15 FT.

MEDICAL FACILITIES

(U)

DISPENSARY AVAILABLE WITH LIMITED CAPABILITY. A LARGE HOSPITAL IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, COMPLETION DATE IS NOT KNOWN. A GERMAN HOSPITAL IS LOCATED ABOUT 4.5 MILES S OF THE BASE WITH GOOD STAFF AND FACILITIES.

SEWAGE DISPOSAL

(U)

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL

(U)

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE.

RUBBISH DISPOSAL

(U)

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE.

WATER SUPPLY

(U)

THERE IS A 3 UNIT DESALINIZATION PLANT ON BASE. EACH UNIT PRODUCING 8000 GALLONS OF WATER PER DAY. NORMAL WATER SUPPLY FROM BORAZJAN BY 12 INCH PIPELINE AT A RATE OF 2113440 GAL/DAY. UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS HOLD 300000 GALLONS. A NEW PIPELINE TO BE BUILT TO PROVIDE 1321000 ADDITIONAL GAL/DAY.

AIRFIELD SECURITY

(C)

TEN FT HIGH CHAIN LINK FENCE WITH A 3 STRAND BARBED WIRE TOP AROUND PERIMETER OF AIR BASE. ENTRANCES ARE WELL GUARDED AND SECURITY IS TIGHT. EXTRA SECURITY AVAILABLE WITH PRIOR COORDINATION. THREAT/SECURITY EVALUATION AS OF 10 NOV 77 IS LOW/RELIABLE

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES

(U)

ONE TERMINAL BUILDING 353X43 FT. ESTIMATE IT CONTAINS A PASSENGER WAITING ROOM AND TICKET OFFICE, OPERATIONS ROOM AND OFFICE, WEATHER OBSERVATION OFFICE. NUMBER OF OFFICES UNKNOWN.

MAIL SERVICES

(U)

IRANIAN NATIONAL AIRLINES HAS DAILY FLIGHTS TO BUSHEHR. SERVICE IS DEPENDABLE

ELECTRICAL POWER

(U)

AVAILABLE AT AIRFIELD ARE A 50 CYCLE PLANT AND A 60 CYCLE PLANT. ESTIMATE MUNICIPAL POWER AVAILABLE.

TRANSPORTATION

ROADS

(U)

PRIMARY ROAD BUSHEHR/SHIRAZ IN GOOD CONDITION. A MILE LONG ASPHALT ACCESS ROAD IS AVAILABLE.

RAILROADS

(U)

NONE

WATER TRANSPORTATION

(C)

NEAREST PORT AT BUSHEHR 3 MILES N. MAJOR FACILITIES FOR CARGO AND OIL. SERVED BY ROAD.

MILITARY VEHICLES

(U)

TRUCKS, BUSES AND JEEPS AVAILABLE BUT UTILIZATION IS POOR.

COMMERCIAL VEHICLES

(U)

COMMERCIAL BUS AND TAXI SERVICE AVAILABLE AT BUSHEHR.

AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL)

(U)

DAILY SCHEDULED MEDIUM TRANSPORT FLIGHTS AVAILABLE.

WEATHER

STATION

(U)

HOURLY AND SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS. METAR AND SPECIAL REPORTS. OPEN 24 HOURS.

11-23

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- BUSHEHR

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASS01W

CLIMATE

(U)

SUBTROPICAL STEPPE. SUMMER IS HOT AND HUMID, SOMETIMES EXCESSIVELY HOT, WINTER IS MILD. ARID JUN THRU SEP. LIGHT AMOUNTS OF PRECIPITATION MONTHLY THE REST OF THE YEAR. MAX CLOUD COVER DEC THRU FEB.

FLYING CONDITIONS

(U)

VISIBILITIES ARE MOST FREQUENTLY RESTRICTED DURING THE PERIOD JUN THRU SEP. DUST IS THE CHIEF CAUSE OF RESTRICTION IN ALL SEASONS. FLYING WEATHER IS GENERALLY GOOD.

PRECIPITATION

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	02.9	01.8	00.8	00.4	00.1	00.0
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.0	00.1	00.7	00.1	01.6	03.2
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	064.0	065.0	073.0	081.0	089.0	092.0
MEAN	057.5	059.0	066.0	074.7	082.5	086.5
MIN	051.0	053.0	059.0	067.0	076.0	081.0

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	095.0	097.0	094.0	089.0	078.0	068.0
MEAN	089.5	090.5	086.5	080.0	070.5	061.5
MIN	084.0	084.0	079.0	072.0	063.0	055.0

DEW POINT

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	048	049	052	056	064	066	071	074	070	065	059	053

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MEAN	-0165	-0145	-0045	00075	00135	00285

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	00360	00385	00185	00025	-0090	-0115

SIGNIFICANCE

(C)


MAJOR CIVIL AND MILITARY AIRFIELD. SERVES THE CITY OF BUSHEHR WHICH IS A PRIMARY SEAPORT. STRATEGICALLY POSITIONED ON THE E COAST OF THE PERSIAN GULF, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR DEFENSIVE FIGHTER OPERATIONS. IT IS THE LARGEST MILITARY BASE IN IRAN AND RAPIDLY EXPANDING.

11-24



~~NO FORN WHINTEL~~

ESFAHAN AIRFIELD



II-33

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FORN WHINTEL~~

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \*AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD JOB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICAUD- 77 NOV FACAF \*  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN AIRFIELD NAME- ESFAHAN ICAO DESIGNATOR- IIFP \*  
 \* BE NUMBER- 0428008003 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- NONE AIRFIELD STATUS- \*B\* \*\*\* ACTIVE \*\*\*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

GENERAL

SRC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	TDI AREA CODE	ASSO TH VOL NO PAGE NO
A	I			M	16 - -
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION ELEVATION
32 37 20N 051 41 52E		JOGA NI 39-15	OPEN 75 SEP	80063	003E 05242
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT			(C)		
39SWS 5654633609677		UTM-INTERNATIONAL			
CENTER OF RUNWAY EQUIDISTANT FROM EITHER END.					
GRAPHIC REFERENCE			(U)		
ONC G-5, JOG NI 39-15, DOD EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-17B, L-18F, H-13C.					
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS			(C)		
2.5 MILES SE OF THE CENTER OF ESFAHAN, 146 MILES WNW OF YAZD, 184 MILES S OF TEHRAN, 222 MILES SE BY E OF ABADAN.					
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE			(U)		
VALLEY IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN, NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL DRAINAGE GOOD. AIRFIELD RECTANGULAR SHAPED, APPROXIMATELY 1000 ACRES IN AREA. SOIL HAS A HIGH CLAY CONTENT. PEAKS 7323 FT 3.6 MILES SW, 6630 FT 5.2 MILES E BY S, 8114 FT 12.5 MILES NW BY N, 10926 FT 39 MILES ENE, 9039 FT 32 MILES WNW.					
CONTROLLING AGENCY(S)			(U)		
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (CAO).					

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS (U)  
 JOINT, IRANIAN AIRLINE AND IMPERIAL IRANIAN ARMY (IIA) USING MEDIUM TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (U)  
 MEDIUM TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. APRONS CAN ACCOMMODATE 150 LIGHT OR 70 MEDIUM TRANSPORT OR 247 F-14 OR 360 F-15 AIRCRAFT.

AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS	(U)
NAME	DISTANCE DIR RWY LENGTH SURF CAPACITY
NONE	

SEARCH AND RESCUE (C)  
 TEHRAN RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER 185 MILES N BY E. LONG AND SHORT RANGE FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT. SHORT RANGE SAR FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT ON BASE.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES (U)  
 AVAILABLE FROM ESFAHAN WITH 24 HOUR PRIOR NOTICE. NEW CUSTOMS BUILDING ON BASE.

PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION (U)  
 HANGARS AND APRONS UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON THE S SIDE OF THE RUNWAY.

INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL (U)  
 ESTIMATE SOME SKILLED, SEMISKILLED AND UNSKILLED AVAILABLE.

FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (U)  
 NONE

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

11-34

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- ESFAHAN

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSG1W

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS (U)  
 TACAN, VOR, RBN TOWER AND A/G RADIO.  
 POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS (U)  
 ANTIQUATED CITY DIAL SYSTEM TELEPHONE AVAILABLE. COMMERCIAL TELEGRAPH ALSO AVAILABLE.  
 U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S) (C)  
 US CONSULATE IN ESFAHAN 2 MILES N. SSB RADIO. US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN 184 MILES N. MAJOR FACILITIES.  
 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES (U)  
 008 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 010 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR  
 U DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 030 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
 030 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS

(U)  
 DIMENSIONS MAG/BRG SFC COND CAPACITY R/LTS RW J/B A/G ELEV OVERRUN APCL GRAD AL  
 11483X00148 085/265 ASP GOOD ESWL-66000/152-PSI A 085 N N 05242 GRS 0200 50=1 -0.46 A  
 265 N N 05143 GRS 0200 50=1 +0.46 A

REMARKS-RUNWAY EXTENSIBILITY NOT FEASIBLE DUE TO PROXIMITY TO THE EDGE OF THE CITY. EFFECTIVE RUNWAY LENGTH CORRECTED FOR AIRFIELD ELEVATION IS 8700 FT. CAPACITY BASED ON LCN. CONCRETE ENDS 340 FT LONG ON W END AND 350 FT ON E END. BOTH CONCRETE ENDS HAVE CONCRETE TURNAREAS 190X50 FT AT N EDGES.

TAXIWAYS

(U)  
 NO TYPE WID SURF COND CAPACITY LTS  
 05 LINK 060 ASP GOOD ESWL-66000/152-PSI A  
 01 LINK 030 ASP GOOD ESWL-3291/50-PSI U  
 01 LINK 020 CON GOOD ESWL-2270/40-PSI U  
 02 LINK 110 ASP GOOD ESWL-66000/152-PSI U  
 01 LINK 080 ASP GOOD ESWL-66000/152-PSI U  
 01 LINK 050 ASP GOOD ESWL-15300/56-PSI U

REMARKS-ITEMS 1 THRU 3 ARE LOCATED IN THE NW ARFA. ITEM 4 LOCATED IN SW AREA TO LARGE APRON. ITEM 5 AND 6 LOCATED IN SE AND SW AREAS.

APRONS

(U)

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FT	*SIMUL	*EST	*HR-*	*DOWN-*
								*PARK CAPCY*	*ARRIVALS*	*DAY*	*HR/MIN*
01	OPERATIONAL	0470X0340	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-66000/152-PSI	999	0000159800*			* 24*	: *
01	OPERATIONAL	0570X0220	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-66000/152-PSI	999	0000125400*			* 24*	: *
01	HANGAR	0240X0230	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-66000/152-PSI	999	0000055200*			* 24*	: *
01	HANGAR	0190X0170	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-28206/92-PSI	999	0000032300*			* 24*	: *
01	HANGAR	0110X0110	CON	GOOD	ESWL-3291/50-PSI	999	0000012100*			* 24*	: *
01	HANGAR	0100X0100	CON	GOOD	ESWL-3291/50-PSI	999	0000010000*			* 24*	: *
01	HANGAR	0170X0110	CON	GOOD	ESWL-28206/92-PSI	999	0000018700*			* 24*	: *

11-35

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- ESFAHAN

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

IACAF ASSUHW

01 HANGAR	0650X0350	CON	GOOD	ESWL-56000/152-PSI	999	0000227500*	*	* 24*	: *
01 OPERATIONAL	2190X1040	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-56000/152-PSI	999	0002277600*	*	* 24*	: *
01 OPERATIONAL	1460X0690	GRE	GOOD	ESWL-41500/75	999	0001007400*	*	* 24*	: *
01 HANGAR	0160X0120	CON	GOOD	ESWL-41500/75-PSI	999	0000019200*	*	* 24*	: *
01 HANGAR	1740X0440	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-66000/152-PSI	999	0000765600*	*	* 24*	: *
						TOTAL-	4710800	*****	

REMARKS-ITEMS 1 THRU 7 ARE LOCATED IN THE NW AREA. ITEM 8 AND 9 LOCATED IN THE SE AREA. ITEMS 10 THRU 12 ARE LOCATED IN THE SW AREA.

\*\*\*\*\* TOTAL SQ FEET OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

NO.	SQ FT	SURFACE	COND	CAP.
LIMITED-APRONS: 12	47048	ASP	G	C9

HARDSTANDS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
04	HELICOPTER PADS	0080X0070	CCN	GOOD	UNKLWN	500	0000022400

REMARKS-FOUR CONCRETE HELICOPTER PADS ARE LOCATED WITHIN AN ASPHALT APRON AT MILITARY AREA.

REVELEMENTS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
N							

PARKING (OTHER)

GENERAL PARKING BETWEEN TAXIWAYS AND OFF FAST APRON. ESTIMATE USABLE UP TO C-54 TYPE AIRCRAFT.

OBSTRUCTIONS

NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	BRG	REMARKS
03	GRAIN SILOS	05420	0179	N	01.2	277	FROM RP TO SILO.
01	NOB MAST	05382	0140	U	00.5	295	FROM RP TO MAST.
01	WATCH TOWER	05432	0190	U	00.8	220	FROM RP TO TOWER
01	STEEL TOWER	05450	0220	U	02.0	014	FROM RP TO TOWER
01	STEEL TOWER	05160	0160	U	22.1	079	FROM RP TO TOWER.

LIGHTING

LOW INTENSITY GREEN THRESHOLD LIGHTS. LOW INTENSITY WHITE RUNWAY LIGHTS SPACED AT 197 FEET INTERVALS, 2.5 FEET FROM RUNWAY EDGE AND 1.3 FT ABOVE THE SURFACE. LOW INTENSITY BLUE TAXIWAY LIGHTS FLUSH WITH SURFACE. FLOODLIGHTS ON APRONS AND LIGHT BEACON FLASHING GREEN AND WHITE.

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

HANGARS

NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOOR WID-HT	HEAT
01	SINGLE BAY	SHEET METAL AND STEEL	1230X0150	220X20	N
02	SINGLE BAY	SHEET METAL AND STEEL	0190X0110	080X20	N
01	SINGLE BAY	SHEET METAL	0110X0110	U XU	N
01	SINGLE BAY	BRICK	0070X0060	U XU	U
01	DOUBLE BAY	SHEET METAL AND STEEL	0200X0160	U XU	U

11-36

01 SINGLE BAY SHEET METAL AND STEEL 0210X0160 U XI U  
 01 SINGLE BAY SHEET METAL AND STEEL 0230X0160 U XU U  
 02 SINGLE BAY SHEET METAL AND STEEL 0160X0120 U XI U

REMARKS-HANGARS ARE APPROXIMATELY 30 FT HIGH. ITEMS 1 AND 2 LOCATED IN THE NW MILITARY AREA. ITEMS 3 AND 4 ARE LOCATED IN THE NW CIVIL AREA. ITEM 5 AND 6 ARE LOCATED BY THE E APRON IN THE SE AREA. ITEM 7 LOCATED BY THE W APRON IN SE AREA. ITEM 9 LOCATED IN THE SW AREA, ONE AT SW CORNER OF E APRON, ONE AT SE CORNER OF W APRON.

MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES (C)  
 ONE SHOP PLUS SHOPS IN HANGARS. FIELD AND ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE ON HH-43 HELICOPTERS.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (U)  
 ORGANIZATIONAL RADIO REPAIR TO HH-43 AND LIAISON TYPE AIRCRAFT.

OXYGEN (U)  
 NONE

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS (U)  
 ELECTRICAL STARTING UNIT FOR BOEING 727.

GROUND POWER UNITS (U)  
 AVAILABLE

ORDNANCE STORAGE (U)  
 NONE

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE (S)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP EACH	TOT CAP	FILL STANDS NO	GPM	RESUPPLY METHOD/RECEIPT
TA	TANK TRUCK	001	0005000	00005000	N	A	TANK TRUCK
100/130	TANK TRUCK	001	0005000	00005000	N	A	TANK TRUCK
80	TANK TRUCK	001	0002800	00002800	N	A	TANK TRUCK

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM (U)

PRODUCT	STORAGE CAP. (GPM)	OUT-LETS	HOSE NO.	CARTS TYPE	NOZZLES NO. TYPE
N					

REFUELLING UNITS (S)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP.	DISP RATE	NOZZLES NO. TYPE
AVGAS	01	BOWSER	005000	00600	U U
TA	01	TRUCK	005000	U	U U
80	01	TRUCK	002800	U	U U

DEFUELLING FACILITIES (U)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP(GPM)
N			

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS (C)

NONE

OFF BASE STORAGE (S)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP. EACH	TOTAL CAPACITY
TA	TANKS	003	0120000	00360000
JP-4	TANKS	002	0012000	00024000

11-37

ENTRY CODE- IP AFLO NAME- ESFAHAN

JIRB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

IACAF ASSUW

~~SECRET NO~~

100/130	TANKS	002	0100000	00200000
U	TANK	001	0120000	00120000

REMARKS-SIX TANKS AT NEW FARM NEAR AIRPORT, 1 OLD TANK IN TOWN. TANKS RESUPPLIED BY TANK TRUCKS FROM ANWAZ AND TEHRAN. A NEW 6 INCH PIPELINE EXISTS BETWEEN EZNA AND ESFAHAN BUT IS NOT BEING USED AT THE PRESENT TIME.

STOCK LEVEL (S)

PRODUCT	GAL-ON-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE
JP-4	N	00024000
TA	00005000	00360000
100/130	00050000	00200000
BO	00028000	U
U	U	00120000

REMARKS-OLD TANK IN TOWN 120000 GAL CAPACITY, TYPE FUEL UNKNOWN.

OIL AND LUBRICANTS (U)

AVIATION AND TURBO OIL AND LUBRICATION AVAILABLE.

THRUST AUGMENTATION (U)

NONE

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT (C)

TWO AMBULANCES WITH 8 STRETCHERS EACH, TWO LANDROVERS WITH CHAIN SAWS (COMPLETE LIGHT).

FIRE EQUIPMENT (C)

LUYLAND FOAM MAKER AND CO2 WITH 65 GALLONS OF FOAM, 615 GALLONS OF WATER AND 1200 LBS OF CO2. BEDFORD FOAM MAKER WITH 18 GALLONS OF FOAM. ONE JEEP WITH 300 LBS OF DRY POWDER. NINE FIREMAN ASSIGNED TO SECTION.

WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT (U)

COMMERCIAL CRANE AVAILABLE.

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (U)

NONE

CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT (C)

ESTIMATE FORKLIFT AND MOBILE STAIRCASE AVAILABLE. CITY EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE WITH PRIOR REQUEST.

BASF SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS (C)

DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS                      AIRMEN

NORMAL    MAX.            NORMAL    MAX.

N                                      N

REMARKS-ARMY HAS BARRACKS AT NEARBY ARTILLERY CENTER.

DEPENDENT UNITS (U)

NONE

BIVOUAC AREA (U)

ESTIMATE AREA S OF FIELD SUITABLE. NO FACILITIES.

OFF BASE FACILITIES (C)

HOTELS IN TOWN AND ARMY BARRACKS ADJACENT TO THE AIRFIELD.

MESSING (C)

OFFICERS                      AIRMEN

NORMAL    MAX.            NORMAL    MAX.

~~SECRET~~

11-38

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- ESFAHAN

JG9 DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUIM

N N  
REMARKS-RESTAURANT ON AIRFIELD, ARTILLERY CENTER AND ARMY AVIATION CENTER HAVE GOOD CAPACITY FOR MESSING.  
(IRANIAN STANDARDS).

STORAGE

WAREHOUSE			SHEDS				
NO.	LEN.	WID.	T/SQ.FT.	NO.	LEN.	WID.	T/SQ.FT.
A	U	U	U	A	U	U	U

MEDICAL FACILITIES

ONE FIRST AID DISPENSARY IN THE TERMINAL BUILDING. SIX HOSPITALS IN TOWN.

SEWAGE DISPOSAL

ESTIMATE SANITATION FACILITIES AVAILABLE, TYPE UNKNOWN.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL

ESTIMATE REMOVED BY TRUCKS TO DUMP SITES.

RUBBISH DISPOSAL

ESTIMATE REMOVED BY TRUCKS TO DUMP SITES.

WATER SUPPLY

DEEP WELL AND RESERVOIR FURNISH TO ARMY AVIATION 35 CUBIC METERS, RELIABILITY UNKNOWN. ARMY AVIATION NOW BUILDING WATER SYSTEM. WATER FOR CIVIL FACILITIES PIPED FROM CITY WATER SUPPLY.

AIRFIELD SECURITY

WIRE MESH ON WEST, NORTH AND EAST. FOUR KM OF SOUTHERN PART IS OPEN. MOAT RUNS ON S SIDE. ARMY AVIATION GUARDS AVAILABLE. A FEW CIVIL POLICE ON DUTY DURING DAYLIGHT ONLY. EXTRA SECURITY WITH PRIOR COORDINATION WITH IRAN GOVERNMENT. THREAT/SECURITY EVALUATION AS OF 10 NOV 77 IS LOW/RELIABLE.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES

TERMINAL BUILDING 17614 SQ FT AND BASE OPERATIONS BUILDING 3250 SQ FT. NUMBER OF OFFICES UNKNOWN.

MAIL SERVICES

MAIL BY SCHEDULED AIRLINE FLIGHTS.

ELECTRICAL POWER

CITY POWER IS NORMAL SOURCE. EMERGENCY SOURCE CONSISTS OF 1 DOUTZ GENERATOR, 95 KVA, PHASE 3, 50 CYCLE, 220 VOLTS CAPACITY.

TRANSPORTATION

ROADS

ASPHALT ACCESS ROAD 25 FT WIDE CONNECTS WITH PRIMARY ROAD QOM/ESFAHAN/SHEPAZ IN THE CITY.

RAILROADS

RAILROAD 4 MILES S CONNECTS WITH MAIN LINE TO QOM

WATER TRANSPORTATION

NEAREST PORT AT BANDAR SHAMPUR, 180 MILES SW. MAJOR FACILITIES. SERVED BY ROAD.

MILITARY VEHICLES

TRUCKS AND CARS AVAILABLE.

COMMERCIAL VEHICLES

ESTIMATE TAXICABS AVAILABLE FROM TOWN.

AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL)

NATIONAL IRANIAN AIRLINES SCHEDULES AT LEAST ONE FLIGHT DAILY. MILITARY AIR TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE.

WEATHER

11-39

CNTRY CODE- IR AFD NAME- ESFAHAN

JCB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF 355014

STATION

HOURLY AND SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS 0000-2400Z. METAR AND SPECIAL REPORTS. OPEN 24 HOURS.

CLIMATE

SUBTROPICAL STEPPE. WINTER IS RELATIVELY COLD AND SUMMER IS SELDOM EXCESSIVELY HOT. ARID JUN THRU SEP. PRECIPITATION LESS THAN 1 INCH MONTHLY THE REST OF THE YEAR. MAXIMUM CLOUD COVER NOV THRU FEB, VERY LITTLE CLOUDINESS THE REST OF THE YEAR. THUNDERSTORMS ARE RARE OCCURRING MOST FREQUENTLY IN THE SPRING

FLYING CONDITIONS

VISIBILITIES, GENERALLY GOOD, ARE OCCASIONALLY RESTRICTED IN WINTER AND EARLY SPRING BY FOG AND SNOW. AIR ROUTES OVER THE NEARBY RIDGES ARE OCCASIONALLY RESTRICTED FOR DAYS AT A TIME IN WINTER.

PRECIPITATION

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.9	00.9	00.6	00.4	00.3	00.1
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.0	00.1	00.1	00.1	00.4	00.7
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	050.0	052.0	064.0	073.0	083.0	095.0
MEAN	038.5	040.0	051.5	059.0	069.0	078.5
MIN	027.0	029.0	039.0	045.0	055.0	062.0

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	099.0	096.0	091.0	078.0	063.0	052.0
MEAN	082.5	079.5	072.5	061.5	049.0	041.0
MIN	066.0	067.0	054.0	045.0	035.0	030.0

DEW POINT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	024	025	029	033	040	041	043	040	039	036	031	029

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MEAN	05072	05092	05112	05122	05132	05142

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	05242	05192	05142	04992	04977	04962

SIGNIFICANCE

IN EMERGENCIES, FIELD COULD HANDLE MEDIUM JET BOMBERS. IT IS AN IMPORTANT AIRFIELD FOR DOMESTIC USE, SERVING A POPULATION OVER 340,000. CONSIDERED NOT FEASIBLE FOR HEAVY JET TRAFFIC DUE TO THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE SURROUNDING MOUNTAINS WHICH MAKE APPROACHES TO THE RUNWAY DANGEROUS.

11-40


SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM



~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN W/INTEL~~

GACH SARAN AIRFIELD



II-41

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN W/INTEL~~

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \*AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD JOB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICOD- 77 DEC TACAF \*  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN AIRFIELD NAME- GACH SARAN ICAD DESIGNATOR- CIAH \*  
 \* BE NUMBER- 0444008024 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- NONE AIRFIELD STATUS- \*A\* \*\*\* ACTIVE \*\*\*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

GENERAL

SRC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	TOT AREA CODE	ASSDTH VOL NO	PAGE NO
A	L			M		16 -
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION	ELEVATION
30 20 20N 050 49 45E		JOGA NH 39-06	02ED 75 JAN	80090	002E	02346
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT			(C)			
19RVP 4835793356399		UTM-INTERNATIONAL				
CENTER OF RUNWAY EQUIDISTANT FROM EITHER END.						
GRAPHIC REFERENCE			(U)			
DNC H-6, JOG NH 39-6, DOD EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-13E, H-13C.						
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS			(C)			
8.2 MILES N OF GACH SARAN, 2 MILES ESE OF DU GOYBAJAN, 34 MILES ESE OF BUSHHEHAN.						
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE			(U)			
HIGH VALLEY IN MOUNTAINS, NATURAL DRAINAGE GOOD. PEAKS 4226 FT 2.6 MILES SSW, 10407 FT 10 MILES NNE.						
CONTROLLING AGENCY(S)			(U)			
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, (NIOC).						

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS (U)  
 NIOC AND IRAN AIRLINE USING LIGHT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (U)  
 MEDIUM TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. APRON CAN ACCOMMODATE 2 TO 3 MEDIUM TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.

AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS (U)

NAME	DISTANCE	DIR	RWY LENGTH	SURF	CAPACITY
NONE					

SEARCH AND RESCUE (C)  
 TEHRAN RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER 323 MILES N. LONG AND SHORT RANGE FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT. SAR HELICOPTERS AT BUSHHEHAN 82 MILES S.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES (U)  
 NONE

PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION (U)  
 NONE

INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL (U)  
 SOME UNSKILLED AND SEMISKILLED AVAILABLE.

FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (U)  
 NONE

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS (U)  
 TOWER AND A/G RADIO.

POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS (U)  
 TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH, TELETYPE AND H/F RADIO. TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE 215 AND 247.

11-42

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- GACH SARAN

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUIM

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S) (C)  
 US CONSULATE AT KHORRAMSHAHR 140 MILES W. SSR RADIO.  
 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES (U)  
 N ARR PER HR 4X IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 N DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR  
 N DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 012 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 012 DEP PER HR 4X IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
 N DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS

DIMENSIONS	MAG/BRG	SFC	COND	CAPACITY	R/LTS	RWY	J/P	A/G	ELEV	OVERRUN	APCL	GRAD	AL
06000X00148	123/303	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-54000/132-PSI	F	123	N	N	02346	GVL 0150	50=L	+0.00	N
						303	N	N	02346	GVL 0150	50=L	+0.00	N

REMARKS-EXTENSIBLE FOR APPROXIMATELY 2500 FT. EFFECTIVE RUNWAY LENGTH CORRECTED FOR FIELD ELEVATION IS 5100 FT. CAPACITY BASED ON LCN.

TAXIWAYS

NO	TYPE	WID	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	LTS
01	LINK	070	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-54000/132-PSI	F

\*\*\*\*\* TAXIWAY WIDTHS OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

LIMITED-TAXIWAY-1				LIMITED-TAXIWAY-2					
TYPE	WIDTH	SURFACE	COND	CAPACITY	TYPE	WIDTH	SURFACE	COND	CAPACITY
LINK	075	ASP	G	C121					

APRONS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FT	*PARK	CAPLY	*ARRIVALS	*DAY	*HR	*MIN
01	OPERATIONAL	0620X0200	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-54000/132-PSI	999	000012400*					12	
						TOTAL-	124000	*****					

HARDSTANDS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
----	------	------------	------	------	----------	-------	-------------

REVTMENTS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
----	------	------------	------	------	----------	-------	-------------

PARKING (OTHER)

(U)

11-43

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ENTRY CODE- IR AFID NAME- GACH SARAN

JOB DATE- 05 OCT 1973

TACAF ASSIGNED

ON DIRT OFF RUNWAY FOR LIGHT AIRCRAFT.

OBSTRUCTIONS	NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	SEC	REMARKS
	N							

LIGHTING	NO	REMARKS
		FLARES ON 12 HOUR NOTICE.

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

HANGARS	NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOOR WIDHT	HEAT
	01	SINGLE BAY	CORRUGATED TIN	0055X0055	030X20	N

MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES	NO	REMARKS
		TWO FIELD MAINTENANCE SHOPS.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE	NO	REMARKS
		NONE

OXYGEN	NO	REMARKS
		NONE

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS	NO	REMARKS
		NONE

GROUND POWER UNITS	NO	REMARKS
		NONE

ORDNANCE STORAGE	NO	REMARKS
		NONE

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP EACH	TOTAL CAP	FILL STATUS

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP EACH	TOT CAP	FILL STATUS	NO	GPM	RESIDUAL	RECEIPT
TA	TANKS	U	U	00005500	N	U			TANKER
100/130	TANKS	U	U	00005500	N	U			TANKER
80	5 GALLON CANS	320	0000005	00001600	N	U			U

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM	STORAGE	CAP.	OUT-LETS	HOSE	CARTS	NOZZLES

PRODUCT	CAPACITY	NO. (GPM)	LETS	NO.	TYPE	NO.	TYPE
TA	U	01 U	U	U	U	U	U
100/130	U	01 U	U	U	U	U	U

REFUELLING UNITS	PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP.	DISP RATE	NOZZLES

DEFUELLING FACILITIES	PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP(GPM)

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS	NO	REMARKS
		NONE

OFF BASE STORAGE	PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP.EACH	TOTAL CAPACITY

11-00

SECRET

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- GACH SARAN

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUTW

TA	TANKS	U	U	99999999
100/130	TANKS	U	U	99999999
80	U		U	U
STOCK LEVEL		(C)		
PRODUCT	GAL-ON-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE		
TA	00005500	99999999		
100/130	00005500	99999999		
80	00001600	A		
OIL AND LUBRICANTS		(U)		
ESTIMATE SOME AVOIL AND TURBO OIL AVAILABLE.				
THRUST AUGMENTATION		(U)		
NONE				

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT	(U)
NONE	
FIRE EQUIPMENT	(U)
ONE LANDROVER EQUIPPED WITH CO2 DISPENSER, ONE 900 USG WATER TRUCK.	
WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT	(U)
NONE	
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES	(U)
NONE	
CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT	(U)
ONE 3/4 TON HYSTER FORK LIFT.	

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS	(U)
DORMITORY AREA	
OFFICERS	AIRMEN
NORMAL MAX.	NORMAL MAX.
N	N
REMARKS-OIL COMPANY GUEST HOUSE 1 MILE N HAS 25 SINGLE ROOMS SUITABLE AS REQ.	

DEPENDENT UNITS	(U)
NONE	

BIVOUAC AREA	(U)
IMMEDIATE SURROUNDING TERRAIN. NO FACILITIES.	

OFF BASE FACILITIES	(C)
SMALL GUEST HOUSE AT OIL CAMP .5 MILES NW. ESTIMATE MESS AVAILABLE AT ADJACENT OIL COMPANY CAMP.	
MESSING	(U)

OFFICERS	AIRMEN
NORMAL MAX.	NORMAL MAX.
N	N

REMARKS-100 MAN OIL COMPANY DINING HALL, GUEST HOUSE HAS A 30-35 PERSON DINING ROOM.

STORAGE	(C)
---------	-----

WAREHOUSE	-	SHEDS
NO. LEN. WID.	T/SQ.FT.	NO. LEN. WID. T/SQ.FT.

11-45

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

CNTRY CODE- IP AFLO NAME- GACH SARAN

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TALAF ASSGTH

01 0065X0035 0002275 01 0065X0010 000065 )  
MEDICAL FACILITIES (C)  
NOT AT FIELD. DISPENSARY AT OIL CAMP .5 MILES NW WITH 10 BEDS, 4 DOCTORS, 13 MEDICAL PERSONNEL, 1 AMBULANCE.  
SEWAGE DISPOSAL (U)  
NONE  
GARRAGE DISPOSAL (C)  
NONE  
RUPRISH DISPOSAL (U)  
NONE  
WATER SUPPLY (U)  
NOT AT FIELD. POTABLE WELL WATER AT OIL CAMP .5 MILES NW.  
AIRFIELD SECURITY (U)  
FIELD HAS A 5 FT CHAIN LINK FENCE AROUND PERIMETER. ENTRANCE TO OPERATIONS-MAINTENANCE AREA HAS GUARD HOUSE  
ON ACCESS ROAD. SAVAK UNIT IN TOWN.  
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES (U)  
ONE BLDG 65X33 WITH TOWER, TOTAL 50 FT 1950.  
MAIL SERVICES (U)  
IRAN AIRLINE, TWICE WEEKLY.  
ELECTRICAL POWER (U)  
220V, 50 CY FROM LOCAL PUBLIC UTILITIES.

TRANSPORTATION

ROADS (C)  
GACH SARAN/BEHBEHAN ALL WEATHER, 2 LANE ASPHALT ROAD PASSES JUST N OF FIELD. ACCESS ROAD AVAILABLE.  
RAILROADS (U)  
NONE  
WATER TRANSPORTATION (C)  
NEAREST PORTS ARE BUSHEHR 78 MILES S AND BANDAR SHAPUR 90 MILES W. MAJOR FACILITIES. SERVED BY ROAD.  
MILITARY VEHICLES (U)  
NONE  
COMMERCIAL VEHICLES (U)  
NONE  
AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL) (U)  
IRAN AIRLINES WITH 2 FLIGHTS WEEKLY USING C-47 ACFT.

WEATHER

STATION (U)  
HOURLY AND SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS 0300-1500Z  
CLIMATE (U)  
DRY SUMMER SUBTROPICAL. SUMMER IS HOT AND HUMID, WINTER IS MILD. ARID JUL THRU OCT, MODERATE AMOUNTS OF PRE-  
CIPITATION MONTHLY DEC THRU MAR, LIGHT MONTHLY AMOUNTS THE REST OF THE YEAR.  
FLYING CONDITIONS (U)  
VISIBILITIES ARE GENERALLY GOOD. DUST IS THE CHIEF RESTRICTION IN ALL SEASONS.  
PRECIPITATION (U)  
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- GACH SARAN

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSOTH

MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	03.2	03.1	02.4	01.3	00.2	00.7
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.3	02.2
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	054.0	055.0	064.0	076.0	085.0	096.0
MEAN	043.0	043.5	051.5	061.0	070.5	080.0
MIN	032.0	032.0	039.0	046.0	056.0	064.0

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	099.0	097.0	093.0	094.0	070.0	057.0
MEAN	084.0	081.5	076.5	066.5	055.0	046.0
MIN	069.0	066.0	060.0	049.0	040.0	035.0

DEW POINT

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	043	041	054	053	060	053	056	060	057	053	051	049

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MEAN	02166	02176	02246	02216	02346	02496


	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	02516	02496	02371	02221	02171	02166

SIGNIFICANCE

(U)

AIRFIELD SUPPORTS OIL CAMP AND OPERATIONS IN VICINITY. RUNWAY, TAXIWAY AND APRON CAN SUPPORT LIGHT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. NO KNOWN PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT.

SHAHROKHI AIR BASE



11-57





ENTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- SHAHRUKHI AB

JGB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TALAF ASSUTW

POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS (S) TELEPHONE, 400 LINES AUTO DIAL. TELETYPE, 7 ENGLISH AND 7 FARSI (PERSIAN) MACHINES. MICRO-WAVE LOS TERMINAL, 24 VF CHANNELS. C/W/VOICE/TTD/SSB RADIO

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S) (C) US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, 135 MILES ENE. MAJOR FACILITIES.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES (U) 010 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP 015 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR 010 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR 030 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR 030 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED.

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

Table with columns: DIMENSIONS, MAG/BRG, SFC COND, CAPACITY, R/LTS RHY, J/R A/G, ELEV, OVERRUN, APCL, GRAD, AL. Includes runway data for 14625X09148 and 13200X00148.

REMARKS-EXTENSIBILITY OF BOTH RUNWAYS UNLIMITED. RHY 126/306 CONSTRUCTION IS COMPOSED OF 21 INCHES OF CRUSHED ROCK SUBBASE, 6 INCH CRUSHED ROCK BASE TOPPED WITH 3 INCHES OF HOT MIX ASPHALTIC CONCRETE WITH 1000 FT UN EACH END 10 INCH PORTLAND CEMENT ON A 16 INCH CRUSHED ROCK SUBBASE AND 6 INCH CRUSHED ROCK BASE. BOTH RWYS HAVE 25 FT ASPHALT SHOULDER. BARRIER/CABLE LOCATION- RHY 13 640S/500S 200 FT IN OVERRUN, RHY 31 4A-1A 200 FT IN OVERRUN, 44B-2E 1500 FT FROM THLD, RHY 23 44B-2E 1500 FT FROM THLD. RHY 126/306 CAPACITY OF LCN 10 REPORTED.

Table with columns: TAXIWAYS, NO, TYPE, WID, SURF, COND, CAPACITY, LTS. Lists taxiway details for runways 01, 02, and 01.

REMARKS-CAPACITIES ARE ESTIMATES BASED ON REPORTED RHY CAPACITIES.

APRONS

Table with columns: NO, TYPE, DIMENSIONS, SURF, COND, CAPACITY, ENTRY, TOT SQ FT, \*SIMUL, \*PARK CAPCY, \*ARRIVALS, \*DAY, \*HR, \*MN, \*DOWN, \*HR, \*TIME. Lists apron details for various operational and holding areas.

11-59

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- SHAHROKHI AB

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASS01W

TOTAL- 1091500\*\*\*\*\*

REMARKS-OPERATIONAL APRON CAPACITIES ARE ESTIMATES.

HARDSTANDS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
01	OPERATIONAL	0125X0125	CON	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	495	0000015625

REVETMENTS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
05	COVERED	0285X0075	CON	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	999	0000106475

REMARKS-REVETMENTS ARE COVERED AND CONTAIN 4 BAYS TWENTY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT CAN BE ACCOMMODATED.

PARKING (OTHER)

ON DIRT OFF EAST SIDE OF APRON OR ON DIRT OFF RUNWAY FOR C-47 AND LIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

OBSTRUCTIONS

NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	HKG	REMARKS
01	WATER TOWER	05695	0130	U	01.2	102	

LIGHTING

RUNWAY, TAXIWAYS, THRESHOLD, OBSTRUCTION AND BOUNDARY. APPROACH LIGHTS ON RUNWAY 31 ONLY

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

HANGARS

NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOOR	WID	HGT	HEAT
01	SINGLE BAY	BRICK AND METAL	310X0150	U	XU	A	
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL	0120X0100	U	XU	F	
10	SINGLE BAY	CONCRETE	0120X0075	U	XU	J	HANGARETTES

REMARKS-THE 310X150 FT MAINTENANCE HANGAR IS EQUIPPED WITH 3 30000 BTU HEATERS. THE 120X100 HANGAR IS AN ALERT HANGAR. HANGARETTES ACCOMMODATE 30 ACFT. TWO ALERT HANGARETTES UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES

FACILITIES FOR FIELD AND ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE ON ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT. SHOPS LOCATED IN A 100X12 FT HEATED LEAN-TO ATTACHED TO THE HANGAR. TYPE OF SHOPS AND EQUIPMENT UNKNOWN. ENGINE TEST CELL AND PARACHUTE BUILDING AVAILABLE.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE

AVAILABLE.

OXYGEN

LOX PLANT WITH GENERATING CAPACITY OF 1 TON DAILY. STORAGE CAPACITY OF 1000 GALLONS.

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS

1 MD3, 2 LOW PRESSURE STARTING UNITS FOR C-130 AND 1 HIGH PRESSURE STARTING UNIT FOR F-5 AIRCRAFT.

GROUND POWER UNITS

NUMEROUS GROUND POWER UNITS AVAILABLE, DESIGNATED 443.

ORDNANCE STORAGE

THREE 30 FT IGLOOS, 1 FUSE STORAGE CELL, 1 ROCKET STORAGE BUILDING, 1 SMALL W445 STORAGE, TWO 60 FT IGLOOS.

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP EACH	TOT CAP	FILL STANDS	RESUPPLY METHOD/RECEIPT
JP4	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	001	0752600	0752600	U U J	TRUCK
JP4	UNDERGROUND TANKS	001	0396300	0396300	U U U	TRUCK

09-11

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- SHAHROKHI AB

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TALAF ASSOCI

JP4	UNDERGROUND TANK	001	0039630	00039630	U	U	U	TRUCK
100/130	UNKNOWN	U	U	A	U	U	U	TRUCK

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM (U)

PRODUCT	STORAGE	CAP.	OUT-	HOSE	CARTS	NOZZLES
	CAPACITY	NO. (GP4)	LETS	NO.	TYPE	NO. TYPE

REFUELLING UNITS (U)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP.	DISP	NOZZLES
				RATE	NO. TYPE
JP4	07	TRUCK	070000	U	U U
JP4	04	TRUCK	014000	U	U U
100/130	02	TRUCK	U	U	U U

DEFUELLING FACILITIES (U)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP (GPM)
JP-4	04	F7 TANK TRUCK	U
100/130	02	MERCEDES TRUCK	U

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS (U)

FOUR 520,000 GALLON TANKS INSTALLED BUT IN USE DUE MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS. DETAILS ON AVGAS STORAGE UNKNOWN.

OFF BASE STORAGE (U)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	TANKS	CAP. EACH	TOTAL CAPACITY
JP4	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	U	U	A
100/130	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	U	U	A

REMARKS-DISTANCE TO OFF-BASE STORAGE IS 194 MILES. RESUPPLY TIME IS 3 HOURS. OFF-BASE RESERVES ARE LIMITED ONLY BY DISTANCE TO BASE AND TANK TRUCK AVAILABILITY.

STOCK LEVEL (U)

PRODUCT	GAL-ON-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE
JP4	A	99999999
100/130	U	99999999

REMARKS-A 10 DAY RESERVE IS MAINTAINED ON BASE. OFF-BASE RESERVES ARE UNLIMITED.

OIL AND LUBRICANTS (U)

GRADE 1100 RECIP ENGINE OIL (MIL-L-6082), TURBINE ENGINE OIL (MIL-L-7808), TURBOPROP/SHFT ENGINE OIL (MIL-L-23699). SOAP AVAILABLE.

THRUST AUGMENTATION (U)

NONE

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT (U)

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE. TYPE AND NUMBER UNKNOWN.

FIRE EQUIPMENT (U)

ONE 0-15 TYPE FOAM TRUCK AND FOUR 750 GALLON CHEMICAL TRUCKS. TRUCK TYPE UNKNOWN.

WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT (U)

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE. TYPE AND NUMBER UNKNOWN.

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (U)

THREE ROTARY TYPE SNOW PLOWS, 2 GERMAN AND 1 BRITISH.

CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT (U)

11-61

SECRET NO FORN DISSEM

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- SHAHRUKHI AB

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

LOCAL ASSOCIATION

TWO SMALL FORKLIFTS, SEVERAL LARGE AND SMALL TRUCKS MADE IN US.

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS (U)

DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS		AIRMEN	
NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
00064	U	00800	U

REMARKS-ADDITIONAL QUARTERS FOR OFFICERS IN FAMILY HOUSING UNITS.

DEPENDENT UNITS (U)

THERE ARE 1219 FAMILY HOUSING UNITS, 2 TO 4 BEDROOMS.

BIVOUAC AREA (U)

ESTIMATE AREA SURROUNDING AIRFIELD SUITABLE. NO FACILITIES.

OFF BASE FACILITIES (C)

TWO ACCEPTABLE HOTELS IN HAMADAN, 25.5 MILES SSW.

MESSING (U)

OFFICERS		AIRMEN	
NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
00060	00100	03500	05200

REMARKS-NGU CLUB AVAILABLE.

STORAGE (U)

WAREHOUSE			SHEDS		
NO.	LEN. WID.	T/SQ.FT.	NO.	LEN. WID.	T/SQ.FT.
02	0182X0053	0019292	4	U XU	J

MEDICAL FACILITIES (U)

HOSPITAL WITH MAXIMUM CAPACITY OF 100 BEDS ON BASE.

SEWAGE DISPOSAL (U)

CENTRAL SEWER SYSTEM AND DISPOSAL PLANT, 3500 MAN CAPACITY.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL (U)

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE.

RUBBISH DISPOSAL (U)

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE.

WATER SUPPLY (U)

CENTRAL SYSTEM SUPPLIED FROM 2 DEEP WELLS AND A 250000 GAL ELEVATED TANK AND 1 DEEP WELL WITH 50000 GALLON TANK. WELLS PRODUCE 25000 GPH. ESTIMATE WATER TREATED AND POTABLE.

AIRFIELD SECURITY (S)

SECURITY CONSIDERED TO BE VERY TIGHT. PASSES ARE REQUIRED FOR EVERYONE INCLUDING MILITARY, CIVILIAN AND VISITORS. CYCLONE TYPE FENCE AROUND AMMO AND POL AREAS. SMALL AIR POLICE FORCE ON BASE. NO ALARM SYSTEM.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES (U)

ONE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING 31500 SQ FT. THREE SQUADRON OPERATIONS BUILDINGS 7415 SQ FT.

MAIL SERVICES (U)

NONE SCHEDULED. BROUGHT IN AND SENT OUT ON UNSCHEDULED MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

ELECTRICAL POWER (U)

ESTIMATE POWER PLANT WITH THREE 800 KVA DIESEL GENERATORS IN OPERATION. TWO SMALL 220 VOLT, 50 CYCLE, 2 WIRE GENERATORS AVAILABLE, LOCATED IN OPERATIONS BUILDING.

TRANSPORTATION

ROADS

GOOD 2 LANE ASPHALT ROAD FROM BASE TO HAMADAN. ROAD IS FREQUENTLY CLOSED 2 TO 3 DAYS PER WEEK IN WINTER, DUE TO HEAVY SNOW. (U)

RAILROADS

NONE. (U)

WATER TRANSPORTATION

NEAREST PORT AT KHORRAMSHAHR 290 MILES S. MAJOR FACILITIES, 9 WHARVES. SERVED BY ROAD. (U)

MILITARY VEHICLES

FIVE LARGE GERMAN BUILT BUSES AND SEVERAL US BUILT TRUCKS. (U)

COMMERCIAL VEHICLES

COMMERCIAL BUSES AND TRUCKS AVAILABLE. (U)

AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL)

NON-SCHEDULED IIAF TRANSPORTS OPERATE INTO AFELD. CIVIL NOT AVAILABLE. (U)

WEATHER

STATION

WEATHER STATION USING HORIZONTAL VISIBILITY MEASURING SET, WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED INDICATOR, CLOUD BASE HEIGHT MEASURING SET, SURFACE TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY MEASURING SET. HOURLY AND SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS 0000-2400Z. METAR AND SPECIAL REPORTS. OPEN 24 HOURS. (U)

CLIMATE

DRY SUMMER SUBTROPICAL. WINTER RELATIVELY COLD, SUMMER SELDOM EXCESSIVELY HOT. MAX RAINFALL JAN THRU MAY 2 TO 1.5 INCHES MONTHLY. DRY JUL THRU SEP. FOUR THUNDERSTORM DAYS PER MONTH APR AND MAY, NONE REST OF THE YEAR. IN WINTER, HEAVY SNOW ON GROUND OCCURS FREQUENTLY. MAXIMUM CLOUDINESS NOV THRU MAR. (U)

FLYING CONDITIONS

VISIBILITIES, GENERALLY GOOD, ARE OCCASIONALLY RESTRICTED WINTER AND EARLY SPRING BY FOG AND SNOW. TAKEOFF CONDITIONS GENERALLY GOOD. AIR ROUTES OVER NEARBY RIDGES UNFAVORABLE FREQUENTLY DURING WINTER. (U)

PRECIPITATION

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	01.3	01.5	01.8	02.1	01.7	00.1	00.0	00.2	00.1	00.3	01.3	01.6
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	078.0	038.0	053.0	064.0	077.0	083.0	090.0	090.0	083.0	069.0	059.0	053.0
MEAN	030.9	028.5	043.0	052.5	059.0	067.0	074.0	073.5	066.5	056.5	042.5	034.5
MIN	023.0	019.0	033.0	041.0	046.0	051.0	058.0	057.0	050.0	043.0	032.0	026.0

DEW POINT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	021	022	021	027	036	037	033	039	035	023	021	022

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	05396	05451	05513	05594	05678	05812	05379	05852	05697	05534	05423	05394


SIGNIFICANCE

THIS AIRFIELD IS ONE OF THE MAJOR MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN IRAN. IT IS A MAJOR FIGHTER BASE AND IS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING F-4 TYPE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS. MEDIUM AND HEAVY TRANSPORT OPERATIONS WOULD BE LIMITED BY PARKING SPACE. (U)

11-63

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN WHINTTEL~~

SHIRAZ INTERNATIONAL



II-65

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN WHINTTEL~~

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- SHIRAZ INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUIM

TOWER, VORTAC, NOB, UHF/VHF/DF, APP CON, A/G RADIO, RADAR-ASR, PAR.  
 POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS (S)  
 TELEPHONE-AUTO DIAL, 600 LINES EXPANDABLE TO 1000 LINES. TELETYPE-5 ENGLISH PEACE NET (ALT AFCP), 13 FARSI PEACE NET (ALT AFCP), 10 ENGLISH PEACE RUBY. MICRO-WAVE LOS TERMINAL 120 VV CHANNELS. ALTERNATE AF COMMAND POST WITH TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS. VHF/FM RADIO, FREQUENCY UNKNOWN. HF POINT TO POINT RADIO CW/VOICE/TTY.  
 U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S) (C)  
 US CONSULATE IN ESFAHAN 195 MILES N BY W. SSB RADIO.  
 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES (U)  
 010 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER JEP  
 015 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR  
 015 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 030 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS (U)

DIMENSIONS	MAG/BRG	SFC	COND	CAPACITY	R/LTS	RW	J/B	A/G	ELEV	OVERRUN	APCL	GRAD	AL
14009X00148	111/291	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	N	11R	A	A	04912	ASP 1000	50=1	-0.41	A
						29L	N	N	04855	ASP 1180	50=1	+0.41	N
14009X00148	111/291	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-59000/185-PSI	A	11L	A	A	04910	ASP 1180	50=1	-0.36	N
						29R	A	A	04859	ASP 1000	50=1	+0.36	N

REMARKS-RUNWAY ENDS ARE CONCRETE. CAPACITY OF RUNWAY 11R/29L BASED ON LCN 100, RWY 11L/29R BASED ON LCN 70. THRESHOLD OF RWY 11L DISPLACED 709 FT. VASI AT THLD OF RWY 29L ANGLE 3.3 DEGREES. PACKED GRAVEL OR EARTH SHOULDERS APPROXIMATELY 70 FT WIDE ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE RUNWAYS.

TAXIWAYS

(U)

NO	TYPE	WID	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	LTS
01	PARALLEL	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A
19	LINK	075	CON	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A
02	LINK	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	E
02	ALERT	090	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	F
09	DISPERSAL	068	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	E
01	LINK	090	CON	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	E
01	PARALLEL	075	ASP	POOR	UNUSABLE U/C	N
02	HI-SPEED LINK	075	ASP	POOR	UNUSABLE U/C	N
05	LINK	075	ASP	POOR	UNUSABLE U/C	N

REMARKS-PACKED GRAVEL OR EARTH SHOULDERS APPROX 35 FT WIDE ALONG BOTH SIDES OF PARALLEL AND LINK TAXIWAYS. LAST THREE ITEMS LOCATED ON S SIDE OF RUNWAYS. TAXIWAY LOCATED WEST OF THE TERMINAL IS NOT STRESSED FOR B-747 TYPE AIRCRAFT.

APRONS

(U)

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY TOT SQ FT	*SIMUL	*EST	*PARK CAPCY	*ARRIVALS	*DAY	*HR/MN
01	OPERATIONAL	(MIL) 2177X0590	CON	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	999 0001286430*	*	*	*	*24*	:	*

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11-67



SECRET NO. [REDACTED]

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 \*AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD JOB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICAU- 78 MAR ICAU \*  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN AIRFIELD NAME- SHIRAZ INTL ICAU DESIGNATOR- IIRAS \*  
 \* BE NUMBER- 0444008020 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- TADAYON AB AIRFIELD STATUS- \*9\* \*\*\* ACTIVE \*\*\* \*  
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GENERAL

SRC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	TOI AREA CODE	ASSOTW VOL NO PAGE NO
A	I			M	16 - -
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION ELEVATION
29 32 25N 052 35 27E		JGCR NH 39-12		01ED 70 SEP 8005L	002E 04912
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT			(C)		
39RXN 6541513268948 UTM-INTERNATIONAL					
MIDPOINT OF A LINE CONNECTING THE CENTERS OF TWO PARALLEL RUNWAYS.					
GRAPHIC REFERENCE			(U)		
DNC H-6, JGCR NH 39-12, DOD EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-18F, H-13C.					
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS			(C)		
4.8 MILES SE BY S OF SHIRAZ ON W SIDE OF ROAD, 6.6 MILES FROM EDGE OF LAKE MAHARLU, 98 MILES ENE OF BUSHEHR.					
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE			(U)		
FAIRLY FLAT TERRAIN IN LARGE VALLEY. AIRFIELD IS SITUATED BETWEEN 2 PRIMARY NATURAL DRAINAGE CHANNELS THAT ARE NOT ADEQUATE AS THE FIELD IS ONLY SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN EITHER CHANNEL. ARTIFICIAL DRAINAGE IS GOOD.					
PEAKS 8720 FT 0.3 MILES N BY E, 9259 FT 10 MILES S BY W, 10160 FT 18.2 MILES SW.					
CONTROLLING AGENCY(S)			(U)		
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (CAO).					

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS (U)  
 IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE (IAF) AND GENDARMERIE (IG) AND IRANAIR USE THE AIRFIELD. SEVERAL ARABIAN COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT USE THE FIELD AS AN AIRPORT OF ENTRY. AIRCRAFT USING THE FIELD ARE C-130, F-4 AND 727.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (U)  
 AIRFIELD APRONS (CIVIL AND MILITARY) CAN ACCOMMODATE APPROXIMATELY 54 C-130 TYPE AIRCRAFT.

AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS (U)

NAME	DISTANCE	DIR	RWY LENGTH	SURF	CAPACITY
NONE					

SEARCH AND RESCUE (C)  
 TEHRAN RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER 375 MILES N BY W. LONG AND SHORT RANGE FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES (U)  
 IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOM SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE SUNRISE TO SUNSET. AT OTHER TIMES ON 6 HOUR NOTICE

PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION (U)  
 ONE PARALLEL, 2 HI-SPEED LINK AND 5 LINK TAXIWAYS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. ALSO A LARGE MILITARY APRON AND A HOLDING APRON.

INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL (U)  
 ESTIMATE SEMISKILLED AND UNSKILLED AVAILABLE.

FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (U)  
 NONE

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS (U)

SECRET NO. [REDACTED]

99-11

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- SHIRAZ INTL

JGR DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TALAF ASSUM

01	OPERATIONAL(CIV)	2080X0300	CON	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	999	0000624000*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	OPERATIONAL(MIL)	0540X0410	CON	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	999	0000221400*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	MAINTENANCE	0170X0155	CON	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	999	0000026350*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	ALERT	0300X0225	CON	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	999	0000067500*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	HOLDING	0545X0270	CON	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	999	0000147150*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	HOLDING	0490X0260	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000127400*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	HOLDING	0315X0185	CON	GOOD	ESWL-41362/75-PSI	999	0000058275*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	OPERATIONAL(MIL)	2000X0600	ASP	POOR	UNUSABLE U/C	999	0001200000*	*	* 24*	:	*
01	HOLDING	0500X0250	ASP	POOR	UNUSABLE U/C	999	0000125000*	*	* 24*	:	*

TOTAL- 3881505\*\*\*\*\*

REMARKS-APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE LARGE MILITARY APRON IS HANGAR APRON. APRONS REPORTED NOT SUITABLE FOR B-747 TYPE AIRCRAFT.

\*\*\*\*\* TOTAL SQ FEET OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

LIMITED-APRONS	NO. 08	SQ FT 25565	SURFACE CON	COND G	CAP. C141
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89-11

HARDSTANOS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
01	OPERATIONAL	0155X0140	CON	GOOD	ESWL-14740/205-PSI	999	0000021100
01	PAD	0118 DIAM	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	999	0000010935

REVELMENTS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
N							

PARKING (OTHER)

ON DIRT BETWEEN MAIN PARKING APRONS JUST N OF THE PARALLEL TAXIWAY.

OBSTRUCTIONS

NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	BRC	REMARKS
01	NDB MAST	04989	0051	U	02.0	291	FROM RP TO MAST.
01	WATER TANK	05010	0072	N	00.4	324	FROM RP TO WATER TANK

LIGHTING

RUNWAY 29L/29R LIGHTING CONSISTS OF HI AND LO INTENSITY (CALVERT) APPROACH LIGHTS, 2460 FT CENTER LINE, FOUR HI-INTENSITY WHITE AND 1 LO-INTENSITY RED CROSSBARS. LO INTENSITY WHITE RUNWAY LIGHTS, GREEN THRESHOLD LIGHTS AND BLUE TAXIWAY LIGHTS. RWY 11L EQUIPPED WITH SIMPLE LO-INTENSITY APPROACH LIGHTS WITH ONE CROSSBAR. BEACON FLASHING GREEN AND WHITE. VASI AT RWYS 29L AND 29R ANGLE 3 DEGREES.

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

HANGARS

NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOOR WID-HT	HEAT
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL FRAME	0315X0155	U XU U	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL FRAME	0210X0125	U XU U	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL FRAME	0100X0100	U XU U	U

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- SHIRAZ INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TALAF ASSUW

01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL	0062X0043	U	XU	U	
01	THREE BAY (ALERT)	STEEL FRAME	0130X0210	U	XU	E	
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL FRAME	0100X0100	U	XU	J	
07	SINGLE BAY	CONCRETE	0110X0070	U	XU	U	HANGARETTES
10	SINGLE BAY	CONCRETE	0110X0070	U	XU	U	HANGARETTES
04	SINGLE BAY	CONCRETE	0110X0100	U	XU	U	HANGARETTES
01	3 BAY HELICOPTER	STEEL	0220X0070	U	XU	U	

REMARKS-FIRST 3 ITEMS ARE MILITARY HANGARS, 4TH ITEM IS A GFNDARMERIE HANGAR, ITEM 5 IS AN ALERT HANGAR OF 3 SEPARATE BUILDINGS ATTACHED. ITEM 1 HAS ATTACHED LEAN-TO 295X25 FT, ITEM 2 HAS ATTACHED LEAN-TO 200X25 FT, ITEM 3 HAS TWO ATTACHED LEAN-TO EACH 100X25 FT. SEVEN HANGARETTES LOCATED ON NW SIDE OF RUNWAYS, 10 ARE LOCATED ON THE SW SIDE. ITEM 6 IS LOCATED ON THE CIVIL SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. LARGE HANGARETTES ARE ON THE SW SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD.

MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES (U)  
AVAILABLE. TYPE AND NUMBER UNKNOWN.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (U)  
ESTIMATE AVAILABLE UP TO FIELD LEVEL.

OXYGEN (2)  
LOX STORAGE CAPACITY 1000 GAL. GENERATING CAPACITY 4-5 GAL/HR

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS (U)  
JET STARTING UNITS AVAILABLE. TYPES AND NUMBER OF UNITS UNKNOWN.

GROUND POWER UNITS (U)  
ESTIMATE ONE LOW PRESSURE AIR COMPRESSOR FOR C-130 AIRCRAFT.

ORDNANCE STORAGE (C)  
ONE 60 FT IGLOO, TWO 30 FT IGLOUS, FUSE STORAGE 6 CELL. ESTIMATE SMALL ARMS STORAGE.

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE (C)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF			FILL STANDS			RESUPPLY METHOD/RECEIPT
		TANKS	CAP EACH	TOT CAP	NO	GPM		
JP-4	TANKS UNDER GROUND	004	0528400	02113600	E	U	A	TANK TRUCK
TA	TANK ABOVE GROUND	U	U	U	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK
100/130	TANK ABOVE GROUND	U	U	U	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK
80	TANK ABOVE GROUND	U	U	U	U	U	A	TANK TRUCK

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM (U)

PRODUCT	STORAGE	CAP. (GPM)	OUT-LETS	HOSE NO.	CARTS TYPE	NOZZLES	
						NO.	TYPE
TA	U	04	02160	U	U	U	U
100/130	U	04	02160	U	U	U	U

REFUELLING UNITS (C)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP.	DISP RATE	NOZZLES	
					NO.	TYPE
JP-4	09	TANKER	090000	05400	U	U
JP-4	01	TANKER	003750	00600	U	U

DEFUELLING FACILITIES (U)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP (GPM)
U	U	TANK TRUCKS	U

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS (S)

11-69

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- SHIRAZ INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

13CAF ASSUM

SEVEN VERTICAL STEEL FUEL STORAGE TANKS ARE LOCATED IN THE NIUC STORAGE COMPOUND EAST AND ADJACENT TO THE CIVIL TERMINAL AREA. FOUR FINGER LINES ON EACH OF THE 2 HEADS ON THE HYDRANT SYSTEM. THERE ARE 5640000 GAL OF FUEL STORED ON THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE FIELD.

OFF BASE STORAGE

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP. EACH	TOTAL CAPACITY
JP-4	U	U	U	U
TA	U	U	U	U
100/130	U	U	U	U
80	U	U	U	U

STOCK LEVEL

PRODUCT	GAL-ON-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE
JP-4	02113600	A
TA	A	A
100/130	A	A
80	A	A

OIL AND LUBRICANTS

AEROSHELL 100, 100W, 120, ESSO 100, 120. (U)

THRUST AUGMENTATION

WATER-METHANOL 50/50. (U)

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT (U)  
AN AMBULANCE AND ESTIMATE OTHER CRASH EQUIPMENT.

FIRE EQUIPMENT (U)  
ONE FOAM TENDER.

WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT (U)  
ESTIMATE AVAILABLE. TYPES AND NUMBER UNKNOWN.

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (U)

ESTIMATE EQUIPMENT FOR TOWING AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE. FOUR 29 PASSENGER BENZ BUSES AVAILABLE.

CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT (U)

ONE 5 TON FORK LIFT AND 1 CONVEYOR BELT FOR BAGGAGE. ESTIMATE SOME VEHICLES AVAILABLE.

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS (U)

DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS		AIRMEN	
NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
A	U	A	U

REMARKS-20 MAN 80Q AND TWO 200 MAN DORMITORIES 2 STORIES HIGH. A LATRINE, BATH AND LAUNDRY BLDG IS SITUATED BETWEEN THE DORMITORIES.

DEPENDENT UNITS (U)

ONE GENERALS HOME, 10 SENIOR OFFICERS UNITS AND 100 UNITS OF NCO HOUSING ALL APPEAR TO BE OF POURED CONCRETE.

BIVOUAC AREA (U)

11-70

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- SHIRAZ INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSC/TW

AREA SURROUNDING AIRFIELD APPEARS SUITABLE. POTABLE WATER, LIMITED LATRINE FACILITIES PLUS A KITCHEN AND OUT PATIENT CLINIC AVAILABLE NEAR THE HOUSING AREA.

OFF BASE FACILITIES

DARIUS HOTEL 187 ROOMS AND CYRUS HOTEL 152 ROOMS ARE OWNED AND OPERATED BY IRAN AIR. IN SHIRAZ THE PARK SAVOI IS NEAREST US STANDARDS. IN NEARBY PERSEPOLIS THE APADANA HAS ROOMS AND A RESTAURANT.

MESSING

OFFICERS		AIRMEN	
NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
N		00600	U

REMARKS-A 100 PERSON CAPACITY RESTAURANT IS LOCATED AT THE TERMINAL. A 600 CAPACITY MESS HALL IS LOCATED AT THE IIAF AREA. OFFICERS MESS PLANNED.

STORAGE

WAREHOUSE			SHEDS		
NO.	LEN.	WID.	NO.	LEN.	WID.
02	0255X0050	0025500	N		
01	0095X0060	0005100	N		

REMARKS-TWO LARGE WAREHOUSES ARE IN IIAF AREA. SMALLER ONE IS LOCATED IN THE NIUC COMPOUND.

MEDICAL FACILITIES

AN IIAF 750-MAN DISPENSARY AVAILABLE. DETAILS UNKNOWN. CIVIL FIRST-AID AREA OPERATES SP-SS. 1 AMBULANCE.

SEWAGE DISPOSAL

PRESENT SEWAGE COLLECTED AND TREATED UNDER CONTRACT. SEWAGE LINES INSTALLED IN IIAF AREA BUT TYPE OF TREATMENT OF EFFLUENT IS UNKNOWN.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE.

RUBBISH DISPOSAL

ESTIMATE AVAILABLE.

WATER SUPPLY

ON COMMERCIAL SIDE 1 DEEP WELL WITH A FLOW OF 32 GALS PER MINUTE AND A 12000 GALS CAPACITY TANK AT GROUND LEVEL. IIAF HAS 2 DEEP WELLS AND 2 STORAGE TOWERS, ONE OF WHICH HAS A 6000 GALS CAPACITY. WATER POTABLE.

AIRFIELD SECURITY

RUNWAY AND TERMINAL AREA IS FENCED. IIAF AREA APPEARS TO BE ENCLOSED. POLICE POSTS LOCATED ON PERIMETER OF THE FIELD. POLICE STATION EQUIPPED WITH RADIO, VEHICLES, GARAGE AND WORKSHOP. THREAT SECURITY EVALUATION AS OF 20 MARCH 1978 IS LOW/RELIABLE.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES

OFFICE SPACE AVAILABLE IN TERMINAL, BASE HQ AND SQUADRON OPERATIONS BLDGS. ESTIMATE TOTALS 14,450 SQ FT.

MAIL SERVICES

ESTIMATE AIRLINES HANDLE MAIL FOR THE FIELD.

ELECTRICAL POWER

IIAF POWER PLANT AVAILABLE, TYPE, QUANTITY AND OUTPUT UNKNOWN. COMMERCIAL SIDE DRAWS POWER FROM MUNICIPAL POWER COMPANY'S 6150 KW, 400-VOLT, 3 PHASE, 50 CYCLE GENERATOR WHICH IS THE SECOND LARGEST IN IRAN

TRANSPORTATION

ROADS

A 30 FT WIDE ASPHALT ROAD FROM TOWN TO THE FIELD. INTERNAL ROADS PAVED. SECONDARY ROADS LESS THAN 18 FT WIDE TO BUSHEHR, LINGEH, AND BANDAR ABBAS.

11-71

SECRET

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- SHIRAZ INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSCIN

RAILROADS (U)  
 NONE  
 WATER TRANSPORTATION (C)  
 NEAREST PORT AT BUSHEHR 100 MILES WSW. MAJOR FACILITIES. SERVED BY ROAD.  
 MILITARY VEHICLES (U)  
 AVAILABLE. TYPE, QUANTITY AND CONDITION UNKNOWN.  
 COMMERCIAL VEHICLES (U)  
 IRAN AIR BUSES FOR SCHEDULED OPERATIONS AND TAXIS SR-SS. ONE HOUR PRIOR NOTICE.  
 AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL) (U)  
 DAILY FLIGHTS OF CIVIL AIR CARRIERS AND CHARTER SERVICE AVAILABLE. NO KNOWN SCHEDULED MILITARY AIR TRANSPORTATION.

WEATHER

STATION (U)  
 HOURLY OBSERVATIONS 0000-2400Z AND SPECIAL WEATHER REPORTS. TREND AVAILABLE. OPEN 24 HOURS.  
 CLIMATE (U)  
 SUBTROPICAL STEPPE. SUMMER IS HOT AND WINTER IS USUALLY MILD. PRECIPITATION MODERATE DEC THR MAR, ARID JUL THRU OCT AND LIGHT AMOUNTS THE REMAINING MONTHS. THUNDERSTORMS ARE RARE AND OCCUR MOSTLY IN THE SPRING. MAX CLOUDINESS IN WINTER AND SPRING. VERY LITTLE CLOUD COVER SUMMER AND FALL.  
 FLYING CONDITIONS (U)  
 VISIBILITIES GENERALLY GOOD. DUST IS THE CHIEF RESTRICTION IN SUMMER. EXCELLENT CONDITIONS FOR FLYING TRAINING AT THIS BASE.

PRECIPITATION (U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	03.7	02.0	02.1	04.0	01.0	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.0	03.2	02.8	
MIN U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	054.0	055.0	065.0	076.0	086.0	096.0	099.0	097.0	092.0	083.0	069.0	057.0
MEAN	043.0	043.5	052.5	061.0	070.5	079.0	083.5	081.0	075.0	066.0	054.0	045.5
MIN	032.0	032.0	040.0	046.0	055.0	062.0	068.0	065.0	058.0	049.0	040.0	034.0

TEMPERATURE (U)

DEW POINT (U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	030	031	034	039	039	034	037	039	034	032	033	033

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY (U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	04742	04762	04782	04792	04802	04812	04912	04862	04812	04652	04642	04632

SIGNIFICANCE (U)  
 SHIRAZ INTERNATIONAL WAS DEVELOPED TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF TOURIST TRADE ESPECIALLY THAT DESTINED FOR PERSEPOLIS. THE CIVIL TERMINAL IS PLANNED FOR ORDERLY EXPANSION. AT THE PRESENT, IT IS LARGER THAN REQUIRED FOR THE TRAFFIC IT WILL BEAR. IT IS ALSO A MAJOR IIAF AIRFIELD (TADAYAN AB), HOME OF THE 7TH FIGHTER AND 7TH TRANSPORT WINGS. IT HAS A SECONDARY ROLE OF ASSEMBLING PARIA-MILITARY AND MILITARY FORCES TO SUPPRESS ANY UPRISINGS OF DISSENTING TRIBES. IT IS ALSO A PARTS SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE DEPT. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE DEPT. LACK OF GOOD ROADS AND RAILROADS MAKE THIS MODERN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THE MAJOR TRANSPORTATION CENTER FOR THE AREA.

11-72

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN W/INTTEL~~

TABRIZ AIRFIELD



II-73

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN W/INTTEL~~

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \*AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD JOB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICOD- 78 JUL TADAF \*  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN AIRFIELD NAME- TABRIZ ICAU DESIGNATOR- G111 \*  
 \* BE NUMBER- 0339008201 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- NONE AIRFIELD STATUS- \*R\* \*\* ACTIVE \*\* \*  
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GENERAL

SRC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	TOI AREA CODE	ASSGTW VOL NO	PAGE NO
A	I			M		16
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION	ELEVATION
38 07 54N 046 14 36E	JOCR NJ 38-07	01ED 70 SEP	80053	004E	04483	
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT		(C)				
38SPH 6089724221224 UTM-INTERNATIONAL						
INTERSECTION OF THE TWO RUNWAYS						
GRAPHIC REFERENCE		(U)				
ONC G-5, JOG NJ 38-7, DOD EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLEEAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-174, L-150, H-138.						
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS		(C)				
FOUR MILES NW OF TABRIZ, 42 MILES S OF USSR/IRAN BORDER, 97 MILES W OF APDABIL.						
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE		(C)				
TERRAIN IS FAIRLY FLAT, SLOPING GENTLY TOWARD LAKE URMIA 37 MILES WEST. MOUNTAINS RISE SHARPLY TO THE NORTH, EAST AND SOUTH. PEAKS 12172 FT 25 MILES SSE, 9889 FT 22 MILES NE, 7252 FT 10 MILES NW AND 7802 FT 7 MILES E.						
NATURAL DRAINAGE FAIR, ARTIFICIAL DRAINAGE GOOD. SUBSOIL CONSISTS OF ROCK DOWN TO APPROXIMATELY 1.5 FT.						
CONTROLLING AGENCY(S)		(U)				
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (CAO).						

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS (S)  
 JOINT USE BY IRAN AIR AND IIAF. IRAN AIR HAS SCHEDULED 8777 FLIGHTS TO FIELD. HOME BASE FOR 3 IIAF F5 SQUONS.  
 OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (U)  
 THREE FIGHTER SQUADRONS OR 2 MEDIUM BOMBER SQDNS.  
 AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS (U)

NAME	DISTANCE	DIR	RWY LENGTH	SURF	CAPACITY
NONE					

SEARCH AND RESCUE (C)  
 TABRIZ SEARCH AND RESCUE SUB-CENTER. SHORT RANGE FIXED WING AND HH-43 HELICOPTERS.  
 IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES (C)  
 NONE AT BASE. HOWEVER, THIS SERVICE COULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE CITY OF TABRIZ THROUGH THE AMERICAN CONSULATE LOCATED THERE, WITH PRIOR NOTICE.  
 PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION (S)  
 PME LABORATORY, FUELS LABORATORY AND 5 DOUBLE BAY HANGARETTES PLANNED OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION. CONTINUING CONSTRUCTION AND UPGRADING ON SHOPS, QUARTERS AND ADMIN BUILDINGS.  
 INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL (U)  
 ESTIMATE SEMISKILLED AND UNSKILLED AVAILABLE.  
 FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (U)  
 NONE

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS (U)

11-74



CNTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- TABRIZ

JDD DATE- 26 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSGTA

APPROACH CONTROL, TOWER, A/G RADIO, VORTAC, NDB, AND ASR/PAR. (U)  
 POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS (U)  
 TELEPHONE, 200 LINE AUTO-DIAL, TELEGRAPH, MANUAL MODES: CODE, TELETYPE, 6 ENGLISH AND 4 PERSI MACHINES. MICRO-  
 -WAVE LOS TERMINAL, 24 VF CHANNEL.  
 U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S) (C)  
 AMERICAN CONSULATE IN TABRIZ, 4 MILES SE, HAS SSB CAPABILITY TO THE US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. (U)  
 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES (U)  
 008 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 010 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR  
 008 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 030 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
 033 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED.

STARFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS

DIMENSIONS	MAG/BKG	SFC COND	CND	CAPACITY	R/LTS	PWY	J/P	A/G	ELEV	OVERRRN	APCL	GRAD	AL
12000X00148	124/304	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	A	124	A	A	04462	ASP 1200	50=1	-0.03	A
06230X00148	073/253	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-41362/75-PSI	F	373	N	N	04430	N	50=1	+0.01	A
						253	E	N	04481	N	50=1	-0.02	A

REMARKS-RWY 12/30 EXTENSIBLE ABOUT 8000 FT, PWY 07/25 3700 FT, PWY 12 A-GEAR LOCATED 270 FT INTO OVERRUN, J-  
 BAR 100 FT INTO OVERRUN, RWY 30 A-GEAR LOCATED 60 FT INTO OVERRUN, J-BAR 95 FT INTO OVERRUN, RWY 12/30  
 EFFECTIVE LENGTH CORRECTED FOR FIELD ELEVATION IS 3700 FT, RWY 07/25 4600 FT, PWY 12/30 CAPACITY DERIVED  
 FROM REPORTED LEN 70, RWY 07/25 CAPACITY DERIVED FROM REPORTED CAPACITY OF ADW 19,880 POUNDS FOR DOUBLE  
 WHEEL, 149,746 POUNDS FOR BOGIE GEAR.

TAXIWAYS

NO	TYPE	WID	SUPF	CND	CAPACITY	LTS
01	PARALLEL	330	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	A
02	LINK	080	CON	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	A
04	LINK	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	A
02	LINK	100	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-41362/75-PSI	A
02	LINK	090	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	A
03	LOOP	070	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	U
01	ALERT	100	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	U
01	LINK	050	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	U

REMARKS-THE 2 CONCRETE TWYS ARE RWY END CONNECTING LINKS, 2 75 FT LINKS CONNECT RWY AND PARALLEL TWY AND 2  
 CONNCT CIVIL APRON TO PARALLEL TWY, TWO 90 FT LINKS CONNECT THE LARGE MILITARY APRON TO RWY, THE 2 100 FT  
 LINK SMALL MILITARY APRON TO RWY, THE LOOPS, ALERT AND 50 FT LINK SERVE THE DISPERSAL AREA.

APRONS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURE	CND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT	SO	FT
01	OPERATIONAL	0950X0480	CON	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	999	0000456000		

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 \*SIMUL \*EST \*HR- \*TIME- \*  
 \*PARK CAPLY \*ARRIVALS \*DAY \*HR/MN \*  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 \* 24 \* \* \*

11-75

SECRET TO FOREIGN DISSEM

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- TABRIZ

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSCWA

01 OPERATIONAL (MIL)	0500X0410	CON	GOOD	ESWL-41362/75-PSI	999	0000215000*			
01 OPERATIONAL (CIV)	1030X0367	CON	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	999	000030800*		* 24*	: *
02 WARM UP	0340X0150	CUN	GOOD	ESWL-56574/185-PSI	999	000010200*		* 24*	: *
						TOTAL-	1143800*****		

REMARKS-FIRST APRON IS MAIN MILITARY WITH A LARGE HANGAR. SECOND APRON IS IN THE MILITARY DISPERSAL AREA. THE CIVIL APRON IS THE PASSENGER TERMINAL APRON.

\*\*\*\*\* TOTAL SQ FEET OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

LIMITED-APRONS	NO.	SQ FT	SURFACE	COND	CAP.
	03	10418	CON	G	F4

\*\*\*\*\*

HAPUSTANDS	NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
	N				(U)			

REVESTMENTS	NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
	N				(U)			

PARKING (OTHER)	NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
	NONE				(U)			

OBSTRUCTIONS	NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	BRG	REMARKS
	01	RADIO MAST	04700	0210	A	00.3	030	
	01	STACK	04666	0176	N	03.2	177	
	01	STACK	04630	0140	N	01.6	136	
	01	WATER TOWER	04590	0100	A	00.5	011	
	01	MAST	04930	0500	U	04.4	266	

LIGHTING  
RUNWAY 30 HAS CALVERT APPROACH LIGHTING COMPRISED OF WHITE LIGHTS WITH A 2003 FT CENTERLINE AND 5 CROSSBARS, ALSO LOW INTENSITY RED LIGHTS WITH A 1378 FT CENTERLINE AND 1 CROSSBAR. RUNWAY 12 APPROACH LIGHTS CONSIST OF LOW INTENSITY RED LIGHTS WITH A 1374 FT CENTERLINE AND 1 CROSSBAR. BOTH THRESHOLDS EQUIPPED WITH AMBER LIGHTS. WHITE RUNWAY LIGHTS LOCATED 15 FT IN FROM THE EDGE OF THE PREPARED SURFACE AT THE JUNCTURE OF THE RUNWAY AND SHOULDERS. ALL TAXIWAYS EQUIPPED WITH BLUE LIGHTS. BRILLIANCY CONTROL ON APPROACH AND RUNWAY LIGHTS ARE 1 PERCENT, 3 PERCENT, 10 PERCENT, 30 PERCENT AND 100 PERCENT.

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

HANGARS	NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOOR	HGT	HEAT
	01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL	0155X0310	U	XU	A
	17	DOUBLE BAY	REINFORCED CONCRETE	0075X0100	U	XU	E

REMARKS-THE LARGE HANGAR IS MILITARY, APPROX 50 FT HIGH WITH CONCRETE FLOOR AND SLIDING STEEL DOORS. HANGARETTES WILL ACCOMMODATE 34 ACFT. TWO ALERT AND 3 MAINT-ENANCE HANGARETTES UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES (C)

11-76

SECRET

MAINTENANCE BUILDINGS ARE ATTACHED TO AND LOCATED ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE HANGAR. THEY ARE DIVIDED INTO SHOP AREAS AS ELECTRICAL, BATTERY, AIRPLANE GENERAL, SHEET METAL AND HYDRAULIC. AN ENGINE MAINTENANCE BUILDING APPROX 75X200 IS LOCATED NE OF HANGAR. NW OF THE HANGAR IS THE MAINTENANCE OFFICE BUILDING AND CONTAINS OFFICES FOR MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE STATUS ROOMS.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (C)

AN AIR CONDITIONED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT REPAIR SHOP IS LOCATED JUST N OF THE HANGAR AND MEASURES 75X200 FT.

OXYGEN (I)

LUX PLANT WITH GENERATING CAPACITY OF 1.5 TONS DAILY IN OPERATION. ADDITIONAL 1.5 TON CAPACITY UNIT TO BE INSTALLED IN SAME BUILDING.

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS (I)

STANDARD STARTING UNITS FOR F-5 AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE.

GROUND POWER UNITS (I)

NE 2 LITE ALLS AVAILABLE FOR 110V 60HZ POWER.

GROUND STORAGE (C)

TWO STORAGE AREAS. ONE, APRX 10,000 FT NNE OF RP, CONTAINS 1 60 FT AND 2 30 FT IGLUUS, 6 CELL FUZE STORAGE, 1 ROCKET AND 1 SMALL ARMS STORAGE BUILDING AND 1 WAREHOUSE. ANOTHER STORAGE AREA HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED APRX 5000 FT NNE OF RP. DETAILS ON FACILITIES UNKNOWN.

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE (S)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF			FILL STANDS			RESUPPLY METHOD/RECEIPT
		TANKS	CAP EACH	TOT CAP	NO	GPM		
JP4	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	004	0198150	00792600	03	U	U	TANK TRUCK
JP4	UNDERGROUND TANKS	002	0705000	01410000	U	U	U	TANK TRUCK
TA2	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	U	U	A	U	U	U	TANK TRUCK
100/130	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	U	U	A	U	U	U	TANK TRUCK

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM (U)

PRODUCT	STORAGE CAPACITY	NO.	CAP. (GPM)	OUT-LETS	HOSE CARTS NO.	NOZZLES	
						TYPE	NO. TYPE

REFUELLING UNITS (C)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP.	DISP RATE	NOZZLES	
					NO.	TYPE
JP4	09	TRUCK	033330	U	U	U
JP4	04	TRUCK	042268	U	U	U
TA2	A	TRUCK	U	U	U	U
100/130	A	TRUCK	U	U	U	U
100/130	A	U	U	U	U	U

DEFUELLING FACILITIES (U)

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP (GPM)
---------	-----	------	-----------

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS (U)

TA2 AND 100/130 FUEL AVAILABLE ON CIVIL SIDE OF AIRFIELD. STORAGE CONSISTS OF 6 ABOVE GROUND TANKS WITH A TOTAL CAPACITY OF ABOUT 90,000 GALLONS. AMOUNTS OF EACH TYPE STORED UNKNOWN.

OFF BASE STORAGE (C)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF		TOTAL CAPACITY
		TANKS	CAP. EACH	

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ENTRY CODE- IR 4FLD NAME- TABRIZ

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUIM

JP4	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	U	U	A
JP1	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	U	U	A
100/130	ABOVE GROUND TANKS	U	U	A

REMARKS-DISTANCE TO OFF-BASE STORAGE IS 458 MILES. RESUPPLY TIME IS 72 HOURS. OFF-BASE RESERVES ARE LIMITED ONLY BY DISTANCE TO BASE AND TANK TRUCK AVAILABILITY.

STOCK LEVEL (C)

PRODUCT	GAL-ON-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE
JP4	A	99999999
JP1	A	99999999
100/130	A	99999999

REMARKS-A 10 DAY RESERVE IS MAINTAINED ON BASE. OFF-BASE RESERVES ARE UNLIMITED

OIL AND LUBRICANTS (C)

OIL AND LUBRICANTS FOR JET AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE.

THRUST AUGMENTATION (U)  
NONE

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT (U)  
NONE

FIRE EQUIPMENT (U)

MILITARY AREA HAS 2 USAF STANDARD 1958 FIRE TRUCKS IN GOOD CONDITION. CIVIL AREA HAS 1 BEDFORD FOAM TANK TRUCK RARELY OPERATIONAL.

WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT (U)

ONE LARGE CRANE VEHICLE. CAPACITY UNKNOWN.

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (U)

TWO LARGE DUMP TRUCKS EACH EQUIPPED WITH A REMOVABLE BLADE INCORPORATING A 2 STAGE FAN SYSTEM TO ACT AS A SNOW PLOW, DRIVEN BY A POWER TAKE-OFF FROM THE CARRIER VEHICLE. ON 1 TRUCK THE PLOW IS ADJUSTED IN ELEVATION ONLY. EQUIPMENT CONSIDERED INADEQUATE FOR THE HEAVY 70 INCH SNOWFALL IN THIS AREA

CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT (U)

LARGE CARGO HANDLING MACHINE SUITABLE FOR LOADING AND OFF-LOADING C-141 AND C-5 AIRCRAFT IS AVAILABLE BUT NON-OPERATIONAL DUE TO SHORTAGE OF PARTS AND WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR REPAIRS TO BE MADE SERVICEABLE.

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS (C)

DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS		ARMEN	
NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
00110	U	01100	U

REMARKS-LARGE H SHAPED DORMITORY WITH A CAPACITY OF ABOUT 1100 FOR NCO AND ENLISTED MEN. BUQ/VOU/VIP QUARTERS FOR ABOUT 110.

DEPENDENT UNITS (U)

TWO SENIOR OFFICERS QUARTERS, 16 AND 24 FAMILY HOUSING UNITS IN VARIOUS STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION. THERE ARE 1100 FAMILY UNITS PLANNED.

BIVOUAC AREA (U)

ESTIMATE AREA SURROUNDING AIRFIELD FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE MILE IN ANY DIRECTION IS SUITABLE FOR BIVOUAC

11-78

PURPOSES.  
 OFF BASE FACILITIES (C)  
 ESTIMATE HOTELS IN TABRIZ, NUMBER AND QUALITY UNKNOWN. (C)  
 MESSING (C)  
     OFFICERS  
     NORMAL MAX. AIRMEN  
     A U 00600 U  
 REMARKS-STANDARD IIAF OFFICERS MESS.  
 STORAGE (C)  
     WAREHOUSE  
     NO. LFN. WID. T/SQ.FT. NO. LFN. WID. T/SQ.FT.  
     03 0400X0200 0740000 U U XU U  
 MEDICAL FACILITIES (S)  
 BASE DISPENSARY WITH 20 BED CAPACITY AND 3 AMBULANCES. THREE HOSPITALS IN TOWN WITH A TOTAL OF 370 BEDS.  
 SEWAGE DISPOSAL (U)  
 ESTIMATE AVAILABLE. TYPE AND CAPACITY UNKNOWN.  
 GARBAGE DISPOSAL (U)  
 UNKNOWN  
 RUBBISH DISPOSAL (U)  
 UNKNOWN  
 WATER SUPPLY (I)  
 BASE WATER SUPPLIED BY THE TABRIZ CITY WATER SYSTEM. STORAGE TANK ON BASE.  
 AIRFIELD SECURITY (S)  
 PERIMETER FENCE WITH GUARD TOWERS AND GATE GUARDS AT ACCESS POINTS. GENDARMERIE AND THE NATIONAL POLICE  
 PATROL THE CIVILIAN SIDE OF THE FIELD 24 HOURS. EXTRA SECURITY MEASURES CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITH PRIOR  
 COORDINATION WITH IRANIAN OFFICIALS. THE THREAT/SECURITY EVALUATION OF 10 NOV 77 IS LOW/RELIABLE.  
 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES (C)  
 OFFICES AVAILABLE IN CIVIL TERMINAL BUILDING, BASE HQ, BASE OPERATIONS, 3 SQ OPERATIONS BUILDINGS AND TRAIN-  
 ING BUILDING.  
 MAIL SERVICES (C)  
 SERVICE PROVIDED BY IRAN AIRLINE. ADDRESS- TABRIZ AIRPORT, TABRIZ, IRAN.  
 ELECTRICAL POWER (I)  
 COMMERCIAL POWER FROM THE CITY OF TABRIZ SUPPLIES THE BASE. THE CIVIL SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD ALSO HAS 2 13.7  
 KVA AND 1 9.7 KVA GENERATORS.  
 TRANSPORTATION  
 ROADS (C)  
 FIFTY FOOT WIDE MACADAM ACCESS ROAD FROM TEHRAN TO MERAND (NW OF TABRIZ). DIRT ROAD FROM MERAND TO JULFA ON  
 USSR BORDER.  
 RAILROADS (C)  
 TEHRAN/DZHULFA, USSR RAILROAD 1.3 MILES W OF FIELD. NEAREST STATION AT TABRIZ 3.5 MILES DISTANT. RAILROAD  
 CROSSES USSR BORDER AT DZHULFA 61 MILES NNW. NO RR SPUR FROM FIELD TO MAIN LINE.  
 WATER TRANSPORTATION (C)  
 NEAREST PORT AT KHOPRAMSHAHR 470 MILES SSE. MAJOR FACILITIES, 9 WHARVES. SERVED BY ROAD AND RAILROAD.  
 MILITARY VEHICLES (U)

11-79

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- TABRIZ

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSOTM

ESTIMATE SOME TRUCKS AND CARS AVAILABLE, TYPES AND NUMBER UNKNOWN.  
COMMERCIAL VEHICLES (U)  
PRIVATELY OWNED TAXICABS RUN BETWEEN TOWN AND THE AIRFIELD.  
AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL) (U)  
NATIONAL IRANIAN AIR RUNS REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLIGHTS. ONE IN AND ONE OUT DAILY.

WEATHER

STATION (U)  
HOURLY OBSERVATIONS 0200-0800Z AND SPECIAL WEATHER REPORTS. OPEN 24 HOURS. SURFACE WIND MEASURING SET  
RADIOSONDE RECORDER, AND PRESSURE, RAINFALL AND TEMPERATURE MEASURING INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE.

CLIMATE (U)  
DRY SUMMER SUBTROPICAL. WINTERS ARE RELATIVELY COLD AND SUMMER IS SELDOM EXCESSIVELY HOT. FOUR THUNDERSTORM  
DAYS PER MONTH APR AND MAY, RARE THE REST OF THE YEAR. RELATIVE HUMIDITY IS LOWEST IN SUMMER USUALLY LESS  
THAN 25 PERCENT. IN WINTER, THE AFTERNOONS AVERAGE FROM 85 TO 95 PERCENT. CLOUDINESS AT MAXIMUM NOV THRU MAR  
WITH OVERALL AVERAGE LESS THAN 50 PERCENT. LITTLE CLOUDINESS MAY THRU SEP. SNOW OCCURS 2 TO 5 DAYS PER MONTH  
DEC THRU MAR.

FLYING CONDITIONS (C)  
VISIBILITIES ARE GENERALLY GOOD, OCCASIONALLY RESTRICTED IN WINTER AND SPRING BY SNOW AND FOG. TAKEOFF AND  
LANDING CONDITIONS ARE GENERALLY GOOD EVEN IN WINTER. AIR ROUTES OVER THE SURROUNDING MOUNTAIN RIDGES ARE  
OCCASIONALLY UNFAVORABLE FOR DAYS AT A TIME DURING THE WINTER.

PRECIPITATION (U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.8	00.9	02.0	01.7	01.7	01.2	00.3	00.1	00.3	00.9	01.1	01.9
MIN U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE (U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	037.0	039.0	049.0	042.0	073.0	083.0	089.0	090.0	083.0	069.0	053.0	040.0
MEAN	028.5	030.0	040.0	051.5	061.5	070.0	076.0	076.5	069.5	057.0	046.0	032.5
MIN	020.0	021.0	031.0	041.0	050.0	057.0	063.0	063.0	056.0	045.0	035.0	025.0

DEW POINT (U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	022	022	031	038	045	048	051	050	047	041	035	026

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY (U)


	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	04301	04353	04380	04452	04496	04584	04655	04617	04493	04367	04308	04302

SIGNIFICANCE

(S)  
AIRFIELD IS JOINTLY USED BY IRAN AIRLINES AND THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE. IT IS PRIMARILY AN IMPERIAL  
IRANIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER BASE. THE 2ND TAC FIGHTER WING WITH 3 F-5 FIGHTER SQUADRONS AND 1 COIN SQUADRON IS  
ASSIGNED TO THE BASE.

11-80

TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL



II-97

SECRET

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \*AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD JCB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICD- 78 APR TACAF \*  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN AIRFIELD NAME- TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INTL ICAO DESIGNATOR- OIII \*  
 \* BE NUMBER- 0428008011 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- NONE AIRFIELD STATUS- \*B\* \*\*\* ACTIVE \*\*\*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

GENERAL

SRC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	TDI AREA CODE	ASSOTW VGL NO PAGE NO
A	I			M	15 - -
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION ELEVATION
39 41 27N 051 18 52E		JOGA NI 39-03	02ED 75 JUL	80053	003E 03963
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT		(C)			
39SMV 5284513949766		UTM-INTERNATIONAL			
MID-POINT OF A LINE CONNECTING THE CENTERS OF TWO PARALLEL RUNWAYS.					
GRAPHIC REFERENCE		(U)			
ONC G-5, JOG NI 39-3, DOD EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-17B, H-9C.					
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS		(C)			
5.5 MILES W OF THE CENTER OF TEHRAN, 61 MILES S OF THE CASPIAN SEA, 72 MILES SE BY E OF QAZVIN, 90 MILES SW OF BABOL SAR.					
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE		(U)			
RELATIVELY FLAT, STONY TERRAIN WITH SPARSE VEGETATION. NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL DRAINAGE IS GOOD TOWARD SE. GROUND RISES RAPIDLY N AND E TO PEAKS 14354 FT 26 MILES NE BY N, 18605 FT 44 MILES ENE, 15233 FT 47 MILES NNW.					
CONTROLLING AGENCY(S)		(U)			
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (CAO).					

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS (U)  
 IRANIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE, USAF AND THE GENJARMERIE. AIRCRAFT UP TO C-5 AND B747 USE THE AIRFIELD.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (C)  
 PARKING APRONS CAN ACCOMMODATE 380 F-15 FIGHTERS OR 48 C-141 CARGO TYPE OR 38 B-52 BOMBERS OR 39 C-130 CARGO TYPE OR 19 C-5A AIRCRAFT. CAPABLE OF SUSTAINED LIGHT BOMBER OPERATIONS.

AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS (U)

NAME	DISTANCE	DIR	RWY LENGTH	SURF	CAPACITY
NONE					

SEARCH AND RESCUE- (C)  
 TEHRAN RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER ON BASE. LONG AND SHORT RANGE AIRCRAFT.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES (U)  
 AVAILABLE 24 HOURS DAILY AT HAJ AND MAIN TERMINALS.

PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION (U)  
 UNKNOWN

INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL (U)  
 ESTIMATE SKILLED, SEMISKILLED AND UNSKILLED AVAILABLE.

FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (C)  
 TEHRAN/GHALE MORGHI AIRFIELD 4.2 MILES SE AND TEHRAN/DOSHAN TAPPEH AIRFIELD 7.9 MILES E.

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

SECRET

11-96



NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

TOWER, TACAN, VOR, NDB, UHF/VHF/DF, ILS, RADAR, FAA PAR-2 USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH BRITISH ASR PROVIDE COMPLETE RAPCON. (U)

POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS

TELEPHONE, AUTO DIAL, 600 LINES. TELETYPE, 15 ENGLISH (KLEINSCHMIDT) AND 3 FARSI TT-100 SETMEN, OFF LINE CRYPTO (THIRD COUNTRY). HF POINT TO POINT RADIO. MICRO-WAVE LOS TERMINAL 36 TO 48 CHANNELS. EMERGENCY RADIO NET HF/UHF/FM (MOBILE). (S)

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S)

US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN 5.5 MILES E. MAJOR FACILITIES. (C)

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES

030 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP (U)  
 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO ARR  
 030 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 030 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
 040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
 REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED.

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS

DIMENSIONS	MAG/BRG	SFC	COND	CAPACITY	R/LTS	RWY	J/R	A/G	ELEV	OVERRUN	APCL	GRAD	AL
13120X00197	107/287	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	A	11R	N	A	03949	N	50=1	-1.19	A
13123X00143	107/287	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-85000/185-PSI	A	11L	N	N	03963	N	50=1	+1.19	A
01830X00130	085/265	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-11930/175-PSI	U	29R	A	N	03772	ASP 1137	50=1	+1.30	A
						265	N	N	U	N	50=1	U	N

REMARKS-EXTENSIBILITY OF RWYS 11L AND 11R IS LIMITED TO THE E BY THE CITY. CULVERTS 100 FT WIDE UNDER THE OVERRUNS OF RWYS 29L AND 29R TO DIVERT THE KHAN RIVER. EFFECTIVE RWY LENGTHS CORRECTED FOR FIELD ELEVATION ARE 10100 FT. ARRESTING GEAR 1500 FT W OF THRESHOLD RWY 29L, SINGLE ENGINE AIRCRAFT ARE REQUIRED TO 1/3 AND LAND AFTER BARRIER. J-BAR AT THRESHOLD RWY 11R, 12 FT AGL, LOWERED ON REQUEST. RAISED J-BAR, 12 FT AGL ON OVERRUN 100 FT FROM THRLD OF RWY 11L. VASI RWY 29L, 3 BAR, ANGLE 3.2 DEGREES. (U)

TAXIWAYS

NO	TYPE	WID	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	LTS
01	PARALLEL	130	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	A
07	LINK	075	CUN	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	A
07	LINK	075	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	A
01	LINK	131	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	U
01	ALERT	130	CUN	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	A
01	ALERT	060	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	A
06	LINK	060	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	E
01	LINK	130	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	E

REMARKS-APRON AND BUILDINGS ON PORTION OF FORMER RWY 021/181 S FROM THE MAIN RUNWAY. THE PORTION N OF THE MAIN RWY IS USED AS A TAXIWAY. ALERT TWY LINE 30204 IS BETWEEN E END RWY 11R/29L AND SE MILITARY APRON. LINE 30214 IS LOCATED IN THE HANGARETTA AREA. TWY 33 NOT SUITABLE FOR C-5 AIRCRAFT. (U)

ENTRY CODE- IR AFID NAME- TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSJTH

\*\*\*\*\* TAXIWAY WIDTHS OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

LIMITED-TAXIWAY-1					LIMITED-TAXIWAY-2				
TYPE	WIDTH	SURFACE	COND	CAPACITY	TYPE	WIDTH	SURFACE	COND	CAPACITY
PARA	140	ASP	G	C141	LINK	075	ASP	G	C141

\*\*\*\*\* APRONS \*\*\*\*\*

APRONS

(U)

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FT	*SIMUL *PARK CAPCY	*EST *ARRIVALS	*DOWN- *HR-TIME- *DAY*HR/MN*
01	OPERATIONAL (MIL)	1000X0860	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000860000*			* 24* : *
01	OPERATIONAL (MIL)	1080X1120	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0002105600*			* 24* : *
01	HANGAR	0400X0280	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000112000*			* 24* : *
01	OPERATIONAL	2000X0530	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0001063000*			* 24* : *
01	OPERATIONAL	1400X0450	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000630000*			* 24* : *
01	OPERATIONAL	1125X0450	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	200	0000506250*			* 24* : *
01	HANGAR	0450X0120	CON	GOOD	ESWL-41362/75-PSI	999	0000054000*			* 24* : *
01	HOLDING (NW)	0675X0250	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000168750*			* 24* : *
01	HOLDING (NW)	0550X0200	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	110000*			* 24* : *
01	HOLDING (SE)	0550X0250	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000137500*			* 24* : *
01	HOLDING (SE)	0500X0225	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000112500*			* 24* : *
01	ALERT	0150X0120	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-32812/245-PSI	999	0000018000*			* 24* : *
01	OPERATIONAL	1350X0490	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000661500*			* 24* : *
01	OPERATIONAL	1350X0440	CON	GOOD	ESWL-95000/185-PSI	999	0000594000*			* 24* : *
01	OPERATIONAL	0540X0290	CON	GOOD	ESWL-41362/75-PSI	999	0000156600*			* 24* : *

TOTAL- 7176700\*\*\*\*\*

REMARKS-FIRST 3 APRONS LOCATED ON THE S SIDE OF THE RUNWAYS, THE NEXT 4 APRONS ARE LOCATED ON THE N SIDE OF THE RUNWAYS. LINE 30326 IS AN EXTENSION TO THE W OF LINE 30302. LINE 30328 LOCATED IN DISPERSAL AREA.

\*\*\*\*\* TOTAL SQ FEET OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 312 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

LIMITED-APRONS	NO.	SQ FT	SURFACE	COND	CAP.
	12	72867	CON	G	C141

\*\*\*\*\* HARDSTANDS \*\*\*\*\*

HARDSTANDS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
02	PAD	0180X0070	CON	GOOD	UNKNOWN	999	000029200
01	PAD	0120X0170	CON	GOOD	UNKNOWN	999	000008400
01	PAD	0110X0040	CON	GOOD	UNKNOWN	999	000000400

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ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

IACAF ASSUM

REVENMENTS NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	(U) COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TGT SO FEET
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PARKING (OTHER) AVAILABLE ON DIRT TO W OF RUNWAY 18/36 FOR LIGHT ACFT. (U)

OBSTRUCTIONS NO	TYPE	AMSL	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	CRG	REMARKS
01	CONTROL TOWER	04000	0110	F	00.3	069	FROM RP TO CONTROL TOWER.
01	TOWER	03900	0100	U	00.6	157	FROM RP TO MASTS.
01	MASTS	04035	0160	U	02.9	256	FROM RP TO MASTS
01	VORTAC	03989	0100	A	00.3	235	FROM RP TO VORTAC.
01	CHIMNEY	03770	0200	N	01.5	122	FROM RP TO CHIMNEY.

LIGHTING (U)  
 RWY 29R IS EQUIPPED WITH HI-INTENSITY WHITE APPROACH LIGHTS WITH A 2723 FT CENTERLINE AND 5 CROSSBARS, FIRST CROSSBAR IS INSET, THE REST FLEATED. LO-INTENSITY RED APPROACH LIGHTS WITH A 1378 FT CENTERLINE AND 1 CROSS BAR. THRESHOLD LIGHTS ARE GREEN AND INSET. RUNWAY EQUIPPED WITH HI-INTENSITY WHITE LIGHTS, 1 FT AGL AND 102 FT FROM RWY CENTERLINE. TAXIWAY LIGHTS AVAILABLE. RWY 29L IS EQUIPPED WITH A DOUBLE ROW OF HI-INTENSITY APPROACH LIGHTS EXTENDING 3067 FT FROM THLD. HI-INTENSITY WHITE RWY LIGHTS WITH 1970 FT OF YELLOW LIGHTS AT EITHER END OF THE RWY. SIX GREEN THRESHOLD LIGHTS AT BOTH ENDS OF THE RWY. AIRFIELD HAS FLOOD, BOUNDARY AND WIND-T LIGHTS. BEACON FLASHING GREEN AND WHITE. VASI AT RUNWAY 29R, APPROACH ANGLE 3 DEGREES. VASI, 3 BARS, AT RWY 29L.

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING HANGARS

NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	(U)	DIMENSIONS	DOOR WID-HT	HEAT
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0350X0325	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0400X0350	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0250X0150	U XU	U
01	DOUBLE BAY	STEEL		0140X0140	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0150X0150	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0150X0125	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0150X0125	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0125X0090	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0115X0100	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0100X0100	U XU	U
02	SINGLE BAY ALERT	STEEL		0110X0060	U XU	E
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0200X0125	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0115X0100	U XU	U
02	SINGLE BAY ALERT	STEEL		0110X0060	U XU	E
04	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0075X0075	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0200X0125	U XU	U
01	DOUBLE BAY	STEEL		0175X0100	U XU	U
02	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0175X0100	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0160X0100	U XU	U
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL		0200X0075	U XU	U

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CNTRY CODE- IR AFID NAME- TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TALAF ASSUW

U	07	F-7	TKRS	016643	04200	U	U
U	02	F-2	TKRS	003700	01200	U	U
U	06	M/D	TKRS	022190	03600	U	U
U	03	M/D	TKRS	008717	01800	U	U

DEFUELLING FACILITIES

PRODUCT	NO.	TYPE	CAP(GPM)
U	U	TANK TRUCK	U

(U)

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS

(S)

ALL FUEL IS DELIVERED TO AIRFIELD BY PIPELINE FROM THE NIOC REFINERY AT REY 12 MILES S OF TEHRAN. FIRST 4 ITEMS OF REFUELLING UNITS ARE OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE IIAF. SECOND 4 ITEMS ARE OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL CO. ALL FUEL STORED AT CIVIL SIDE OF FIELD. MILITARY FUEL STORAGE AREA UNDER CONSTRUCTION. FILL STANDS OPERATED BY NIOC ON CIVIL SIDE. DE-ICE AVAILABLE

OFF BASE STORAGE

(C)

PRODUCT	CONTAINERS AND STORAGE	NO OF TANKS	CAP.EACH	TOTAL CAPACITY
JP-4	TANKS	U	U	U
TA	TANKS	U	U	U
100/130	TANKS	U	U	U
80	TANKS	U	U	U

REMARKS-FUEL RECEIVED AT REY REFINERY VIA 10 INCH PIPELINE FROM AHMAZ. DUE TO THE INCREASE IN JET TRAFFIC, THE RATIO BETWEEN STORAGE OF JET FUELS AND AVGAS WILL CHANGE.

STOCK LEVEL

(I)

PRODUCT	GAL-UN-BASE	GAL-OFF-BASE
JP-4	00200000	00911346
TA	00090000	01125000
100/130	00006605	01125000
80	U	U

REMARKS-STOCK LEVEL KEPT ALMOST FULL.

OIL AND LUBRICANTS

(U)

AFROSHELL 100, 100W, 120, 120W, ESSO 100

THRUST AUGMENTATION

(U)

CITIES 1100-METHANOL MIXTURE. TWO METHMIX DISPENSERS, CAPACITY 276 GAL EACH, RATE OF FLOW 36 GPM.

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT

(U)

RESCUE TENDER EQUIPPED WITH ELECTRIC RESCUE SAW AND RESCUE TOOLS. ONE 8 BERTH, ONE 4 BERTH AND TWO 2 BERTH AMBULANCES.

FIRE EQUIPMENT

(U)

SIX THORNCRAFT (ROLLS ROYCE ENGINEERED) FOAM/DRY POWDER APPLIANCES, 800 GALLONS WATER, 75 GALLONS FOAM AND 150 KG DRY POWDER, OUTPUT 7000 GALLONS FOAM PER MINUTE. THREE MANNED AS WATER TENDERS ONLY.

WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT

(S)

ONE 20 TON QUICK-WAY, TWO M10R WRECKERS, ONE QUICK WAY CRANE WITH BUCKET, ONE 3.5 TON CRANE.

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES

(U)

TWO 10000 LB, ONE 25000 LB, TWO 6000 LB AND ONE 4000 LB FORKLIFTS, TWO T-40 TUGS, TWO 4000 LB DRAWBAR TUG TRACTORS, 20 PALLET DOLLIES, ALSO A VARIETY OF TRUCKS AND HANDTRUCKS. ESTIMATE A RUNWAY SWEEPER, VARIOUS

11-103

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLD NAME- TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUHW

MAINTENANCE HOISTS AND BLMR HAULING EQUIPMENT. FOUR LARGE AND ONE SMALL SNOW BLOWERS, ONE GRADER AND ONE LOADER.

CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT

(S)

MILITARY SIDE HAS ONE 6000 LB FORK LIFT, ONE 6000 LB F-J-F FORK LIFT, TWO T-40 TUGS, ONE 4,000 LB DRAWBAR TUG, ONE 4000 LB MUOFL G-5840 LIFT, ONE 4000 LB WHS DRAWBAR TRACTOR, ONE 4000 LB WHS GAS TUG TRACTOR. THE CIVILIAN SIDE HAS A VARIETY OF TRUCKS, HANDTRUCKS, FORK LIFTS ETC.

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS

(C)

DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS

AIRMEN

NORMAL MAX.

NORMAL MAX.

A

U

A

U

REMARKS-20 OFFICER HOUSING UNITS AND FOUR 100 MAN DORMITORIES, FOUR 200 MAN DORMITORIES, ALL MODERN. SEVEN MULTI-UNIT STRUCTURES UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON S SIDE OF FIELD JUST W OF MAIN GATE.

DEPENDENT UNITS

(S)

THREE GENERALS OFFICERS QUARTERS, 50 NCO HOUSING UNITS

BIVOUAC AREA

(U)

TERRAIN WEST OF AIRFIELD SUITABLE. NO FACILITIES.

OFF BASE FACILITIES

(U)

VANAK HOTEL 70 ROOMS, ARIA SHERATON 200 ROOMS, BOTH OWNED AND OPERATED BY IRAN AIR. INTERCONTINENTAL 400 ROOMS OWNED AND OPERATED BY PAN AM. HILTON 558 ROOMS OWNED AND OPERATED BY TWA. BARRACKS AT GHALE MUKHBI.

MESSING

(S)

OFFICERS

AIRMEN

NORMAL MAX.

NORMAL MAX.

A

U

A

U

REMARKS-RESTAURANT AND QUICK LUNCH AND REFRESHMENT CAFE IN TERMINAL. NCO AND OFFICERS CLUBS. ONE 500 MAN DINING HALL AND SEVERAL OTHERS.

STORAGE

(S)

WAREHOUSE

SHEDS

NO. LEN. WID. T/SQ.FT. NO. LEN. WID. T/SQ.FT.

A U XU U 20 0045X0045 0040500

REMARKS-WAREHOUSING IS LIMITED WITH NO STRUCTURE LARGER THAN 361X95 FT.

MEDICAL FACILITIES

(U)

ADEQUATE MEDICAL FACILITIES INCLUDING INPATIENT CARE, OUTPATIENT CARE, FLIGHT MEDICINE, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, CRASH AMBULANCE W/RADIO, DENTAL CARE AND MEDICAL FACILITIES. AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION AVAILABLE INCLUDING CASUALTY STAGING FACILITIES, INFLIGHT MEALS FOR PATIENTS, PATIENT LOADING RAMPS, PATIENTS GROUND TRANSPORTATION, FLIGHT MEDICINE SUPPORT AND OFF BASE EVACUATION CREW BILLETTS.

SEWAGE DISPOSAL

(U)

ADEQUATE, TYPE UNKNOWN.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL

(U)

ADEQUATE. CARRIED TO DUMP NEXT TO AIRPORT.

RUBBISH DISPOSAL

(U)

ADEQUATE. CARRIED TO DUMP NEXT TO AIRPORT.

WATER SUPPLY

(U)

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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WATER SUPPLIED FROM THE CITY OF TEHRAN SYSTEM. WATER IS TREATED AND CONSIDERED 100 PERCENT POTABLE. ONE WELL ON BASE AND THREE STORAGE TANKS.

## AIRFIELD SECURITY

(S)

CIVILIAN SIDE HAS A LARGE CIVIL POLICE SYSTEM, EMPLOYING ABOUT 50 GUARDS. ON THE MILITARY SIDE ALL AREAS ARE GUARDED SUNRISE TO SUNSET. PERIMETER IS FENCED, WITH A PATROL ROAD INSIDE THE FENCE. WITH PRIOR COORDINATION SECURITY MEASURES WOULD BE INCREASED TO INSURE AIRCRAFT SAFETY. THIS IS THE BEST AIRFIELD FOR 747 (NEACP) AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY. THREAT/SECURITY EVALUATION AS OF 13 APR 1978 IS LOW/RELIABLE.

## ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES

(U)

AVAILABLE IN 41IN TERMINAL, HAJ TERMINAL, BASE HEADQUARTERS AND BASE OPERATIONS. NUMBER AND TYPE OFFICES UNKNOWN.

## MAIL SERVICES

(U)

AIRLINE SERVICE AND BY RAIL. POSTAL ADDRESS, MEHRABAD AIRPORT, TEHRAN, IRAN.

## ELECTRICAL POWER

(S)

SOURCE FROM TEHRAN, 220 VOLT, 50 CYCLE, AC, SINGLE AND DOUBLE PHASE. THERMAL GENERATING PLANT, CAPACITY 15500 KW. ONE 177 SKVA, AC, 220/380 VOLT, 3 PHASE, 50 CYCLE DIESEL ENGINE. TWO 150 KW, AC, 110/220 VOLT, 3 PHASE, 60 CYCLE DIESEL ENGINES. ONE 75 KW, AC, 110/220 VOLT, 3 PHASE, 50 CYCLE DIESEL ENGINE. ONE 35 KW, AC, 110/220 VOLT, 3 PHASE, 50 CYCLE DIESEL ENGINE. TWO 30 KW, AC, 110/220 VOLT, 3 PHASE, 60 CYCLE GAS ENGINES.

## TRANSPORTATION

## ROADS

(U)

ACCESS TO TWO LANE ASPHALT TEHRAN/QAZVIN ROAD ADJACENT TO THE N SIDE OF THE FIELD. TWO LANE ASPHALT ROAD ADJACENT TO SOUTH SIDE.

## RAILROADS

(C)

STANDARD GAUGE, SINGLE TRACK, IRANIAN STATE RAILROAD TO SOUTH OF FIELD. STATION AT TEHRAN 5 MILES E.

## WATER TRANSPORTATION

(C)

NEAREST PORT AT BANDAR SHAHPUR 332 MILES SSW. MAJOR FACILITIES AND KHORRAMSHAHR 355 MILES SSW, MAJOR FACILITIES. BOTH PORTS SERVED BY ROAD AND RAILROAD.

## MILITARY VEHICLES

(U)

TRUCKS AND CARS AVAILABLE. NUMBER UNKNOWN.

## COMMERCIAL VEHICLES

(U)

TAXIS AND BUSES TO TEHRAN AVAILABLE.

## AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL)

(U)

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE.

## WEATHER

## STATION

(U)

HOURLY OBSERVATIONS 0000-2400Z, HALF HOURLY OBSERVATIONS 0330-1730, FORECASTING IN ENGLISH AND PERSIAN, SPECIAL WEATHER REPORTS, FORECASTS FOR LANDING AND TAKEOFF, SIGMET AND TREQ. COLLECTING AND DISSEMINATING CENTER FOR ALL WEATHER DATA.

## CLIMATE

(U)

SUBTROPICAL STEPPE. WINTER IS RELATIVELY COLD AND SUMMER IS Seldom EXCESSIVELY HOT. SEMIARID. PRECIPITATION BELOW 2 INCHES MONTHLY DEC THRU APR, BELOW 1 INCH MAY THRU NOV. FOUR THUNDERSTORM DAYS PER MONTH APR AND MAY AND RARELY OCCUR THE REST OF THE YEAR. CLOUDINESS AT MAXIMUM JAN THRU MAR.

## FLYING CONDITIONS

(U)

VISIBILITIES, GENERALLY GOOD, ARE OCCASIONALLY RESTRICTED IN WINTER AND EARLY SPRING BY SNOW AND FOG. TAKE-

~~SECRET NO FORN DISSEM~~

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INTL

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUTW

OFF AND LANDING CONDITIONS ARE GENERALLY GOOD. AIR ROUTES OVER NEARBY RIDGES ARE OCCASIONALLY UNFAVORABLE.

PRECIPITATION

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	01.8	01.5	01.8	01.4	00.5	00.1
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.1	00.1	00.1	00.3	00.8	01.2
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	045.0	050.0	059.0	071.0	082.0	093.0
MEAN	036.0	041.0	049.0	060.0	070.0	079.5
MIN	027.0	032.0	039.0	049.0	058.0	066.0

(C)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	099.0	097.0	090.0	076.0	063.0	051.0
MEAN	085.5	084.0	077.0	064.5	053.0	042.0
MIN	072.0	071.0	064.0	053.0	043.0	033.0

DEW POINT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	027	026	029	035	040	039	045	043	039	034	034	030

(U)

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MEAN	03779	03799	03819	03829	03839	03849

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	03949	03899	03849	03689	03679	03669

SIGNIFICANCE

(I)

ONE OF THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS IN IRAN. IT IS ALSO CAPABLE OF HANDLING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS OF ALL TYPES OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, HEAVY CARGO AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT UP TO JUMBO TYPE. HOME OF THE FIRST FIGHTER WING AND THE FIRST AIR TRANSPORT WING.


11-106

~~SECRET NO FORN DISSEM~~



~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN WHINTEL

VAHDATI AIRFIELD



II-107

~~SECRET~~

NOFORN WHINTEL

\*\*\*\*\*  
 AIRPLANE AND SEAPLANE STATIONS OF THE WORLD JOB-DATE- 06 OCT 1978 ICAO- 78 FEB ICAO #  
 \* COUNTRY CODE- IR COUNTRY NAME- IRAN AIRFIELD NAME- VAHOATI AE ICAO DESIGNATOR- U140 \*  
 \* RT NUMBER- 0428038018 ALTERNATE AIRFIELD NAME- NONE AIRFIELD STATUS- AC \* \* \* ACTIVE \* \* \*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

GENERAL

SIC RELIA	INFO VAL	WEATHER COND/RWY	AFLD SUP FAC	THE AREA CODE	ASSOTW VOL NO	PAGE NO
A	I			M		16 -
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES		SOURCE OF COORDS	(C)	CAT CODE	MAGNETIC VARIATION	ELEVATION
32 25 54N 048 23 56E	JOGA NI 39-13	72FD 75 SEP	80050	003E	00500	
GRID COORDINATES, GRID SYSTEM, BASE REFERENCE POINT			(C)			
39STR 2554273591317 UTM-INTERNATIONAL						
MIDPOINT OF A LINE CONNECTING THE CENTERS OF THE RUNWAYS.						
GRAPHIC REFERENCE			(U)			
ONE G-5, JOG NI 39-13, UIC EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST FLIP ENROUTE CHARTS L-17A, L-17E, H-17C.						
LOCATION AND LANDMARKS			(C)			
2.75 MILES SE OF ANDIMESHK, 3 MILES N OF DEZFUL, 125 MILES N OF ABADAN, 170 MILES W OF ESPAHAN.						
TERRAIN AND DRAINAGE			(U)			
AIRFIELD RECTANGULAR SHAPED APPROXIMATELY 2.5 SQ MILES IN AREA. TERRAIN IS FLAT WITH SOME ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL DRAINAGE SOUTHWARD TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF. MOUNTAINS RUN W TO E NORTH OF THE BASE THEN TURN S AND RUN N TO S EAST OF THE FIELD. PEAKS 9775 FT 49 MILES N, 9229 FT 80 MILES NW, 13400 FT 71 MILES NE, 14921 FT 85 MILESE, 13190 FT 95 MILES ESE.						
CONTACTING AGENCY(S)			(U)			
IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE (IIAF).						

OPERATIONS

OCCUPANTS AND USERS	(S)
IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER BASE. PRIMARY USER IS AN F-59/E/F FIGHTER WING. C-130 AIRCRAFT ALSO USE THE AIRFIELD FREQUENTLY.	
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY	(U)
TWO FIGHTER WINGS OR ONE BUMBER WING.	
AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS	(U)
NAME	
NONE	
DISTANCE DIR RWY LENGTH SUPP CAPACITY	
SEARCH AND RESCUE	(C)
ABADAN SEARCH AND RESCUE SUB-CENTER 125 MILES S. (NICCI) SHORT RANGE AIRCRAFT. SHORT RANGE SAR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS ON BASE.	
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS FACILITIES	(U)
NONE	
PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION	(U)
UNKNOWN.	
INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL	(U)
ESTIMATE SKILLED AND SEMISKILLED AVAILABLE.	
FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN AREA	(C)
IMPERIAL IRANIAN ARMY GARRISON 9.2 MILES NNW.	

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND COMMUNICATIONS

ENTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- VAHDATI AB

JOY DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSIWH

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

TOWER, TACAN, NOB, APP CON, UHF/VHF/DF, A/G RADIO UHF/VHF. RADAR-FAA ASR-7 RNG 60 MILES, FAA PAR-2 RNG 10 MILES.

POINT TO POINT COMMUNICATIONS

TELEPHONE 400 LINES EXPANDABLE TO 800 LINES. TELETYPE, 7 TT-100 SIEMENS, 5 AN/FGC-52X AND 2 AN/FGC-67X, EXPANDABLE TO 12 CHANNELS, ENGLISH AND FARSI SPOKEN. ADA FIELD TELEPHONE. PRC-660, FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER, IR-LDK.

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY(S)

US CONSULATE AT KHORRAMSHAHR 118 MILES S. SSB RADIO.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITIES

015 ARR PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
020 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WITH NO APR  
015 DEP PER HR MAX IN IFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
030 ARR PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH PRIORITY OVER DEP  
040 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WITH NO ARR  
030 DEP PER HR MAX IN VFR WHEN MAX ARR ALSO OCCUR  
REMARKS-RATES ARE ESTIMATED

AIRFIELD DESCRIPTION

RUNWAYS

DIMENSIONS	MAG/BRG	SFC COND	CAPACITY	R/LTS	RWY	J/B	A/G	ELEV	OVERRUN	APCL	GRAD	AL
11732X00149	138/318	ASP GOOD	ESWL-57317/185-PSI	A	14L	A	U	U	ASP 1200	50=1	U	A
09664X00115	138/318	ASP GOOD	ESWL-57317/185-PSI	A	32R	A	U	U	ASP 1160	50=1	U	A
					32L	N	N	U	ASP 1180	50=1	U	U
									ASP 3000	50=1	U	U

REMARKS-RWYS EXTENSIBLE AT LEAST 3500 FT. BOTH RWYS HAVE 25 FT ASPHALT SHOULDERS. CAPACITY DERIVED FROM THE REPORTED LCN OF 75. RWY 14R/32L IS PRIMARILY A PARALLEL TWY WHICH WAS WIDENED AND IS USED AS AN ALTERNATE RWY. ITS OVERALL LENGTH IS 12640 FT BUT THE FIRST 2976 FT ON THE NW END ADJACENT TO THE APRON IS NOT USED AS RWY. BARRIERS FOR RWY 14R, 14L AND 32R LOCATED 200 FT IN THE OVERRUNS.

TAXIWAYS

NO	TYPE	WID	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	LTS
05	LINK	081	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-57317/185-PSI	A
10	LINK	065	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	U
01	LINK (ALERT)	081	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	U
01	LINK	065	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	U
01	LINK	065	CON	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	U

REMARKS-ITEM 1 CONNECT RUNWAYS, ITEM 2 TO REVETMENTS, ITEM 3 TO ALERT APRON, ITEM 4 TO HANGARITES, ITEM 5 TO GUN TEST HARDSTAND.

APRONS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY TOT SQ FT	*SIMIL	*EST	*ARRIVALS	*DAY	*HR	*MIN
01	OPERATIONAL	2940X0720	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-57317/185-PSI	959	0002116800*				24*	:
03	ASSEMBLY	0555X0245	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-57317/185-PSI	999	0000407925*				24*	:

11-109

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- VAHDATI AB

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1974

TACAF ASSUM

01 ASSEMBLY	0400X0180	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-573177185-PSI	999	000007200*	*	* 24*	:	*
01 ALERT	0418X0325	ASP	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	500	0000135450*	*	* 24*	:	*
					TOTAL-	2732575*	*****			

\*\*\*\*\* TOTAL SQ FEET OF LIMITED AND EXPANDED 112 FILES DO NOT AGREE \*\*\*\*\*

LIMITED-APRONS	NO.	SQ FT	SURFACE	COND	CAP.
	06	27325	ASP	G	CI41

\*\*\*\*\*

HARDSTANDS

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
01	GUN TEST	0119 DIAM	CCN	GOOD	ESWL-27266/225-PSI	999	0000011122

NO	TYPE	DIMENSIONS	SURF	COND	CAPACITY	ENTRY	TOT SQ FEET
01							

PARKING (OTHER)

ADDITIONAL PARKING ON COMPACTED DIRT IMMEDIATELY OFF THE RUNWAY AND PARKING APRONS. THIS DIRT HAS 100 PER-CENT DENSITY AND IS REPORTED CAPABLE OF HANDLING P-52 AIRCRAFT WHEN DRY.

OBSTRUCTIONS

NO	TYPE	AMS	AGL	LIGHT	DIST	ARG	REMARKS
01	WATER TOWER	00637	0135	A	00.6	225	FROM RP TO WATER TOWER.
01	WATER TOWER	00625	0135	F	01.4	252	FROM RP TO WATER TOWER.

LIGHTING

AIRFIELD IS EQUIPPED WITH APPROACH, RUNWAY, THRESHOLD AND TAXIWAY LIGHTS. RUNWAY LIGHTING AVAILABLE ON PRIOR NOTICE. FLARES ARE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY. BEACON FLASHING GREEN AND WHITE.

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

HANGARS

NO	TYPE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS	DOOR	WID-HI	HEAT
02	SINGLE BAY	BRICK AND STEEL	0208X0151	U	XU	J
01	SINGLE BAY	BRICK AND STEEL	0120X0165	U	XU	J
06	SINGLE BAY	SHEET METAL	0080X0070	U	XU	J
01	SINGLE BAY	STEEL	0090X0080	U	XU	E
10	SINGLE BAY	STEEL AND CONCRETE	0120X0060	U	XU	E
05	FOUR BAY	CONCRETE	0075X0245	U	XU	E

REMARKS-ALERT CREW FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN SMALL BUILDING NEXT TO 4 ALERT HANGARETTES ON ALERT APRON. HANGARETTES WILL ACCOMMODATE 32 AIRCRAFT. CONSTRUCTION OF 5 TWO ACFT HANGARETTES PLANNED.

MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND FACILITIES

ARMAMENT AND ELECTRONICS SHOPS, PARACHUTE SHOP, ORGANIZATIONAL GENERAL PURPOSE SHOP, ENGINE INSPECTION AND REPAIR SHOP, AIR OPERATED GEAR LUBRICATION UNIT, BATTERY SHOP, ENGINE INSTALLATION COMPUND AND JET ENGINE TEST STAND, VEHICLE MOTOR MAINTENANCE SHOP WITH AIR OPERATED CHASSIS LUBRICATION UNIT. FACILITIES FOR FIELD LEVEL MAINTENANCE ON F-5 AIRCRAFT.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE

(U)

11-110

AIR CONDITIONED WORKSHOP AVAILABLE.

OXYGEN

(2)  
LGX PLANT WITH GENERATING CAPACITY OF 4-5 GAL PER HOUR, 500 GAL STORAGE CAPACITY. THREE 501 GAL STORAGE TANKS PROPOSED. LOW PRESSURE GENERATING FACILITIES.

AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS

(U)  
MD-3, MA-1, MC-1A, M32A-60A UNITS AVAILABLE. ESTIMATE 10 OR MORE OF EACH TYPE OF UNIT.

GROUND POWER UNITS

(U)  
AVAILABLE, TYPES UNKNOWN.

PROPANE STORAGE

(C)  
TWO REVERTED STORAGE BUILDINGS, 15 MOUND CONCRETE TIGLO'S EACH 70X27X13 FT, 12 STORAGE MAGAZINES, FUSE STORAGE 10 CELL, 1 HOCKET STORAGE.

FUEL-AIRFIELD STORAGE

(C)  
PRODUCT CONTAINERS AND STORAGE NO OF TANKS CAP EACH TOT CAP FILL STANDS  
JP4 SEMI-BURIED 003 2113800 06340800 NU CP1 RESUPPLY METHOD/RECIPT  
100/130 UNKNOWN U II A U U U TRUCK  
FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM (U) TRUCK

FUEL-HYDRANT SYSTEM

(U)  
STORAGE CAP. OUT- HOSE CARTS NOZZLES  
PRODUCT CAPACITY NO. (GPM) LETS NO. TYPE NO. TYPE  
N

REFUELLING UNITS

(C)  
PRODUCT NO. TYPE CAP. DISP NOZZLES  
JP4 04 TRUCK 040000 U U U  
JP4 08 TRUCK 028000 U U U

DEFUELLING FACILITIES

(U)  
PRODUCT NO. TYPE CAP(GPM)  
U U TRUCKS U

AIRFIELD STORAGE AND REFUELLING REMARKS

(C)  
THREE 792,600 GALLON TANKS AVAILABLE BUT UNUSED. REFUELLING BY TRUCK. DETAILS ON AVGAS STORAGE UNKNOWN.

OFF BASE STORAGE

(C)  
PRODUCT CONTAINERS AND STORAGE NO OF TANKS CAP.EACH TOTAL CAPACITY  
JP-4 A U U 99999999  
100/130 A U U 99999999

REMARKS-DISTANCE TO OFF-BASE STORAGE IS 84 MILES. RESUPPLY TIME IS 24 HOURS. OFF-BASE RESERVES ARE LIMITED ONLY BY DISTANCE TO BASE AND TRUCK AVAILABILITY.

STOCK LEVEL

(C)  
PRODUCT GAL-ON-BASE GAL-OFF-BASE  
JP4 A 99999999  
100/130 II 99999999

REMARKS-A 10 DAY RESERVE IS MAINTAINED ON BASE. OFF-BASE RESERVES ARE UNLIMITED.

OIL AND LUBRICANTS

(U)  
ALL TYPES AVAIL. JET OIL AND LUBRICATION.

THRUST AUGMENTATION

(U)

11-111

CNTRY CODE- IR 000 NAME- VAHDATI AB

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSCWM

NAME

SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

CRASH EQUIPMENT (U)  
 AVAILABLE, TYPES UNKNOWN.

FIRE EQUIPMENT (C)  
 ONE 15 TYPE FIRE TRUCK AND FOUR 750 GALLON (TENNANT) TRUCKS.

WRECKAGE REMOVAL EQUIPMENT (C)  
 ONE CRANE, 10 TON CAPACITY.

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (C)  
 TWO AIR SERVICE TRAILERS, ONE BOMB SERVICE TRUCK, ROAD AND RUNWAY SWEEPER, SELF PROPELLED.

CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT (C)  
 ONE 5 TON CARGO TRAILER, ONE LOW BED CARGO TRAILER, 6 THREE TON 4X4 CARGO TRUCKS, 5 TWO AND ONE HALF TON 6X6 TRUCKS, TWO 5 TON 4X4 TRACTOR TRUCKS, TWO 3500 LB FORKLIFT TRUCKS, TWO 4000-5000 LB WAREHOUSE TRACTORS.

BASE SERVICES

PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS (S)  
 DORMITORY AREA

OFFICERS		AIRMEN	
NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
0010	U	01100	U

DEPENDENT QUARTERS (S)  
 FIVE FAMILY TYPE HOUSING UNITS EQUIPPED WITH WATER AND ELECTRICITY.

RECREATION AREA (U)  
 AREA OF THE AIRFIELD IS SUITABLE. NO FACILITIES.

OFF BASE FACILITIES (U)  
 ESTABLISHED HOTELS AVAILABLE IN DEZFUL.

MESSING (C)

OFFICERS		AIRMEN	
NORMAL	MAX.	NORMAL	MAX.
A	U	A	U

REMARKS- ONE 1000 MAN KITCHEN AND MESS, ONE 500 MAN KITCHEN AND MESS, ONE 200 MAN OFFICERS MESS AND 1 NCU CATERING

STORAGE

WAREHOUSE			SHEDS		
NO.	LEN. WID.	T/SQ.FT.	NO.	LEN. WID.	T/SQ.FT.
08	0255X0070	0142800	01	0130X0100	0013000

MEDICAL FACILITIES

FIVE BED HOSPITAL STEEL FRAME AND BRICK CONSTRUCTION, 9 WARDS, HAS THE LATEST SURGICAL EQUIPMENT AND MODERN DENTISTS OFFICE. UTILITIES ARE CENTRAL HEAT, ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONE, WATER, MESS HALL AND KITCHEN. MAX BEDS 100. PAY AVAILABLE. FIVE DOCTORS, 1 DENTIST, 10 NURSES AND 4 AMBULANCES AVAILABLE.

SEWAGE DISPOSAL

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT ON AIRFIELD.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL

AVAILABLE

11-112

~~SECRET~~

RUBBISH DISPOSAL (U)  
AVAILABLE

WATER SUPPLY (C)  
FROM WELLS ON AIRFIELD. TANK STORAGE AND TREATMENT SYSTEM.

AIRFIELD SECURITY (C)  
TWO GATE HOUSES AND SECURITY FENCE. AIR POLICE AND GUARD SERVICE AVAILABLE. THE THREAT/SECURITY EVALUATION RATING OF 20 MAR 78 IS LOW/RELIABLE.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES (U)  
HEADQUARTERS BUILDING CONSTRUCTED OF BRICK, 17010 SQ FT. UTILITIES INCLUDE WATER, ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONE AND RADIO. THREE SQUADRON OPERATIONS BUILDINGS TOTAL SQ FT 11025 AND OPERATIONS BUILDING WITH TOWER.

MAIL SERVICES (U)  
AVAILABLE

ELECTRICAL POWER (U)  
MAIN POWER FROM OUTSIDE SOURCE AT DEZ DAN 11000 VOLTS. THERMUELECTRIC TYPE POWER PLANT USED IN EMERGENCY HAS AN AVERAGE OUTPUT OF 500 KW AND MAX OUTPUT OF 950 KWS BETWEEN 1700-2100 HOURS. TRANSMISSION SYSTEM BOTH OVERHEAD AND UNDERGROUND. ENGINES ARE GERMAN MAKE 500 HORSEPOWER, 500 RPM. GENERATORS ARE GERMAN CONZ, KVA-375, 120 VOLT, 60 AMP, 3 PHASE, 50 CYCLE.

TRANSPORTATION

ROADS (U)  
ANDIMESHK/AHAZ ROAD IN FAIR CONDITION. ASPHALT ON CRUSHED ROCK BASE, 24 FT WIDE. HAS 3 FT DIRT SHOULDERS. GOOD DRAINAGE, NO LIGHTING.

RAILROADS (C)  
STATION AND RR REPAIR SHOP WITH ROUNHOUSE AT ANDIMESHK 2 MILES NW. IT SERVICES THE TRANS-IRANIAN RR. SPUR TO AIRFIELD POL, WAREHOUSE AND AMMO STORAGE AREAS.

WATER TRANSPORTATION (C)  
NEAREST PORT AT KHORRAMSHAHR 122 MILES S. MAJOR FACILITIES, 7 WHARVES. SERVED BY ROAD.

MILITARY VEHICLES (U)  
AVAILABLE

COMMERCIAL VEHICLES (U)  
PRIVATELY OWNED TAXIS AND A FEW PRIVATE BUSES RUN BETWEEN DEZFUL AND ANDIMESHK TO THE AIR BASE.

AIR TRANSPORTATION (MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL) (U)  
NO SCHEDULED CIVIL OR MILITARY.

WEATHER

STATION (U)  
HOURLY AND SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS 0000-2400Z. METAR AND SPECIAL REPORTS. OPEN 24 HOURS.

CLIMATE (U)  
DRY SUMMER SUBTROPICAL. SUMMER IS SOMETIMES EXCESSIVELY HOT WITH MAX TEMPERATURES OVER 110 AND EXTREMES OVER 120; WINTER IS MODERATELY COLD SELDOM BELOW FREEZING. ARID JUN THRU SEP; MODERATE PRECIPITATION NOV THRU FEB AND LIGHT THE REST OF THE YEAR. THUNDERSTORMS ARE RARE OCCURRING MOSTLY IN THE SPRING.

FLYING CONDITIONS (U)  
VISIBILITIES, GENERALLY GOOD, ARE MORE FREQUENTLY RESTRICTED JUN THRU SEP. DUST IS THE CHIEF RESTRICTION IN ALL SEASONS. JET STREAMS OVER THE AREA FROM LATE NOV TO APRIL.

PRECIPITATION (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CNTRY CODE- IR AFLO NAME- VAHDATI AB

JOB DATE- 06 OCT 1978

TACAF ASSUTW

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX U	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	01.7	00.5	00.5	00.1	00.7	00.0
MIN U	U	U	U	U	U	U

TEMPERATURE

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX U	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.1	00.7	01.3
MIN U	U	U	U	U	U	U

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	064.0	069.0	077.0	090.0	102.0	110.0
MEAN	054.0	057.0	065.5	076.0	087.5	094.5
MIN	044.0	046.0	054.0	062.0	073.0	079.0

DEW POINT

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	112.0	113.0	109.0	098.0	081.0	057.0
MEAN	096.5	096.5	091.0	080.5	068.0	057.0
MIN	081.0	080.0	073.0	063.0	055.0	047.0

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	045	045	048	053	056	057	062	060	057	055	054	049

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

(U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MEAN	00300	00320	00420	00640	00600	00750

SIGNIFICANCE

(U)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	00825	00850	00650	00510	00375	00350

MAJOR IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE BASE. AIRFIELD HAS COMPLETE SUPPORT FACILITIES AND IS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING FIGHTER/MEDIUM BOMBER OPERATIONS.

11-114

~~SECRET~~



# I-146

Downgraded to SECRET  
per authority of  
DDO (NMCC)  
11/21/90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENCE FACTOR OF  
THE ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE  
TOTAL OPERATIONAL

(5)

6 NOV - HOSTAGES TAKEN INSTRUCTED TO DEVELOP PLAN									
12 NOV - JTF FORMED PER VERBAL ORDER CJCS									
19 NOV - HELICOPTER OPTION BEGINS 20 NOV - HELICOPTER DEPLOYMENT DIRECTED 4 - PSC 1s AVAILABLE FOR MISSION									
28 NOV - HELOS ARRIVE ABOARD CARRIER									
3 DEC - FIRST EXERCISE (YPGI)									
7 DEC - FIRST AIRLAND REFUEL HELOS									
10 DEC - FT 25 UHF SATELLITE CAPABILITY									
11 DEC - SUCCESSFUL DROP OF BLIVETS									
15 DEC - AIR ROUTE ANALYSIS									
17 DEC - 1st REHEARSAL AIRLAND REFUEL HELOS FROM MC 130									
[REDACTED]									
[REDACTED]									
11 JAN - SUCCESSFUL DROP 33 BLIVETS									
15 JAN - 2nd REHEARSAL (NEVI)									
15-19 JAN - NAME MANZARIYEH SCENARIOS PROVEN (RANGERS)									
20-24 JAN - JTF STAFF VISITS CARRIER									
25 JAN - HELICOPTERS ABOARD NIMITZ									
28 JAN - DEVELOPED MC 130 PERSON REFUEL SYS									
4 FEB - 3rd REHEARSAL (NEVI)									
15-16 FEB - SUCCESSFUL AIRBORNE TACCAZ TEST									
17 FEB - ACQUISITION OF IN-COUNTRY ASSETS									

A

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EFFICIENCY FACTOR (SCALE 1 TO 10)  
NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION  
(TOTAL JTF SUPPORT)

	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY
10				
9				
8				
7				
6				
5				
4				


DECEMBER

JANUARY

FEBRUARY

MARCH

APRIL



SECRET

~~SECRET~~

KEY INFORMATION FACTORS

~~TOP SECRET~~ ( # 147 )

1 FEB 1981

KEY FACTORS

	4-7 NOV	19 DEC	24 JAN	1 FEB
AIR ROUTE PLANNING	20%	80%	90%	90%
REFUEL POINT	0	65%	75%	80%
TRANSFER POINT	0	30%	60%	85%
TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT	0	60%	80%	80%
COMPOUND EXTERNAL SECURITY	10%	60%	65%	80%
COMPOUND INTERNAL SECURITY	10%	60%	70%	70%
[REDACTED]	10%	60%	70%	80%
REACTION FORCES (IRREGULAR)	10%	70%	80%	80%
REACTION FORCES (REGULAR)	10%	80%	90%	90%

CRITICAL EEI

reaction if US aircraft are detected over [REDACTED]

Current security and emergency warning procedures.

Security of the helicopter hide.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 COMPLETED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 BEEL FOR DOWNING TO Secret  
 BEYON ON OADR  
 RECEIVED FROM Multiple Sources  
DIA, JS

Classified By: JCS  
 Declassified ON: OADR


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
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~~TOP SECRET~~





14 Jan 01 Feb



4-7

10

20

30

40

50

60

AIR DELIVE

REFUEL

TRANS

ENGINE

EX CHAS SEC

IN REG REAR

REG REAR

REG REAR

REG REAR

~~TOP SECRET~~


11

1

1/2

1/2

11



# ~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPLOYMENT  
DECISION

DEPLOYMENT  
EXECUTE  
DECISION

(S)

E

ALERT  
AC-130s

3 PAC  
MC-130s TO  
CONUS VIA  
HICKAM

2 AC-130s  
CLOSE

ALERT  
PAC  
MC-130s

2 AC-130s

2AC-130s

2 TAC  
MC-130s  
HURLBURT  
TO

2 TAC  
MC-130s  
CLOSE

2 KC-135s  
CLOSE

2AC-130s  
CLOSE

3 PAC  
MC-130  
HURLBURT  
TO

HELO  
PILOTS TO

						D(-) 5	D(-) 4	D(-)
JAN	30	31	FEB 1	2	3	4	5	

Classified by: 55 DDONMC  
Declassified on: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

1 TAC  
1 PAC MC-130

3 PAC  
MC-130

1 PAC  
1 TAC  
MC-130  
CLOSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JTF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E

DEPLOYMENT  
EXECUTE  
DECISION

DECISION  
TO  
EXECUTE

2AC-130s  
CLOSE

2KC-135s  
CLOSE

3 PAC  
MC-130s  
HURLBURT  
TO

3 PAC  
MC-130s  
CLOSE

HELO  
PILOTS TO

HELO  
PILOTS  
ABOARD  
CV

5 KC-135s  
CLOSE

HELOS  
LAUNCH

HOLD  
AREA

HELO  
REFUEL

HELOS TO  
CMPD

EXTRACTION

LAST ACFT OUT  
OF IRAN

D(-) 5

D(-) 4

D(-) 3

D(-) 2

D(-) 1  
INSERTION

D-DAY  
ASSAULT

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

JTF  
CLOSE

DELTA  
CLOSE

TANKERS  
CLOSE

▲ RDV

▲ TO CMPD

RECOVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN / JUL / JI / FEB / I / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5

~~(C)~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 TAC  
1 PAC MC-130  
HURLBURT  
TO

3 PAC  
MC-130s  
CLOSE  
HURLBURT

1 PAC  
1 TAC  
MC-130  
CLOSE

E



2 TAC  
MC-130s  
CLOSE

2 TAC  
MC-130s  
CLOSE

JTF  
CLOSE

D-DAY "H" - HOUR

FEB 2200 Z  
1700 EST  
0130 L (IRAN)

RANGERS  
LAUNCH  
TO

DELTA  
LAUNCH  
TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 / 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TANKERS  
CLOSE

▲ RDV

▲  
TO CMPD

RECOVER

JTF  
CLOSE

DELTA  
CLOSE

▲  
SAFEHAVEN

2 TAC  
MC-130s

2 TAC  
MC-130s  
CLOSE

3  
AC-130'S  
LAUNCH

RANGERS  
CLOSE

ALERT  
INTELL  
TO MOVEMENT  
SUPPORT PREPOSITIONING

LAUNCH  
MC-130  
RANGERS  
DELTA

5  
MC-130'S  
LAUNCH TO  
MANZARIYEH

E

RANGERS  
LAUNCH  
TO

DELTA  
LAUNCH  
TO

Z  
EST  
L (IRAN)

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPLOYMENT /// AIRLAND UP

12

-11

-10

-9

-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

*fet*

MC-130

D.P.

NORTON EGLIN  
1630 2400  
1 MC-130

EGLIN  
0700  
EGLIN  
0300

0700 1600 3 1 MC-130  
0200  
1800 7 MC-130 18  
EGLIN 0300 1 MC-130  
0900 1610  
EGLIN 0300  
1610  
2 MC-130

1200  
A/R  
0320  
3 MC-130

1 MC-130

D.P.

AC-130

D.P.

EGLIN  
1300 4

*E*

D.P.

KC-135

3 KC-135  
1200

4 KC-135

2 KC-135  
DEPART

Classified by: ~~DDO NMCC~~  
Declassified on: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

0700  
GRISSOM  
A

EC-130

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


D.P.

EGLIN  
0600/0700 1 AR

0700 1600 2100



(INSERTION) (ASSAULT)



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MEDEVAC

15  
IT



(e)

UNCLASSIFIED  
0600 1400  
2 KC-135

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EGLIN  
0600/0700 1AR

[REDACTED]  
0700 1600 2100

0400 1300  
3 EC-130

D.P.

MEDEVAC

[REDACTED]  
0400-1500  
LAND  
0140-0900

D.P.

1445 POPE 1200 PAX D  
1147

DELTA

SARM 1041-01 / 1045-01  
1065-03 → 1066-01 B/W  
6227 -1515

D.P.

E

POPE 1500  
1065-03 0900 PAX D  
0826

[REDACTED]  
1107-01  
1107-02

P.

ANDREWS

POPE 1215 0600 PAX D  
0547

0745

0030 JTF D.P.

D.P.

POPE 1445

1200 MEDICAL

D.P.

1100 0900 PAX R

D.P.

0800 0600 PAX R

1635 1067-05 EGLIN 1500 AC/MC-130 MX PAX 81

1445 EGLIN 1700

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~~(e)~~

GHISSUM

**EC-130**

D.P.

EGLIN  
0600/0700 1AR  
△

0700 1600 2100

**C-141**

**E**

D.P.

1445 POPE<sup>068</sup><sub>23</sub> 1200 PI  
△ 1147

D.P.

POPE 1500  
△ 0900 PAX D  
0824

D.P.

POPE 1215  
△ 0600 PAX D  
0547

D.P.

ANDREWS

0745  
△

0030  
JTF  
D.P.

**AIRLIFT**

D.P.

D.P.

D.P.

D.P.

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1635  
1057-05 △ EGLIN 1500

AC/MC-130 MX PAX 81

1445  
△ FGI IN

EMERGENCY = (ZULU) + 4:30

EMPLOYMENT////AIRLA

# 1st NIGHT

ZULU	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200
1405 △			LAND	1810 △	REFUEL SITE	1924 △	T/O	
1510 △					REFUEL SITE 1910 1925 LAND			
T/O								
1517 △					1917 △	REFUEL SITE	2020 △	T/O
1511 △					LAND 1920 △	REFUEL SITE	T/O 2022 △	
1518 △					LAND 1923 △	REFUEL SITE	2024 △	
1519 △					LAND 1930 △	REFUEL SITE	2026 △	T/O
T/O 1506 △					LAND 1930 △	REFUEL SITE	T/O 2010 △	LAND DROPO 2220 △

4 MC-130  
3/3

3 EC-130  
3/3

HELOS  
CARRIER T/O

7/7 KC-135

Classified by: [redacted] NMCL  
Declassified by: OADR  
Downgraded by: NMCL  
DDO 12 Aug 72

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# EMPLOYMENT////AIRLAND OPTION

*fx*

~~TOP SECRET~~

0	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	060
L SITE 1924 △ T/O					2325 △	[REDACTED]						
REFUEL SITE 1910 1925 △ △					2326 △	[REDACTED]						
LAND 1917 △	REFUEL SITE 2020 △	T/O				0026 △	[REDACTED]					
LAND 1920 △	REFUEL SITE 2022 △					0027 △	[REDACTED]					
LAND 1923 △	REFUEL SITE 2024 △					0028 △	[REDACTED]					
LAND 1930 △	REFUEL SITE 2028 △	T/O				0029 △	[REDACTED]					
LAND 1930 △	REFUEL SITE 2010 △											
				LAND DROPOFF 2220 △	T/O 2250 △	LAND HIDEOUT 2315 △						
				H/O		L/O						

*E*

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3/3

(c)

# 2nd NIGHT

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MC-130

T/O 1453

PRE ARCT  
1719

LAND OBJ M  
2045/46

OBJ M  
2215/17

POST ARCT  
0100

3/3

3 AC-130

T/O 1420

PRE ARCT  
1730 1755

2040

POST /  
012

3/3

2 C-141

T/O 1811

LND OBJ M  
2056

T/O OBJ M  
2210

2/2

KC-135

T/O 1533

PRE ARCT  
1719

LAND  
2031

T/O 2240

POST ARCT  
0100

2/2

10 KC-135

T/O 1530

PRE ARCT  
1730 1755

LAND  
2155

T/O 2259

POST ARC  
0120

3/3

3/3

2/2

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~~(S)~~

LAND OBJ M  
2045/46  
▲

OBJ M  
2215/17  
▲

POST ARCT  
0100  
▲

LAND  
0425/27  
▲

2040  
▲

POST ARCT  
0120  
▲

LAND  
0450  
▲

E

LAND OBJ M  
2056  
▲

T/O OBJ M  
2210  
▲

LAND  
0320  
▲

LAND  
2031  
▲

T/O  
2240  
▲

POST ARCT  
0100  
▲

LAND  
0510  
▲

LAND  
2155  
▲

T/O  
2259  
▲

POST ARCT  
0120  
▲

0554  
▲

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

LAND

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



# COMMAND

## NIGHT 1

① STAGING

② ENROUTE

I-152



Classified by: ~~JES~~ DDON mcc  
Declassified on: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

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

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# CONTROL

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
③ DESERT LAND

④ HIDE



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② EXTRACTION  
- MANZARIYEH



A

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
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Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

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# NIGHT 2

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① EXTRACTION  
- ENROUTE



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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TIPS A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK	
218	1700 -10	C-141	[REDACTED]			19/0915	19/1014	E-3A SUPPORT			[REDACTED]	
			[REDACTED]	19/1200	19/1320	19/1415	19/1504					INBOUND
			[REDACTED]	19/2000	19/2315							
219	1100 -0Y	C-130	[REDACTED]			19/0615	19/0642	MISC GENERAL CARGO				
			[REDACTED]	19/1300	19/1404	20/0630	20/0639					
			[REDACTED]	20/1500	20/1450							
220	1700 -08	C-141	[REDACTED]			19/2115	19/2136	E-3A SUPPORT				
			[REDACTED]	20/0057	20/0032	20/0200	20/0212					
			[REDACTED]	20/0750								
221	1700 -09	C-141	[REDACTED]			21/0615		M2-15 GENERATOR, WALK-IN REFR				
			[REDACTED]	21/1200	21/1415							
			[REDACTED]	21/2000								

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 Declassified ON: OADR  
 Downgraded by: DDO NMC

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX		REMARKS
214	1780-90	C-141	[REDACTED]			14/0415	14/0414	MISC GENERAL CARGO				
			[REDACTED]	14/0900	14/0850	14/1115	14/1038					
			[REDACTED]	14/1200		14/1330						
			[REDACTED]	14/1900	14/1745							
215	1700-06	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/0615	17/0624	MISC GENERAL CARGO	13			
			[REDACTED]	17/1100	17/1108	17/1315	17/1305					
			[REDACTED]	17/1930								
216	1700-01	C-141	[REDACTED]			18/0615	18/0640	E-3A SUPPORT				
			[REDACTED]	18/0900	18/0928	18/1115	18/1218					
			[REDACTED]	18/1500	18/1536							
217	1700-07	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/2200	17/2343	E-3A SUPPORT				
			[REDACTED]	18/2100	18/2131	18/2315	18/2305					
			[REDACTED]	19/0300	19/0218							

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14

E

LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
211	1780-76	C-141	[REDACTED]			10/0230	10/0222	Misc GEN'L CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	10/0700	10/0707	10/0915	10/0920	REPAIRS, REPAIR E-3 EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]								
			[REDACTED]	10/1815	10/1835						
212	1780-71	C-141	[REDACTED]			11/0815	11/0805		53		PERSONNEL
			[REDACTED]	11/1100	11/1040	11/1315	11/1315				ROTATION
			[REDACTED]	11/1600	11/1600						(E-3A SUPPORT)
213	1780-83	C-130	[REDACTED]			12/0615	12/0611	THREE WALK-IN REPAIRS (SWAP-OUT)			
			[REDACTED]								
			[REDACTED]	12/1600	12/1645	13/0830	13/0822				
			[REDACTED]								
			[REDACTED]	13/1930	13/2140						

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LOAD NR	MAC NSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
F 208	1780 75	C-141	[REDACTED]			8/0715	8/0727	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	8/1200	8/1206	8/1415	8/1400	RETROGRADE E-3A EQUIPMENT &			
			[REDACTED]	8/1800		8/2015		PERSONNEL			
			[REDACTED]	8/2130	8/2250						
E 209	1780 74	C-141	[REDACTED]			9/0415	9/0416	MISC GEN'L CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	9/0900	9/0905	9/1115	9/1200	RETROGRADE E-3A EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	9/1930	9/2115						
210	1780 -15	C-141	[REDACTED]			9/0815	9/0819	MISC GEN'L CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	9/1300	9/1257	9/1515	9/1538	RETROGRADE E-3 EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	9/2330	10/0005						
211											

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FLOW PLAN

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE AIL	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
204	1780 57	C-141	[REDACTED]			4/ 0615	4/ 0621	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	4/ 1100	4/ 1057	4/ 1315	4/ 1405				
			[REDACTED]	4/ 1900	4/ 2000						
205	1780 66	C-141	[REDACTED]			5/ 0615	5/ 1022	RATIONS, BX SUPPLIES, GENERAL			
			[REDACTED]	5/ 1400	5/ 1514	5/ 1315	5/ 1903	CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	5/ 1900	6/ 0045						
206	1102 01	C-141	[REDACTED]			—	6/ 0623	RETURN OF REMAINS			
			ZURICH	—	6/ 0704	—	6/ 1352				
			DOVER	6/ 2244	6/ 2337						
207	1780 72	C-141	[REDACTED]			7/ 0615	7/ 0642	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO,			
			[REDACTED]	7/ 1100	7/ 1116	7/ 1315	7/ 1415	E-3A SUPPORT (RETROGRADE)			
			[REDACTED]	7/ 1545	7/ 1645	7/ 1800	7/ 2030				
			[REDACTED]	7/ 2015	7/ 2230						

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FLOW PLAN

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LOAD NR	MAK MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
200	1780 53	C-141	[REDACTED]			30/ 0815	30/ 1007	RETROGRADE ALCE			
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1300	30/ 1445	30/ 1515	30/ 1632				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 2100	30/ 2245	1/ 1230	1/ 1228				
			CHARLESTON	1/ 2145	1/ 2153						
201	1780 55	C-141	[REDACTED]			3/ 0815	3/ 0825	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	3/ 1000	3/ 1012	3/ 1215	3/ 1258				
			[REDACTED]	3/ 1800	3/ 1900						
202	1780 56	C-141	[REDACTED]			3/ 0915	3/ 0911	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	3/ 1400	3/ 1345	3/ 1615	3/ 1603				
			[REDACTED]	3/ 2200	3/ 2150						
203	1780 41	C-130	[REDACTED]			3/ 0615	3/ 0614	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	3/ 1300	3/ 1321	4/ 0630	4/ 0626				
			[REDACTED]	4/ 1330	4/ 1428						

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FLOW PLAN

LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
197	1780 50	C-141	[REDACTED]			29/ 0915	29/ 0931	RETROGRADE AC/EC/MC-130			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1400	29/ 1356	29/ 1615	29/ 1624	EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 2210	29/ 2245	30/ 0045	30/ 0246				
			McGUIRE	30/ 0930	30/ 1130	30/ 1145	30/ 1345				
			HURLEY	30/ 1430	30/ 1550	30/ 1645	30/ 1810				
			McGUIRE	30/ 1900	30/ 2005						
198	1780 51	C-141	[REDACTED]			30/ 0115	30/ 0119				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 0600	30/ 0655	30/ 0815	30/ 0800				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1400	30/ 1400	30/ 1630	30/ 1900				
			MILDENHALL	30/ 1730	30/ 2015						
199	1780 52	C-141	[REDACTED]			30/ 0515	30/ 0521				
			[REDACTED]	—	30/ 0940	—	30/ 1010				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1000	30/ 1049	30/ 1215	30/ 1244				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1800	30/ 1835	30/ 2015	30/ 2050				
			RHEIN MAIN	30/ 2130	30/ 2125						

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FLOW PLAN

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYP AIR	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
195	1780 49	C-141	[REDACTED]			28/ 0715	28/ 0911	RETROGRADE AC/EC/AC-130			
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1400	28/ 1747	29/ 1615	28/ 1613	EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 2230	28/ 2205	29/ 0045	29/ 0119				
			CHARLESTON	29/ 1020	29/ 1100	29/ 1235	29/ 1300				
			HURLEBUR	29/ 1350	29/ 1418	29/ 1500	29/ 1700				
			CHARLESTON	29/ 1615	29/ 1820						
196	1780 34	C-141	[REDACTED]			29/ 0615	29/ 0619	RETROGRADE AC/EC/MC-130			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1100	29/ 1051	29/ 1315	29/ 1246	EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1900	29/ 1740	29/ 2145	29/ 2216				
			ANDREW	30/ 0700	30/ 0722	30/ 0915	30/ 0902				
			MACDILL	30/ 1200	30/ 1150	30/ 1615	30/ 1245				
			HURLEBUR	30/ 1645	30/ 1320	30/ 1900	30/ 1530				
			CHARLESTON	30/ 2000	30/ 1628						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
192	1780 82	C-141	[REDACTED]			28/ 1900	28/ 1938	RETROGRADE JCSE			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 0530	29/ 0600	29/ 0745	29/ 0750				
			MAC DILL	29/ 0915	29/ 0900	29/ 1130	29/ 1115				
			CHARLESTON	29/ 1245	29/ 1300						
193	1780 47	C-141	[REDACTED]			28/ 0700	28/ 0646	RETROGRADE EC/AC/IC-130			
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1130	28/ 1126	28/ 1345	28/ 1309	EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	28/ 2000	28/ 1915	28/ 2130	28/ 2122				
			CHARLESTON	29/ 0730	29/ 0722	29/ 0945	29/ 0945				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1100	29/ 1100	29/ 1315	29/ 1340				
			M'GUIRE	29/ 1515	29/ 1538						
194	1780 48	C-141	[REDACTED]			28/ 0915	28/ 0958				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1400	28/ 1434	28/ 1615	28/ 1707				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 2230	28/ 2255	29/ 0045	29/ 0311				
			ANDREWS	29/ 1015	29/ 1210	29/ 1230	29/ 1430				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1315	29/ 1510	29/ 1530	29/ 1715				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1545	29/ 1846	30/ 0900	30/ 0857				
			CHARLESTON	30/ 1030	30/ 1026						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	-ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
190	1780 37	C-141	[REDACTED]			27/ 0615	27/ 0613	RETROGRADE AC/EC/HC-130			
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1100	27/ 1037	28/ 0100	28/ 0110	EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	28/ 0600	28/ 0600	28/ 0815	28/ 0745				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1315	28/ 1250	28/ 1530	28/ 1652				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 2245	28/ 2148	29/ 0130	28/ 2340				
			ANDREWS	29/ 1300	29/ 0915	29/ 1515	29/ 1107				
			HURLBUR	29/ 1700	29/ 1303	29/ 1915	29/ 1546				
			CHARLESTON	29/ 2015	29/ 1653						
191	1780 38	C-141	[REDACTED]			28/ 0730	28/ 0724	RETROGRADE AC/EC/HC-130			
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1845	28/ 1755	28/ 2100	28/ 2150	EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 0200	29/ 0307	29/ 1930	29/ 1700				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 2345	29/ 2255	30/ 0315	30/ 0530				
			CHARLESTON	30/ 1300	30/ 1500	30/ 1515	30/ 1715				
			HURLBUR	30/ 1630	30/ 1820	30/ 1845	30/ 2025				
			CHARLESTON	30/ 2015	30/ 2140						

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FLOW PLAN TOP SECRET

LOAD NR	MAZ MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
162	1062 02	C-141	CHARLESTON			22/ 0745	22/ 0650	RANGERS			
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0745	22/ 0740	22/ 1100	22/ 1100				
			CHARLESTON	22/ 1200	22/ 1155	22/ 1515	22/ 1512				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0045	22/ 0045	22/ 0815	22/ 0359				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0900	22/ 0843	22/ 1115					
163	1065 03	C-141	CHARLESTON			21/ 1845	21/ 1850	MEDICAL			MISSION LOG BACK-UP TO EMPLOYMENT
			[REDACTED]	21/ 2045	21/ 2007	22/ 1445	22/ 1445				
			McGUIRE	22/ 1645	22/ 1623	22/ 1915	22/ 1908				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0345	22/ 0340	22/ 0715	22/ 0703				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 1200	22/ 1149	22/ 1600					
164	1780 23	C-141	[REDACTED]			22/ 0615	22/ 0629	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	22/ 1100	22/ 1050	22/ 1315	22/ 1147				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 1800	22/ 1810						

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FLOW PLAN

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LOAD NR	MISC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
159	1785 60	C-141	[REDACTED]			21/ 1515	21/ 1739	CABLES (2 PALLETS), BATTERIES			
			[REDACTED]	21/ 2000	21/ 2209	21/ 2215	22/ 0015	MULTI VOLTAGE BATTERY CHARGERS (2)			
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0415	22/ 0640			TSC-60, TSC-101 WITH WSC-3			
160	1106 01	C-141	McGUIRE			21/ 1145	21/ 1145	TSC-85 SATCOM			
			[REDACTED]	21/ 2015	21/ 2015	22/ 0115	22/ 0045				MISSION ID CHANGED TO 1780-45
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0600	22/ 0514	22/ 0815	22/ 0625				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 1300	22/ 1415						
161	1065 01	C-141	McGUIRE			21/ 1245	21/ 1245	RANGERS			
			[REDACTED]	21/ 1445	21/ 1453	22/ 0800	22/ 0835				
			McGUIRE	22/ 1000	22/ 1050	22/ 1315	22/ 1415				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 2145	22/ 2247	22/ 0115	22/ 0302				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0600	22/ 0858	22/ 0815	22/ 1042				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 1300	22/ 1530						

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LOAD NR	TRAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
156	1069 02	C-141	CHARLESTON			19/ 2045	19/ 2045				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 2145	19/ 2138	20/ 1500	20/ 1445				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 0045	21/ 0030	21/ 0415	21/ 0355				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 0900	21/ 0824	21/ 1115	21/ 1019				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 1600	21/ 1625						
157	1068 03	C-141	MCGUIRE			20/ 1015	20/ 1015				
			[REDACTED]	20/ 1130	20/ 1140	20/ 1445	20/ 1410				
			MCGUIRE	20/ 1600	20/ 1545	20/ 1915	20/ 1908				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 0345	21/ 0345	21/ 0715	21/ 0708				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 1200	21/ 1142	21/ 1415	21/ 1254				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 1900	21/ 1905						
158	1780 32	C-141	[REDACTED]			21/ 1615	21/ 1635	4 PALLET, CONTROL GEAR, COMMUNICATIONS, BAGGAGE	32		16 PAX FROM [REDACTED]
			[REDACTED]	21/ 2100	21/ 2100	21/ 2315	21/ 2151				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0500	22/ 0400						

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BOARD NR	IMAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
153	1105 01	C-141	MCGUIRE			19/ 0330	19/ 0330	JTF			
			A/NOREWS	19/ 0430	19/ 0435	19/ 0745	19/ 0743				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 1645	19/ 1645	19/ 2000	19/ 1946				
			[REDACTED]	20/ 0045	20/ 0031	20/ 0300	20/ 0315				
			[REDACTED]	20/ 0745	20/ 0800						
154	1780 39	C-141	[REDACTED]			20/ 0515	20/ 0510	PLYWOOD, RATIONS, GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	20/ 1000	20/ 0949	20/ 1215	20/ 1114				
			RAMSTEIN	20/ 1800	20/ 1900						
155	1068 01	C-141	CHARLESTON			19/ 1800	19/ 1801				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 1900	19/ 1858	20/ 1215	20/ 1215				
			[REDACTED]	20/ 2145	20/ 2140	21/ 0115	21/ 0115				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 0600	21/ 0547	21/ 0815	21/ 0700				
			[REDACTED]	21/ 1300	21/ 1305						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
150	1067 04	C-141	CHARLESTON			17/ 2015	17/ 2015		87		
			EGUN	17/ 2130	17/ 2125	18/ 1445	18/ 1350				
			CHARLESTON	18/ 1600	18/ 1412	18/ 1850	18/ 1745				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 0345	19/ 0215	19/ 0715	19/ 0714				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 1200	19/ 1201	19/ 1415	19/ 1409				
[REDACTED]	19/ 2000	19/ 2015									
151	1067 05	C-141	McGUIRE			18/ 1055	18/ 1210	WRSK (9 PALLETS)	3		
			EGUN	18/ 1320	18/ 1430	18/ 1635	18/ 1715				
			McGUIRE	18/ 1900	18/ 1950	18/ 2215	18/ 2245				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 0645	19/ 0700	19/ 1015	19/ 1025				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 1500	19/ 1511	19/ 1715	19/ 1611				
[REDACTED]	19/ 2300	19/ 2210									
152	1780 13	C-130	[REDACTED]			19/ 0615	19/ 0618	RATIONS, BX SUPPLIES, GENERAL			RETURN VIA
			[REDACTED]	19/ 1300	19/ 1333	20/ 0730	20/ 0819	CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	20/ 1630	20/ 2050						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
47	1840 44	C-130	[REDACTED]			25/0730	25/0807	BACKHOE	5		MAPS PERSON BACKHOE OPERA
			[REDACTED]	25/1500	25/1459	26/0730	26/0740				
			[REDACTED]	26/1500	26/1500						
48	1840 43	C-130	[REDACTED]			26/0615	26/0821	200 KW GENERATOR	40		REPLACEMENT SUPPORT PERSON
			[REDACTED]	26/1300	26/1505	26/1515	27/0900				
			[REDACTED]	26/2200	27/1730						
49	1840 46	C-130	[REDACTED]			27/0730	27/0730	200 KW GENERATOR, 60 KW GENERATOR, PLUMBING SUPPLIES	7		REPLACEMENT SUPPORT PERSON
			[REDACTED]	27/1500	27/1432	28/0730	28/0730				
			[REDACTED]	28/1500	28/1500						
50	1840 56	C-141	[REDACTED]			29/0545	29/0548	MAINTENANCE SUPPORT PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT FOR E-3A DEMONSTRATION WITH IAF			
			CIAMPINO, IT	29/0745	29/0800	29/1700	29/1530				
			[REDACTED]	29/1900	29/1755						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
43	1094 03	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/0715	17/0722	R-9 REFUELER (2)			AIRCRAFT NOT FOR HYDRAULIC PUMP. PARTS 1094-02 ETI PARTS + 2 H.
			[REDACTED]	17/1200	17/1200	17/1415	18/1055				
			[REDACTED]	17/1900	18/1543						
44	1094 02	C-141	[REDACTED]			18/0415	18/0418	R-14 FUEL SYSTEM			AIRCRAFT RETN VIA [REDACTED] (N/TIMES) TO EST. GRADE COMPS TO RAMSTEAD
			[REDACTED]	18/0900	18/0900	18/1115	18/1105	MB-2 TUG			
			[REDACTED]	18/1600	18/1545						
45	1840 45	C-141	[REDACTED]			19/0115	19/0108	NF-2 (2), LOX CART (2)	2		
			[REDACTED]	19/0600	19/0550	19/0815	19/0730	WASHING MACHINE, TIRES, SMALL FUEL BLADDERS, REPAIR PARTS			
			[REDACTED]	19/1430	19/1315						
46	1840 42	C-130	[REDACTED]			23/0715	23/0700	BX SUPPLIES, MOVIES, MAIL,			
			[REDACTED]	-	23/1320	-	23/1353	SPARE PARTS			
			[REDACTED]	23/1445	23/1420	24/0730	24/0731				
			[REDACTED]	24/0830	-	24/0930	-				
			[REDACTED]	24/1800	24/1723						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
39	1840 52	C-130	[REDACTED]			11/0300	11/0310	WSC-3 (CAIRO), RATIONS,	15		PAX: REPLACING JCSF PERSONNEL
			[REDACTED]	11/0900	11/1005	11/1115	11/1120	MISCELLANEOUS RESUPPLY			
			[REDACTED]	11/1200	11/1205	12/0730	12/0702				
			[REDACTED]	12/1500	12/1635						
40	1840 48	C-141	[REDACTED]			14/0130	14/0131	REPAIR PARTS, MAIL, FIELD SAFE,	4		MISSION WILL RETURN 57 PAX TO (RAMS) ALSO RETROGR 3 POWER CARTS ACE AIR CONDIT FILTER CAB
			[REDACTED]	14/0615	14/0616	14/0900	14/0901	BX SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	14/1430	14/1500						
41	1840 49	C-141	[REDACTED]			15/0130	15/0405	RUNWAY LIGHTING SYSTEM (ARMOUKH)	8		MISSION WILL RETURN 12 SPARE ENGINE 6 PALLETTS RV
			[REDACTED]	15/0615	15/0855	15/0900	15/1155	M1B-17 GENERATOR, LUMBER			
			[REDACTED]	15/1430	15/1710			EMPTY CONEX, REPAIR PARTS			
42	1094 01	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/0415	17/0452	R-14 REFUEL SYSTEM			
			[REDACTED]	17/0900	17/0935	17/1115	17/1320	M1B-2 TUG			
			[REDACTED]	17/1600	17/1910						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
35	1840 51	C-130	[REDACTED]			9/0215	9/0213	E-3A WRSK, LOX CART, BX	4		PAX: RETURNEE
			[REDACTED]	9/0915	9/0845	10/0630	10/0715	SUPPLIES, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS,			
			ATHENS	10/0930	-	10/1145	-	COMSUMABLES			
			[REDACTED]	10/1745	10/1445						
36	1840 39	C-141	[REDACTED]			10/0300	10/0300	M-151 JEEP (7)			MISSIONS W/ (39-41) RETROGRADE 6 COMMERCIAL VEHICLES: 6 PAX PICK-UP CARRYALL (1) STEVAN (1) VW MINIBUS
			[REDACTED]	10/0800	10/0745	10/1115	10/0913	M-885 PICK-UP (1)			
			[REDACTED]	10/1745	10/1510						
37	1840 40	C-141	[REDACTED]			11/0300	11/0214	M-151 JEEP (1)			
			[REDACTED]	11/0800	11/0700	11/1115	11/0834	M-885 PICK-UP (2)			
			[REDACTED]	11/1745				M-35 2 1/2 TON TRUCK (1)			
38	1840 41	C-141	[REDACTED]			12/0300	12/0319	M-151 JEEP (1)			
			[REDACTED]	12/0800	12/0804	12/1115	12/1004	M-885 PICK-UP (2)			
			[REDACTED]	12/1745				M-35 2 1/2 TON TRUCK (1)			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	127.4 PAX	REMARKS
32	1840 35	C-130	[REDACTED]			1/0600	1/0610	RATIONS, PAPER PRODUCTS, BX	2		
			[REDACTED]	1/1330	1/1223	1/1545	1/1410	SUPPLIES, LOX CART, MAIL,			
			ATHENS	1/1900	-	2/1115	-	VEHICLE PARTS, STEAM CLEANER			
			[REDACTED]	2/1700	1/2140						
33	1840 37	C-130	[REDACTED]			4/0215	4/0320	RATIONS, MAIL, BX SUPPLIES,	7		PAX: 1 C-12 PI 1 VECTOR CONT TECHNICIAN, E RETURNES
			[REDACTED]	4/0900	4/1308	4/1145	4/1418	VEHICLE PARTS, RECREATION EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	4/1215	4/1005	4/1430	4/1145				
			ATHENS	4/1700	-	5/0915	-				
			[REDACTED]	5/1500	4/2215						
34	1840 38	C-130	[REDACTED]			6/0215	6/0500	RATIONS, REPAIR PARTS, TOW	-		MISSION CREW RESTED AT [REDACTED] AS A RESULT OF AIR ABORT AT RAM
			[REDACTED]	6/0900	6/1140	6/1115	7/0758	BAR, MEDICAL & BX SUPPLIES,			
			[REDACTED]	-	7/0910	-	7/0959	20 TON JACK (2)			
			ATHENS	7/1430	7/1305	7/0645	7/1415				
			[REDACTED]	7/1230	7/1945						

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LINE NO.	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOT WAD	REMARKS
28	1840 30	C-141	[REDACTED]			21/0720	21/0725	6 PAX Pick up TRUCK	-		
			[REDACTED]	21/1220	21/1225	21/1435	21/1355	H-1 HEATER (6)			
			[REDACTED]	21/1935	21/1935			NF-2 LIGHT CART (2)			
29	1840 31	C-141	[REDACTED]			23/0700	23/0640	RATIONS	-		
			[REDACTED]	23/1200	23/1120	23/1415	23/1300	STEP VAN			
			[REDACTED]	23/1915	23/1800						
30	1840 32	C-141	[REDACTED]			27/0700	27/0812	RATIONS, CRYPTO EQUIPMENT	-		
			[REDACTED]	27/1200	27/1300	27/1415	27/1455	LOX CART (2), PORTABLE TACAN,			
			[REDACTED]	27/1915	27/1948			MB-19 GENERATOR, WALK-IN REFRIGERATOR, SUPPLIES			
31	1840 34	C-141	[REDACTED]			29/0130	29/0110	RATIONS, MOVIES, HOUSE	4		2 LEGAL, 1 POS
			[REDACTED]	29/0630	29/0600	29/1015	29/0925	KEEPING SUPPLIES			1 PAYMASTER.
			[REDACTED]	29/1515	29/1420						WILL RETURN SAME PASSPORT

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OTD NI	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOT	REMARKS
25	1840 27	C-141	[REDACTED]			19/0100	19/0135	P-13 FIRE TRUCK	2		
			[REDACTED]	19/0600	19/0610	19/0815	19/0735	E-3A DEMONSTRATION KIT			
			[REDACTED]	19/0915	19/0845	19/1130	19/1415	BX PACKAGE			
			ATHENS	19/1630	19/1630		FOR [REDACTED]: WSC-3 ANTENNA, SUPPLIES FOR AMEMB (FIRST AID KIT, CLASS B MUNITIONS)				
26	1840 28	C-141	[REDACTED]			20/0240	20/0245	FILTER CART	-		
			[REDACTED]	20/0800	20/0745	20/1015	20/0940	HOSE CART			
			[REDACTED]	20/1115	20/1040	20/1330	20/1140	PARTS FOR FUEL PUMP			
			ATHENS	20/1530	20/1340		BX SUPPLIES BASE RADIO PHONES				
27	1840 29	C-141	[REDACTED]			21/0300	21/0258	R-8 REFUELER (2) - 140GAS &	-		
			[REDACTED]	21/0800	21/0742	21/1015	21/0925	DIESEL			
			[REDACTED]	21/1515	21/1505		STEP VAN BULK CARGO				

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DTG NI	MAC MSN	TIPS A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTL	REMARK
21	1840 25	C-141	[REDACTED]			16/2110					
			[REDACTED]	17/2315		17/0240	17/0230				
			[REDACTED]	17/0600	17/0505	17/0815	17/0645				
			[REDACTED]	17/1115	17/1005						
22	1840 23	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/0640	17/0742				
			[REDACTED]	17/1000	17/1045	17/1215	17/1240				
			[REDACTED]	17/1515	17/1550						
23	1840 24	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/0940	17/1115				
			[REDACTED]	17/1300	17/1415	17/1515	17/1550				
			[REDACTED]	17/1815	17/1855						
24	1840 26	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/1900	17/1915	M-880 (3/4 Ton Truck) (2)	28		
			[REDACTED]	17/2215	17/2145	18/0440	18/0630	PERISHABLE RATIONS			
			[REDACTED]	18/0800	18/0955	18/11215	18/1120	GROUNDING ROOS			
			[REDACTED]	18/1715	18/1653			COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (To			
							ESTABLISH [REDACTED]				

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UNIT NO.	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTL	REMARK
19	1840 21	C-141	[REDACTED]			16/0440	16/0557				
			[REDACTED]	16/0800	16/0910	16/1015	16/1045				
			[REDACTED]	16/1315	16/1405						
			[REDACTED]								
(1)	-	E-3A	[REDACTED]			16/0945	16/0945				
			[REDACTED]	16/1245	16/1245						
(2)	-	E-3A	[REDACTED]			16/1015	16/1015				
			[REDACTED]	16/1315	16/1315						
20	1840 22	C-141	[REDACTED]			16/0555	16/0600				
			[REDACTED]	16/0755	16/0800	16/1010	16/1020				
			[REDACTED]	16/1330	16/1310	16/1545	16/1515				
			[REDACTED]	16/1645	16/1545	17/1245	17/1200				
			[REDACTED]	17/1845							

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MISSION TOOK 1  
 MINUTE TEAM TO  
 FIX 1840-18.  
 TOOK OFF 16/16  
 COULD NOT GET C  
 UP. RON [REDACTED]  
 16 DEC.

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ORIG NO	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOT	RE.MARK
16	1840 19	C-141	[REDACTED]			14/0500	14/0500	RAIONS, PORTA JOHNS, SOAP	8		PAX INCLUD. [REDACTED] (2) COMM TECH FOR [REDACTED] (3) CONSTRUCT PERSONNEL F BOS SET-UP
			[REDACTED]	14/0825	14/0725	14/1040	14/1005	TOWELS, COTS, SLEEPING BAGS,			
			[REDACTED]	14/1400	14/1325	14/1640	14/1435	RECREATION EQPMT, MEDICAL			
			[REDACTED]	14/1940	14/1800		SUPPLIES, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS				
17	1840 18	C-141	[REDACTED]			14/1000	14/0940	FIELD SHOWERS, FIELD LATRINES,	-		MISSION WAS DELIVER MB-2 TO [REDACTED] DEVELOPED H LEAK AT [REDACTED] MB-2 DELIVER 1840-20. A CON [REDACTED] 15 DEC. DEPART DECEMBER
			PISA	14/1145	14/1118	14/1400	14/1245	WELDING UNIT, HAND OPERATED			
			[REDACTED]	14/1545	14/1450	14/1945	14/1842	PUMPS, (1) M-35 2 1/2 TON			
			[REDACTED]	14/2300	14/2105	15/0240	15/0230	TRUCK, BATTERIES & BATTERY			
			[REDACTED]	15/0600	15/0545	15/0815	15/0730	CHARGER			
			[REDACTED]	15/0915	15/0820	15/1130	17/0645				
			[REDACTED]	17/0945							
18	1840 20	C-141	[REDACTED]			14/0240	14/0431				DELIVERED MI TO [REDACTED] AND DELIVER [REDACTED] 31 COMM. TECH.
			[REDACTED]	14/0600	14/0715	14/0815	14/0845				
			[REDACTED]	14/0915	14/0930	14/1130	14/1130				
			[REDACTED]	14/1230	14/1230	14/1445	14/1445				
			[REDACTED]	14/1745	14/1727						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK	
11	1840 09	C-141	NORTON			7/0720	7/0700	FILTER CART	34	83	32	2 OFFERS (1) [REDACTED]
			TINKER	7/1005	7/0935	7/1320	7/1247	ACE AIR CONDITIONER				
			LATES	7/2310	7/1940	8/0125	8/0101	MEP IIGA GENERATOR (3)				
			[REDACTED]	8/0625	8/0600							
12	1840 10	C-141	TRAVIS			8/0105	8/0034	FILLER-PLEEDER	4	83	36	
			TINKER	8/0405	8/0341	8/0720	8/0559	BULK CARGO (TOOLS, SPARES,				
			LATES	8/1710	8/1238	8/1925	8/1743	SHOP EQUIPMENT)				
			[REDACTED]	9/0025	8/2735							
13	1840 11	C-141	CHARLESTON			8/0720	8/0702	AUXILLIARY FUEL TRAILER	21	83	56	1 COMM NCO PROCEED TO [REDACTED] FOR OMC SUPP
			TINKER	8/1005	8/0925	8/1320	8/1237	SPARE ENGINE (TF-33)				
			LATES	8/2310	8/1940	9/0125	9/0129	HOSE CART				
			[REDACTED]	9/0625	9/0624			BULK CARGO (MEDICAL & MX SUPPLIES)				
14	1840 12	C-141	CHARLESTON			9/0120	9/0059	BULK CARGO (WRSK, RADAR	4	83	60	
			TINKER	9/0405	9/0340	9/0720	9/0706	TEST EQUIPMENT)				
			LATES	9/1710	9/1355	9/1925	9/1804					
			[REDACTED]	10/0025	9/2320							

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
9	1840 07	C-141	CHARLESTON			5/1200	5/1124	CARRYALL	19	83	0
			HOLLOMAN	5/1600	5/1528	5/1815	5/1745	JEEP			
			TINKER	5/1945	5/1900	5/2200	5/2010	ELECTRIC LOAD BANK (2)			
			BERGSTROM	5/2330	5/2111	6/0145	5/2315	NF-2 LIGHT CART			
			CHARLESTON	6/0315	6/0130	6/0630	6/0604	B-5 STAND			
			LAJES	6/1230	6/1210	7/0400	7/0403				
			[REDACTED]	7/1200	7/1118	7/1415	7/1400				
			[REDACTED]	7/1455	7/1435	7/1710	7/1730				
			ATHENS	7/1910	7/1925						
10	1840 98	C-141	MILDBENHALL			7/2100	7/2218	A-2 WATER TRUCK	0	83	0
			[REDACTED]	8/0025	8/0130	8/0240	8/0306	10K FORKLIFT			
			[REDACTED]	8/0600	8/0615	8/0815	8/0820				
			ATHENS	8/1055	8/1000						

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FLOW PLAN

LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
7	1840 06	C-141	McGUIRE			4/1500	4/1500	NF-2 LIGHT CART (2)	3	27	0
			HOLLOMAN	4/1945	4/1915	4/2300	4/2300	MC-11 HIGH PRESSURE AIR COMP			
			LATES	5/0845	5/0740	6/0830	6/0849	R-9 REFUELER			
			<del>██████████</del>	6/1600	6/1635	6/1815	6/1825	AM 32A-60 GENERATOR (2)			
			ATHENS	6/2015	6/2035			MC 2A LOW PRESSURE AIR COMP			
8	1840 16	C-141	CHARLESTON			6/1100	6/1307	JACC/CP	37	64	0
			LATES	6/1710	6/1920	6/1925	6/2116	LATRINE SERVICE TRUCK			
			<del>██████████</del>	7/0025	7/0234	7/0240	7/0640				
			<del>██████████</del>	7/0600	7/0940	7/0815	7/1115				
			ATHENS	7/1055	7/1345						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX		REMARKS
5	1840 OS	C-141	McGUIRE			3/1500	3/1438	NF-2 LIGHT CART (2)	4	11	0	INCLUDES TOWER OPERATOR
			TINKER	3/1815	3/1800	3/2130	3/2118	B-1 STAND				
			HOLLAMAN	3/2315	3/2315	4/0230	4/0215	R-9 REFUELER				
			McGUIRE		4/0715		4/2330	AGE TOW VEHICLE				
			MILDENHALL		5/0130	6/0045	6/0102	LOX CART				
			[REDACTED]	6/0600	6/0620	6/0815	6/0830					
			ATHENS	6/1030	6/1030							
6	1840 08	C-141	CHARLESTON			5/1700	5/1700	MAC ALCE	13	24	0	
			LATES	5/2230	5/2245	6/0230	6/0240	B-4 STAND				
			[REDACTED]	6/1030	6/1030	6/1245	6/1310	TIRE CHANGE KIT				
			ATHENS	6/1525	6/1550			NF-2 LIGHT (2)				
												ALCE VEHICLE
												JACK - 35 T
												GENERATOR
												START CART

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# FLOW PLAN

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX		REMARK
3	1840 03	C-141	CHARLESTON			2/0230	2/0229	MOBILE TACAN	3	5	0	
			ROBINS	2/0530	2/0330	2/0745	2/0605	UHF CONTROL TOWER RADIO				
			LATES	2/1405	2/1200	3/0500	3/0455	MRC - 107 COMM JEEP				
			<del>██████████</del>	3/1000	3/1015	3/1215	3/1200	10 KW GENERATOR				
			<del>██████████</del>	3/1500	3/1500	3/1715	3/1707					
			ATHENS	3/1915	3/1910							
4	1840 04	C-141	CHARLESTON			2/1715	2/1717	NF-2 LIGHT CART	2	7	0	
			TINKER	2/2015	2/2010	2/2330	2/2354	GASEOUS NITROGEN CART				
			HOVESTEAD	3/0200	3/0225	3/0515	3/0502	B-4 STANDS (2)				
			LATES	3/1245	3/1055	4/0500	4/0525	MB-2 TUG				
			<del>██████████</del>	4/1000	4/1050	4/1215	4/1338	HYDRAULIC JACK MANIFOLD				
			<del>██████████</del>	4/1500	4/1620	4/1715	4/1825	ENGINE TRAILERS (2)				
ATHENS	4/1915	4/2008										

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX		REMARK
1	1840 01	C-141	McGUIRE			30/0730	30/0701	60 KW GENERATOR (2)	0	0	0	
			ROBINS	30/0530	30/0414	30/0745	30/0640	REFRIGERATION UNIT (3)				
			LATES	30/1405	30/1255	1/0500	1/0420	FIELD KITCHEN COMPONENTS				
			[REDACTED]	1/1000	1/0940	1/1215	1/1212	CIVIL ENGINEERING KIT				
			[REDACTED]	1/1500	1/1445	1/1715	1/1915					
			ATHENS	1/1915	1/2120							
2	1840 02	C-141	CHARLESTON			30/1200	30/1149	WATER PURIFICATION SET (2)	2	2	0	
			ROBINS	30/1230	30/1239	30/1430	30/1412	WATER TRAILER 600 gal (2)				
			MAC DILL	30/1545	30/1515	30/1800	30/1840	LOX TRAILER 400 gal				
			CHARLESTON	30/2000	30/1950	1/0130	1/0805	SOAP LAB				
			LATES	1/0845	1/1355	1/1100	1/1603					
			[REDACTED]	1/1600	1/2105	2/1215	2/1211					
			[REDACTED]	2/1500	2/1455	2/1715	2/1617					
			ATHENS	2/1915	2/1820							

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE AIL	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
17	1840 99	C-141	M'GUIRE LATES			5/0815	5/0812	MAC STAGE			
18	1840 15	C-130	POPE TAMPA INTL CHARLESTON			5/2130 5/2330 6/0415	5/2049 6/0245 6/0315	JACC/CP PREPOSITION			
19	1840 17	C-130	LITTLE ROCK TAMPA INTL CHARLESTON			6/1800 6/2115 7/0045	6/1800 6/2330 7/0045	PREPO COMM TO EUCOM			
78	1840 33	C-130	[REDACTED] PISA [REDACTED]			27/1000 27/1315 27/1845		PREPOSITION MATERIAL FOR 1840-34			
79	1840 36	C-141	DOVER TAMPA INTL TRAVIS M'CHORD				30/0945	WSC-3 (FOR [REDACTED])	6		SAINT LAZARUS DEPOSITIONAL DUE TO [REDACTED] VIA CHANNEL

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LOAD NR	MAK MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
80	1700 01	C-141	CHARLESTON				18/1106	JACK/CP			
			TAMPA		18/1211		18/1328				
			CHARLESTON		18/1435						
	1067 06	C-130	LITTLE ROCK			22/0230		C-130 PARTS			
	(ARRL)		POPE	22/0515		22/0630					
			ROBINS	22/0740		22/0840					
			HURBURT	22/0930		22/1145					
			LITTLE ROCK	22/1445							

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LOAD NR	YAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
		C-130	[REDACTED]		24/2100						
		C-130	[REDACTED]		28/2100						
		C-130	EGLIN		29/9						
		C-130	[REDACTED]		Return			[REDACTED] Home			
		C-130	EGLIN		29/?						
		C-130	LANGLEY								
		C-130	LANGLEY								
		C-130	YUMA	30 Apr.				3 pallets (JCSE)	6		
			MACDILL					3 py cargo			
			[REDACTED]					cgo			
			CHESTNUT					3 pax			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
108	1130 02	C-141	CHARLESTON			25/ 1635	25/ 1621	AG-130 AMMUNITION (105,408 20) S. PALLETS			
			HURLEBT	25/ 1745	25/ 1730	25/ 2100	25/ 2013				
			McGUIRE	25/ 2310	25/ 2230	26/ 0225	26/ 0142				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1055	26/ 1000	27/ 0410	27/ 0456				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 0900	27/ 1345	27/ 1115	27/ 1530				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1600	27/ 2110						
109	1130 03	C-141	McGUIRE			25/ 1820	25/ 1819	3000 GAL BLAGGERS (5) PUMPS (10) FILTER SEPARATOR (8) M-274 MULES, SUPPLY PALLET	12		
			HURLEBT	25/ 2045	25/ 2049	25/ 2359	26/ 0109				
			McGUIRE	26/ 0210	—	26/ 0525	—				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1355	26/ 1136	27/ 0710	27/ 0816				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1200	27/ 1300	27/ 1415	27/ 1520				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1900	27/ 2004						
110	1128 01	C-141	McGUIRE			26/ 1820	26/ 1744	500 GAL DONUTS (10) PUMPS (4) M-274 MULES (2) SUPPLY PALLET	12		
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1925	26/ 1844	26/ 2240	27/ 0118				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 0755	27/ 1010	28/ 0110	28/ 0130				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 0600	28/ 0601	28/ 0815	28/ 0816				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1300	28/ 1416						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
104	1191 03	C-141	[REDACTED]			26/ 0130	26/ 0140	M-880 1 1/4 TON TRUCK (4)			
			[REDACTED]	26/ 0600	26/ 0615	26/ 0815	26/ 0830				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1300	26/ 1430						
105	1191 04	C-141	[REDACTED]			26/ 0430	26/ 0815	A-2 WATER TRUCK			
			[REDACTED]	26/ 0900	26/ 1413	26/ 1115	26/ 1631				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1600	26/ 2220						
106	1186 04	C-141	M <sup>C</sup> GUIRE			25/ 0001	25/ 0012	TTC-76 , TTC-77,	10		
			ROBINS	25/ 0150	25/ 0200	25/ 0505	25/ 0418	MB-18 GENERATORS (2)			
			[REDACTED]	25/ 1345	25/ 1335	26/ 0700	26/ 0721				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1200	26/ 1213	26/ 1415	26/ 1432				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1900	26/ 2025						
107	1146 01	C-141	CHARLESTON			25/ 2225	25/ 2211	ALCE - WRSK , MA-1A POWER	26		
			[REDACTED]	26/ 0755	26/ 0720	27/ 0110	27/ 0115	CART, NF-2 (2) B-4 STAND,			
			[REDACTED]	27/ 0600	27/ 0621	27/ 0815	27/ 0813	PORTABLE TACAN (2) CCT			
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1300	27/ 1410						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMA.
102	1186 02	C-141	McGUIRE			23/1800	23/1731	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	2		
			ROBINS	23/1950	23/1920	23/2305	23/2250	TTC 2C SWITCHBOARD, 2MIB-18			
			[REDACTED]	24/0745	24/0825	25/0100	25/0123	GENERATORS, 4 PALLETS EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	25/0600	25/0600	25/0215	25/0815				
			[REDACTED]	25/1400	25/1400						
103	1186 03	C-5	DOVER			21/2300	21/2300	DMSP - 2 TTC-8A	25		
			McCLELLAN	22/0510	22/0438	23/0345	23/0315	SUPPLY VAN, GENERATOR			
			ROBINS	23/0800	23/0713	23/1415	23/1350	TRAILER			
			DOVER	23/1545	23/1535	23/2100	23/2213				
			LAJES	24/0145	-	24/0600	-				
			[REDACTED]	24/1000	24/0635	25/0415	25/0532				
			[REDACTED]	25/1000	25/1000	25/1415	25/1415				
			[REDACTED]	25/2000	25/1950						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMA
100	1186 01	C-141	CHARLESTON			22/ 1800	22/ 1755	2 VANS WITH TRAILERS, TAC	10		
			ROBINS	22/ 1850	22/ 1835	22/ 2205	22/ 2200	WEATHER ANALYSIS CENTER			
			[REDACTED]	23/ 0645	23/ 0750	24/ 0115	24/ 0115	25 K LOADER			
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0145	24/ 0200	24/ 0415	24/ 0411				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0900	24/ 0900	24/ 1115	24/ 1145				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1700	24/ 1745						
101	1129 01	C-141	CHARLESTON			23/ 0645	23/ 0649	ICSE COMMUNICATIONS	24		Drop 6 PA (ATHENS)
			MACDILL	23/ 0755	23/ 0745	23/ 1110	23/ 1109	EQUIPMENT (7 PALLETS - 2 TO			
			ANDREWS	23/ 1310	23/ 1315	23/ 1625	23/ 1624	ATHENS)			
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0025	24/ 0100	24/ 0340	24/ 0353				
			ATHENS	24/ 0625	24/ 0634	24/ 0925	24/ 0940				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1200	24/ 1212	24/ 1415	24/ 1422				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 2000	24/ 2035						

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LOAD NR	MIAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL MAX	REMARKS
97	1730 32	C-130	[REDACTED]			23/ 0900	23/ 1000	MIC-130 REPAIR PARTS			
			[REDACTED]	23/ 1345	23/ 1615	23/ 0845	23/ 0907	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	23/ 1630	-						
			SEMPACH	-	23/ 1715						
98	1730 40	C-141	[REDACTED]			23/ 0700	23/ 0915		82		ROTATION PERSONNEL
			[REDACTED]	23/ 1200	23/ 1200	23/ 1415	23/ 1815				
			[REDACTED]	23/ 2030	24/ 0030						
99	1730 41	C-141	[REDACTED]			24/ 0245	24/ 0253	MIC-130 REPAIR PARTS	35		ROTATION PERSONNEL
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0730	24/ 0740	24/ 1045	24/ 1044	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1115	24/ 1132	24/ 1230	24/ 1425				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1700	24/ 1900						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TIPS A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL MAX	REMA
93	1730 31	C-132	[REDACTED]			17/0915	17/0915	E-3A GEAR ACTUATOR, RATIONS			
			[REDACTED]	19/0900	19/0910	19/0730	19/0910	M-818 10 TON TRACTOR			
			[REDACTED]	20/1730	20/1730						
94	1730 30	C-141	[REDACTED]			21/0600	21/0835	25 FT. TRAILER, COMMISSARY	6		
			[REDACTED]	21/1100	21/1320	21/1415	21/1516	REFRIGERATORS (3), MISCELLANEOUS			
			[REDACTED]	21/1945	21/2115			GENERAL CARGO			
95	1191 01	C-141	[REDACTED]			22/0130	22/0130	M-880 1 1/4 TON TRUCK			
			[REDACTED]	22/0600	22/0615	22/0815	22/0902	A-2 WATER TRUCK			
			[REDACTED]	22/1400	22/1430						
96	1191 02	C-141	[REDACTED]			22/0430	22/0522	M-880 1 1/4 TON TRUCK (4)			
			[REDACTED]	22/1000	22/1006	22/1315	22/1315	M-B-485 DEMINERALIZING			
			[REDACTED]	22/1900	22/1910			SYSTEM			

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NO	TIME	TYPE	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
187	1780 30	C-130	[REDACTED]			25/ 2215	25/ 2215	[REDACTED]			
			[REDACTED]	25/ 2330	25/ 2315	26/ 0115	24/ 0020	A			
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0230	24/ 0115						
188	1780 26	C-141	[REDACTED]			26/ 0400	24/ 1615	RETROGRADE [REDACTED]	8		Also SAAP 1085-01
			[REDACTED]	26/ 0945	24/ 2100	26/ 2130	24/ 2215				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 0115	27/ 0305	27/ 0330	27/ 0415				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1230	27/ 1231	27/ 1445	27/ 1410				
			McGUIRE	27/ 1615	27/ 1520						
189	1780 36	C-141	[REDACTED]			27/ 0215	27/ 0206				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 0700	27/ 0631	27/ 0930	27/ 0855				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1530	27/ 1450	27/ 1745	27/ 2205				
			ANDREW	28/ 0345	28/ 0700	28/ 0600	28/ 0905				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 0700	28/ 1000	28/ 0915	28/ 1110				
			CHARLESTON	28/ 1015	28/ 1215						

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ESD NO NR	NRK NR	TIPS R/C	STATION	ETD	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
183	1105 02	C-141	[REDACTED]			26/ 0700	26/ 0855	JTF / Helo Crews			JTF PAX / CG TO PENTAGON HELO CREWS QUANTICO USMC HELO
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1445	26/ 1505	26/ 1400	26/ 1638				
			ANDREWS	27/ 0230	27/ 0210	27/ 0445	27/ 0350				
			CHARLESTON	27/ 0615	27/ 0500						
184	1105 03	C-141	[REDACTED]			26/ 1430	26/ 1554	JTF			
			[REDACTED]	26/ 2030	26/ 2210	26/ 2245	26/ 2250				
			ANDREWS	27/ 0830	27/ 0915	27/ 1045	27/ 1000				
			CHARLESTON	27/ 1215	27/ 1105						
185	1780 19	C-130	[REDACTED]			26/ 0315	26/ 0306	RESUPPLY			
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1000	26/ 0929	27/ 0730	27/ 1237				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1500	27/ 2120						
186	1780 65	C-141	[REDACTED]			24/ 0700	24/ 0655	BASE OPERATING SUPPORT			MISSION REC AS 1068/1065
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1145	24/ 1145	—	—	MISCELLANEOUS CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	—	—	—	—				

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LOG ID NR	MISC NR	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
179	1065 05	C-141	[REDACTED]			25/ 1130	25/ 1208	RANGERS ]			
			[REDACTED]	25/ 1300	25/ 1845	25/ 2015	25/ 2022				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 0700	26/ 0635	26/ 0850	26/ 0730				
			CHARLESTON	26/ 0920	26/ 0800						
180	1065 06	C-141	[REDACTED]			25/ 1300	25/ 1411	[REDACTED]			
			[REDACTED]	25/ 2040	25/ 2030	25/ 2255	25/ 2245				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 0955	26/ 0955	26/ 1210	26/ 1110				
			CHARLESTON	26/ 1240	26/ 1140						
181	1068 04	C-141	[REDACTED]			25/ 1200	25/ 1318	[REDACTED]			C-130 TO [REDACTED]
			[REDACTED]	25/ 1943	25/ 1945	25/ 2200	25/ 2134				
			LANGLEY	26/ 0645	26/ 0700	26/ 0900	26/ 0745				
			McGUIRE	26/ 1000	26/ 0905						
182	1068 05	C-141	[REDACTED]			25/ 1205	25/ 1349	[REDACTED]			C-136 TO [REDACTED]
			RAMSTEIN	25/ 2025	25/ 2025	25/ 2240	25/ 2255				
			LANGLEY	26/ 0955	26/ 0951	26/ 1210					
			McGUIRE	26/ 1310							

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE AIR	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
1	AE 1015	C-9	[REDACTED]	25/ 0220	25/ 0220	25/ 0200	25/ 0159	5 CASUALTIES, 3 AMBULATORY,	6		[REDACTED]
			[REDACTED]	25/ 0845	25/ 0811	25/ 0435	25/ 0407	2 LITTER			
			[REDACTED]	25/ 1606	25/ 1635	25/ 1000	25/ 1049				
			[REDACTED]								
2	1105 04	C-141	[REDACTED]	26/ 1330	26/ 1405	26/ 0500	26/ 0443	5 CASUALTIES, 3 AMBULATORY,	5		VIA SCOTT & CHAI
			McGuire	26/ 1900	26/ 1927	26/ 1545	26/ 1547	2 LITTER			
			Kelly	26/ 0100		26/ 2115					
			McGuire								

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE AIR	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
174	CHANNEL W3	C-141	DOVER			23/ 0500					PRIME AIRCRA
			[REDACTED]	23/ 1330		24/ 0900					
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1610							
175	CHANNEL 721	C-141	DOVER			23/ 0900					PRIME AIRCRA
			[REDACTED]	23/ 1730		24/ 1400					
			[REDACTED]	24/ 2110							
176	1040 01	C-141	[REDACTED]								
			[REDACTED]	25/ 0230			25/ 0330				
			[REDACTED]		25/ 0752						
177	1045 01	C-141	[REDACTED]								
			[REDACTED]	25/ 0240			25/ 0335				
			[REDACTED]		25/ 0814						
178	1780 35	C-141	[REDACTED]			25/ 0500	25/ 0020				
			[REDACTED]	25/ 0945	25/ 0505						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPG A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
171	1780 33	C-141	[REDACTED]			23/ 2030	23/ 2145	3 J-57 ENGINE (KC-135)			
			MILDENHALL	23/ 2315	23/ 2305	24/ 0130	24/ 0124				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0715		24/ 0930					
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1415							
172	1780 15	C-130	[REDACTED]			24/ 0615	24/ 0607				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1300	24/ 1312	28/ 0730	28/ 0748				BASIC-UP C-130
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1500	28/ 1640						
173	1780 63	C-141	[REDACTED]			24/ 1315		RESUPPLY, BASE SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1800		24/ 2015					
			[REDACTED]	25/ 0100							

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
168	1780 61	C-141	[REDACTED]			23/ 0615	23/ 0619	BACKHOE, RATIONS, OIL			RECYCLED TO DEPLOYMENT
			[REDACTED]	23/ 1100	23/ 1105	24/ 0615	24/ 0615	R-25 PUMPS (2)			
	1107 02		[REDACTED]	24/ 1115	24/ 1105	24/ 1330	24/ 1308				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1830	24/ 1815						
169	1780 64	C-141	[REDACTED]			23/ 1630	23/ 1638	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	23/ 2115	23/ 2119	23/ 2330	23/ 2352				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0415	24/ 0431						
170	1780 46	C-141	[REDACTED]			23/ 2045	23/ 2048	FLARES, FLARE RACKS, C-130 NAV TAPES	3		PAX: 2 PHOTO INTER COL GEORGE. BACKUP TO UIC 730 #1107-02
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0130	24/ 0124						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL	REMARKS
165	1780 14	C-130	[REDACTED]			22/ 1915	22/ 0015				
			[REDACTED]	23/ 0200	22/ 0750	23/ 2200	23/ 0115				TIMES ACCELERATED PER JTF DIRECT
			[REDACTED]	24/ 0600	23/ 0915	24/ 0815	23/ 1130				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 2000	23/ 1830	24/ 0845	23/ 0903				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1600	27/ 1810						
166	1780 62	C-141	[REDACTED]			22/ 2015	22/ 2133	RATIONS, M3-15 GENERATOR			
			[REDACTED]	23/ 0215	23/ 0214	23/ 0430	23/ 0357	M-A-3 AIR CONDITONAL			
			[REDACTED]	23/ 0915	23/ 0845						
167	1780 24	C-141	[REDACTED]			23/ 0515	23/ 0510				
			[REDACTED]	23/ 1000	23/ 0951	24/ 0545	24/ 0545				RECYCLED TO DEPLOYMENT
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1045	24/ 1035	24/ 1300	24/ 1240				
			[REDACTED]	24/ 1800	24/ 1730						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
124	1780 03	C-141	[REDACTED]			1/0815	1/0811	E-3A EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	1/1300	1/1520	1/1515	1/1620				
			[REDACTED]	1/2100	1/2205						
125	1780 04	C-141	[REDACTED]			1/0915	2/0743	E-3A EQUIPMENT, WATER			MIX DELAY:
			[REDACTED]	1/1400	2/1213	1/1615	2/1401	TANK REFRIGERATION UNIT			
			[REDACTED]	1/2200	2/1950						
126	1780 06	C-141	[REDACTED]			2/0415	2/0945	E-3A EQUIPMENT, WATER			
			[REDACTED]	2/0900	2/1425	2/1115	2/1702	TRAILER, 40 FOOT TRAILER			
			[REDACTED]	2/1700	2/2310			(ROLLERIZED)			
127	1780 07	C-141	[REDACTED]			2/0715	2/1217	40 FOOT TRAILER (ROLLERIZED)			
			[REDACTED]	2/1200	2/1645	2/1415	2/1856	WATER TANK			
			[REDACTED]	2/2000	3/0055						
128	1780 08	C-141	[REDACTED]			2/0915	3/0132	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			MIX DELAY:
			[REDACTED]	2/1400	3/0550	2/1615	3/0816	R-14 TRAILER, FLATBED TRAILER			RETURN VIA
			[REDACTED]	2/2200	3/1625			<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> HB-485 DETAILED SUPPLIES			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMR.
111	1130 01	C-141	McGUIRE			26/ 1520	26/ 1737	AC/MC-130 MAINTENANCE SUPPORT	2		
			EGLIN	26/ 1745	26/ 1920	26/ 2100	26/ 2313	7 PALLETS (WRSK), LIFTBAR,			
			McGUIRE	26/ 2310	-	27/ 0225	-	TOWBAR			
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1055	27/ 0920	28/ 0410	28/ 0413				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 0900	28/ 0851	28/ 1115	28/ 1300				
			[REDACTED]	-	28/ 1340	-	28/ 1425				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1600	28/ 1846						
112	1130 06	C-141	CHARLESTON			26/ 1935	26/ 1906	AC/MC-130 MAINTENANCE SUPPORT	8		
			EGLIN	26/ 2045	26/ 2037	26/ 2359	26/ 0010	MAINTENANCE PLATFORMS (S)			
			McGUIRE	27/ 0210	-	27/ 0525	-	JACK, FENCING LINES, CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1355	27/ 0935	28/ 0710	28/ 0730	BIN			
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1200	28/ 1208	28/ 1415	28/ 1333				
			[REDACTED]	28/ 1900	28/ 1925						
			[REDACTED]								
113	1730 42	C-141	[REDACTED]			27/ 0915	27/ 1209	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	-	27/ 1435	-	28/ 0755	RATIONS, PX SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	27/ 1400	28/ 1034	27/ 1615	28/ 1218				
			[REDACTED]	27/ 2200	28/ 1810						
			[REDACTED]								

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMA
119	1720 47	C-141	[REDACTED]			30/ 0915	30/ 0918	P-4 FIRETRUCK, P-4 FIRETRUCK			
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1400	30/ 1406	30/ 1615	30/ 1547	FOAM			
			[REDACTED]	30/ 2200	30/ 2200						
120	1730 49	C-141	[REDACTED]			31/ 0415	31/ 0415	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	31/ 0900	31/ 0858	31/ 1115	31/ 1026	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	31/ 1700	31/ 1616						
121	1730 48	C-141	[REDACTED]			31/ 0515	31/ 0532	TRENCHER, FARM TRACTOR, FOAM			
			[REDACTED]	31/ 1000	31/ 1005	31/ 1215	31/ 1210	FOR FIRETRUCKS			
			[REDACTED]	31/ 1800	31/ 1801						
122	1730 39	C-130	[REDACTED]			31/ 0615	31/ 0520	RATIONS, BX SUPPLIES, REPAIR			
			[REDACTED]	31/ 1400	31/ 1400	31/ 0730		PARTS			
			[REDACTED]	31/ 1500							
123	1780 05	C-141	[REDACTED]			31/ 0800	31/ 0757				
			[REDACTED]	31/ 1245	31/ 1405	31/ 1500	31/ 1540				
			[REDACTED]	31/ 2045	31/ 2130						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
114	1730 43	C-141	[REDACTED]			29/ 0215	29/ 0220	RUNWAY SWEEP, COTS, C-RATIONS			
			[REDACTED]	29/ 0700	29/ 0700	29/ 0915	29/ 0831				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1500	29/ 1415						
115	1730 45	C-141	[REDACTED]			29/ 0645	29/ 0655				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1130	29/ 1133	29/ 1315	29/ 1303				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1900	29/ 1815						
116	1730 38	C-130	[REDACTED]			29/ 0615	29/ 0627				
			[REDACTED]	29/ 1300	29/ 1329	30/ 0730	30/ 1730				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1500	31/ 0145						
117	1730 48	C-141	[REDACTED]			30/ 0545	30/ 0549	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1035	30/ 1036	30/ 1245	30/ 1238				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1830	30/ 1830						
118	1730 44	C-141	[REDACTED]			30/ 0815	30/ 0824	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	30/ 1300	30/ 1306	30/ 1515	30/ 1419				
			[REDACTED]	30/ 2100	30/ 2100						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TIPS A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
148	1067 02	C-141	McGUIRE			17/ 1135	17/ 1158	TIRES, FENCING LINES, JACK	3		
			EGUN	17/ 1420	17/ 1415	17/ 1735	17/ 1740	MAINTENANCE STANDS (S), AIRL			
			McGUIRE	17/ 2000	17/ 1945	17/ 2315	17/ 2315	COMPRESSION			
			[REDACTED]	18/ 0755	18/ 0745	17/ 0115	17/ 0124				
			[REDACTED]	17/ 0650	17/ 0650	17/ 0815	17/ 0739				
[REDACTED]	17/ 1400	17/ 1325									
149	1067 03	C-141	McGUIRE			17/ 1455	17/ 1500	WRSK (6 PALLET)	36		
			EGUN	17/ 1720	17/ 1720	17/ 2035	17/ 2015				
			McGUIRE	17/ 2300	18/ 2250	18/ 0215	18/ 0215				
			[REDACTED]	18/ 1045	18/ 1045	19/ 0415	19/ 0414				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 0900	19/ 0851	19/ 1115	19/ 1112				
[REDACTED]	19/ 1700	19/ 1711									

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LINE NO.	TRK INSTR	TYPE #/K	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL WTS	REMARKS
146	1780 12	C-130	EGLIN MAIN			17/ 1630	17/ 1625	10 K FODGLIST, G.P. TENTS (10)			
			[REDACTED]	17/ 1715	17/ 1708	17/ 2130	17/ 2114	LATRINE SUPPLIES, TRASH CANS			
			[REDACTED]	18/ 0415	18/ 0415	18/ 2200	18/ 2150	UTENSILS			
			[REDACTED]	19/ 0600	19/ 0525	19/ 0815	19/ 0810				
			[REDACTED]	19/ 1700	19/ 1545	21/ 2130	22/ 2200				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 0600	22/ 0515	22/ 0815	22/ 0730				
			[REDACTED]	22/ 2000	22/ 1510	26/ 0900	26/ 0843				
			[REDACTED]	26/ 1800	26/ 1810						
147	1067 01	C-141	McGUIRE			16/ 1810	16/ 1804	BUMPS LIFT, GENERATOR, TIRE DOLLY,	23		
			EGLIN	16/ 2035	16/ 2018	16/ 2350	16/ 2340	COMPRESSOR (2), INF-2 TOWBAR			
			McGUIRE	17/ 0215	17/ 0215	17/ 0515	17/ 0500				
			[REDACTED]	17/ 1345	17/ 1320	18/ 0715	18/ 0727				
			[REDACTED]	18/ 1200	18/ 1220	18/ 1415	18/ 1351				
			[REDACTED]	18/ 2000	18/ 2000						

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LINE NO	TIME PERIOD	TYPE AIR	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS	
144	1103 21	C-141	CHARLESTON			16/ 0200	16/ 0155	JOSE, MAX, ALICE, JTF ADVON				JOSE TO IN MARK
			MAC DILL	16/ 0335	16/ 0300	16/ 0650	16/ 0545					
			CHARLESTON	16/ 0830	16/ 0700	16/ 1145	16/ 1145					
			ANDREWS	16/ 1300	16/ 1235	16/ 1615	16/ 1600					
			[REDACTED]	17/ 0045	17/ 0030	17/ 0415	17/ 0415					
			ATHENS	17/ 0730	17/ 0736	17/ 0945	17/ 0948					
			[REDACTED]	17/ 1200	17/ 1204	17/ 1415	17/ 1422					
			RAMSTEIN	17/ 2000	17/ 2020							
145	1780 31	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/ 0515	17/ 0521	WSC-3	3		WSC-3 De on 1780-1 MASIRAH	
			[REDACTED]	17/ 1000	17/ 1008	17/ 1215	17/ 1220	E-3A EXTRACTION SUPPORT				
			[REDACTED]	17/ 1800	17/ 1724							

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAK	TOTAL PAK	REMARKS
141	1810 02	C-5	DOVER			13/ 0345	13/ 0350	AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT	8		
			HULLMAN	13/ 0745	13/ 0800	13/ 1400	13/ 1215	AIR CONDITIONERS, GENERATORS,			
			DOVER	13/ 1800	13/ 1620	14/ 0015	13/ 2250	DISTRIBUTION CENTRES, CABLES			
			RHEIN MAIN	14/ 0845	14/ 0710	15/ 0300	14/ 0307				
			[REDACTED]	15/ 0800	15/ 0802	15/ 1115	15/ 1118				
			RHEIN MAIN	13/ 1600	13/ 1710						
142	1810 03	C-5	DOVER			13/ 1000	13/ 0959	AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT			14Y DELAY RHEIN MA
			HULLMAN	13/ 1400	13/ 1403	13/ 2015	13/ 1815	12 HARVEST BARE 12 MAN			
			DOVER	14/ 0015	13/ 2230	14/ 0630	14/ 0630	SHelters WITH AIR CONDITIONING			
			RHEIN MAIN	14/ 1415	14/ 1415	15/ 0800	15/ 1146				
			[REDACTED]	15/ 1300	15/ 1633	15/ 1615	15/ 1935				
			RHEIN MAIN	15/ 2100	16/ 0115						
143	1780 11	C-130	RHEIN MAIN			15/ 0630	15/ 0708	RATIONS, BX SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	15/ 1400	15/ 1411	14/ 0630	14/ 0721	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	16/ 1400	14/ 1545						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
138	1780 22	C-141	[REDACTED]			11/0715	11/0731	RATIONS, MISCELLANEOUS, GENERAL			
			[REDACTED]	11/1200	11/1209	11/1415	11/1438	CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	11/2200	11/2020						
139	1780 25	C-141	[REDACTED]			14/0715	14/0731	E-3A RETROGRADE SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	14/1200	14/1157	14/1415	14/1348				
			[REDACTED]	14/1500	14/1435	14/1715	14/1650				
			[REDACTED]	14/2115	14/2055						
140	1810 01	C-141	CHARLESTON			13/1130	13/1128				
			[REDACTED]	13/1230	13/1220	13/1545	13/1545	[REDACTED]			
			MCGUIRE	13/1745	-	13/2100	-	[REDACTED]			
			RHEIN MAIN	14/0515	14/0120	14/2300	14/2310				
			[REDACTED]	15/0400	15/0358	15/0615	15/0638				
			RHEIN MAIN	15/1100	15/1240						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
134	1780 16	C-130	[REDACTED]			7/0645	7/0656	LOX CART, E-3A & KC-135 PARTS			RETURN VIA A-10 AVIANO
			[REDACTED]	7/1300	7/1304	7/0730	8/0735	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	8/1500	8/2015						
135	1780 29	C-5	[REDACTED]			8/0515	8/0557	4 M-131 FUEL TRAILERS,			RETURN VIA AVIANO
			[REDACTED]	8/1000	8/1010	8/1415	8/1415	M1B-2 TUG, LOX CART			
			[REDACTED]	8/2200	8/2205						
136	1780 30	C-5	[REDACTED]			9/0515	9/0513	2 M-52 5 TON TRACTORS,			
			AVIANO	9/0630	9/0622	9/1045	9/1010	2 M-818 10 TON TRACTORS,			
			[REDACTED]	9/1400	9/1408	9/1715	9/1657	29 PAX BUS			
			[REDACTED]	9/2300	9/2250						
137	1780 17	C-130	[REDACTED]			9/0545	9/0556	PORTABLE SCALES, MISCELLANEOUS			
			[REDACTED]	9/1300	9/1300	10/0730	10/0739	GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	10/1500	10/1750						

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LOAD NR	MAC MCH	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
89	1730 29	C-130	[REDACTED]			14/0615	14/0615	RATIONS, MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL	26		REPLACE PERSONNEL
			[REDACTED]	14/1200	14/1302	15/0730	15/0645	CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	15/1630	15/1430						
90	1730 33	C-141	[REDACTED]			16/0215	16/0202	E-3A SUPPORT, EMPLY CONEX(2)	12		RETROGRADE PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT
			[REDACTED]	16/0700	16/0700	16/0915	16/0950				
			[REDACTED]	16/1500	16/1535						
91	1730 34	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/0245	17/0235	BACKHOE			RETROGRADE PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT
			[REDACTED]	17/0730	17/0700	17/0915	17/0917				
			[REDACTED]	17/1500	17/1505						
92	1730 35	C-141	[REDACTED]			17/0445	17/0426	1500 GAL BLADDERS (2), MD-18	3		RETROGRADE PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT
			[REDACTED]	17/1230	17/1205	17/1500	17/1500	30 KW GENERATOR (2), MP2-17			
			[REDACTED]	17/2100	17/2055			50 KW GENERATOR, REEFER KITS (2)			
								BATH UNIT			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPES A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMA
85	1730 27	C-141	[REDACTED]			05/0615	05/0702	A-2 WATER TRUCK MISCELLANEOUS			
			[REDACTED]	05/1300	05/1426	05/1515	05/1630	GENERAL CARGO			RETROGRADE A-2 WATER T
			[REDACTED]	05/2000	05/2115						
			[REDACTED]								
86	1730 22	C-130	[REDACTED]			07/0615	07/0850	RATIONS, MAIL, BX SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	07/1300	07/1540	08/0730	08/0725	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	08/1500	08/1430						
			[REDACTED]								
87	1730 23	C-130	[REDACTED]			10/0615	10/0628	LOXCART, E-3A WRSK,			
			[REDACTED]	10/1300	10/1412	11/0730	11/0730	GENERATORS (2), MISCELLANEOUS			
			[REDACTED]	11/1500	11/1428			GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]								
88	1730 28	C-130	[REDACTED]			15/0930	15/0855	LOX CART, BX SUPPLIES LUMBER			ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 12 MARCH
			[REDACTED]	15/1215	15/1155	15/1345	15/1342	MEDICAL SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	15/1430	15/1430	15/1615	15/1615				
			[REDACTED]	15/2030	15/2025	16/1200	15/2230				
			[REDACTED]	16/1630	16/0010						
			[REDACTED]								

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
81	1730 21	C-130	[REDACTED]			03/0615	03/0615	VASI LIGHTS, CABLES	4		
			[REDACTED]	03/1800	03/1315	04/0730	04/0730	TRANSFORMERS, MISCELLANEOUS			
			[REDACTED]	04/1600	04/1505			GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]								
82	1730 24	C-141	[REDACTED]			03/0615	03/0709	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	03/1100	03/1204	03/1315	03/1245				
			[REDACTED]	03/1800	03/1735						
			[REDACTED]								
83	1730 25	C-141	[REDACTED]			04/0315	04/0320	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	04/0800	04/0800	04/1015	04/1005				
			[REDACTED]	04/1500	04/1458						
			[REDACTED]								
84	1730 26	C-141	[REDACTED]			04/0815	04/0843	E-3A SUPPORT			
			[REDACTED]	04/1300	04/1321	04/1515	04/1515				
			[REDACTED]	04/2000	04/2010						
			[REDACTED]								

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
75	1730 15	C-130	[REDACTED]			25/0615	25/0704	LOX CART, MAIL, WATER PUMPS,			
			[REDACTED]	25/1300	25/1259	25/0730	25/0730	MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES & EQUIP-			
			[REDACTED]	26/1600	26/1510			MENT.			
76	1730 16	C-130	[REDACTED]			27/0615	27/0612	RATIONS, CHARCOAL, TRUCK &	5		
			[REDACTED]	27/1300	27/1317	28/0730	28/0745	JEEP TIRES, MAIL, MOVIES			
			[REDACTED]	28/1600	28/1522						
77	1730 17	C-130	[REDACTED]			29/0615	29/0624	10K FORKLIFT, MISCELLANEOUS	14		
			[REDACTED]	29/1300	29/1458	1/0730	1/0730	GENERAL CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	1/1600	1/1457						
78								SEE CONUS SAAMS			
79								" " "			
80								" " "			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
71	1730 19	C-141	[REDACTED]			19/0315	19/0319	AN/TSC-85 EQUIPMENT (XM 889	3		RETROGRADE E. EQUIPMENT/PER TO CAMISTON
			[REDACTED]	19/0800	19/0800	19/1015	19/1019	TRUCK M-880 TRUCK M-105			
			[REDACTED]	19/1600	19/1605			TRAILER)			
72	1730 20	C-141	[REDACTED]			19/0615	19/0611	AN/TSC-85 EQUIPMENT	10		RETROGRADE E. EQUIPMENT/PER TO CAMISTON
			[REDACTED]	19/1100	19/1107	19/1315	19/1335	(S280 SHETER, M35A2 TRUCK			
			[REDACTED]	19/1915	19/1930			M-105 TRAILER			
73	1730 13	C-130	[REDACTED]			20/0615	20/0518	RATIONS, BX SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	20/1300	20/1300	21/0730	21/0740				
			[REDACTED]	21/1415	21/1530						
74	1730 14	C-130	[REDACTED]			22/0615	23/0748	GENERATORS (3), WATER PUMPS			RETURNED VIA C TO PICK-UP 2
			PIEA	22/0815	-	22/1030	-	(3), 500 GAL BLADDERS (3)			
			[REDACTED]	22/1500	23/1525	23/0730	23/0725	MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES AND			
			[REDACTED]	23/1415	23/1600			EQUIPMENT			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
67	1730 07	C-141	[REDACTED]			11/0615	11/0616	W/S-C-E FOR CAIRO RATIONS			
			[REDACTED]	11/1045	11/1078	11/1215	11/1235				
			[REDACTED]	11/1300	11/1314	11/1515	11/1500				
			[REDACTED]	11/2000	11/1940						
68	1730 10	C-141 <del>C-130</del> CHANGES TO C-141	[REDACTED]			13/0615	14/0815	BX SUPPLIES, PLYWOOD, O <sub>2</sub>			A/C DID NOT OPERATE ON 13 FEB DUE TO CHANGE TO C-141. RETROGRADED TO EDAR FOR ( TO COMUS)
			[REDACTED]	13/1300	14/1250	14/0730	14/1605	BOTTLES, ANIMAL CONTROL SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	14/1445	15/2050						
69	1730 11	C-141	[REDACTED]			15/0815	15/0824	10 K AT FORKLIFT, RATIONS,	28		RETROGRADE 1 REFUELER FOR MAPLE ENGINE OUTFHAUL
			[REDACTED]	15/1300	15/1307	15/1515	15/1500	BX AND MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	15/2000	15/1945						
70	1730 18	C-141	[REDACTED]			18/0515	18/0518	G K FORKLIFT, MAIL			RETROGRADE 6 EQUIPMENT/PG TO RAMSTEIN
			[REDACTED]	18/1130	18/1200	18/1345	18/1455	MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	18/1830	18/2045						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
63	1730 06	C-130	[REDACTED]			6/0700	6/0627	AMBULANCE, MEDICAL SUPPLIES,	8		
			[REDACTED]	6/1400	6/1320	7/0730	7/0729	MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES &			
			[REDACTED]	7/0830	7/0830	7/0930	7/0915	EQUIPMENT			
			[REDACTED]	7/1700	7/1610						
64	1730 08	C-141	RHIN MAIN			7/0815	7/0829	TSC 60 (U-2 & U-3), AE 240-8	11		REPLACEMENT FOR JACC/CP
			[REDACTED]	7/1300	7/1332	7/1515	7/1530	GENERATORS (2)			
			[REDACTED]	7/2000	7/2015						
65	1730 03	C-130	[REDACTED]			8/0415	8/0435	RATIONS, BX SUPPLIES,			
			[REDACTED]	8/1100	8/1258	9/0730	9/0740	MISCELLANEOUS CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	9/1430	9/1500						
66	1730 09	C-141	RHIN MAIN			8/0615	8/0745	TGC 27 VAN, AE 24 U-8	9		REPLACEMENT FOR JACC/CP
			[REDACTED]	8/1100	8/1211	8/1315	8/1411	GENERATOR (2), MISCELLANEOUS			
			[REDACTED]	8/1800	8/1846			CARGO			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	HTD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
59	1730 02	C-130	[REDACTED]			2/0415	2/0400	AMBULANCE*			* AMBULANCE OF (WRONG TYPE ONBOARD) WILL ON 1730-02
			[REDACTED]	2/1100	2/1102	3/0700	3/0715	WATER TRAILER (600 GAL)			
			[REDACTED]	3/1600	3/1426						
60	1730 01	C-130	[REDACTED]			2/0715	2/0705	COTS (3 PALETS)			
			[REDACTED]	2/1400	2/1410	3/0730	3/0748	WATER TRAILER (600 GAL)			
			[REDACTED]	3/1630	3/1455			MISCELLANEOUS CARGO			
61	1730 05	C-141	[REDACTED]			2/0930	2/0737	R-14 Pump UNITS (3)			
			HAIN	2/1030	2/0842	2/1245	2/1408	60 KW GENERATOR			
			[REDACTED]	2/1345	2/1455	3/0615	3/0634				
			[REDACTED]	3/1100	3/1103	3/1315	3/1343				
			[REDACTED]	3/1900	3/2040						
62	1730 04	C-141	[REDACTED]			4/0115	4/0631	R-9 REFUELER			
			[REDACTED]	4/0600	4/1059	4/0815	4/1315	MISCELLANEOUS CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	4/1400	4/1900						

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FLOW PLAN

LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/C	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
55	1840 58	C-141	[REDACTED]			3/0815	1/0811	DIESEL GENERATORS (5)	14		E-3A REVERSE  (VIA SIGONELLA ATA - 1/0815 ATD - 1/0820)
			[REDACTED]	3/1300	1/1315	3/1615	1/1530	FILTER CART, WRSK (2 PALLET)			
			[REDACTED]	3/2300	1/2018						
56	1840 59	C-141	[REDACTED]			1/0115	1/0200	ACE AIR CONDITIONER, E-3A	7		E-3A REVERSE  (VIA SIGONELLA ATA - 1/0120 ATD - 1/0125)
			[REDACTED]	1/0600	1/0732	1/0815	1/1115	ENGINE, NITROGEN CART, E-3A			
			[REDACTED]	1/1500	1/1610			CARGO (4 PALLET)			
57	1840 60	C-141	[REDACTED]			1/0415	1/0540	LOX CART (2) (5000 50 GAL)	6		E-3A REVERSE
			[REDACTED]	1/0900	1/1020	1/1115	1/1212	ACE AIR CONDITIONER, WRSK			
			[REDACTED]	1/1800	1/1600			(1 PALLET), TEST EQUIPMENT (2 PALLET)			
58	1840 62	C-130	[REDACTED]			1/0715	1/0712	RATIONS, RESUPPLY, SPARE PARTS			
			[REDACTED]	1/1400	1/1420	2/0730	2/0735	WATER TRAILER			
			[REDACTED]	2/1630	2/1429						

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARK
47	1840 44	C-130	[REDACTED]			25/0730	25/0807	BACKHOE	5		MAINT PERSONNEL BACKHOE OPS
			[REDACTED]	25/1500	25/1459	26/0730	26/0740				
			[REDACTED]	26/1500	26/1500						
48	1840 43	C-130	[REDACTED]			26/0615	26/0821	200 KW GENERATOR	40		REPLACEMENT SUPPORT PERSONNEL
			[REDACTED]	26/1300	26/1505	26/1515	27/0900				
			[REDACTED]	26/2200	27/1730						
49	1840 46	C-130	[REDACTED]			27/0730	27/0730	200 KW GENERATOR, 60 KW	7		REPLACEMENT SUPPORT PERSONNEL
			[REDACTED]	27/1500	27/1432	28/0730	28/0730	GENERATOR, PLUMBING SUPPLIES			
			[REDACTED]	28/1500	28/1500						
50	1840 56	C-141	[REDACTED]			29/0545	29/0548	MAINTENANCE SUPPORT			
			CIAMPINO, IT	29/0745	29/0800	29/1700	29/1530	PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT FOR			
			[REDACTED]	29/1900	29/1755			E-3A DEMONSTRATION WITH IAF			

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LOAD NR	MAC MSN	TYPE A/L	STATION	ETA	ATA	ETD	ATD	CARGO	PAX	TOTAL PAX	REMARKS
51	1840 50	C-130	[REDACTED]			29/0415	29/0418	MOBILE DRILLING RIG	3		PAX: PAVEMENT EVALUATION
			[REDACTED]	29/1100	29/1132	30/0715	29/1255				
			[REDACTED]	-	29/1751	-	30/0900				
			[REDACTED]	30/1400	30/1330						
52	1840 55	C-130	[REDACTED]			29/0815	29/0719	MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	2		
			[REDACTED]	29/1400	29/1400	30/0730	29/0730				
			PISA	-	30/1200	-	30/1345				
			[REDACTED]	30/1415	30/1550						
53	1840 57	C-130	PISA			31/0600	31/0530	REFRIGERATOR UNITS (2) GENERATORS (3) MISCELLANEOUS CARGO			
			[REDACTED]	31/1000	31/1125	31/1215	31/1305				
			[REDACTED]	31/1645	31/1730						
54	1840 61	C-130	[REDACTED]			31/0515	31/0519	RATIONS, BX GOODS, HOT WATER HEATER, MISCELLANEOUS CARGO	3		
			[REDACTED]	31/1200	31/1200	31/1300	31/1417				
			[REDACTED]	31/1400	31/1500	1/0730	1/0725				
			[REDACTED]	1/1630	1/1440						

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